Turkey Analyst,
vol. 3 no. 15
15 September 2010

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

The significance of the constitutional amendments that were put to a popular vote on September 12 has been widely debated by the commentators in the Turkish press.  The ideological polarization in society and between the government and the opposition has been mirrored in the newspaper columns as well.  While both set of commentators agree that the constitutional reform constitute a historic turning point, the assessment of what the changes amount to differ sharply. Those who hail the changes are confident that they usher in full democracy by putting an end to the system of state tutelage over society, while those who decry the constitutional makeover warn that the ground is prepared for the institution of a new system of tutelage. There are also those who point out that the amendments inauspiciously fail to address the crucially important Kurdish issue.

ALTAN: WHAT THE FIGHT IS ABOUT
Ahmet Altan in Taraf writes that the ongoing struggle in Turkey is basically about two different political preferences: On the one hand you have those who believe that the state should rule over those who are brought to power by the popular will. On the other hand, you have those who defend that the parliament and political power that is elected by the people should rule the state. Since the military has managed to discredit itself severely, it no longer plays a major role in this struggle. Thus the judiciary has become the focal point of the standoff. The constitutional amendments restrict the power of the judiciary to constrain political power. In its present composition the high judiciary is sure to obstruct every democratic step. How come that CHP and MHP (the opposition parties) oppose changes that are going to impose restraints on the power of the state? That is because they don’t have the confidence that they are going to be elected to government. Indeed, they stand no chance of ever being able to appeal to the two crucial constituencies – the conservatives and the Kurds. Yet the AKP and the conservatives have a serious problem as well. The conservatives are not as forthcoming toward the Kurds and the Alevis as they ought to be; their sectional and nationalists prejudices make them less inclined to extend those very rights that they claim for themselves to the Kurds and the Alevis. The Sunni conservatives need to gain the trust of the Kurds and the Alevis. Only then will victory in this great struggle for democracy be definitely secured.

GÜRSEL: OPENING THE DOOR FOR AUTHORITARIANISM
Kadri Gürsel in Milliyet writes that the constitutional amendments will nullify the independence of the judiciary by asserting the control of the executive over the judiciary. This will principally come about as that the powers of the president – who is going to be popularly elected, and who is thus henceforth going to have a partisan character – to appoint judges to the Constitutional court are vastly expanded. The framework that is now being put in place is of a kind to supply the perfect instruments to a government which happens to have authoritarian aspirations, that intends to assert its own power at the expense of the law and that is intent on trampling on democracy and on the rights of the political minority. Granted, the status quo does not satisfy the needs of Turkey. But why should we be forced to acquiesce to a costume that will just be another kind of straightjacket on us?

AYDINTAŞBAS: THE YES WILL NOT MAKE TURKEY AN “ADVANCED” DEMOCRACY
Aslı Aydıntaşbaş argues against those who hold that a “yes” to the constitutional amendments will make Turkey a more “advanced” democracy. In fact, Turkey is still going to be far from an “advanced” democracy on September 13, after a “yes” in the referendum. The ten percent threshold to parliament is kept in place. One thing that the parties agree on is to keep the Kurdish movement out of the parliament. As long as that is unchanged, Turkey will not qualify as an “advanced” democracy. The constitutional amendments solve the AKP’s problem with the high judiciary, but what is still lacking is an inclusive definition of citizenship (in order to solve the Kurdish problem), something that is called for more than anything else. Society is sure to remain as polarized as ever after a victory for yes and the authoritarian tendencies of the civilian government will continue to be of concern. Finally, democracy will never be secure in a Turkey that is not anchored in the Western alliance and that is busy searching for alternative affiliations.

KEYMAN: HOW ARE WE TO EXPLAIN THE PKK’S STRENGTH AND RESILIENCE?
Fuat Keyman writes in Radikal that the Kurdistan Worker’s party (PKK) is not only succeeding in asserting its importance through the use of violence, but that the organization has displayed an ability to set the political agenda and imposed itself as the indispensable Kurdish political actor. How are we going to explain the PKK’s resilience and its staying power? One explanation resides in the sociological, political, and human ties that have come to be woven between the PKK and the Kurdish issue over the years. But the other part of the answer is supplied by the deep political and institutional polarization in Turkey. The struggle over power and hegemony is in fact ascertaining that Turkey becomes ungovernable and works to offer the PKK the opportunity to set the political agenda.

MAHÇUPYAN: ISLAM FURTHERS THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY MORE THAN KEMALISM DOES
Etyen Mahçupyan in Taraf poses the question what will further the cause of democratization – Islam or Kemalism? As we can assume that the executive is Islamic, while the judiciary represents Kemalism, the question boils down to whether the former or the latter is a vector of democracy. In fact, Islam is inherently more democratic than Kemalism. Islam tolerates and respects societal diversity, while Kemalism is bent on trying to oppress and homogenize expressions of societal diversity. Thus, even if we, for the sake of argument, were to assume that there are two opposing forces that both stand for two concurrent versions of a system of tutelage, we can conclude that the tutelage of the executive has a much more humane and democratic potential than the tutelage of the judiciary, since the former is based on an ideology that allows democracy significantly more breathing space than what the ideology of the judiciary does.

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2010. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".

The Turkey Analyst
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published bi-weekly, and includes topical analysis, as well asa summary of the Turkish media debate. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell and Halil M. Karaveli.

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The Joint Center was created in 2005 through the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

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The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understanding of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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