"Recent Russian Policies in Georgia: How Should the West Respond?"

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Featuring:


H.E. Mr. David Bakradze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

Mr. Matthew J. Bryza, Deputy Assistant secretary of State (Southeastern Europe)

Mr. Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation

Dr. Svante E. Cornell, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

TRANSCRIPT OF EVENT:

A discussion hosted by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute (CACI) at SAIS on Tuesday, April 22, 2008.

The event featured H.E. David Bakradze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation and Dr. Svante E. Cornell, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

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H.E. David Bakradze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

What changed in Russian policy in the last three months? As a result of those changes vis-à-vis Georgia and especially vis-à-vis conflict resolution in Georgia Russia became more focused, more result oriented and ore clear. What may be the reasons for such a change? Three factors influence the recent Russian policy. Those factors are 1) NATO 2) Kosovo and 3) power transition in Russia.

1) NATO
Bucharest was a crucial place and timing for Georgia, our position was that we were supposed to get a very clear signal the MAP. The clear signal was important because MAP is an institutionalized mechanism, a clear recognition that countries stand on the track of membership, an irreversible process. What we got in Bucharest was a strange animal, it was something very new in NATO history, what we got was a compromise between supporters and skeptics and as a result of the compromise we got a decision on membership, the document very clearly states ‘today we agree the Georgia and Ukraine will become NATO members’ it is a clear commitment on the side of NATO that Georgia will become NTAO member. On the other hand as the result of skeptics we haven’t received the MAP. In a simple and funny way we became members but we still need to become candidates. This is something very new. It was a mixed signal and was seen in Russia as a mixed signal. We heard a series of very clear statements on the side of Russian politicians including the Foreign Minister, that Russia will do everything not to allow Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO and the fact that the we weren’t extended MAP was seen by them as a victory but then they discovered the second sentence, that we will become NATO members which creates a certain confusion. It is a grey zone between now and December, this is what worries us and this is what triggers a reaction in Moscow. We don’t have MAP at least until December, so time between now and then is an increased risk area for us, where people in Moscow believe that through pressure and creating problems they can reverse the process of integration or at least delay, because delay is also important. For those people it is a possibility to delay this decision. From Bucharest to December we are in an area of increased risk where one should expect increasing pressure from Russia. This period is seen as a last chance to blow up the situation in Georgia which will further frighten the European skeptics and make the MAP decision unrealistic. One of the reasons for Russian action is that it is a window of opportunity.

2) Kosovo
Kosovo was a big change in Russian attitudes towards the Georgian conflict area. 1) People in Moscow think that after Kosovo they obtained a kind of moral high ground vis-à-vis the US and the EU. Because of the way Kosovo was recognized. This moral high ground creates for an increased possibility to act. Now from their viewpoint they can do things they wouldn’t have done 6 months or 6 years ago, because now they perceive to have the moral high ground. 2) Kosovo was also understood as a new kind of case which reestablished the concept of areas of influence. Because the understanding is that if US and the EU see the Balkans as area of interest then why not do something in the Former Soviet Union, which is the wrongest possible interpretation of Kosovo.

3) Power transition in Russia
This is something very new for Russia. Whenever transitions happen like that in the country they are painful transitions and usually they generate changes. I cannot say if they will be good or bad, I hope everything will go smoothly and normally, but certainly the time before the new President comes to power became more important to implement certain decision which then maybe more difficult to issue and implement from the viewpoint of making bold decision or decisions with political price, this kind of decision will be more difficult for new president and I don’t think that new president would like to start with a confrontation. So the remaining time may also be seen as a window of opportunity.

What is the change? First of all in last three months we have witnessed a series of steps on the ground which very much exemplify the process of de facto control over Georgian territory. Some of those steps are not important as such but as a piece of the broader picture, these steps clearly give direction.

We have two principally new components. 1) Legal component, the recent decree by the President of Russia which instructed to start direct cooperation with de facto structures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is something very new. So far, we had de facto steps on the ground but so far nobody has ever questioned Georgian jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia because this jurisdiction is something which is protected by international law and once you recognize the principle of territorial integrity of the country you should also recognize the principle of the single jurisdiction within the entire perimeter of the borders of the state. This is the first time somebody attacked Georgia’s jurisdiction over Abkhazian and South Ossetia, this is an absolutely new component. By recognizing local jurisdiction and accepting local jurisdiction and establishing the possibility of direct or legal cooperation or legal incorporation of local structures into Russian legal space. This is a very big step forward towards the practical absorption of this space into Russian legal system. This and I will repeat again because it is very painful for us, is a very big step towards full scale absorption of these territories.

