Is Central Asia Stable?
The Central Asia - Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) recently hosted a webinar titled "Is Central Asia Stable?" The discussion explored regional stability in Central Asia.
The panel featured Dr. Svante Cornell, Director of AFPC's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute; Dr. Nargis Kassenova, Director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center; and Dr. Jacob Zenn, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University. The panel was moderated by Ms. Laura Linderman, Director of Programs, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, AFPC.
Watch the full discussion below or on YouTube.
2022 Unrest
As Dr. Cornell explained, the episodes of violence in Central Asia during 2022 served as a reminder that the region remained vulnerable to internal and external forces that could have devastating effects. As detailed in his paper, these incidents included the January riots in Kazakhstan that spread from the west to Almaty; Tajikistan's May crackdown in Khorog, the capital of the Gorno-Badakshan autonomous region; July protests in Uzbekistan's Karakalpakstan region; and the September flare-up of border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Similar levels of violence had not been seen in Central Asia since 2022, raising the question of whether these instances were isolated remnants of COVID-induced unrest or indicators of larger regional instability. Despite these examples, Dr. Cornell noted that other forms of violence had not been apparent in Central Asia, such as large interstate conflicts, foreign-sponsored separatism, military coups, and Islamic militancy.
External Influences
Dr. Cornell discussed the negative effects of Russia's malign influence in fomenting instability in Central Asia. Dr. Kassenova contrasted this with China's role as a stabilizing force in the region, noting that China acted more predictably and with a longer strategic horizon than Russia. Due to its geographic position, China had a self-interest in promoting security cooperation, as Central Asia bordered Xinjiang, and in fostering regional connectivity to facilitate trade. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's endorsement of regional sovereignty became even more important. At the same time, anti-China sentiment among Central Asian populations limited China's reach in regional politics. Dr. Kassenova also noted that Central Asia found itself caught between U.S.-China rivalry, attempting to benefit from partnerships with both states while maintaining non-aligned status. Dr. Zenn asserted that the greatest threats from armed groups stemmed from ISIS Khorasan and Syria, although these threats remained moderate.
Economic and Institutional Vulnerabilities
Dr. Cornell highlighted institutional factors that created regional instability, including how security forces had contributed to episodes of violence. He also discussed the persistent nature of Soviet-era institutions, which created obstacles for reform attempts. These reforms—most notably in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—sought to make state institutions more effective and accountable to the population, offering genuine hope for improvement. Dr. Kassenova highlighted a gap between reform visions and successful implementation, while noting regional cooperation between Tashkent and Astana and expressing hope for further institutionalization and identity-building to solidify regional stability.
Based on the AFPC webinar featuring Laura Linderman, Director of Programs at Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, AFPC; Nargis Kassenova, Director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center, Harvard University; Jacob Zenn, Adjunct associate professor at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University; and Svante Cornell, Director of Research and Publications at AFPC's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.
Webinar: Economic Outlook for Central Asia and the Caucasus
The American Foreign Policy Council's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute recently hosted a webinar on the region's economic outlook. Dr. Subir Lall from the IMF's Middle East and Central Asia Department and Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli from AFPC discussed economic forecasts for this resource-rich region, home to some of the world's fastest-growing economies. The webinar examined whether Central Asia and the Caucasus can sustain their recent robust growth and what steps countries can take to maintain it.
Watch the full discussion below or on YouTube.
Current Economic Situation
In 2024, Central Asia and the Caucasus experienced stronger levels of growth than predicted. However, inflation remains above central bank targets in several countries, highlighting persistent price pressures. Inflation is most pronounced in Kazakhstan, where levels are expected to remain significantly higher than forecasted this year, and is most constrained among the region’s oil importers. Inflation levels are projected to gradually decline across the region.
Global Trade Tensions and External Spillovers
Dr. Lall described how global shifts, including U.S. tariffs, can indirectly affect the region. While Central Asia and the Caucasus have limited direct U.S. trade, external spillovers could include weaker demand, volatile commodity prices, and increased uncertainty in trading relationships. Effects vary by country, with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan depending on remittances, while Georgia and Armenia face higher exposure to travel and tourism impacts.
