Turkey Analyst,
vol. 3 no. 16
29 September 2010

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

In the wake of the September 12 referendum on constitutional amendment, several commentators have observed that the greatest loser of the referendum was the ultra right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). A significant portion of the core base of the MHP shifted over to the yes-side, defying the party leadership that had campaigned for a rejection of the constitutional amendment on the ground that the ruling Justice and development party (AKP) needed to be punished for its Kurdish opening. The outcome of the referendum is generally interpreted as an indication that the electorate of Turkey wants change and prefers a moderate stance on the Kurdish issue.

CEMAL: ERDOĞAN CAN RULE UNTIL 2022
Hasan Cemal in Milliyet raises the possibility that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may very well retain power until 2022, speculating that Erdoğan will be elected president in 2012 -- after the AKP has won handsomely in the 2011 general election -- and be reelected for another five year term in 2017. Do you want to see Erdoğan wave at you from the presidential mansion in Çankaya until 2022? I pose that question to the opposition, to all those within the state establishment and others who have spent the last eight years accusing Erdoğan, day and night, who have concocted all sorts of schemes against the AKP government. What is the result? The AKP has gone from 34 percent (in the 2002 election) to 47 percent (in 2007) and now to 58 percent (in the referendum on constitutional reform). There is no end in sight to the disappointments of the opponents of the AKP. They are indeed set to experience more of the same. The CHP (the main opposition party) has not succeeded in presenting a project for Turkey that inspires the confidence of the voters. If the CHP fails to present an alternative, Erdoğan will indeed settle comfortably into the presidency until 2022.

AKYOL: THE CORE BASE OF THE MHP RESENTS THE MILITARY’S INTERVENTIONS
Taha Akyol in Milliyet notes that a significant portion of the voters of the ultra right Nationalist Movement party (MHP), perhaps as many as one out of three, voted yes in the referendum, despite the fact that the party leadership had campaigned for no, on the grounds that Prime Minister Erdoğan has reached an accord with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader. However, that accusation lacked credibility and many nationalists voted yes. They did so because first of all, the MHP’s voters are nationalists as well conservatives, and secondly because the base of the MHP has grown disenchanted with the military after the 1980 coup and the “post-modern” coup in 1997. After all, the MHP joined forces with the AKP in the decision to lift the ban on the headscarf in the universities, which should serve as a reminder of how attached the MHP is to conservative values. The decision of the parliament was later abrogated by the Constitutional Court, and it can be assumed that the intervention of the court caused resentment among the base of the MHP, evoking the memory of how the judiciary had dispensed rulings during the “post-modern” coup in 1997. Thus, the core base of the MHP should never have been expected to reject amendments that aim at ascertaining that the recruitment base of the high judiciary is broadened. As to the effects of the military interventions in 1980 and 1997, those have shattered the idealized perception of the armed forces that had traditionally prevailed among the base of the MHP.

ÇALIŞLAR: THE MHP HAS LOST TOUCH WITH ANATOLIAN CONSERVATISM
Oral Calışlar in Radikal writes that the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli failed to arouse his constituency with the accusation that the AKP government was endangering the integrity of Turkey with its Kurdish opening. The MHP sustained significant losses in its central Anatolian heartland. In the city of Erzurum for instance, the MHP had received 20, 5 perceived of the votes in the municipal elections in March 2009. Yet in the referendum only 12, 3 percent voted “no”. The support base of the MHP is increasingly to be found in the western, coastal areas where a retrograde nationalism has grown in strength among the secularist middle class that resents the pious Muslims and the Kurds alike. Nationalism is indeed becoming a coastal phenomenon. In central Anatolia and in the Black sea region in contrast, the conservative voters are less inclined to reward an aggressive stance. The growing wealth in these regions can be seen to foster a more pragmatic mindset. Prospering Central Anatolia and the Black sea region are not abandoning nationalism, but these regions are however displaying a new predilection for a more moderate nationalism and conservatism.

İNSEL: THE VOTERS REPUDIATED VULGAR AND AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM
Ahmet İnsel in Radikal rejoices that the biggest loser of the September 12 referendum was vulgar and aggressive nationalism in the shape of the MHP. The fact that the MHP, whose leader Devlet Bahçeli had turned the referendum into a vote over the Kurdish opening, was resoundingly defeated means that the Turkish society is set to embrace a solution of the Kurdish issue that is based on the acknowledgment of cultural diversity. As the AKP is no longer threatened by the ultra nationalism of the MHP, and as the CHP grows increasingly confident that it stands to broaden its electoral appeal by embracing democratic change, a new dynamic of democratization may be the result. The defeat of ultra nationalism is also something to rejoice over since it will occasion second thoughts among those who have been dreaming of a CHP-MHP coalition.

TAŞPINAR: TURKEY IS BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC
With the resounding “yes” of last week’s referendum on constitutional reforms, it has become increasingly clear that the old days of military tutelage are gone for good, writes Ömer Taşpınar in Today’s Zaman. Civilian supremacy over the military is becoming firmly established. The critics of the AKP hold that Turkey is now bereft of “checks and balances.” One has to ask: what kind of democracy needs to be checked by the military? Why should the military have the power to “check” and “balance” a democratically elected government? The same logic applies to the judiciary. In which European democracy do “checks and balances” involve banning political parties? The legal system, especially the constitutional court, is not a guarantor of democracy but a force that has several times undermined democracy by banning Kurdish and Islamic parties that do not fit the norms of the undemocratic constitution. In order to become a liberal democracy Turkey does not need judiciary or military “checks and balances” but a brand new constitution that significantly improves human and minority rights. This will be the next step for Turkey, after the probable AKP victory in the 2011 elections. Yet, the AKP government should be aware that “perception is reality.” There is a perception among important segments of the U.S. punditry and more importantly the U.S. government that the AKP is becoming more authoritarian. The reason for this perception is primarily the tax penalty exerted on the Doğan media group.

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2010. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".

The Turkey Analyst
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published bi-weekly, and includes topical analysis, as well asa summary of the Turkish media debate. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell and Halil M. Karaveli.

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The Joint Center was created in 2005 through the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

The Turkey Initiative
The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understanding of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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