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Turkey Analyst,
vol. 2 no. 17
28 September 2009

WHAT THE COLUMNISTS SAY

The implications of the record $2.5 billion tax fine imposed on the Doğan Media Group and the prospects in general of Turkey becoming more democratic under the rule of the AKP remained the main preoccupations of the commentators in Turkey during the last fortnight.  

MERT: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Nuray Mert in Radikal writes that one does not have to be an expert on matters related to taxation to realize that the record tax fine imposed on the Doğan Media Group is a political measure. Punishments of this kind have always been politically motivated. In the past, it was others who were punished under the guise of the “fight against reaction”. Notably, the (Islamic conservative) daily Yeni Şafak was the target of the process that followed on the military intervention in 1997. I fully understand the anger felt by those who were subjected to such treatment in the past. Yet, I also believe that making anger the point of departure of policies paves the way to another hell. By bringing the AKP to power, the people and democracy defeated the process initiated by the intervention of 1997. It is a great disappointment that the oppressed of yesterday, by repeating past patterns, have proven themselves unable to do that victory the justice it deserves.

AKYOL:  IT’S A PITY THAT THE AKP MAKES THE CASE OF THE NEOCONS AGAINST IT SEEM CREDIBLE
Mustafa Akyol in Star writes that the fine imposed on the Doğan Media Group was inevitably going to be perceived as a politically motivated measure by international observers, whatever Prime Minister Erdoğan says about it. With its record in the Kurdish issue, minority rights and foreign relations, the AKP represents a decidedly liberal alternative compared to the opposition parties. But as its pursuit of a “blood feud” against the Doğan group suggests, the AKP also has a tendency to fall into the traditional pitfalls of Turkish politics. It’s a pity that the image of a liberal, democratic and Muslim party that represents such a great hope for the world gets tarnished by such missteps. Two years ago, marginal neocons were alone in the West in comparing Prime Minister Erdoğan with the Russian autocratic leader Vladimir Putin. Today, even the prestigious New York Times, which has so far been a supporter of the AKP, to the great chagrin of our secularists, takes a critical line. In fact, the AKP does not need to muzzle critical media or create its own, subservient media in order to remain in power. Let us bear in mind that it was not because it was supported by a loyalist media that the AKP won its landslide victory in 2007.

MAHÇUPYAN: SECULARIST REFLEXES
Etyen Mahçupyan in Taraf notes that secularist intellectuals have been incensed by the fine imposed on the Doğan Media Group, a punishment that is deemed to be unjust and which is seen to be an act of political revenge.  I don’t think that all of those who are appalled by the fine actually endorse the kind of unethical, pro-state campaign journalism that is the hallmark of the media outlets of the Doğan Group, not least of its flagship, the daily Hürriyet. Instead, I think that they are repelled because they basically mistrust the motives of the government. But, frankly I don’t believe that that mistrust is the result of the actual deeds of the government; rather, the reactions towards the tax fine display “secularist reflexes”. We tend to mistrust and to question the motives of those who are unlike ourselves, while we conversely tend to identify with the case of those who are culturally of our own kind.

BIRAND: AKP INSPIRES FEARS AS WELL AS HOPES
Mehmet Ali Birand in Milliyet writes that secular-minded liberals and democrats like himself have not been able to make up their minds about the ruling AKP. On the one hand, the AKP inspires fears, while at the same time it also inspires hopes. What inspires fears is above all the fact that the AKP seeks to turn Turkey into a more conservative, religious society. True, the government has not sought to introduce any Sharia-inspired laws. Nevertheless, the language and demeanor of the representatives of the AKP from the Prime Minister and down send the unequivocal message that Islamicization is an encouraging development in the eyes of the ruling party. The AKP also inspires fears because it has consistently displayed an intolerant attitude towards dissent, as the fine recently imposed on the Dogan Media group illustrates, and as it systematically staffs the bureaucracy only with people of its own kind. Yet, the AKP has taken initiatives, such as the Kurdish opening and the Armenian opening that are laudable. Prime Minister Erdoğan should make a decisive choice, electing to be a truly democratic and tolerant leader.

İNSEL: THE HERITAGE OF AUTHORITARIANISM
Ahmet İnsel, writing in Radikal on the occasion of the 29th anniversary of the September 12, 1980 military coup, states that the AKP during its tenure in government has not made up its mind whether to refute or to exploit to its own advantage the heritage bequeathed by the military junta of the 1980s. The AKP government has oscillated between small and pragmatic departures from the 1980 regime and the exercise of the institutions and powers inherited from that statist and authoritarian regime. It was never easy for the AKP to make the choice of an unequivocal break with statist authoritarianism, since no such strong desire has been expressed by society itself.  One reason for that is that the AKP is distrusted by those sections of society – leftists, social democrats and conservatives of the kind of the former president Süleyman Demirel – who oppose the change of the constitution of 1982. But more consequential is perhaps the fact that the military regime of the 1980s has succeeded in creating its own particular kind of society and individual, as was the case in the former Communist bloc. After all, 29 years is not a short period. Approximately two-thirds of the population of Turkey consists of generations that have come of age politically after 1980. Significantly, these generations are the products of an educational system where the values of the military regime, intolerance and uniformity, dominate; hence, the 1980 regime has perpetuated itself.

GÜZEL: A CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM NATION (2)
Referring to a new survey of religiosity in Turkey, which he deems to be the most important survey to have been published in recent years, Hasan Celal Güzel in Radikal observes that Turkey is a decidedly Muslim and at that conservative nation. 92.6 percent declares religion to be important in their lives. 79.8 percent describe themselves as being pious. 82.2 percent expresses the desire that their children be raised to be pious. 1 percent says that religion does not matter at all for them. 1.4 percent says that they are not religious at all. 82.4 percent declare that they belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. This survey shows beyond any doubt that religion, alongside citizenship, is what keeps the diverse ethnic parts of the population of Turkey together. Those who are alien to the society’s dominant religious values are a marginal minority, ranging between approximately 2 and 10 percent.  Pity that it is the values of this fringe minority that have come to inform the policies of the state. Islam is not a problem for Turkey, but on the contrary the very foundation of and the guarantor of the continued existence of the Turkish nation.

 

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2009. This article may be reprinted provided that the following sentence be included: "This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center".




The Turkey Analyst

The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published weekly, and includes a topical analysis, as well as translations and summaries of selected Turkish news reports. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell, Halil M. Karaveli, and M. K. Kaya.

The analyses appearing in the Turkey Analyst are often written by the three Editors. The Turkey Analyst occasionally publishes signed guest analyses.

The Joint Center
The Joint Center was created in 2005 through the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

The Turkey Initiative
The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understand of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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