Turkey Analyst,
vol. 3 no. 20
22 November 2010

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

The outcome of the NATO summit in Lisbon has been generally hailed by commentators in the Turkish press as a reaffirmation of Turkey’s adherence to the Western alliance, and of the country’s Western, strategic identity. However, those who are critical of the ruling AKP point out that the foreign policy of the government is inconsistent, as Turkey simultaneously holds that Iran does not constitute any threat and nevertheless signs on to a missile defense system that is precisely designed to ward off an Iranian threat. The other prominent topic in the recent Turkish debate has been the suddenly raised specter of a possible electoral alliance between the Kemalist CHP and the Kurdish BDP. Although most commentators are inclined to deem such an alliance unlikely, the possibility is nonetheless being seriously considered. It seems certain that the question of how the AKP is going to be challenged in the elections that are to be held next year is destined to feature prominently in the Turkish debate.

SAZAK: WHY SHOULD TURKEY PROTECT EUROPE IF IT IS NOT GOING TO BE OFFERED EU MEMBERSHIP?
Derya Sazak in Milliyet writes that Turkey’s concerns about NATO’s missile shield were legitimate, and he further raises the question why Turkey should help defend Europe at all. Turkey indeed has reason to be concerned that the deployment of the missile shield will create new enmities, after having recently developed good relations with its neighbors Russia and Iran. And Turkey is now left outside the political community that it helped defend against communism during forty years. The erstwhile enemies of the West are today all members of the EU. Meanwhile, in countries like France, Germany and the Netherlands racist nationalism and Islamophobia are on the rise, and they are trying to block Turkey’s EU membership by alleging that Turkey is drifting eastward. But if that really is the case, then is it not in the interest of the West to keep Turkey within the “European alliance”? Of what use is the missile shield going to be for us if we aren’t going to become members of the EU? Why should we protect Europe?

GÜRSEL: TURKEY’S MUCH TOUTED FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE HAS UNRAVELED
Kadri Gürsel in Milliyet writes that the result of the NATO summit amounts to nothing less than the repudiation of what he calls the ideological and unrealistic foreign policy of the AKP government. Let there be no misunderstanding; I am not suggesting that the Turkish government did something wrong by signing on to the missile shield of the NATO. That was the right thing to do. The AKP government realized that abstaining would ultimately have been detrimental to Turkey’s national interests and that it would have resulted in the country becoming dangerously isolated in its region. Yet the government had been insisting that it did not perceive any threat from Iran; now, one may legitimately inquire why Turkey has signed on to the missile shield if Iran wasn’t any threat.

ÖZEL: TURKEY’S STRATEGIC IDENTITY REMAINS WESTERN
Assessing the results of the NATO summit, Soli Özel in Habertürk concludes that Turkey defines its security interests within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Turkey’s adherence to the West was always primarily strategic; in strategic terms, Turkey’s identity was Western. However, in political terms, Turkey was far from living up to the democratic standards and values of the West. In fact, during the Cold War Turkey’s semi-authoritarianism was of little concern for the Western countries. Today, when geopolitical considerations have once again acquired preeminence, Turkey’s Western interlocutors will be the U.S. and NATO. The leverage of the EU over Turkey’s internal affairs will diminish. In this light, the deepening of democracy and of the rule of law in Turkey will depend on the outcome of the internal power struggles.

ÇANDAR: TURKEY EMERGED AS NATO’S SECOND MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY
Cengiz  Çandar in Radikal observes that the outcome of the NATO summit in Lisbon has occasioned the greatest satisfaction among the practitioners of Turkish foreign policy. If Turkey had not been able to obtain the results it did, a major crisis would have ensued. Now, instead of being cast in the role as the country that obscured the prospects of the NATO alliance, Turkey emerged from the Lisbon summit with a strong hand, and indeed as the second most important country of the alliance, after the U.S. Turkey’s role in NATO, which was forcefully reaffirmed in Lisbon, is the country’s most crucial asset, and it is one that it has every intention of safeguarding. The Lisbon summit reaffirmed Turkey’s appurtenance to the “Western collective security system”, in the event rendering the discourse on Turkey’s supposed “eastern drift” very much obsolete.

ZAMAN: LEFTISM AND SECULARISM UNITE CHP AND BDP
Amberin Zaman in Habertürk supports the idea of an electoral alliance between the CHP and the Kurdish BDP. Both parties share common ideological origins, since they are leftists. They are also united by secularism. In fact, the BDP is ahead of the CHP when it comes to gender equality, with fifty percent of its parliamentarians being women. If the two parties join forces, it is likely that several candidates will be elected from the BDP quota in the cities in the western parts of the country where there is a significant Kurdish population. Thus, the BDP will cease to be a party that is restricted to the Southeastern region. That in turn will be beneficial for the unity of the country. A solution to the Kurdish issue requires societal concord, and in that perspective the participation of the CHP is absolutely essential. Indeed, one reason that the BDP looks favorably on an alliance with the CHP is that the latter is still perceived by the Kurds as the “party of the state”. Ironically, however, the CHP will not be able to persuade the Kurds or the Turks about its sincerity if it continues to behave like the “political arm” of the state.

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2010. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".

The Turkey Analyst
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published bi-weekly, and includes topical analysis, as well asa summary of the Turkish media debate. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell and Halil M. Karaveli.

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The Joint Center was created in 2005 through the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

The Turkey Initiative
The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understanding of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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