And another reason why this was important to us is related to ethnic cleansing. The structures in Abkhazia are still called de facto structures, of the reasons is because all the structures were formed after the ethnic cleansing and as a result of ethnic cleansing. When majority of population was deprived in participation in political life simply because of ethnic cleansing they have been expelled from Abkhazia they still don’t have a chance to go back to their home. If one accepts legitimacy of structures created as a result of ethnic cleansing it means acceptance and legitimization of the result of ethnic cleansing. This is a very dangerous development, which adds a moral dimension to the story. We have hundreds of thousands in Georgia waiting for return to their home and if ethnic cleansing is legalized and accepted it means that these people cannot go back to their homes, this is a new reality which can substantially change the situation on the ground and make the situation for the Georgian government much more difficult.

The other component that came as a result of Russian recent policy is a military component. This is something which worries us very much. In March, Russia made the decision to withdraw from CIS regime of 1996, the decision made by CIS heads of states to have no relation with Abkhazia unless the central government of Georgia is informed about it. If it comes to humanitarian and economic side of the story, in the past 11-12 years, there was not a single case when the government of Georgia stopped any assistance from going to Abkhazia. This is important because the CIS regime of 1996 was the only international document absolutely prohibiting military cooperation with Abkhazia. Absolutely prohibiting military build up in Abkhazia and absolutely prohibiting transfer of weapons and arms to Abkhazia, by withdrawing from this commitment, they freed their hand for increase military presence in Abkhazia. This is very dangerous development. We already see signs of this development, four days ago with the Georgian UAV (unarmed air vehicle). What happened was that the President of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, called deputy chief of UN mission (UNOMIG) and formally submitted an ultimatum unless Georgia withdrew police force that he would engage in attacks, he issued an ultimatum of 24 hours. What we got the next day was a number of eye witnesses confirming military movements. And since UNOMIG does not have intelligence capabilities though it is written in their mandate for one year, we decided to use our own intelligence gathering capability. Afterwards a Russian MiG – 29 a military jet, launched a missile, shot down the UAV and flew back into Russian air space. This is 100% evidenced, which I distributed to UN Security Council. There is radar data evidence, and the radar is compatible with NATO system. And also we have the film from the UAV, we got the picture of the MIG 29. It is 100% evidenced.

This has very serious implications; it means that Russia had illegal military presence in Georgia. The MIG 29 jet was stationed in Gudauta, which is clearly illegal military presence in Georgia. This is a clear violation of CFE treaty and Istanbul commitment, they have no permission to have military fighter jet without consent of host state which we never gave which means an act of aggression because the unarmed UAV was shot down within the Georgian air space. It has very serious implications.

This is a series of de facto steps on the ground promoting the creeping annexation process in addition we have attack on Georgian jurisdiction and trying to legalize the creeping annexation process and we have military presence and military steps. You should be alarmed enough.

What we did when we saw this emerging picture of Russian steps? It was difficult for the Georgian government to react. We have huge public pressure on the government. What we did, we have not responded with confrontation, we initiated an enhanced peace plan. We have a new peace proposal for Abkhazia, in which Abkhazians are offered to take Vice Presidency of the country. We offer them veto rights over any decision which influences Abkhazia or rights of the people living there. We are ready to give international guarantee that Abkhaz autonomy will be there. We initiated a peace plan which was the only right response to show the difference as to how we act; we are acting with maximum possible restraint. We are not involved in harsh rhetoric’s or military preparation, we exercise restraint. We push our peace plan and ask the international community to react diplomatically, now Russia should exercise restraint and behave in a responsible way refraining itself from any steps which increase risk of provocation on the ground. So what we expect from international community, and we are grateful for having gotten a number of statements, 1) Russia should reverse two decisions: the withdrawal from CIS regime and reverse decision on direct legal cooperation with de facto authorities it should 2) To support Georgian peace plan.  3) Will ask UNSC is to increase capability of UNOMIG, to be able to monitor Georgia’s airspace and to monitor border. 4) Ethnic cleansing becomes very important again. It was slightly diluted in last year but it should be back, there can not be cooperation with de facto structures because they were implemented after ethnic cleansing. We want Russia to reverse this policy, not only not to implement. If they do, it questions Georgian sovereignty, it means situation is changed. It doesn’t matter when implemented. There will be implementation if the decision remains, if not it leads to a potentially very dangerous situation.

