

Tajikistan

Khojamakhmad Umarov

Central Asian countries are still disentangling themselves from the former Soviet Union. Border conflicts in the region are increasing, with new restrictions preventing the movement of goods, services, and people. Industrial cooperation among these countries has almost completely stopped, and visa restrictions are becoming more stringent. Cultural and scientific bonds between the countries are breaking, with academic diplomas from one country no longer being recognized in another. It is not clear that Central Asian countries acknowledge the necessity and effectiveness of regional cooperation. They are focusing instead more on processes of economic globalization than on regional cooperation. Uzbekistan has signed a bilateral free-trade agreement with five members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), only one of which is a Central Asian state; Tajikistan signed such an agreement with four CIS members, only one of which is in Central Asia. Turkmenistan's recent agreement included a non-Central Asian country but none with a neighbor. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed agreements with eight and six CIS members, respectively, both of which included only two Central Asian countries. None of Kazakhstan's main export partners are Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan's main trade partners include only Kazakhstan from the Central Asian region, while Uzbekistan has no significant trade with any countries in the region.

In spite of this, economic cooperation in the region is expanding. The volumes of inter-regional trade between 1994 and 2004 increased from US\$1.6 to US\$3.4 billion. However, the rates of trade growth among the countries themselves are low compared with those of other CIS members and nonmembers. As a result, the specific weight of the Central Asian region as a

part of the total volume of foreign trade turnover decreased from 8.4 to 6.6 percent.

In 2004 Uzbekistan suggested establishing a Central Asian general market under the framework of the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC). This suggestion called for the stage-by-stage implementation of the following measures:

- establishment of a free-trade zone;
- establishment of a customs union five years after the creation of the free-trade zone; and
- establishment of a regional general market five to seven years after the creation of the custom union.

Other OCAC-member countries supported this suggestion, and Uzbekistan took the lead in drafting the framework. However, without formal support from the OCAC itself, preparatory work on the establishment of such a market ceased. A new program to develop trade, transportation, and transit procedures is in the works, and another focuses on strengthening cooperation among Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. TRACECA, a European project to develop transport infrastructure, was begun in 1993 and has proceeded only haltingly since then.

The main problems facing the development of regional trade are as follows:

- unequal approaches to the issues of regional trade with no solid evaluation of the potential benefits of deepening cooperation;
- varying levels of socio-economic development among neighboring countries;
- structural imbalances of trade between neighboring countries. For example, Tajikistan relies more heavily on imports from Uzbekistan than Uzbekistan does on Tajikistan. A similar scenario exists between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The most serious obstacles to regional trade include the following:

- corruption among border officials, customs agents, and transport sector personnel;

- the prevalence of drug trafficking;
- inefficient banking systems;
- poor transportation infrastructure;
- poorly maintained transportation services, for example, old trucks and shortages of railway cars, passenger cars, passenger planes and helicopters, and poorly developed expediting services; and; the blockade of transit through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which forces North-South transit through China rather than Afghanistan.

Borders are a serious obstacle to regional trade in Central Asia. More than 50 percent of respondents to surveys mentioned that difficulties in crossing borders have a negative impact on economic cooperation. These difficulties are more serious and time-consuming for regional transit firms than for those from more distant lands.

Border checkpoints are excessively strict and corruption is rampant. Eighty to 100 percent of goods crossing borders are checked by hand while in Europe only 5 percent of such loads are checked this way. It is no wonder that only five to seven trucks cross most borders in one day. At the Khargos crossing on the Kazakh-Chinese border, 50–70 trucks are allowed to pass daily - a regional record. In addition, between seven and nine different agencies must check each load, and no coordination exist among them.

High customs tariffs and other bureaucratic impediments lead to the widespread trade in contraband. The practice of understating the cost of declared goods is also widespread and accepted by customs officials and customers. This practice severely reduces the state's revenues.

The most productive steps toward increasing regional trade would be the following:

- simplifying border functions, visa processes, and civilians crossing;
- supporting step-by-step widening of the free-trade areas;
- development of a supportive political climate; and,
- state assistance of the private sector in the sphere of international trade.

Potential Role of the United States in the Development of Trade in Greater Central Asia

The United States is playing a decisive role in solving a number of issues hindering economic integration, including aiding in the development of trade links within Central Asia.

The United States routed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which has led to more favorable conditions for the coordination of large-scale trade between Afghanistan and the countries of former Soviet Central Asia. Examples of U.S. support include its participation in the construction of the road-transport infrastructure within Afghanistan and between Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries, notably the construction of the bridge across the Panj River between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

The United States could render further assistance to the region on the following issues:

- assist in developing the road-transport infrastructure, especially with construction of bridges, tunnels, anti-mudslide galleries, and in providing machinery for road construction;
- assist in financing and construction of power lines to export electrical energy from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and other countries to Afghanistan;
- facilitate the construction of a further hydro-power station on the Panj River, which would expand trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan;
- support the current efforts of Central Asian countries to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and make their membership conditional on reducing the number of barriers to trade;
- supply Central Asian countries with the equipment necessary to raise handling capacity at border check points;
- assist in finishing the construction of international transport corridors crossing the Central Asia countries and in financing the construction of motels, camping sites, service stations, petrol stations, and phone stations; and,

- assist in establishing a trans-border area of free trade in the Panj River valley, which would reduce illegal trafficking in drugs.

Tajikistan and the Development of Regional Trade

The Republic of Tajikistan is well aware that international trade is an effective means of promoting socio-economic development and is aware that current trade levels are far below their potential. Goods imported from Kazakhstan amount to 12.2 percent of Tajik imports, a number that could increase to 40 percent if the full potential were realized. Imports from Kyrgyzstan amount to only 1.1 percent of Tajik imports but could reach as high as 17 percent. Currently, Tajik exports to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan make up only 1 and 0.1 percent, respectively, of Tajik exports. However, studies suggest that trade between these countries could be as high as 3 and 5 percent, respectively.

