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**Drug Trafficking in Weak States:  
The Case of Central Asia**

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN  
PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH  
at

UPPSALA UNIVERSITY

Spring 2003

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## Abbreviations

|       |                                                     |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| CA    | Central Asia                                        |
| CARs  | Central Asian Republics                             |
| CIS   | Commonwealth of Independent States                  |
| EEC   | Eurasian Economic Community                         |
| GTZ   | Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit          |
| IDU   | Intravenous Drug Users                              |
| IMU   | Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan                      |
| mt    | Metric tonne (1,000 kg)                             |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (new name) |
| UNDCP | United Nations Drug and Crime Prevention (old name) |
| UNDP  | United Nations Development Program                  |
| UTO   | United Tajik Opposition                             |

## **Chapter I: Introduction and Research Design**

### **1.1 Purpose of the Research**

The aim of this thesis is to examine the perception of the new types of threats not as serious threats to the national security by the newly emerged states in Central Asia of the Former Soviet Union, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. New types of threats include, drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, religious radical movements, terrorism and etc. However, this thesis will look specifically at the problem of drug trafficking in the Central Asian region, since it is closely intertwined with the aforementioned new threats, and how this relatively new challenge (for them) affects or poses a threat to the national security of the aforementioned states. Drug trafficking is amplified by the fact that Central Asian republics are positioned between the biggest opiate-based drugs producer Afghanistan and the largest consumer market in the Western Europe.

The analysis of the threats posed by drug trafficking to the national security of Central Asian republics, is of growing importance, because those states are weak states, and in addition, they are newly independent, thus they are only in the process of forming their national security agendas. Weak states are rather vulnerable to many types of security threats. The analysis of this vulnerability of weak states to the threats will be given in theoretical part Chapter II and data analysis in Chapter III.

This research is relevant as a contribution to the security studies in the whole, because no significant academic work has been written about new security threats, as in this paper drug-trafficking, that are posing a challenge to the national security of the Central Asian republics (CARs). CARs political leaderships are pre-occupied with the state building, with a great emphasis on the economic development, and thus leaving out the drug trafficking problem, and not seeing it as a growing threat to their fledging national security. Meanwhile, drug trafficking is seriously challenging, and will challenge the CARs' stability but also lead to the economic and social disruption, unless it will be addressed and the necessary countermeasures will be included in the decision-making of the CARs.

### **1.2 Research Questions**

This thesis will try to answer the following research question and stemming from it sub-questions that will facilitate the intended research. These questions are necessary in shaping the direction of the research.

Research Question is:

***Does drug trafficking pose a threat to the national security of the weak Central Asian republics?***

Sub-questions are:

- *Who does traffic illicit drugs in Central Asia?*

In order to answer this question, the author will look at existing hierarchy in the drug trafficking transnational criminal groups. Those transnational criminal groups are crucial links between the demand and supply sides.

- *What are the possible effects caused and exacerbated by drug trafficking? And what are the implications for the national security?*

This question will investigate the link of drug trafficking with: co-option of transnational criminal groups with the state officials, law enforcement officers, customs officers, border guards (military and political threats) leading to the corruption, including money laundering (economic threats); link with the drug consumption and rising addiction leading to the increase of HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users; and rising number in drug related crimes (societal threats).

- *Do the political leaderships in CARs see drug trafficking as a threat to their national security?*

Depending on the results obtained from the analysis of the aforementioned questions the attitude and perception of political leaderships towards the drug trafficking problem will be analyzed. Do they perceive it as a threat to their national security? If they do not, why? Is it the perception problem?

- *Can CARs as a region jointly oppose the problem of drug trafficking?*

What are the common problems of CARs? What hinders the development of a robust regional economic and security cooperation? Is it due to the competition among CARs and/or historical prejudices against each other? If there is economic and security cooperation how does it tackle drug trafficking problem? All these questions will be asked and the results will give larger and clearer picture on the regional setting and CARs capability (present and future) in facing and tackling drug trafficking problem jointly.