Overall, risks for the region tilt downward. Trade tensions and global political concerns reduce external demand while increasing commodity price volatility. Regional uncertainties compound these issues by reducing confidence and slowing reform momentum. However, the region could benefit from trade diversion and faster reforms.
Economic Forecast for the Future
The current growth momentum offers states a "critical opportunity" – what Dr. Lall calls the "most historic moment since the fall of the Soviet Union" – to strengthen policy frameworks and entrench market-based reforms for sustained regional growth.
As countries navigate global uncertainties, structural reforms aligned with international standards would unlock new productivity and competitiveness. Total factor productivity, once a key regional driver, has stalled recently. Private sector privatization and growth reforms are essential to reverse this slowdown. With current reforms, Dr. Lall believes the region can avoid a low-productivity trap. External reforms would boost competitiveness, while reinforcing monetary frameworks and strengthening reserves remain imperative.
Webinar Recap for Layers of Cooperation: The Future of Central Asian Regional Integration
The American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asian-Caucasus Institute recently hosted a webinar covering the development of intra-regional cooperation in Central Asia. The event featured two experts: retired Ambassador George Krol, former ambassador to three Central Asian countries and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asian Affairs, and Dr. Svante Cornell, the institute's director and a regional integration expert. Their discussion examined how regional cooperation has evolved in Central Asia, the current state of integration efforts, and future obstacles and opportunities for US engagement.
Watch the full discussion on YouTube.
Historical Overview of Regional Cooperation
Ambassador Krol opened the discussion by reflecting on U.S.–Central Asian relations since the republics gained independence after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. He noted that Washington's foreign policy circles had an early instinct to encourage regional cooperation, but despite cordial rhetoric from Central Asian partners, real progress failed to materialize. The new governments prioritized building domestic institutions and asserting their newly won sovereignty. Dr. Cornell emphasized that despite this focus on sovereignty and the failure of the short-lived Central Asian Union, there remained recognition of the need for cooperation. This was evident in initiatives such as the Aral Sea Fund and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Together, Krol and Cornell's discussion provided a nuanced understanding of the context that led to the creation of the C5+1 format under the Obama administration and the first C5 summit in Astana—notably held without outside powers present.
The Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan Partnership
Cornell and Krol suggested that no relationship within the region is more important for Central Asian integration than the one between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Their relative size and international standing mean these states drive the pace of integration: when aligned, progress advances quickly; when divided, momentum stalls. Yet, shaped by the legacy of forced cooperation under the Soviet Union, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have generally shown restraint in interfering in their neighbors' domestic affairs. Cornell highlighted two key episodes that illustrate their evolving role in regional conflict management. In 2010, amid unrest in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan evacuated the Kyrgyz president, preventing further destabilization, while Uzbekistan notably refrained from intervening despite ethnic ties to the persecuted Uzbek minority. More recently, during clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the Ferghana Valley, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan acted as mediators in trilateral talks, helping to ease tensions. Together, these cases demonstrate how regional leaders are increasingly capable of addressing security crises through their own conflict resolution efforts.
The Changing Geopolitical Landscape
The discussion shifted to C5 and C5+1 relations amid Russia's war in Ukraine and China's growing influence. Cornell noted that the war in Ukraine has heightened Central Asia's awareness of sovereignty and territorial integrity, reinforcing the value of regional cooperation. He also observed that China's expanding economic presence adds both opportunities and dependencies, complicating integration efforts. Krol emphasized that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to play pivotal roles, mediating disputes and advancing coordination, while smaller states exercise caution to protect their sovereignty. In this new geopolitical context, even Turkmenistan has moved away from its historic isolationism, redefining its neutrality to participate more actively in regional initiatives.
Impediments and the Future of External Engagement
Finally, the speakers considered potential limits of integration and opportunities for U.S. engagement. Both Cornell and Krol highlighted that limited people-to-people exchanges, weak educational ties, and varying historical perspectives constrain deeper integration. These factors illustrate both the progress made and the challenges that remain in fostering a shared Central Asian identity. They agreed that practical issues such as location, budget, staffing, and bureaucratic capacity must be considered for regionalism to endure. While presidential-level commitments are important, long-term success depends on cooperation among government ministries and agencies at lower levels. Both speakers stressed that a more integrated region will ultimately be more prosperous and resilient. Even if sometimes more resistant to U.S. influence, it will ultimately be in American interests to promote a more stable Eurasia.