Extending regional and continental trade would allow Tajikistan to do the following:

- increase GDP. Estimates suggest that had Central Asia had a single customs area since 2000, the average annual rate of growth in each country would be 12.9 percent, and in 2004 the GDP per capita would have been 35.7 percent more than it actually was.
- reduce poverty;
- foster new industrial cooperation among neighboring countries;
- change the geography of foreign-economic links, thereby rendering domestic production more effective; and
- ensure sustainable power sources.

The main motor roads connecting Tajikistan with the external world pass through Uzbekistan. All current methods of transporting goods and people along these corridors involve serious obstacles. The normalization of economic and political relations with Uzbekistan will therefore increase significantly Tajikistan's trade and economic links with other Central Asian countries, CIS members, and non-CIS members.

In addition, Tajikistan's small- and medium-sized businesses have a particular interest in the Uzbek market, especially in agriculture. Eliminating obstacles to the transport of Tajik goods will allow the increased production of vegetables, fresh and dried fruits, and non-perishables, and the demand for these goods will significantly increase in Uzbekistan. A similar scenario would occur in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Trade between Tajikistan and other Central Asian Countries

Among Central Asian countries, Tajikistan's biggest trading partners are Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, trade relations with these countries are not developing evenly. Exports to Uzbekistan were \$4.2 million in 1991, \$7.7 million in 1993, \$190.7 million in 1996, and \$65.9 million in 2004. Exports to Kazakhstan were \$7.2 million in 1991, \$12.5 million in 1993, \$24.3 million in 1996, and \$3.5 million in 2004. Exports to Kazakhstan fluctuate considerably.

The rapid growth of trade between Tajikistan and Asian countries is the result of dynamic economic relations with Iran and, in particular, with Turkey. In 2004, exports to these two countries made up 89.2 percent of Tajikistan's total exports to Asia. Between 1998 and 2003 exports to Iran quadrupled from \$13.6 million to \$51.4 million, (in 2004 this number dropped to \$29.6 million), and to Turkey they grew from \$0.4 million to \$193.2 million, i.e., by 483 times (in 2004, exports dropped to \$139.7 million).

Tajik exports to China are growing, albeit slowly. Over the last three years exports to Afghanistan have grown considerably (\$0.6 million in 1998, \$3.1 million in 2001, \$6.3 million in 2002, and \$7.7 million in 2004). The volume of exports to Afghanistan could be increased from \$80 million to \$100 million within the next few years.

From 1991 to 2004 Tajik imports from Uzbekistan increased 26.8 times but the volume has fluctuated greatly. The total was \$6.3 million in 1991, \$65.4 million in 1993, \$261 million in 1997, and then \$150.7 million in 2001, and \$168.8 million in 2004. The primary cause of such drastic fluctuations remains the volatile political climate between the two countries.

Tajik imports from Kazakhstan have also fluctuated, but not by as much as those from Uzbekistan. Imports from Kazakhstan amounted to \$5.5 million in 1991, \$26.5 million in 1995, \$95.8 million in 2003, and \$152.8 million in 2004.

The volume of imports from Kazakhstan nearly doubled in the first half-decade of the new millennium. The largest single purchaser of Tajik products is China at \$57.0 million annually. China is followed by Turkey, at \$37.9 million; Iran, with \$26.3 million; the UAE at \$16.2 million; and India with \$3.3 million.

There is a considerable gap in Tajikistan's balance of trade. Exports to Turkey exceed imports by a factor of 37. For Uzbekistan the ratio is 2.6, for China it is 9.3, and for Kazakhstan the ratio is 43.6.

Tajikistan's trade with neighboring countries in 2004 was as follows: it imported from Kazakhstan 280,100 tons of wheat and wheat flour, 80,200 tons of coke, 64,600 tons of oil products, and 48,400 tons of chemical fertilizers.¹ In the future, the import of wheat could be reduced if Tajikistan's government remains committed to increasing domestic production. If a coke plant is put into operation in the Zerafshan valley, then the import of coke for aluminum production will no longer be necessary. Conversely, the import of oil products and chemical fertilizers (phosphatic manure) from Kazakhstan would need to be increased proportionally if the goal is the development of the above-mentioned industries.

Meanwhile, Tajikistan exported to Kazakhstan 8,400 tons of fruit juice and 298 tons of aluminum and transformers. Tajikistan could expand the export of dried fruits and canned fruits and vegetables, aluminum, fresh flowers, fermented tobacco, cotton fiber, and cotton and silk yarn. Proper diversification of trade through these products could improve the balance of trade between these countries.

Tajikistan by 2005 was annually importing from Kyrgyzstan printed materials worth \$14.1 million, 66,400 tons of asbestos products, and electric bulbs. More recently, the Tajik government has encouraged the rapid development of its own printing industry and the rehabilitation of the construction materials industry. If these projects are implemented, Tajikistan will not need to import asbestos or such printed materials, as textbooks. Meanwhile, through diversification Kyrgyzstan will be able to increase its exports.

¹ Tajikistan: 15th year of independence. Statistical Report. Dushanbe, 2006, p.p. 370-386.

There is much potential for greatly increasing Tajik trade with Turkmenistan. Tajikistan needs sulfur from Turkmenistan while Turkmenistan needs chemicals, construction materials, marble and granite, transformers, vegetables and fruit juices from Tajikistan. Future growth of Tajik imports of all products from Turkmenistan is all but guaranteed, although this could be impeded by Uzbekistan's obstructionist policy of inhibiting transport and not allowing pipelines from other countries to cross its territory.

By 2005 Tajikistan was exporting to Uzbekistan 2,200 tons of aluminum hydroxide, 4,700 tons of cotton fiber, and power. In addition 1.5 billion kwt/h of electric power, as well as aluminum, and medicines are smuggled from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan. Moreover, illegally exported Chinese consumer goods flow from Tajikistan to the neighboring Uzbek provinces of Surkhandarya and Kashkadarya. A recent survey shows that over 40 percent of goods, imported illegally from China to Tajikistan are re-exported illegally to Uzbekistan. The volume of smuggled goods from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan far exceeds the officially declared figure.