### **1.3 Methodological Framework**

This thesis will adopt a process-tracing approach, which is a careful analytical approach process of variable interaction and the links between the dependent and independent variables.<sup>1</sup> This research will be conducted based on the qualitative empirical research including analysis of the statistical data. A qualitative method was chosen for this particular research, because it tends to focus on one or a small number of cases, to use depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method.<sup>2</sup> Qualitative method is appropriate here, since this research will focus on the perceptions and prioritization of threats to the national security by the newly emerged Central Asian states. The threats can be best analyzed based on the qualitative methods for its descriptive possibilities.

#### **1.3.1 Limitations of the Research**

This research acknowledges existence of several limitations of applicability. It is important to notice that the findings and observations presented and found in this research do not necessarily apply or fit similar cases in other parts of the world. It can be due to many factors, differences in size of the problem, timing, internal and external factors, proximity to the epicenter of the problem, historical pattern, interest (or lack of it) of regional or major powers and threats perception.

Namely, it does not necessarily mean that other (than CARs) states around the world have problems with the perceptions of new security threats, e.g. drug trafficking, as a threat to their national security. On the contrary, some states may view drug trafficking as a threat to their national security, but they might have different priorities, and perception of what is threat to their security.

This research will have the time scope, meaning that the analysis will be done based on events that took place from the independence date of the CARs that is 1991 and up to the present time that is May 2003. Although some remarks will be made to the earlier periods and events, for the sake of the factual prove and clarification of some moments, and resulting from them outcomes.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted from pp. 65-66. Niklas Swanstrom. *Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management*

<sup>2</sup> King, Keohane, Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*, p. 4

### ***1.3.2 Data Collection and Materials***

It is important to notice that this research was conducted based on respected secondary hand information, such as books, government reports, U.N. agencies and other international organization reports, research papers, commentaries, newspapers both in electronic and hard copy versions. The author did not conduct direct interviewing of the political leadership of the researched CARs or other officials related to the issues of interest in this research. However, the author established a close link through email correspondence with the specialists and experts that are involved in dealing with issues related to the combating and controlling of drug trafficking in the Central Asian region. The contacts include, to name few: Programme Coordinator of United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for Central Asia; Research Expert for UNODC in Central Asia; and Coordinator of Drugs and Development Program at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).

Author collected and analyzed data in four languages, Kyrgyz, Russian, English, and German; the latter was done with the assistance of the native speaker, and dictionary.

Author acknowledged the fact that she relied on the data presented by UNODC on drug trafficking, and considered that there was no need to contact national agencies of the CARs for the additional information, because the member states submitted sufficient information, and data to UNODC. It is necessary to notice that the overwhelming majority of data used in this research was obtained from U.N. sources, thus one should carry in mind that the data was presented by the official government agencies it might not disclose some intricacies of the drug trafficking situation, due to the particular interests of the report submitting states, and there may be manipulation or omission of data for the sake of state interests.

### ***1.3.3 Case Selection***

This research was done based on a single case study method. Case studies are preferred when the researcher is supposed to answer “how” and “why” questions, when the researcher has little control over the events (in contrast to experimental methods), and when the focus is on contemporary events within a real-life context.<sup>3</sup>

The research is about the Drug Trafficking in Central Asia, and it will be done based on a process tracing approach rather than conducting a comparative study with other regions in the world. Research will focus on the region that comprises five Central Asian

states, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Definitely, problems arising from drug trafficking cannot be viewed in the isolation from Afghanistan, which is the main opiate-based drugs producer in that region, and Russia, which is the main trafficker from Central Asia to the final destination, Western Europe.

The research will focus on the policies and actions of CA political leadership as a region, rather than viewing each CA state separately. As Ragin notes correctly, case analysis is the idea that the objects of investigation are similar enough and separate enough to permit treating them as comparable instances of the same general phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> It could be reinterpreted to this particular case, where objects of investigation are Central Asian states, and they are similar enough, due to the common culture, linguistics,<sup>5</sup> history, Soviet Union legacy, and geographical proximity that encouraged communication, but with gaining of independence in 1991, those CA states are separate enough that allows the author to draw similar comparable instances of the same phenomenon, that is similarity in perception and prioritization of threats to their national security by the political leaderships.

#### **1.4 Organization of the Research and Disposition**

This thesis consists of five chapters. First chapter is an organizational part. This chapter will outline the purpose of the conducted research. Which methodology was used; what are the limitations of the study, and how the data for this research was collected. Most importantly, it will outline research question, and sub questions that will be answered by analyzing the selected case, and applying the chosen theory.

