Turkey Analyst,
vol. 3 no. 19
8 November 2010

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

The suicide bombing in Istanbul on October 31, for which TAK, a terrorist group generally believed to be connected to the PKK, assumed responsibility, raised concerns among commentators that the peace process that has gotten underway between the Turkish state and the Kurdish PKK risked being endangered. While some commentators speculated that the act had been carried out at the behest of the “deep state”, others suggested that the bombing pointed to divisions within the PKK. The power struggle within the Republican People’s party (CHP) was widely commented. The commentators were divided over the implications of the changes in the leadership of the CHP. While some entertain the hope that the CHP is about to shed old, Kemalist ways, others predict that the effort is destined to fail.

ESAYAN: THE TAKSIM ATTACK POINTS TO DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PKK
Markar Esayan in Taraf describes the suicide bombing at the Taksim square in Istanbul on October 31, which left over thirty people injured, fifteen of whom were police officers, as an act designed to disrupt the nascent peace process. It could be that we are faced with the provocation of sinister forces that have a vested interest in ensuring that the war (with the Kurdish PKK) continues. The bombing occurred just after Murat Karayılan (the acting leader of the PKK) in an interview declared that the organization was no longer going to target civilians, and in which he stated that he regretted the civilian casualties of the past; set in this context, the bombing was very unfortunate, taking place at an extremely critical juncture. Its codes need to be carefully studied. It may very well be that we are faced with a division within the PKK. If so, if there are those within the PKK who refuse to heed the calls for peace that are issued by Murat Karayılan and by Abdullah Öcalan, and who are seeking to wrest control from Karayılan, then the problem is destined to become truly intractable.

AYDINTAŞBAS:  REVOLUTION IN THE CHP
Aslı Aydıntaşbas in Milliyet writes that what has occurred in the CHP is anything but a simple struggle between different personalities, and definitely not any new version of the kind of the sectarian intra-fighting of which the history of the CHP is full of examples. No, it is nothing less than a settling of accounts between two diametrically divergent ideological visions.  On the hand there is the vision of Önder Sav: closed to the world, estranged from democracy, and capable only of repeating, year after year, a stale mantra about secularism.  Opposed to it, we find the attempt of Kılıçdaroğlu to verbalize the new language of the left. Kılıçdaroğlu is still struggling to find his way, but he intuitively appreciates what is called for. He represents the yearning to integrate with the world; he understands that the CHP must make its peace with society, with religion and with change. Who do you think stands the best chance to succeed? Kılıçdaroğlu has passed his first leadership test (by firing Sav). But he is going to encounter severe troubles in the days ahead; the defenders of the status quo are going to do everything in their power in order to make him stumble. It’s a safe bet that there will be a final settling of accounts at a party congress. But I am nonetheless hopeful. The delegates will face a simple choice: to go along with Kılıçdaroğlu or opt for the melting of the party. To oppose change will amount to conceding defeat and to handing over a third, consecutive electoral victory to the AKP. Which delegate would make such a choice?

ALTAN: THE CHP IS BREAKING UP
Ahmet Altan in Taraf writes that the leadership struggle within the CHP is a sign that the party is breaking up. Altan poses the question if it’s reasonable to assume that a party that pledges allegiance to “Atatürk’s principles and reforms”, as the CHP does, can have any future at all in a Turkey that has changed. Like the world, Turkey has changed. The Kurds demand that their identity is respected, the Sunni religious want their freedom, the Alevis expect the state to bestow official recognition on their prayer sites, and the leftists ask for freedom of thought. Now, which of Atatürk’s principles can meet any of these demands? The new leader of the CHP is unable to pronounce the word “Kurd”, he doesn’t participate at the national day reception hosted by the president because the first lady is wearing the headscarf, and he is unable to defend Alevis rights although he is a Alevi himself. How is he then ever going to be able to live up to the demands of the people and succeed in politics? It is because Atatürk’s and the CHP’s principles are unsuitable for the Turkey of 2010 that the party is torn apart in a way seldom seen. It is not the fight between Önder Sav and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu that is shredding the CHP to pieces. It is the changing realities of life.

TURGUT: THE CHP IS EMBARKING ON A LONG OVERDUE EFFORT TO REDEFINE REPUBLICAN MODERNITY
Serdar Turgut in Habertürk writes that the crisis that is rocking the CHP is at the same time the crisis of the founding ideology of the Turkish republic. The modernization that was ushered in by the republic was predicated on the notion that faith and religion was going to be excluded from the system. As a consequence, the people were excluded from the system as well, and the party that touts “people” in its name came to understand modernization in this particular sense. The attitude (of the CHP) was “had it not been for this people, we would have been able to westernize”. It is this understanding of modernization that has distorted our political system from the founding of the republic onward and which accounts for why the shoring up of democracy has continued to elude us. The redefinition of modernization was long overdue.  An understanding of modernization that does not exclude faith had imposed itself. I am encouraged by the developments in the CHP and I am confident that the new leadership has embarked on an endeavor to fill secularism and modernization with a new content.

GÜRSEL: THE NEO-LEVANTINE TURKS NEED TO LEARN POLITICS
Kadri Gürsel in Milliyet writes that the westernized, well-to-do Turks under the rule of the AKP display traits that recall the Levantine populations in the Ottoman Empire. Like the case was with the Levantines, Europeans who had settled in the Ottoman Empire, they constitute an economic, social and cultural elite; no one interferes with their life-style, they are sovereign in running their economic interests, and they maintain their social status and the privileges that go with it. Yet just like the Levantines – who lacked political influence – the “neo-Levantines” have grown estranged from the state (since the AKP came to power and took charge of the state apparatus). I am not writing these lines to suggest that the “neo-Levantines” are destined to share the fate of the Levantines, who were eventually forced to leave Turkey after the advent of the republic. In fact, they wield considerable economic and cultural power. Unlike what was the case with the Levantines, the venues of politics are not closed to them. But they do have to shed their vanity and haughtiness and let themselves be inspired by how the conservative masses, that moved into the cities during the last forty years, have excelled in politics. They need to change, to empathize and learn how to forge alliances. They would do well to start by envisioning the past exclusion of the religious masses and by being sensitive to the enduring pain of the Kurds.
 

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2010. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".

The Turkey Analyst
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published bi-weekly, and includes topical analysis, as well asa summary of the Turkish media debate. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell and Halil M. Karaveli.

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The Joint Center was created in 2005 through the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

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The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understanding of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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