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have great potential for a rapid increase in their mutual trade. If Uzbekistan were to remove its undeclared economic blockade on Tajikistan, and if visa restrictions were abolished between the two countries, as well as landmines cleared along the shared border, then the potential for growth would be impressive.

Evolution of Tajikistan's Foreign Trade Policy

The President of Tajikistan determines the main lines of the country's foreign trade policy. The government of Tajikistan, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries, carries out that vision. The Ministry of Economy and Trade, the Ministry on State Revenues and Dues, and the National Bank of Tajikistan are in charge of executing foreign trade policy.

Since independence Tajikistan's trade regime has made progress towards liberalizing the internal market. The state's monopoly over foreign trade was abolished in 1991. Customs tariffs changed frequently, though the external economic policy did not undergo any noticeable changes. Between 1994 and 2003 customs tariffs changed three times. The unrestricted liberalization of

foreign trade had already forced the closure of some leading industries, some of them major employers.

Rates of Custom Duties—from 1997 to 2003²

	September 1997	June 1998	January 1999	April 2000	October 2001	April 2002	November 2003
Average arithmetical rate of customs tariff	16.0	16.0	25.5	16.4	11.2	2.3	7.5
Maximum level of tariff	30.0	30.0	60.0	60.0	30.0	5.0	15.0
Quantity of tariff corridors	2	10	8	3	4	4	4

The table shows the drastic fluctuations between customs tariffs, their average percentage, and the maximum levels. Such fluctuation shows the lack of understanding of the aims and tasks of customs and of foreign economic policy generally.

The most recent custom tariff of 23 November 2003, includes revisions made to correct past mistakes. It prioritizes export-oriented industries, even when such industries are not subsidized by the Tajik government. The present customs tariff is the result of a more complete consideration of interests of the society and of the leading traders and associations. It is genuine instrument for regulating trade policy in both internal and external markets.

The Tajik legislation sets down registration requirements for those involved in foreign trade. Registration cards are issued by the Ministry of Economy and Trade and carry an expiration date. In addition, exporters are obliged to have a taxpayer's identification number (TIN) to ensure proper tax collection in accordance with the tax code.

Tajikistan has no tariffs on exports but the customs legislation stipulates quantitative restrictions on exports, which have yet to be specified. The legislation also sets quotas on ethyl alcohol, and alcohol and tobacco products. Minimum export prices, voluntary restrictions on exports, and

² Calculation on the base of official statistical dates.

other market regulations are also stipulated by the legislation but have not been applied in practice. At the same time, the Republic of Tajikistan does nothing to encourage exports. The legislation to date provides no specific measures for encouraging the export by individuals.

Presidential decrees of 27 June 1995 and 10 February 1996 require that raw materials must be sold at prices fixed by the Republic Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange, taking into account world market prices. This requirement affects products as diverse as cotton fiber, aluminum, ores, precious metals and stones, scrap-iron, tobacco, leather, chemical fertilizers, geranium oil, natural honey, medicinal herbs, and snake venom. Such requirements dramatically confine Tajikistan's foreign trade. Moreover, the country offers no export credits and prohibits barter transactions. Tariffs of 0 percent, 5-10 percent, and 10-15 percent are currently in effect, amounting to about 6.7 percent of the value of total exports.

Barriers to Intraregional Trade

High border taxes including value-added tax (VAT), excise-duties, customs duties, and collections for customs service, are a serious barrier to trade. Taken together, they make up between 35 and 45 percent of the cost of goods. This heavy tax burden, forces importers to seek ways of concealing data. Importers and customs officers deliberately collude in order to understate costs. Estimates put the resulting lost revenue at between \$250 and \$300 million each year.

Another barrier to export/import operations is the amount of paperwork that producers face. They must produce sixteen documents for trade officials. As corruption is widespread in the country, an importer/exporter has to pay bribes to obtain almost all these documents, with the informal fees far exceeding the formal ones. One example of this inefficiency is the required certificate on quality issued by Tajikgosstandart, for all goods not manufactured in Tajikistan. Organizations, in charge of issuing the various certificates, create obstacles to importers/exporters for the purpose of generating bribe revenue. High taxes and formal and informal fees increase the market price of goods, and cause numerous bankruptcies.

Another significant barrier to regional trade is the range of customs duties charged by each country. This is particularly significant for trade between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Until recently, the official rate of customs duties for goods imported to Tajikistan was 5 percent, i.e., a unified customs tariff was in effect. But Uzbekistan did not apply this principle, and the maximum duty reached 19 percent. According to the recently revised customs tariff, the maximum rate of customs duties in Tajikistan can be 15 percent, while the maximum rate of customs duties in Uzbekistan can now reach 70 percent, thanks to Uzbekistan's strategy of import substitution. Obviously, this is much more beneficial to Uzbek entrepreneurs doing business in Tajikistan than to their Tajik counterparts in Uzbekistan. This helps account for the trade imbalance between the two countries.

As a result of these unilateral actions by Uzbekistan, some industries in Tajikistan are incurring great losses. For example, Uzbekistan has for ten years demanded pre-payment for the cost of transporting alcohol and alcohol products across that country. Alcohol exporters must deposit the sum in an Uzbek bank and do not receive it back until the shipment crosses another border.

Tajik vintners suffer badly from this procedure. No deposits have been returned during the five years since the procedure was adopted. Uzbek authorities simply keep the money, citing the need to pay off Tajikistan's debt. This situation has led to the extinction of winemaking in Tajikistan. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of vineyards in the Hisor, Vakhsh, Yavan and Obi Kiik valleys have been converted into dry lands for growing crops, which are up to a twentieth as productive financially.

A similar situation exists with the Isfara Chemical Plant, which manufactures explosive materials used in the construction of mines, roads, railways, irrigation canals and other structures. Following independence, Uzbekistan outlawed the export of these explosives through its territory, which is the only possible route for exporting this product to the North. The plant used to manufacture up to 300,000 tons of explosive material prior to the break up of the USSR, and the price ranged from \$745,000 to \$810,000 per ton. For transiting such consignments through Uzbekistan, the Uzbek customs and railway services require more than 20 documents and even if all

necessary documents are submitted, they may still refuse transit. Exporters of perishable fresh vegetables, fruits, and citrus also incur great losses when their goods cross the Tajik-Uzbek border.