Chapter II will seek theoretical framework that could fit the selected case, and thus give an academic analysis of the threats posed by drug trafficking to the national security of the weak CARs. Within that chapter, apart from sheer theory, while analyzing the concept of weak states, I will include overview on CARs, and see if they fall into the category of the weak states. Defining on whether CARs are weak states is crucial since it will explain actions, and attitudes of CARs towards perceiving (or not) the drug trafficking as a threat to their national security. In addition, it will show the difference in threats perception and prioritization, thus difference in formation of national security by weak and strong states. National security here will comprise of military, political,

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<sup>3</sup> Yin. *Case Study Research* quoted from p. 67. Niklas Swanstrom. *Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management*

<sup>4</sup> Ragin, Charles. *What is a Case?* p. 1

<sup>5</sup> Turkic language family, except for Tajikistan which is Persian.

economic, environmental and societal sectors. 'The theory from this chapter will be applied to the selected case in Chapter IV.

Chapter III will deal with the case study on drug trafficking in Central Asia. This chapter will give definitions of drugs, and what is considered to be drug trafficking; hierarchy in drug trafficking system; demand and supply; routes; corruption and money laundering; consumption and addiction, HIV/AIDS outbreak caused by intravenous drug users. And it will be analyzed is there a robust regional security complex in Central Asia that could deal with the aforementioned effects from drug trafficking. The results from the analysis of the case study will be the factual basis to be used along with theory in order to give academically based answers to the posed research question and sub questions.

Chapter IV will apply the theoretical framework from Chapter II to the case study in Chapter III, and will see how the selected theory can explain the results obtained from case study. Within this chapter the posed research question and sub questions will be answered.

Chapter V will summarize the main results of the research received from applying theoretical framework to the selected case.

Next chapter is on theoretical framework, which will lay the basis for the analysis of the selected case on drug trafficking in the Central Asian region.

## Chapter II: Theoretical Framework

This chapter will establish the theoretical framework for the analysis of the selected case study on the drug trafficking in the Central Asian republics as region. This chapter will theoretically define weak states concept, where the differentiation between strong and weak states will be given, and thus the difference in threat perception and level of vulnerabilities. In addition this chapter will attempt to see how the ruling elites in weak states manipulate the threats for the protection of their power. In conclusion this chapter will look how/what the weak states view as a threat to their national security of the state that includes military, political, economic, environmental and societal sectors.

The selected theoretical framework was based on recent works of Barry Buzan, such as *Peoples, States & Fear* (1991) and *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998). Buzan with his colleagues<sup>6</sup> were able to classify the five sectors comprising national security,<sup>7</sup> and not just classify but also give sufficient definitions as: who the referent objects and actors are in each security sector, and to which threats they are vulnerable. In this thesis, in order to analyze the threats posed by drug trafficking to the national security of CARs, it is necessary to go through all five sectors for grasping the scale of the threat. It could be done best based on the works of Buzan, since his arguments related to the national security are sufficient in explaining the perception of threats by weak states, and thus formation of national security agendas.

### 2.1 Levels of analysis

This thesis will focus at two levels of analysis namely unit (state) and international subsystem (Central Asian Republics as a region). Other levels of analysis such as international system, subunits, and individuals will not be the main focus, as it could be seen in the analysis of the present case study they do not play a significant role in the formation of perceptions of the drug trafficking as a serious threat to the national security.

According to Buzan *units* are “actors composed of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and many individuals and sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from others and to have standing at higher levels,”<sup>8</sup> here it will be states. *International subsystems* are “groups of units within international system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other.

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<sup>6</sup> Waever and de Wilde

<sup>7</sup> Military, political, economic, environmental and societal

Subsystems may be territorially coherent, in which case they are regional.”<sup>9</sup> This thesis will focus on the Central Asian republics as a region.

The present case study in this research can be better explained at the unit and international subsystem levels of analysis, since state in weak states (often authoritarian) is a unitary, and main body of decision making where the power is concentrated, and international subsystem is important since the new threats (drug trafficking) can not be contained within one country and it transcends several borders, and in this particular case, initiatives at the regional level might help to tackle the problem jointly.

