Turkey Analyst,
vol. 4 no. 9
2 May 2011

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

The decision of the Supreme electoral board two weeks ago to veto 12 independent candidates, most of whom were supported by the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), sent schock-waves through Turkey, with Kurds staging mass protests all over the country, during which one Kurdish adolescent was killed by the security forces. The veto decision was met with the heavy criticism of most mainstream commentators.  Although the decision was subsequently rescinded,  there is a general concern that the Kurdish issue risks getting out of hand, and many commentators  are critical of the way the ruling AKP is handling the matter.

BELGE:  IT WAS A CLOSE CALL
Murat Belge in Taraf observes that the initial decision of the Supreme Electoral Board to veto independent Kurdish candidates in the general election, which was subsequently rescinded, shook Turkey. We experienced a couple of suspenseful days, and it seems that we have escaped the ordeal with only one dead. Yet as this is Turkey, you can never be sure. Certain things in this country are so strange, that it is difficult to understand what is happening and why they are happening for a bystander even if you try hard to follow developments as closely as it is possible for an observer. In order to really understand, you need to be involved personally, making it possible for you to follow the events as they evolve step by step. OK, the board decided to veto the candidates, and chaos followed. That was hardly unexpected; after all, it was hardly expected that the vetoed candidates would just say, “I might as well as go back home and take care of the laundry” or “Anyway, what I really wanted was go fishing”. It was evident that chaos would break out, and presumably the members of the board were well aware that it would. Indeed, logic tells you that this was precisely the intention. But then again, what happened next didn’t fit that narrative, as the board invited the candidates to supplement their documents so that they could be reinstated as candidates. Yet even as we witness the unfolding events with ever growing amazement, I cannot but help feel that it was close call; and I certainly hope that I am not being too optimistic when I use the past form. The initial decision could have ushered in a process leading to civil war. It was as if we came close to the edge, perhaps because someone beckoned, but then something happened and we didn’t take the final plunge. Ours is indeed a very strange life.

MERT: THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IS NOT RESPECTED
Nuray Mert in Milliyet writes that it has been misleading to portray the initial decision of the Supreme electoral board to veto the independent Kurdish candidates as the only problem. Some try to create the impression that everything was going smoothly, that we were joyously headed to the election, before the Supreme electoral board destroyed it all; it is certainly true that the decision to veto 12 independent candidates has been utterly disruptive, but still, it is not true that we were joyously headed to the election. For sure, the ruling of the board was bad enough, but hadn’t the principle of democratic representation already been damaged enough by the insistence to retain the ten percent threshold to parliament? Subsequent to the veto decision, the leader of the CHP wisely called attention to the matter and suggested that the threshold be lowered. Yet it is apparent that the government does not entertain any such plans. On the contrary, it has made plain once again that it is going to defend the ten percent threshold. And finally, the Prime Minister has declared that there is no such thing as a Kurdish issue. None of us could have expected this much, but under such circumstances, one must conclude that the ruling of the Supreme electoral board was not that unexpected.

MAHÇUPYAN:  THE AKP MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN EMBODYING THE NATION OR PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
Etyen Mahçupyan in Zaman writes that the political mission of the ruling AKP is marked by a profound contradiction. On the one hand, here is a party that authors democratic reforms; on the other hand, we have a party that aspires to make its power near-permanent, that nourishes dreams of becoming identified with the “nation”. However, these two aspirations are not compatible. It is not possible to be very democratic when you aspire to unify society behind your leadership, when you create and sustain the myth of the homogenous nation. Doing that implies that society is reduced to the nation, which makes it politically easier to disregard multitude and societal differences. We are indeed witnessing that the leading representatives of the AKP are increasingly prone to imply that that their own identity is more “authentic” and thus superior. Yet democratization inevitably results in nations becoming societies; that is, as nations move toward democracy, societal differences naturally assert themselves, with the “nation” in the process becoming fractured. It would be useful if it was appreciated that the Kurdish question will not be solved by integrating the Kurds into the nation, but by making the “Kurdish nation” a part of society. Yet it seems that the AKP is finding it difficult to grasp the distance that separates its self-perception as the embodiment of the nation and its concurrent dream of being the political vector of democratization. The coming period will force the AKP to change. It will become apparent that trying to have it both ways is a dead-end, forcing the AKP to make a choice. The AKP will either loose society because it insists on embodying the nation, or it will set society free through democratization, ushering in a nation that does not identify itself with the ruling party.