The total losses incurred by Tajikistan between 1992 and 2004 as a result of all such actions by Uzbekistan exceed \$15 billion.

These many barriers have resulted in trade deficits with all Tajikistan's main trading partners, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia. In addition to the above-mentioned barriers, the amount of contraband crossing Tajik borders has increased, costing Tajikistan an additional \$5 billion annually. If the government could find a way to eliminate these barriers, it could reduce poverty by 35 to 40 percent.

Between 1992 and 2004, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan concluded seventeen agreements. The most important of which concern trade and economic cooperation, and long-term economic cooperation. They envisage the expansion of mutual trade, increased delivery of oil products, joint control over the flow of the Amudarya River, and the diversification of trade. However, these agreements have not been successful, as is evident from the constant decline in trade in recent years. The commodity circulation between the two countries fell from \$73.3 million in 2001, to \$41.3 million in 2004.

Bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were secured in an agreement on eternal friendship, signed on 15 June 2000. The real relationship between them, however, is such that the agreement has become the subject of caustic jokes. Between 1992 and 2004, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed forty-seven documents on trade and economic cooperation. These documents remain a dead letter, however, and Uzbekistan maintains its economic blockade of Tajikistan. Almost all border passages have been mined, leading to the death of hundreds and the injury of thousands.

Between 1999 and 2004, commodity circulation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan fell by 1.9 times, exports to Uzbekistan dropped by 2.7 times, and imports from Uzbekistan fell by 1.6 times.

Thirty one bilateral agreements regulating trade and cooperation exist between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. A Tajik-Kyrgyz Intergovernmental committee on the construction and improvement of highways between the

two countries and on the diversification of trade was set up in 1994. However, concrete results are all but nonexistent. Trade turnover between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan fell by half between 1996 and 2002; Tajik exports to Kyrgyzstan fell 2.9 times, and imports were reduced 1.4 times. Between 2002 and 2003 the situation briefly changed, with commodity circulation increasing by 3.5 times and imports from Kyrgyzstan increasing by 5.2 times. Exports to Kyrgyzstan remained at the same level, however. Notwithstanding these problems, there is evidence that the potential for trade between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is great.

Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have signed twenty-nine documents touching on various aspects of trade and economic cooperation, but most of these have not been implemented. The further development of trade and economic cooperation will depend on long-term deliveries of aluminum from Kazakhstan's Pavlodar Aluminum Plant to the Tajik Aluminum Plant, as well as deliveries of uranium-rich raw materials to the Vostokredmet Company located in Khujand.

Unlike other countries in the region, commodity circulation between Tajikistan and Kazakhstan is growing, having increased 1.85 times since 1997. This progress sharply aggravated Tajikistan trade deficit however and worsened Tajik-Kazakh trade balance. Since 1997, the export volume from Tajikistan to Kazakhstan declined 3.5 times, while the import volume from Kazakhstan increased 1.7 times. The rate of exports from Tajikistan was 22.4 percent of the total trade turnover between the two countries in 1997, but fell to 4.6 percent in 2004. The rate of imports from Kazakhstan increased from 77.6 percent to 95.4 percent during the same period. Such trends are alarming and harmful to Tajikistan. Tajikistan is capable of balancing its trade relations with Kazakhstan, but for now all efforts to do so have been insufficient.

Transportation Problems

During Soviet times the annual volume of cargo crossing the Tajik/Uzbek border in the Zeravshan Valley reached 175,000 tons. No less than 75,000 tons of the concentrate coming out of the Varzob ore mine were transported for processing to the Kadomhaiski facilities in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, 200–

250,000 tons of ammonal (explosive material) produced by the Isfara Chemical Plant were transported through Uzbek territories, to be used for mine, tunnel, road, and railway construction. Today, this trade has ceased, at a cost to Tajikistan of \$1.5 billion annually.

Truck transport from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan has also ceased. Concentrates of antimony and mercury are now transported from Khudjand by railway, increasing the cost of processing. Uzbek authorities have also put an end to cargo transit from Khudjand to Tajikistan's Badakhshan region via the Fergana Valley.

During Soviet times there was also an extensive private trade relationship between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Tajik traders, especially from the northern regions of the republic, sold fresh and dried fruits in all regions of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and also in the southern and eastern regions of Russia. The volume of such deliveries was huge. According to available statistics, traders from the Zeravshan Valley sold up to 45,000 tons of apples and pears and 3,500 tons of dried fruit annually. These numbers are for production in a single valley. Restrictions on the export of lemons, pomegranates, figs, pears, dried fruits, fresh flowers, vegetables, and wine cause huge losses for Tajikistan. Today hundreds of tons of fresh flowers, lemons, and fresh stone-fruits wait at inefficient border crossings, a process which can take several days. After the slow so-called antinarcotics check, many of these products are worthless and have to be sold at below-market prices. According to preliminary data, estimates of the deterioration of fresh production owing to unreasonable border delays cost Tajikistan \$28–31 million annually.

Goods transported from Tajikistan to Kazakhstan must pass through Uzbekistan. The basic transit routes are as follows: Sari-Osiya – Denau – Kitob – Shahrisabz – Samarkand – Djizak – Guliston. The transit route to Turkmenistan is via Sari-Osiya – Baysun – Bukhara – Chardzhou. At present the basic transit route to China is via Aibek – Toshkoz – Chernovka – Dzhambul – Alma-Ata – Khorgos. It is possible that next year, this road will be replaced by a new one that will lie entirely within Tajikistan via Kulyab – Darvoz – Khorog – Murghab – Kulma – Kashgar. For the southern areas of the country the transit route via Sari-Osiya – Denau – Samarkand –

Dzhizak – Guliston – Chernovka still functions. However, the economic value of these transit routes has been reduced due to the introduction of restrictive measures on the import of consumer goods to Uzbekistan.

