Turkey Analyst,
vol. 4 no. 6
21 March 2011

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

Commentators in the Turkish press are trying to make sense of the position that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken in the Libyan crisis. Several journalists who enjoy access to government officials argue that Turkey is in fact not at all as pro-Qaddafi as it has come to appear; they relay the information that the Turkish government, although it continues to be unhappy about the military intervention, has nonetheless engaged in talks with the Libyan opposition. The recent arrests of journalists accused of being members of the Ergenekon terrorist organization continues to reverberate in the columns; there is a strong apprehension among liberal-minded commentators and intellectuals that the investigation into the coup schemes has taken a very wrong turn.

AYDINTAŞBAS: TURKEY HAS ABANDONED QADDAFI

Aslı Aydınstaşbas in Milliyet notes that the Turkish government has been facing internal as well external criticism since the Libyan crisis erupted on account on what has been perceived as its support for the Qaddafi regime. However, during the last week Turkey has in fact quietly disengaged from Qaddafi.  Although Prime Minister Erdoğan has spoken out against a military intervention – asking “What has NATO got to do in Libya” – and although the ties with the Qaddafi regime have not yet been severed, Turkey has nonetheless quietly supported the UN resolution allowing the use of force against Libya. Meanwhile, high ranking officials confirm that Turkey has established contacts with the Libyan opposition. The Turkish consulate in rebel-controlled Benghazi provided the first venue for those contacts that have subsequently continued through several channels. Representatives of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) and the foreign ministry have reportedly held meetings with the Libyan opposition representatives in Europe during the last week. A high government official denies that Turkey is pro-Qaddafi. “He has to go. Even if he stayed on he would no longer be able to govern the country.”  One reason Turkey has abandoned its initial, cautious position and begun to plan for a post-Qaddafi Libya is that Turkish officials were appalled by the reports that the forces of Qaddafi were committing atrocities in the areas they had recaptured from the rebels.  The officials do not deny that the Turkish government has been opposed to an intervention in Libya, but they add that they want the regimes in the Middle East to be accountable to their populations. They emphasize that their main concern is that Libya is going to become a second Iraq and that the Western intervention will change the psychological climate in the Middle East, by unleashing a backlash against the wave of change.

ERGİN: ANKARA IS SQUEEZED BETWEEN THE WEST AND QADDAFI
Sedat Ergin in Hürriyet writes that Turkey in fact desires a change of regime in Libya, but that it has abstained from announcing this in a loud and clear way. Turkey has adopted a cautious policy of “wait and see”. When the crisis erupted, Turkey did come out in support of the opposition in Libya. Prime Minister Erdoğan urged Qaddafi not to “overlook democratic demands”. Yet when the situation on the ground between the government forces and the opposition forces was leveled out, Turkey fell silent. All in all, Turkey has sought to hedge its bets, distributing the risks equally between the warring parties in the civil war. Turkey, which has secured construction contracts in Libya worth an estimated US$15 billion during the last five years, has taken the possibility that Qaddafi might be able to hold on to power for a while into consideration.  In the final analysis, Turkey has adopted a position of equidistance to the warring parties, thus falling behind the Western position that calls for Qaddafi’s departure, instead seeking to – if possible – secure a role of mediator. Yet as long as Qaddafi remains in power, Libya is going to be a headache for Turkey in its relations with the West.