TAYIZ: HOW IS THE AKP GOING TO SOLVE THE KURDISH ISSUE?
Kurtuluş Tayiz in Taraf notes that solving the Kurdish question has been one of the most important promises made by Prime Minister Erdoğan in the election campaign. Yet Erdoğan has not specified how he is going to realize this proclaimed aim. No details, beside veiled suggestions, are to be found in the 155 page long election manifesto of the AKP. Yet when compared with the election manifesto from 2007, one is nonetheless struck by more radical expressions. For one thing, this time the problem is spelled out by its proper name, the “Kurdish question”. And while the matter was dealt with under the heading of “National security” in 2007, it is now treated under the chapter that deals with “Democratization”. I don’t know whether it is a measure, but significant steps were taken after 2007 even though the election manifesto then hadn’t given any hint of what was to come. Yet the way the AKP deals with the matter nevertheless remains problematic. Now, it is understandable that the AKP acts with a certain, tactically dictated caution in the run-up to the election. There may be legitimate reasons – up to a point – of not disclosing ones cards. But that inevitably raises the question how a government that has desisted from spelling out publicly, in front of the voters, how a Kurdish solution is going to look like will secure the consent of the people, the popular legitimacy of the steps that it are going to be taken after the election. How is a governing party that fears being sincere with the people out of fear of losing votes, going to persuade the people after the election has been held? Is it not going to have difficulty calming the protests that are going to follow? The election manifesto of the AKP states that “the radical steps for the solution of the problem can only be taken by an AK Party which rules by its own, which has secured the solid support of the people, embodying the integration of the people and the state.” As these lines suggest, the AKP deems it necessary to have a parliamentary majority (of more than 330 deputies) in order to take radical steps in order to solve the Kurdish problem. The promise has now been made to the people. If the Kurdish problem does not become history during their third term in power, then they will not escape the fate of becoming history themselves.

ALTAN:  THE IMAGE OF THE ”NEW” CHP IS HURT AS THE PARTY APPROPRIATES THE CAUSE OF ERGENEKON
Mehmet Altan in Star wonders why Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) goes to such lengths in appropriating the cause of the suspects in the Ergenekon case. In his campaign speech in Zonguldak, Kılıçdaroğlu came out in support of Mehmet Haberal (a university president and a confidant of former president Süleyman Demirel who has been made a CHP candidate in the election) in an exaggerated way.  The “Süleyman Demirel-Mehmet Haberal-Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu” triangle is badly hurting the image of the “new CHP” which Kılıçdaroğlu is trying to project and it is undermining the credibility of the positive, reformist steps that are being taken. Instead of assuming a burden that it cannot possibly carry by appropriating Ergeenekon, CHP would have done much better if it had lent full support to the over one hundred NGOs who recently made a public call to the government, urging it to revitalize the accession process with the EU; if the CHP had done so, it would have done Turkey and indeed the government itself a service. The CHP’s insistence on defending the Ergenekon conjures up the image of a man who shoots himself in one leg, while moving ahead with his other leg. And Kılıçdaroğlu pours acid on the claim that his party has “renewed” itself by inscribing his own name alongside the “Süleyman Demirel-Mehmet Haberal” duo.

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2010. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".

The Turkey Analyst
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published bi-weekly, and includes topical analysis, as well asa summary of the Turkish media debate. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell and Halil M. Karaveli.

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The Joint Center was created in 2005 through the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

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The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understanding of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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