Speaker:
Dr. Ali Jalali, former Minister of Interior of Afghanistan


Date and Place:
Wednesday, December 7
5PM-7PM

1619 Massachusetts Ave., NW, The Rome Auditorium

Summary:

Dr. Ali Jalali, Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC; former Minister of Interior of Afghanistan (2003-2005).

This CACI Forum was chaired and moderated by S. Frederick Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. Dr. Starr introduced the Forum, noting that Dr. Jalali had been a speaker at the Forum shortly following September 11, 2001, discussing infantry tactics in Afghanistan at a time the U.S. was gearing up to the military action in Afghanistan. At the time, Dr. Jalali specifically noted the importance of the Tora Bora caves, and their importance to the war - a prediction that would be painfully realized soon thereafter. Dr. Starr also emphasized the key role played by Dr. Jalali as Minister of the Interior in Afghanistan in the past three years. Noting that outside Kabul, the Ministry of the Interior is the Government, Dr. Starr specifically emphasized the role of the Ministry in the most pressing issues facing Afghanistan including counter-narcotics, provincial reconstruction, and naturally the simple fact that it is the country's largest ministry. In handing over the floor to Dr. Jalali, Dr. Starr closed on a note of recognition of Dr. Jalali's accomplishments.

Dr. Jalali opened by commenting on the fact that it is easier to write on problems than actually fixing them, something that became painfully clear to him upon assuming his duties in Kabul in 2003. Now, at the fourth anniversary of the Bonn accords, Dr. Jalali again found himself in the position of writing about these problems, with a different perspective.

Afghanistan still depends on the international community for economic and military assistance. This assistance is crucial and will remain crucial to rebuild the economy and foster security. The Bonn agreement did not timeline the long-term development of Afghanistan; it initiated many important developments, only a few of which have been accomplished, such as the building of a national army, and the adoption of a Constitution. Most, nevertheless, will take long to complete. Hence, securing a stable Afghanistan will require a long-term commitment on the part of the international community and continued cooperation with the Afghan government and society. Success in this endeavor will be determined by the level of assistance; and the ways in which this assistance is used.

Security

The questions involved in security in Afghanistan include identifying the threat to security; how to respond to them; and which strategy to adopt. Security, of course, I a primary prerequisite for good government. It is not only a matter o the security of the state and its institutions but very much an issue of removing threats to the society.

While terrorism is perhaps the most noted element of security threats in Afghanistan, it may not be the most significant threat if compared with the complex interaction of warlords, drug lords, and corrupt officials which often poses greater challenges than terrorism.

The insurgency in Afghanistan does not pose a strategic threat to Afghanistan's government: it can for the foreseeable future not overthrow the government. What it can do is provide a sense of insecurity; which in turn weakens government control; leads people to lose trust; lose hope; the issue then turns into one of survival for people, leading to the proliferation of corruption and drug trade. In other words, the insurgency creates a condition of insecurity which prevents government functions from becoming effective. This is particularly a problem in the South and Southwest of the country, where the problems are not so much a reflection of the capacity of the insurgency but a reflection of the lack of government services. What is needed is a stabilization program, to establishment the government's presence everywhere.

The insurgency in Afghanistan is not primarily ideological but political. It does not have an ideology with massive appeal; it has no strong network of popular support; it has no unified leadership. It is composed of different groups, that wage insurgency for a variety of reasons. These include the Taliban remnants; the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; other radical Islamic, foreign elements; and criminals. In this context, it should be noted that among the many hostages that the government was able to free, most were captured by criminal groups, which sought to 'sell' the hostages to one or another insurgent groups for money. In this context, fighting terrorism implies acting through the development of remote areas and enhancing government presence.

Armed groups are another problem The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process was generally successful, as it dismantled paramilitary groupings, many of which were integrated into the Ministry of Defense. Here the crucial point is what happens to decommissioned fighters. If nothing is done to provide attention to their livelihood, the risk is that they join a drug mafia or become 'freelancers' and thereby elements of insecurity.

The larger problem of warlords was in a sense built into the Bonn process. The interim chairman of the government came into a government that was made for him and where he had little say over appointments of ministers. Warlords, in a sense, appointed themselves to positions in government and in the provinces. The options to deal with this situation were twofold. First, the leadership could use force to bring the country together and reduce the influence of warlords. The second is to co-opt the warlords. An additional complication here is that the warlords were often an important U.S. instrument in the war on terror, and participated in fighting against Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants.

In its relations with regional potentates, it is important to recall the balance of forces in Afghan history. While regional challenges to government authority always existed, the government was historically stronger than any single challenger, and was able to pit on regional kingpin against another. The state was stronger than society. But after the Soviet invasion and the civil war, the state was weakened to the extent that society became stronger than the state. Restoring the central government was therefore a challenge. Te strategy of co-opting warlords had pitfalls: if a warlord I made Governor, it does not end there: he brings along his entire network of patronage and institutionalizes it. Although the DDR process disarmed 62,000 former combatants, and collected 40,000 weapons and 11,000 heavy arms, this did not end the grip of the warlords because their links and networks continue to exist, and can be mobilized upon need. Afghanistan not long ago counted 1,780 small armed groups.