For the last two and a half years, the flow of imported goods from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and China has grown thanks to the restoration and expansion of the Osh – Bishkek road. This highway reaches the pass that connects Kzil-Art – Saritosh – Dzhirgatal – Garm – Nurobod – Obi-Garm – Faizobod – Dushanbe. The construction of this highway has not yet been completed but it is being used nonetheless, sometimes with tragic consequences. In 2002, 34 Tajik women returning from Almaty died in a bus crash on this road.

It would be possible to avoid this dangerous highway if the roads through the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan were open to the Kyrgyz and Tajik traders. Similarly, accidents could be avoided if the road between Chernovka – Oibek and Chernovka – Sir-Darya was opened.

The transport of goods by trucks tends to be very expensive. Secret surveys of Tajik truckers reveal that Tajik vehicles must pay at least \$100 at each check-point in Uzbekistan. There are four such checkpoints en route between Sari-Asiya and Charjou and eleven en route between Sari-Asiya and Cherneevka. If they refuse to pay, drivers and accompanying persons are subject to physical beating as well as the seizure of their goods and vehicle.

Goods transported out of Tajikistan by trucks are subject to a number of non-official fees demanded by police and criminals. The author of this report found that the following payments demanded are standard: en route through Kazakhstan between Chimkent, Karaganda, and Almaty, traffic police require each vehicle carrying less than 20 tons to pay \$200, while the ecological service demands \$30, with no receipt provided. En route between Jambul and Karaganda drivers are stopped at nine separate check-points at each of which vehicles must pay between \$75 and \$100. The most complicated case is the so-called "vehicle escorts" that are unofficially "required" in Kazakhstan. One driver was charged \$350 for an unwanted and illegal escort on the highway between Jambul and Almaty.

Kyrgyz motor transport can operate within Tajikistan without restriction or fees, while Tajik vehicles can do the same in Kyrgyzstan. But Tajik trucks are subject to high official and non-official fees on the territory of Turkmenistan. For entrance into the country, a fee of \$250 is required and an additional fee of \$35 is charged for a so-called "transit visa." There are four police check-points between Sarakhs and Charjon, each of which demands bribes of \$50 to \$70/per vehicle.

Such an approach to trucking in Central Asian countries is a result of near-total ignorance of norms of international transport communications. Political linkages, imperial ambitions, and the psychology of the "stronger power" also play roles in creating this problem. Uzbekistan's transit policy is designed to protect domestic agriculture and directly undermines Tajik agriculture in that part of Tajikistan where 75 percent of population lives. Tajik agriculture cannot develop without the use of mineral fertilizers. In 2002 the government of Uzbekistan issued a decree banning the export and import of nitric fertilizers on grounds that they could be used in the production of explosives.

Under the pretext of resisting drug trafficking, Uzbek customs officers do everything in their power to prevent Tajik trucks carrying large volumes from entering Uzbekistan. From 1993 to 1999 goods crossing from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan were unloaded at checkpoints and then reloaded onto Uzbek trucks. Under pressure from Tajik entrepreneurs, Tajik border guards and customs officers make concessions to Uzbek truckers, which allowed them to enter Tajikistan with few complications. Such approaches can work but they must be reciprocal.

Problems of Transit Mechanisms

Non-official fees account for between 2 and 3 percent of the entire value of Tajikistan's foreign trade . A partial list of such fees would include the following:

- payments for phyto-sanitary conditions;
- payment for bilateral road sanctions;
- border payments involving taxes and fees;
- fees for the issuance of declaration forms;

- fees for bridge crossings;
- insurance fees;
- payments for escorting goods or passengers;
- payments for guards;
- payments for the issuance of approvals by standardization authorities;
- payments to customs dealers on borders;
- payments for the traveling speed of vehicles;
- payments for axel taxes;
- payments for ecological services;
- payments for car inspectors; and,
- payments for police check-points.

Such fees dampen the entrepreneurial spirit in Tajikistan. As a result of the heavy burden of transit fees, the number of bankruptcies in Tajikistan increases every year, and the black market continues to develop and grow.

Professor L. Ojalla has analyzed the long waiting times at border points. He concluded that if trucks were checked in three hours or less, the annual financial savings would amount to approximately \$30 million. Widespread corruption ensures that long waiting times continue and prevents any sort of reform. A major obstacle to the transit of Tajik goods are the “mortgage” requirements for the transport of tobacco, ethyl alcohol, wine and vodka introduced by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Such arrangements do nothing to promote a liberal economy. After Uzbekistan introduced mortgage requirements, the Tajik wine industry collapsed as it relied on exporting to wineries in Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation where the wine was bottled and sold.

Trade with Afghanistan

Tajikistan’s longest border (1030 km long) is with Afghanistan. Until recently, this border was closed on both sides. Now the situation has changed, and trade and economic relations between Afghanistan and Tajikistan are developing quickly. As the statistics indicate, the total volume of turnovers between the two countries in 1993 was \$10.7 million, but by 2004

this figure had increased to \$63.1 million. In the same time period the volume of exports from Tajikistan increased from \$0.1 to \$6.1 million, and imports increased from \$10.6 to \$57.0 million.³ This shows that despite high rates of turnover, the trade balance for Tajikistan is negative. The turnover of goods between these two countries is marked by sharp fluctuations and is not sustainable.

Trade and economic relations between Tajikistan and its southern neighbor are below normal levels, thanks to civil wars both in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Drug trafficking also has a negative impact on normal trade and economic relations. Prolonged peace and reduced drug trafficking along the borders will go a long way towards improving trade relations between the two countries.

Assistance from the U.S. government and from the Aga Khan Foundation has contributed to the creation of five bridges, connecting the left and right banks of the Panj River. The U.S. government and a number of other countries have provided assistance for the rehabilitation of road infrastructure in Afghanistan. These highways will all become organic parts of international transport corridors, that will connect former Soviet Central Asia with several ports on the Persian Gulf, as well as with industrial cities in Pakistan and northern India.