I think it is a test for Georgia on restrain and responsibility, but also a test for the international community for how responsible the international community is for something which is unacceptable and today in 2008 annexation of territory of neighboring countries should be unacceptable for the international community because otherwise we are entering a very dangerous era and we are back to the 19th century which I don’t think is in anybody’s interest including Russia itself.

Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

I can provide a US perspective, to see what we are thinking about these recent and extremely serious events. This is a test for Russia, it is a test for Georgia in whether or not Georgia will be able to elaborate its peace plan into something which is appealing and workable and it is a test for the international community it is a test for the US government as one of the member of the UN Friends process for Abkhazia.

First thing is to look at how serious the situation is. It is impossible to predict where Russian policy is going, where Abkhaz policy is going, we know where our policy is going which is that we want to do everything that is possible first and foremost to help Georgia restore territorial integrity and to do that by virtue of a peaceful process to negotiate a compromise political settlement. The Friends process has not been able to move this whole set of issues forward. We have spent enormous amounts of time looking at bottom up approach, not just grass roots but below the soil, small steps that under normal situation would improve the climate and create a situation for a political settlement of the Abkhazian crises. But we have never been able to get into a real discussion for the political settlement. We get bogged down on issues such as should there be more police trainers rather than more fundamental question of is there any way to provide for the security of Georgian IDPs to return to Galli.

The question of sales of property of IDPs who are residing in the rest of Georgia needs to be addressed. It is not only unfair to see the property of Georgians who have been forced to leave Abkhazia, it is extremely destabilizing and dangerous, creates tensions. Same thing is happening in south Ossetia, not in terms of property, but steps to connect in a de facto way such as connecting the telephone system of Russia and the gas network. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are in Georgia, the Russian Federation recognizes that, it is official policy. So it is serious when steps are undertaken that seem to work against that official policy.

What happened last week came right to the edge of diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian government will open representative offices right near the border, not inside, which is good. But has announced that it will recognize the documents issued by the local authorities. This creates a grey area. These steps don’t constitute recognition but that sort of steps is not in keeping in the spirit of the Friends process as a mediated settlement of the Abkhazia situation, is that the spirit that reflects Russia’s special status in the UN as the facilitator of the Friends process? This calls Russia’s role into question. Lifting restrictions on transfer of military equipment to Abkhazia and recognizing the decisions and documents of the de facto authority of Abkhazia seem pretty clearly to run against the spirit of what we are trying to do in the Friends process.

We are getting to a point where it doesn’t seem that the Friends process is making headway. It is moving backward, we need to rejuvenate that, Georgia has made an offer, it has put a settlement plan on the table. Georgia seems to be reacting in an appropriate way, it has been an unhappy one but calm. We have discussed economic and military developments which have been important but it is way past time that we talk about political settlement which should be settled, it is time to do that in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

What we saw on Sunday was a deplorable action. We are still gathering information to know exactly what happened to the Georgia UAV. It looks like a MiG-29 but we are still gathering information. That action is not in keeping with the UN Friends peace process. It is a very serious situation, we are moving in the wrong direction. The way to rejuvenate the process is for us to stand up once and for all and call it like we see it. We went through an absurd period last August when many people in the international community were trying to convince us that Georgia attacked itself. Georgia did not attack itself. There was also the March 11th attack last year, we don’t know what for certain happened but we have our brains and experience and the UN made its assessment and concluded it was likely that it was a helicopter attack on Georgian facilities. We don’t know who coordinated the attack, but it is not in keeping with the UN Friends group.

Last point, some argue that Georgia should have notified that it was flying an unmanned UAV over Abkhazia, but Georgia has a need to observe its own territory. There are genuine concerns in Tbilisi that there are movements of people and material in Abkhazia, if Georgia cannot at least observe what is going on with an unarmed vehicle, I don’t know what it can do to have a requisite degree of confidence that it need not some sort of military step, when something as provocative happens as what did in past three weeks so we should welcome the presence of an unarmed vehicle to have a look at the ports, borders and coastline. It is a step that reinforces stability. I am at loss why there is controversy as to our proposal to increase the number of OSCE military observers in South Ossetia.