In order to reduce the role of warlords, a vetting process was instituted for the parliamentary elections, which provided that anyone associated with armed groupings would lose their place on the ballot or even in parliament. Now, there are at least 60 members of parliament associated with armed groups; the question is whether anyone will have the courage to fire them, with the inevitable consequences that this would have?

Drugs

In spite of the 8-pillar counter-narcotics plan (building institutions, an information campaign, developing the rural economy and alternatives for poppy farmers, interdiction and law enforcement, criminal justice, eradication, demand reduction and the treatment of addicts, and regional cooperation) there has been no agreement anmong donors on the priority among these. The plan looks good on paper, but the unclear priorities jeopardize it.

Many countries have come to Afghanistan to provide much-needed assistance, unlike in Iraq - there a 23 Provincial Reconstruction Teams from a variety of countries, but there are question regarding the coordination of the efforts. Strategies suffer from national caveats, resource limitations, and political hindrances. The lesson learned since the bonn process is that unless there is a unified plan, a shared vision, and the Afghan government is in the driver's seat, the effectiveness of the efforts will suffer greatly.

Counter-narcotics is part and parcel of most if not all other efforts: the development of the economy, good governance, and building security. There are no quick fixes: counter-narcotics involves all these elements, and will require long-term investments.

Eradication is inherently problematic in Afghanistan's situation, and this is true whether talking about the Taliban 2001 eradication or other elements, such as the Nangarhar eradication this year, because they are untenable. With the prevailing economic conditions, they cannot last, especially as promises to farmers tend not to be kept. Hence, the following year, sheer survival dictates that poppies are again planted. This is likely to happen in Nagarhar next year. Talk of legalization, in this context, is heavily counter-productive. Or a legal agriculture to grow, farmers need three main things: water, power (including to operate water pumps), and access to markets, which means functioning roads.

Growing poppies is at present a low-risk enterprise in a high-risk environment. The key will be to turning it into a high-risk enterprise in a low-risk environment. Of a revenue of $2.8 billion, only $600 million goes to farmers, and the rest stays in the hands of traffickers - which includes numerous foreign traffickers that operate networks inside Afghanistan. This should be the first lien of attack: a crackdown on traffickers will be immensely more productive that going for the farmers. Going after production will take long time, while going after traffickers could yield almost immediate results. Traffickers are everywhere: in the government, in the parliament, in the police, etc. A number of high-profile arrests and convictions would do much to change the incentive structure.

The role of the international community is important in this context. ISAF and the PRT are staying aloof from counter-narcotics. But whereas interdiction teams are few and operate from Kabul, PRTs are everywhere. Since the vast majority of the heroin produced has Europe as its destination, it would only be natural for NATO countries to get involved in counter-narcotics, for their own sake.

ISAF, it should be recalled, stands for International Security Assistance Force. If it does not intervene against drug trafficking, how could it provide security in the long term? There is a strong paradox here.

The role of the illegal economy - including the drug trade but also timber and gem smuggling - is complex also because it has strong ties to the legal economy. In fact, the illegal economy has a multiplier effect in terms of the investments into the legal economy it generates, which needs to be kept in mind. That said, it is crucial not to accommodate the drug trade in the name of stability because what that would create is a "pax narcotica" or "pax warlordiana".

Development

In terms of development, Afghanistan's major challenge is poverty. The country's growth rate in 2002-03 was 28%; in 2003-04 15.7%; in 2004-05 7,5%, and growth rates are expected to be at 8-10% for the next decade. But growth does not automatically mean poverty reduction. Unless poverty is reduced, it will be difficult to establish security, and increase the central government's influence.

In January 2006, a conference on Afghanistan beyond Bonn will be held in London. Afghanistan will present a national development strategy, which will focus on growth. In this context, reducing poverty is a process that will take at the very least a decade. This will require massive and continued international assistance. If this assistance is not forthcoming, there is a great risk that the gains that have been made will be lost and even reversed.

There is a creeping donor fatigue as relates to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has an army. Police, some institutions have been built. But given the country's low revenue base, these cannot be sustained without assistance at this point. If international support stops, the army, police, and other institutions risk to collapse. Hence continued assistance is crucial.

The Millennium Development Goals out poverty reduction as the first priority. To achieve this, the focus must be on rural development, and again three areas of focus: roads, water, and power. The fight against corruption and clientelism in the government must continue; the government must be purged from the drug mafia elements; jobs must be found and created for demobilized combatants.

Regional Dynamics

Afghanistan cannot succeed without the cooperation of its neighbors. These neighbors or elements within them have interfered and do interfere in Afghanistan's affairs, but at the same time their cooperation is needed for this landlocked country. Iran and Pakistan are the main countries of concern then and now, and it is important to note that elements that interfere in Afghanistan, from Pakistan for example, are threats both to Pakistan and to Afghanistan. There different forces in both Iran and Pakistan, some of which are cooperative and some of which are harmful. Mistrust with these two countries is strong, and can be reduced through developing economic and cultural relations.

Afghanistan is a convenient bridge between three areas - Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Developing transit trade, and establishing ways to resolve mistrusts will stabilize Afghanistan as a post-conflict society.

Conclusion

To conclude, Afghanistan needs substantial and continued assistance for at least the next ten years in order to successfully build good governance, security, and development. It also needs ties with the U.S. as a strategic partner in order to protect it against foreign intervention, a key to its success.