GÜRSEL:  THE OLD TURKEY AND THE NEW TURKEY
Kadri Gürsel in Milliyet writes that the day when his two esteemed colleges Nedim Şener ve Ahmet Şık were arrested, accused of membership in the Ergenekon terrorist organization is, without exaggeration, a historical turning point for Turkey. He then goes on to chart the similarities and differences between the old Turkey and the new Turkey: In the old Turkey we had one deep state; in the new Turkey we have two deep states. One is on the run, the other is chasing it. The taboos of the old Turkey were the Kurdish problem, the Armenian problem and the military; in the new Turkey those taboos have been broken. Yet while we are now free to express radical views on those issues, other taboos have replaced them. The Gülen movement and the corruption of the ruling AKP are the taboos of the new Turkey. To report on them is to invite serious trouble. In the old Turkey, books were censured, confiscated and burnt; in the new Turkey the authors are arrested as the books are in the process of being written. In the old Turkey, newspapers were shut down; in the new Turkey pressure is applied on the owners of the newspapers so as to ensure that they change hands. In the old Turkey, the holders of power used to claim that the “judiciary is independent” when they were confronted with the indefensible acts of the judiciary and the police. As the holders of power in the new Turkey can no longer with any credibility claim that the judiciary is independent, they say “it has got nothing to do with us” when they are called to comment the indefensible acts of the judiciary and the police. In no way do I long for the old Turkey. Yet neither am I grateful to anyone that we are no longer assassinated in extrajudicial killings, thankful that we are no longer tried in military courts and are not subjected to torture. Because I do happen to believe that this country deserves something much better than what we are being offered today.

ALTAN:  ERDOĞAN’S VICTORY RISKS TURNING INTO A PYRRHIC VICTORY
Ahmet Altan in Taraf notes that Turkey is becoming an increasingly polarized country. There is something that Prime Minister Erdoğan and AKP needs to appreciate: there are indeed those who are his “sworn enemies” only because they dislike the values and the masses that the AKP represents, and because they resent the fact that the AKP has forced the regime of military tutelage to cede ground. But there are also those who are sincerely worried by the odd things that are happening as the elections approach. Unnecessary discussions that turn around issues like statues, television series and alcohol, the increasingly nationalist rhetoric of Prime Minister Erdoğan, his estrangement from Europe, his fixation with introducing a presidential system, combine to stoke the fears of a significant portion of this society. Sure, Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP might very well receive fifty percent of the votes, but if the feelings of insecurity take permanently hold of the remaining fifty percent, Erdoğan will nonetheless be hard put to govern the country. If society is divided in two halves and those two halves view each other with suspicion and hatred, such a society will be ripe for the worst and will become impossible to govern. If the AKP copies the CHP which passes judgments on people’s way of life and seeks to impose interdictions on lifestyles, if it creates such an impression, then a Kemalist CHP together with a religious “CHP” will set this society ablaze. The situation is also extremely tense in the Southeast these days. How is Erdoğan going to be able to govern a society where the Kurds in the east and the “moderns” in the west equally feel under threat? If Erdoğan persists in stoking tensions in order to secure his election victory, I fear that such a victory will turn out to be nothing but a pyrrhic victory.

FINKEL: THE CHP IS TRYING ITS HAND AT POPULISM
Andrew Finkel in Today’s Zaman writes that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) under new management has not exactly hit the ground running. Yet Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu appears to possess one important quality his predecessor Deniz Baykal lacked. He wants to see his party win the election. To this end, his party has actually started producing not just policies, but policies that may even win it votes. Only this week the CHP has taken a hard look at the thing that obsesses every Turkish male once they come of legal age – the obligation to do compulsory military service. Turkey does not need such a large standing army and for many the time spent in uniform is a wasteful distraction from their future careers. In the past, people have been able to buy an exemption to do a reduced stint, but this is clearly unjust. So with a bit of lateral thinking the CHP has come up with a scheme which would allow people to do an abbreviated tour of duty not by forking out a whacking fee but what they can afford. It’s not a revolution but it is a start. For those who cry “foul,” saying that it is a bit of pre-election populism, that is exactly what it is. But it is not irresponsible and it has made the government flinch. As for the electorate, perhaps they may come to like the idea of political parties actually competing for their vote.

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2010. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".

The Turkey Analyst
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published bi-weekly, and includes topical analysis, as well asa summary of the Turkish media debate. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell and Halil M. Karaveli.

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The Joint Center was created in 2005 through the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

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The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understanding of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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