I don’t want to leave you with the impression that Georgia is 100% right, Georgia has its own work to do to elaborate this peace plan, to make it a credible plan to make it attractive to the separatists. They are starting to do that. I hope our Georgian friends realize that the Abkhaz really want independence, they feel a certain threat.

    
Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation

Five observations and policy recommendations: Russia’s declared policy to recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity has corresponded only to a very limited extent to the facts all along. It was only real to the extent that Russia has not posed overt territorial claims to Georgia. In any other sense, Russia’s own declaratory policy was contradicted by Russia’s own steps on the ground. Those steps are of creeping annexation de facto of Abkhazia and South Ossetia those steps, since Putin came to office, include mass handover of Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia unlawfully even in Russian law, let alone international law. Appointment by Moscow of local de facto leaders, property takeovers by Russian state entities, deliverance of arms to unlawful local forces, direct transportation and communication routes bypassing Georgia, these are all elements of the process of creeping annexation. With Putin’s latest move the declaratory policy of recognizing Georgia’s territorial integrity no longer applies. For the first time Russia is posing a territorial claim to Georgia in terms of Russian law. By instructing Russian government bodies to conduct direct relations with Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities. Therefore Putin’s decree caps the policy of creeping annexation of the past two years, Putin’s decree turns an unofficial policy into a semi official and fully open policy. What should be response to this move? It should not focus on the decree itself; the revocation of the decree would be a mistake. The response should focus on the process of creeping annexation. Merely revoking the decree would not reverse the process on the ground. A non implementation of the decree would create a false impression that the situation is returning to normal when it is not. Georgia with international friends should demand the reversal the process of creeping annexation that has been going on for six years before this decree was issued.

2) Second observation, Putin’s decree moved the process of de facto annexation into a pseudo legal ground in terms of Russian law. It amounts to a withdrawal of Russian recognition of Georgian territorial integrity. This disqualifies Russia from its role as principal peacekeeper and mediator in the conflict. Russia was always an actor rather than a mediator in this conflict, Russia was allowed to pose as a neutral actor which it never was. This move disqualifies Russia conclusively. Since it is not possible to remove Russia from the process and may be counter productive, Putin’s move means there should be a transformation in the process, with continued Russian participation but with a far greater international role than has been the case. Russia’s move makes a mockery of the UN Friends process.

3) Russia’s move attempts for the first time in an overt way to change post soviet borders. It is an overt effort to push the border, the first case of its sort since 1991, border revision, it is a potentially momentous development which if not checked in these two borders, may spread to other sectors of the Russia –Georgia border and maybe even to Russia-Ukraine border. The recommendation that naturally flows is that it is necessary to intensify international efforts for oversight of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian borders. To institute joint control of the borders with involvement of EU or OSCE. This proposal has been on the table, it now needs to be done in order to prevent Russian border revisionism.

50kms away from border there is site of Olympic Games in Sotchi, is the international community going to participate when Russia is moving by force an international border just a few kilometers away? Under the gaze of president Putin, whose residence is in Sotchi. The Olympic Games is a good time to raise this issue.

4) Fourth observation, we in presence of Russian overt exercise of hard power, Putin's decree stops short of national contacts, I think a response to this is available it is the soft power of the EU. The EU considers that it is its vocation to use soft power on foreign policy, therefore it is the time more than ever to appeal to the EU initially through Georgia’s friend within the EU to establish a soft power presence in the conflict areas, which could be done through technical projects unobjectionable to anyone even Russia, to benefit all elements of population. The EU could finally open visa facilitation to the citizens of Georgia. We are now in the presence of an absurd situation in which citizens of Russia, including those who have passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, enjoying visa facilitation in EU while citizens of Georgia do not. This enhances the appeal of Russian citizenship while eroding appeal to Georgian citizenship.

5) Firth observation, Russia’s move is clearly a step to signal to NATO that giving MAP to Georgia would be a risky step to make that may advance into a political clash and a risky situation with Russia, jeopardizing NATO relations with Russia. This move is not aimed at Georgia but at MAP. NATO’s response can only be giving a MAP as soon as possible. Georgia is entering a danger zone between now and April 9 2009 summit when the issue may be resolved. NATO must not repeat what in another context I call the Acheson mistake, in spring 1950 Dean Acheson defined the perimeters of US and NATO security, drew maps in front of the press, the map left out South Korea from US and NATO spheres. A few weeks later North Korean forces attacked across the armistice line. NATO must not repeat the Acheson mistake with Georgia, giving Georgia a MAP as soon as possible would clearly signal to Russia that Georgia is within the perimeter of NATO security interest and this would reduce rather than increase any risk of Russia NATO confrontation. If NATO wants to avoid confrontation, the way to do so is to give Georgia and Ukraine a MAP as soon as possible.