Gone but Not Forgotten: The Central Asian Union, 1990–2005
By Sanat Kushkumbayev
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Silk Road Paper
June 2025
Executive Summary
The post-Soviet landscape of Central Asia, characterized by an intricate web of cultural ties, shared histories, and political ambitions, presents a unique case of regional integration that has both fascinated and perplexed international observers. From 1991 to 2005, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan worked assiduously to develop regional cooperation, an effort that had to contend with conflicting national interests and external geopolitical pressures.
The early years following the Soviet dissolution ushered in a moment of hope for a “Golden Age” of integration. Between 1992 and 1998, regional leaders embarked on ambitious initiatives aimed at constructing a new order that would facilitate collaboration and mutual development. However, as idealism gave way to pragmatism, the stark realities of internal and external challenges emerged.
From 1998 to 2002, the dynamics within Central Asia became increasingly contentious, with external powers asserting their influence and regional leaders jockeying for position. Despite the opportunities for collaboration, the interplay between national ambitions and external interests led to a dilution of collective efforts and a hesitation to fully commit to regional integration paths.
Still, the accomplishments of Central Asian regionalism were significant, especially coming at a time when the states of the region were focused primarily on the building of national sovereignty. In other words, they always saw the strengthening of sovereignty as entirely compatible with the development of regional cooperation.
The later phase, from 2002 to 2005, witnessed a significant decline in the momentum for regional initiatives against the backdrop of geopolitical shifts and mounting internal crises. The influence of larger powers, particularly Russia, shifted the focus of regional cooperation away from original Central Asian projects, culminating in key initiatives like the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) being subsumed into broader Eurasian frameworks.
This comprehensive analysis underscores the complexity of Central Asia's road to regional integration, highlighting the intricate balance between national aspirations and the overarching influence of external geopolitical factors. It serves as a crucial reflection for policymakers, analysts, and scholars interested in the intersection of regional dynamics and global geopolitics. In particular, as Central Asian states are once again embarked on a quest to deepen and institutionalize their regional cooperation, the lessons of the past attempts to build regional institutions will be valuable to the region’s leaders as well as external supporters of this process.
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Is Central Asia Stable? Conflict Risks and Drivers of Instability
By Svante E. Cornell
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Silk Road Paper
May 2025
Executive Summary
In 2022, violence erupted in four different areas of Central Asia. These episodes of violence were very different from each other, and all were contained within days or weeks. The region has seen little violence since. Yet their occurrence during a single year raised the question whether Central Asia is actually more prone to instability than a cursory overview would suggest.
The episodes of violence in 2022 were varied: one was a conflict over territory between two states, while the other three were internal conflicts, featuring struggles over power and complex center-periphery relations.
In Kazakhstan, demonstrations erupted in January 2022 but were hijacked by forces that sought to implement a coup attempt against the government, making the violence an issue over control over the country’s government. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan both saw violence that featured an element of separatist sentiments and a struggle between center and periphery. In Tajikistan’s Pamiri-populated Gorno-Badakhshan region, the government violently sought to stomp out influential local powerbrokers. In Uzbekistan’s Karakalpakstan republic, a government bid to reduce local autonomy triggered violent protests. In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, inter-state tensions over a contested border triggered the most deadly episode since tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had begun to rise in 2020.
A series of potential factors impact the risk of renewed instability in Central Asia. Internal to the region, these include the economic difficulties the region has experienced in the past decade. In addition, the remarkable resistance to reform that post-Soviet institutions in the region have shown in the past three decades has become increasingly unsustainable in the face of new communication technologies and an emerging post-Soviet generation. Among state institutions, the region’s security services can be identified as the most unreformed and retrograde power centers, and they played influential roles in most of the episodes of violence in the region.
Aggravating these risk factors are the growing disparity between states of the region and the continued malign role of Russian influence, whose array of instruments to undermine stability have only intermittently been deployed across Central Asia.
These risk factors are mitigated by the constructive efforts toward greater regional cooperation in Central Asia, which provide a window into a future where Central Asia is more integrated and able to withstand external pressure, all while internal reform efforts provide greater opportunities for economic development and accountable government.