International transport corridors will connect the countries of the region with major continental economies by the shortest routes possible. At present, 52 such corridors are being constructed within the region. Kazakhstan's president Nazarbaev noted that the most important of these is the "North-South" corridor, which will connect Almaty, Bishkek, Osh, Dushanbe, and Kabul, and on to Pakistan's new port at Gwadar, as well as to India and will become the main transport and trade artery of the region.

When the present author was on a mission in Afghanistan, he was surprised to find that the Afghan portion of this transport corridor is already operational and is functioning successfully. The highway between Sherhon, Bandar, Kunduz, Baglan, Puli, Khumri, passage Salang, and Kabul is now up

³ Tajikistan: 15 th years of independence. Statistical Report. Dushanbe, 2006, p.p. 339, 345, 363.

to the highest international standards. Due to U.S. financial support, this highway, constructed by Chinese and Turkish companies, was finished ahead of schedule. The corresponding infrastructures, including wayside restaurants, snack bars, motels, and service stations, function along this highway. Another transport corridor connecting the Uzbek city of Termez with Mazar-I-Sharif and Puli Khumri is also near completion.

The prospects for future trade between Tajikistan and Afghanistan are great. It is possible that by 2015 Afghanistan will be able to meet all of Tajikistan's natural gas requirements and a share of Tajikistan's electrical power needs as well, especially once Afghanistan brings to completion the hydro-electric stations at Sangtuda and Rogun.

The challenge of constructing transcontinental pipelines for the transport of oil and gas is a problem not only for Central Asia but for the rest of the world as well. The problem is particularly acute with regards to the construction of a gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Turkey, and between Turkmenistan, Pakistan and India via Afghanistan, as well as a pipeline across the Caspian from Kazakhstan to Baku and the BTC route.

Beyond these projects, special emphasis should be put on the production and transmission of hydroelectric power. Hydro-electric power, unlike hydrocarbons, is renewable. The productivity of capital invested in hydro-electric development is higher than for oil and gas pipelines. Hydropower is also "greener" than petroleum-based energy. It is worth noting that a large percentage of oil and gas exported from Central Asia is transformed into electric power.

One potential obstacle to harnessing hydroelectric power in the region concerns rights to the water itself. Afghanistan is fencing off part of the Panj River for irrigation purposes. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan must acknowledge this action and at the same time start utilizing more advanced irrigation technologies. More than 17 thousand cubic meters of water are used to irrigate each hectare of cotton in Uzbekistan, and as as much as 19 and 20 thousand cubic meters in Turkmenistan. By contrast, Israel uses only six thousand cubic meters of water to achieve the same results.

Afghanistan possesses the land resources necessary for self-sufficiency in food. It is possible to increase the area of irrigated land to 5.3 million hectares from the current level of no more than 2.1 million hectares. Doubling the amount of irrigated land and the improvement of agricultural methods could lead to the increase of crops production by a factor of no less than four. This would enable Afghanistan to meet domestic food needs and at the same time become a large exporter of agricultural produce. Afghanistan also needs a large-scale program designed to expand its irrigation capacity, as well as a concerted effort to identify and develop additional farm land.

Tajikistan could become Afghanistan's largest supplier of coal and coke, aluminum and reinforced-concrete construction materials, cement, and bitumen. In addition, Tajikistan is poised to provide Afghanistan with nitrogen fertilizers, crushed stone, gravel, gypsum, paints, decorative stones, and pavement slabs. Afghanistan, for its part, has the capacity to provide Tajikistan with wool for its carpet production, as well as oranges and tangerines, early vegetables, and potatoes and dried fruit. In the long-term, Tajikistan can become a permanent provider of electric power, building machinery, chemical products and household equipment. Afghanistan and Tajikistan can work together to construct hydroelectric stations on the Panj River, to secure stable supply of natural gas for Tajikistan, to construct joint irrigation projects in the northern provinces of Afghanistan and cultivate virgin lands in Tajikistan. An export-oriented free economic zone between Afghanistan and Tajikistan should also be developed through a joint effort by both countries. All this is more readily possible because the two countries share a common language, culture, history, and psychology. Thanks to this, too, Tajikistan is well positioned to assist in the education and cultural development of Afghanistan's people, thereby building up human capital and political stability. Such assistance will be particularly important in areas that affect Afghanistan's future role in trade. Tajikistan's agricultural and technical institutions of higher education can train competent agronomists, agrochemists, engineers of different profiles, as well as business leaders, economists, and public administrators in the field of international trade and finance. At present, Tajikistan has no financial resources for assisting Afghanistan in achieving these goals. However, with the help of

international donors it can use its existing knowledge resources to remove impediments to regional and continental trade.

The most serious challenge facing Afghan-Tajik relations is the continued drug trafficking, which not only harms people of these and many other countries but also severely damages the credibility of regional states as partners in legal trade and commerce. Economic incentives must be devised in order to provide people with viable alternatives to the growing, selling, and transporting of drugs. Particular attention should be placed on improving the livelihoods of people on both sides of the Panj River, so that they can become a reliable barrier to the drug trade. This can be accomplished in part through the development of legal trade on the regional and continental basis.

Trade and Economic Cooperation

Overcoming trade barriers is particularly difficult in the case of states that were formerly part of the USSR. No gains in regional and continental trade will be possible until existing levels of corruption are reduced. All cases of illegal interference with cargo and transportation should be the object of special attention from security forces. All governments in Central Asia should have unified customs regimes that treat truckers from other countries with respect as their citizens. This means collecting duties only at check points and defining all demands for payments made elsewhere as crimes. Uzbekistan, in particular must apply these simple principles.

More integrated approaches to the management of transport will help all countries in the region. Special attention should be paid to highways, since they will be the principal means of transporting goods both in the regions and on a continental basis. Roads should be maintained in such a way that they meet international standards. Emergency technical assistance and telephone outlets should be available along all motor routes. In addition, general services, such as filling stations, motels, and rest stops must be developed. Above all, it is very important that truck transport systems in all countries function under the TIR regulations and standards. All barriers to this regimen should be removed.

In addition, the region should work toward adopting common insurance standards and unified banking practices to ensure smoother business transactions. Likewise, the collection of border taxes should work similarly at all borders, which in turn calls for unified tariff policies and procedures for collecting excise and value-added taxes.