Final point, about the solution in Kosovo and how it affects Russian policy vis-à-vis Georgia. It is a supreme irony that a state which lacks any legal culture took a legalistic approach to the situation of Kosovo. It claimed that such recognition could become a precedent. In reality, the Kosovo precedent, is not a narrow legalistic precedent, the Kosovo precedent has a far greater significance, a political and strategic significance. The conflict was resolved through the reversal of ethnic cleansing and through hands on intervention by international organizations on the ground. This is the Kosovo precedent. The solution of the conflict, the resolution of the conflict, came with western institutions such as NATO, OSCE and EU in a leading role in the ground. If the Kosovo precedent is to be applied to Abkhazia then it must involve the reversal of ethnic cleansing. I was surprised to see that of all western leaders to the best of my knowledge, only one western leader called for reversal of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, the President of Poland, I have not seen that demand by other western leaders of the international organizations. I believe that this should become the basic demand in response to Putin’s decree. Reversal of ethnic cleansing is indispensable for settlement of the conflict.

Dr. Svante E. Cornell, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

I would argue that what we are seeing in Russian policy towards Georgia has nothing to do with any step towards recognition, it has to do with annexation which is different. Some Russian sources have compared it to the US relationship with Taiwan as a potential model for the relationship with the territories. But Taiwan is open to the world, freely interacting with other governments, other organizations and able to trade freely. What we are seeing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is fundamentally different from recognition which a step to internationalization, in fact what we see are moves that prevents the self determination of the de facto governments. In practice its policies of creeping annexation have included the direct appointment of Russian security officials in positions in the de facto governments. The US does not appoint the Prime Minister of Taiwan. This is a big difference. We should be careful to think that anything which Russia has been doing has anything to do with recognition. Even the Abkhaz leadership is now disturbed by the moves taken by the Russians, they had been hopeful for a legalistic resolution like Kosovo but now realize Russia has only intention to absorb them in their power and use them as pawns in the game against NATO. This is a very serious element.

The other element is the relationship between recent Russian policies and the United States. In fact as was mentioned the Sotchi Olympics will be near the Abkhaz border and Putin’s residence, this is also the residence where President Putin received President Bush only weeks ago. The move taken by Russia in this context, followed days after President Bush’s visit to Russia only miles away from Abkhazia, in the immediate aftermath of the NATO summit in Bucharest, and after Bush had invested significant amount of time in the extension of MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, I believe is particularly alarming. The Russian moves are not only direct confronting of the US interest and also a slap in the face of President Bush personally.

This is not something the US can allow to happen. What Russia did was directly related to President Bush’s support for MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. He is now undermining the security of Georgia, who knows if now the next step will be to do something in Ukraine. It is clear that if the US does not forcibly react to these recent steps this will strongly undermine the credibility of the US government in the entire region not only Georgia.

It is seriously time to think about the format for peacekeeping and negotiation in the conflict with Georgia. It is by now obvious that Russia is not an impartial arbitrator in this conflict rather a direct party, the decree signed last week makes this explicit and disqualifies Russia from the role of even being a peacekeeper or facilitator of negotiations in this conflict. Therefore the most obvious policy consequence forced upon us by the Russian President’s decree is that we can no longer accept the situation, we can no longer accept that Russia has a monopoly over the negotiation and monopoly of peacekeeping in these two territories. Continuing to accept this would be basically to accept that parties to a conflict can be a mediator to a conflict which is absurd, we can no longer tolerate this and it is time, long overdue and it has been forced upon us by the Russians to reconsider how these conflicts should be handled by the international community and the mechanism that should take place, the ones we have today are inadequate. Can they be reformed? should they be reformed? or something totally different put in place? it will have to be raised.
 

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute is a leading center conducting fundamental and applied research on an important world region. It has offices at SAIS (Johns Hopkins University), Washington, and in Stockholm, Sweden, through a Joint Center with the Silk Road Studies Program (Institute for Security and Development Policy). This Joint Center publishes the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (cacianalyst.org), the China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, and the Silk Road Papers as well as books and monographs. Additional information about the Joint Center is available at www.silkroadstudies.org .