Turkey Analyst,
vol. 4 no. 1
10 January 2011

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

The main topic of the Turkish political debate during the last days of 2010 and the first days of 2011 was the declaration of the National Security council, chaired by President Abdullah Gül, that no concession is going to be made with regard to the mono-culturally Turkish identity of the state. The declaration, as well as the fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan has called the right of the Kurds to talk about autonomy and bilingualism into question, deeming deliberations on those matters “dark schemes against the AKP” and as “assassination attempts against democracy” led several commentators to conclude that the AKP is introducing its own version of authoritarian state tutelage.

GÜRSEL: THE KURDISH ISSUE UNDER THE AKP’S TUTELAGE
Kadri Gürsel in Milliyet notes that Prime Minister Erdoğan objects strongly to the issues of “democratic autonomy” and bilingualism being discussed. He accuses those who take part in such discussions of being part of “sinister forces” and of “scheming against the AKP”. The reason why these issues cannot be debated is the fact that a general election is approaching. In fact, Prime Minister acknowledges the existence of the Kurdish problem, but does not want it to be discussed. As long as autonomy and bilingualism remain on the political agenda, AKP runs the risk of losing votes to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Fair enough. Yet by trying to thwart that threat by reverting to repressive measures, the AKP faces the risk of losing the Kurdish vote. The right way to counter this challenge is in fact to produce policies, instead of instituting a new version of the old regime of tutelage. If the Kurdish problem is going to be solved by means of a democratic mobilization which is fed by a free discussion, then it’s perfectly legitimate that the different propositions are debated, not least in the run-up to a general election. It’s the attempt to question the legitimacy of these deliberations that is illegitimate.

ÇALIŞLAR: ERDOĞAN ACTS AS IF HE IS THE PROPRIETOR OF THE COUNTRY
Oral Calışlar in Radikal writes that the Kurdish issue is a defining issue; he reminds that several Turkish leaders in the recent past chose to retreat when they were confronted with this issue, and that they surrendered to militarism and joined the powers that be. Erdoğan assumed great risks when he challenged militarism and the status quo; as long as he promoted change, he earned and received the support of those who otherwise don’t agree with his policies. However, as a third consecutive electoral victory is now apparently within Erdoğan’s reach, there are  signs that his ways are about to change. Once Erdoğan had to ask himself “I can win the election, but will they allow me to govern?”; today, as he no longer needs to worry about not being allowed to govern, Erdoğan is increasingly displaying signs of a psychology of dominance, viewing himself as the one to whom allegiance is owed. He behaves as if he is the proprietor of the country. Indeed, it is possible to interpret the declaration issued by the National Security council in this light. Power is dangerous. Once you begin to count yourself among the power elite, then your historic journey inevitably takes on a new direction.

ESAYAN:  THE KURDISH OPENING IS THREATENED BY THE AKP’S ARROGANCE AND THE PKK’S INTOLERANCE OF DISSENT
Markar Esayan in Taraf writes that the AKP has been enervated by the attempt of the Kurdish movement to force its hand. The AKP is working according to its own time-table; according to what was reported in Taraf recently, the state authorities have informed the Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, that Turkey is going to introduce education in Kurdish within five years. Kurdish teachers are said to be currently educated in Erbil in northern Iraq. Talabani is reportedly exhorting PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to hold his fire and refrain from causing trouble for the AKP government before the upcoming general election. Yet when I read this news, my reaction was that five years is an awful long period, that it will not be possible for the AKP to postpone the march of history. When somebody tries to force your hand (as the Kurdish movement is doing with its proposal of democratic autonomy and bilingualism) that does not give you the right to label them as “assassins” and “saboteurs”. As to the blueprint for democratic autonomy which was presented by the Democratic Society congress (DTK), it is an outrageous document that would turn the clock back to the 1940s; it is a perfect example of Kurdish Kemalism. Galip Ensarioğlu, the chairman of the Diyarbakir Business Association, remarks that democratic autonomy is in fact not what most Kurds aspire for; his remark drew the ire of Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) who commented that it was up to the elected representatives of the Kurds to express opinions on the matter. Is the Kurdish opening going to get squeezed between the arrogance of an AKP that admits no interference with the time-table it has set, and the PKK’s “I am the sheriff in this town” attitude?

MİROĞLU: THE DEPRESSING NOSTALGIA OF THE KEMALISTS
Dissecting the psychology of those who support the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP), Orhan Miroğlu in Taraf makes the observation that their choice is ultimately determined not so much by politics as by a deep sense of sadness, by a nostalgia for a distant past, namely that of the 1930s. “As I sit down and talk with those who have come to be termed ‘worried moderns’, I am struck by the fact that every single one is actually feeling deeply depressed because he or she was not born in and lived at the time when Mustafa Kemal (the founder of the Turkish republic) was alive”. Obviously, it is not unusual that political parties nurture their historical heritage; yet what sets the CHP and its electorate apart is the fact that society is viewed solely through the lenses of nostalgia and the cherished values of the past. In Europe such parties are marginalized and thus inconsequential; the CHP however, remains the main opposition force at this historical juncture in Turkey. When Turkey’s own Berlin wall is finally coming down, with a delay of twenty years, the CHP still manages to remain the main opposition to change. The CHP has succeeded in keeping alive the nostalgia for its historical accomplishment – the creation of a nation-state in Anatolia; it is a heritage that remains sacrosanct for the supporters of the CHP, making it an object of sadness at a time when the rest of the population of Turkey is engaged in the process of revisiting history, reconstructing and questioning the truths of the historical memory that the republic had constructed. After this point, the subject of the CHP is, I believe, a matter that must be left to psychiatrists who are specialized in treating national traumas.
 
ÖZEL: THE NEW TURKISH REGIME IS NO LESS AUTHORITARIAN THANTHE DEFUNCT REGIME OF MILITARY TUTELAGE
As he sums up the developments in Turkey and internationally during the last year, Soli Özel in Habertürk notes that 2010 was the year when a long era in Turkey finally came to an end. The regime of military tutelage, which was first conceived in 1960, and which was institutionalized in 1980, ended. A new power structure and conception took its place, which in turn is a consequence of the economic-societal-political power shift that had begun to shape Turkey since the 1990s. It is not possible to maintain that this new power structure and understanding differs from the authoritarian, state-centered, intolerant model to which the citizens of Turkey are accustomed. This in turn presages that the struggle that was waged in the past against authoritarianism is going to be reenacted against those who have now begun to monopolize power. “I consider it likely that Turkey’s defining political issue in 2011 and beyond will be framed in this context”. The question of how the Kurdish problem will be settled is going to be decided as a part of this struggle.

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2010. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".

The Turkey Analyst
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published bi-weekly, and includes topical analysis, as well asa summary of the Turkish media debate. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell and Halil M. Karaveli.

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