Modern equipment can reduce the time needed to check cargo and passengers at border crossings. Check point staff must also be reeducated in order to reduce current levels of contraband. Greater transparency of the entire system is also needed, both of procedures and of personnel.

To prevent the flight of money from export operations, repayment schedules should be clear. The non-repayment of bonded money from the export of goods and services should be considered a crime. A better system for reporting such non-repayment by governments is also needed.

To foster both regional and continental trade Tajikistan should focus on reducing the cost of transport across its border with Afghanistan. A trans-Afghan railway could benefit not only Afghanistan but Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as well. International financial organizations should work to make such projects a reality.

As noted above, the creation of free economic areas and border industrial zones could be of special importance to this region. In Tajikistan the Badakhshan area has particular potential in this regard.

For all this to happen, it will be essential to create inter-ministerial bodies among trading countries in order to monitor and assist the development of trade, transit, tax free zones, and other forms of cooperation among Central Asian countries. Such bodies should be charged with removing barriers to trade in accordance with WTO norms, rules, and standards.

It is the deep hope of Tajikistan, and other neighboring countries as well, that by joining the WTO it will be possible to remove nearly all above-mentioned barriers to trade. Such hopes also are focused on Uzbekistan's membership to EURASEC and the creation of a Central-Asian common market. To be sure, the transformation in recent years of Central Asia Economic Union into EURASEC will completely change certain dynamics. Will prices be based on the Central Asian region alone or continent-wide

realities? How will other geographic parts of Central Asia such as Afghanistan or Mongolia, find their place in such an expanded market? These and other “global” issues will all have to be addressed in due course. However, the urgent first step is for Tajikistan to adopt a strategy of economic and social development that is based on the rational use of natural and human resources in the context of a region- and continent – wide market economy.

Appendix 1: Tajikistan: Foreign Trade Turnover (In millions of U.S. dollars)¹

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Only, including	131.3	353.2	881.9	1038.9	1558.5	1438.2	1496.0	1307.6	1351.8	1453.3	1339.0	1457.4	1678.0	2106.2
Kazakhstan	12.7	27.6	81.8	42.9	33.5	76.7	52.1	61.9	81.4	88.1	92.2	75.7	100.4	156.1
Kyrgyzstan	5.1	4.5	6.2	2.9	5.3	17.7	14.4	11.1	11.1	10.2	7.7	8.9	31.2	22.0
Turkmenistan	5.1	21.7	29.5	41.2	59.6	34.8	39.8	40.0	16.5	34.0	72.0	57.1	33.8	41.3
Uzbekistan	10.5	21.3	85.7	105.9	384.3	389.6	434.0	353.0	445.4	285.4	237.9	205.3	199.8	234.7
Mongolia	-	-	0.4	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.0	-	-	0.1
XUAR	-	-	10.7	6.2	6.0	7.5	15.3	5.8	5.1	15.3	7.4	9.7	32.4	63.1
Afghanistan	-	-	1.0	2.0	0.3	4.2	4.5	1.1	2.3	2.7	3.2	6.6	7.4	11.7
On region GCA	33.4	75.7	215.3	201.4	489.0	530.1	557.2	472.9	562.8	420.4	420.4	363.3	405.0	529.0
percent	25.4	21.4	24.4	19.4	31.4	36.8	37.2	36.2	41.6	28.8	31.4	24.9	24.1	25.1

¹Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, p.p.244, 245, Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2005, p.p.255, 256.

Appendix 2: Tajikistan: Exports (In millions of U.S. dollars)¹

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Only, including	67.9	192.5	349.8	491.9	748.6	770.1	745.7	596.5	688.7	784.3	651.3	739.9	797.2	914.9
Kazakhstan	7.2	12.5	16.3	10.1	7.0	24.3	10.0	10.0	3.6	5.7	3.1	3.5	4.6	3.5
Kyrgyzstan	1.0	2.0	4.1	1.9	2.6	10.5	9.0	5.8	3.9	2.7	2.0	3.7	3.7	4.4
Turkmenistan	1.7	3.7	3.5	1.8	2.2	8.5	10.2	8.7	1.3	4.7	9.7	10.0	2.2	7.6
Uzbekistan	4.2	7.6	20.3	22.7	132.0	190.7	172.5	125.7	181.0	97.8	87.2	72.9	67.1	65.9
Mongolia	-	-	0.4	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.0	-	-	-
XUAR	-	-	0.8	0.8	0.3	1.3	0.8	0.6	2.2	2.6	3.1	6.3	5.8	7.7
Afghanistan	-	-	0.1	1.4	5.6	6.2	13.4	4.9	2.6	3.4	1.4	2.1	5.7	6.1
On region GCA	14.1	25.8	45.5	39.0	149.7	284.8	215.9	155.7	194.6	117.0	106.5	98.5	89.7	95.2
percent	20.7	13.4	13.0	7.9	20.0	37.0	28.9	26.1	28.2	14.9	16.3	13.4	11.2	10.4

¹ Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, p.p. 247,248; Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2005, p.p. 258,259.


Appendix 3: Tajikistan: Imports (In millions of U.S. dollars)¹

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Only, including	63.3	160.7	532.1	547.0	809.9	668.1	750.3	711.0	663.1	675.0	687.5	720.5	880.3	1191.3
Kazakhstan	5.5	15.1	65.5	32.8	26.3	52.4	42.1	51.9	78.8	82.4	89.1	72.2	95.8	152.6
Kyrgyzstan	4.1	2.5	2.1	1.0	2.7	7.2	5.4	5.3	7.2	7.3	5.7	5.2	27.5	17.6
Turkmenistan	3.4	18.0	26.0	39.4	57.4	26.3	29.6	31.3	15.2	29.3	32.3	47.1	31.6	33.7
Uzbekistan	6.3	13.7	65.4	83.2	251.4	198.9	261.5	227.3	264.4	185.6	150.7	132.4	132.7	168.8
Mongolia	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1
XUAR	-	-	0.2	1.2	0.0	2.9	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.6	4.0
Afghanistan	-	-	10.6	4.8	0.4	1.3	1.9	0.9	2.5	11.9	6.0	7.6	26.7	57.0
On region GCA	24.8	49.3	169.8	162.4	338.2	288.4	341.3	317.2	368.2	316.6	333.9	264.8	315.9	433.8
percent	39.2	30.7	31.9	29.7	41.7	43.2	45.5	44.6	55.5	46.9	48.6	36.7	35.9	36.4

¹ Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, p.p. 250, 251.

Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2005, p.p. 261, 263.

Appendix 4: Tajikistan: Imports from countries of Greater Central Asia



Calculation on the base of official statistics.

Appendix 7: Export International Service from Tajikistan ¹

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Only, including	10688.0	58099.0	49698.2	53353.7	66219.6	68933.6	58297.3	96025.3
Kazakhstan	2640.0	1979.2	1582.5	1700.2	1879.0	2659.6	2483.0	2144.2
Kyrgyzstan	111.6	101.6	1126.2	133.8	162.3	351.1	378.0	426.1
Turkmenistan	296.9	1073.9	168.6	198.8	758.8	1537.6	725.6	683.4
Uzbekistan	685.9	34724.4	31860.3	39131.3	45240.0	34105.8	20880.0	38454.3
Mongolia	-	-	0.03	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.0
XUAR	3.7	5.0	35.1	14.6	29.0	645.5	1081.4	374.5
Afghanistan	-	23.2	28.8	14.8	5.9	14.3	40.9	56.8
On region GCA	3738.1	31907.3	34809.9	41203.5	48075.1	39374.5	26589.2	42339.3
percent	35.0	65.2	70.0	77.2	72.6	57.1	45.6	44.1


¹ Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, p.p. 266,267. Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2005, p.p. 282,283.

Appendix 8: Tajikistan: Import of International Services (In thousands of U.S. dollars)¹

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Only, including	39488.8	46019.0	58485.2	63963.5	51659.9	76265.6	70409.3	97076.2
Kazakhstan	1504.1	2084.5	1815.2	1566.3	891.0	4870.5	2210.03149.	690.0
Kyrgyzstan	6.4	680.2	364.8	414.3	206.8	1042.8	680.0	611.9
Turkmenistan	4804.8	4923.2	22656.6	24244.9	1501.6	8375.0	2275.9	4472.4
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mongolia	2.0	-	22.0	0.0	1.1	233.5	497.8	318.7
XUAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.1	-
On region GCA	6321.6	7872.2	24991.5	26413.3	2868.9	14718.9	5950.9	9292.1
B percent	16.0	17.1	42.7	41.3	5.6	19.3	8.4	9.6

¹ Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, 2001, p.268.

Appendix 9



Appendix 10: Tajikistan: Import of Some Food Products (In thousands of U.S. dollars)¹

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Sunflower oil	8,216	4,186	3,715	6,079	6,784	3,308	7,286	8,128
Only, including								
Uzbekistan	1,726	2,565	3,463	4,424	3,584	385	-	161
Azerbaijan	2,504	745	164	248	1,279	1,358	1,204	1,634
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	712	158	444	1,884	2,248
Iran	458	-	66	87	459	944	3,006	3,011
<i>Sugar, only</i>	21,062	13,802	11,363	10,759	5,160	12,517	79,018	22,985
including Kazakhstan	-	-	-	110	-	0	261	1,241
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	39	75	482	210	492
<i>Flour, only</i>	11,398	12,642	13,167	8,490	7,530	12,543	19,887	34,184
Including Kazakhstan	7822	9063	10769	7266	4989	11525	17531	27620
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	288	263	39	1317	3972
XUAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
Afghanistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
<i>Wheat, only</i>	13,249	29,978	32,797	36,332	30,156	23,332	12,401	15,049
Including Kazakhstan	12,578	27,786	32,237	36,272	29,596	22,783	12,082	10,437
Uzbekistan	-	-	143	60	510	418	164	24
Afghanistan	-	216	-	-	-	-	56	5
<i>Tea, only</i>	1,432	490	1,072.5	751	1,097	1,181	1,404	1,534
Including Kyrgyzstan	32	404	35	43	50	32	72	150
XUAR	-	28	84	19	90	129	96	198
Iran	140	314	340	459	680	787	952	866

¹Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, p. 280. Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2005, p.281.

Appendix 11: Export of RT to Separate Countries (In millions of U.S. dollars) ¹

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
In total export	745.7	596.5	688.7	784.3	651.5	736.9	797.2	914.9
Russia	63.5	47.9	115.1	258.8	104.7	87.5	52.2	60.5
India	0.0	0.0	–	0.0	–	–	0.0	0.2
Iran	3.5	13.6	13.5	12.5	29.9	28.4	51.4	29.6
The Incorporated Arab Emirates	0.9	6.0	2.2	0.4	0.3	1.2	0.7	0.3
Pakistan	1.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2
Turkey	8.2	0.4	1.0	58.4	75.1	118.5	193.2	139.7


¹ Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, p.p. 247,248. International Activity of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2005, p.p. 24,26.

Appendix 12: Import of RT from Separate Countries (In millions of U.S. dollars) ²

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
In total export	750.3	711.0	663.1	675.0	687.5	720.5	880.8	1191.3
Russia	115.1	102.1	92.4	105.1	129.4	163.5	178.1	240.8
India	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.1	34.4	31.5	3.2	3.3
Iran	12.0	11.3	10.4	7.6	10.0	15.6	23.7	26.3
The Incorporated Arab Emirates	7.1	4.9	4.0	2.8	4.9	6.9	13.8	16.2
Pakistan	1.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.3
Turkey	5.0	3.9	1.4	4.0	9.3	10.5	29.5	37.9

² Annual Report of Republic of the Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2001, p.p. 250,251. International activity of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2005, p.p. 28,30.

Appendix 13: Share of Foreign Trade Turnover, Export and Import of Tajikistan with Greater Central Asia (In total size of respective indicators)



Appendix 14: Change of Share of Turnover, Export and Import of Tajikistan (In total size of respective indicators-- Greater Central Asia)¹