## **2.2 Weak States Concept and Threat Perceptions**

In order to analyze what is a weak state, it is necessary firstly to give a definition to the concept of state and national security, the classification what is considered to be a weak state vs. strong state, and thus how the weak states perceive various threats to their national security.

### **2.2.1 Definitions of State, National Security and Threat**

It is necessary to give a definition of the state, in order to see what constitutes threats to it. Buzan’s defines:

“...states as territorially defined socio-political entities. They represent human collectivities in which governing institutions and societies are interwoven within a bounded territory. ...the major purposes of interaction within the system this nexus of territory, government and society is what constitutes the state.”<sup>10</sup>

State is viewed as a political organization of society, or the body politic, or, more narrowly, the institutions of government.<sup>11</sup> As John Locke said “the great and chief end ... of men’s ... putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property’ (meaning here their lives, liberties and estates) which in the state of nature is ‘very unsafe, very unsecure’.”<sup>12</sup> The state consists of three components: the idea of the state (nationalism); the physical base of the state (population, resources, technology); and the institutional expression of the state (administrative and political systems).<sup>13</sup> Classically, state is viewed as a sovereign entity that has its distinct territory, population

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<sup>8</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 6

<sup>9</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 6

<sup>10</sup> Buzan. *People, States, & Fear*, p. 60

<sup>11</sup> “State” definition from “Encyclopedia Britannica,” Online. Available. <<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=1297>> (27 April 2003)

<sup>12</sup> John Locke. *Second Treaties on Government*, pp. 406-7. Quoted from Buzan, Barry. *People, States, & Fear*, p. 38

within that territory, and legitimacy to exercise power over its population. Buzan analyses that as a form of political organization, the state has transcended, and often crushed, all other political units to the extent that it has become the universal standard of political legitimacy.<sup>14</sup> The state is a form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security.<sup>15</sup> State seeks to strengthen the internal and external security against threats emanating within or outside of its borders in order to ensure the survival of the state as an aggregate and unitary, political, geographical and physical entity with the inhabitants within its occupied and recognized territory. States attempt to shape their national security in order to meet the posed internal (usually weak states) and external (often strong states) challenges and threats.

What is then security, more specifically national security? Security is, in historical terms, the field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on.<sup>16</sup> Arnold Wolfers stated that "security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threat to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."<sup>17</sup> Walter Lippmann's definition is similar to Wolfers, he views security in its traditional military context "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."<sup>18</sup> Buzan offers the closest and more operational definition, where security issue is presented as posing an existential threat (which is anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority)<sup>19</sup> to a designated referent object<sup>20</sup> (e.g. state).

The traditional concept of national security used to focus mainly on military and political sectors. Since the security is a dynamic field, and given the newly emerged challenges and threats, where the traditional military-political sectors were not sufficient to explain and develop solutions, it was revised and broadened to include economic, environmental and societal sectors. Traditional national security, namely military, was

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<sup>13</sup> Buzan, Barry. *People, States, & Fear*, p. 65

<sup>14</sup> Buzan, Barry. *People, States, & Fear*, p. 58

<sup>15</sup> "State" definition from "Encyclopedia Britannica," Online. Available. <<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=1297>> (27 April 2003)

<sup>16</sup> Waeber, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Lipschutz, "On Security." *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html>> (22 Mar. 2003)

<sup>17</sup> Quoted from Buzan. *People, States, & Fear*, p. 17

<sup>18</sup> Lippman, Walter. *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, p. 53

<sup>19</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 22

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

defined as “the ability to withstand aggression from abroad”<sup>21</sup> that practically underlined the fixation on the military power, and military capabilities of the state. In late 1970s other than classical interpretation of traditional security concept (offense-defense) appeared that was based on interdependence theory. The pioneers of the new definition were Keohane and Nye that saw security not only as state-centric military policies, but also in a broader framework that encompassed interdependence between regions, and states in economic, military, and societal sectors. The emergence of international regimes, breakthroughs in telecommunication technologies greatly strengthened the interdependence argument. The main argument was that “conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and the cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems.”<sup>22</sup> Interdependence theorists state that “international economic system on which everyone is depended or our basic life-supporting ecological system were in danger; all countries were significantly vulnerable to such catastrophe; *and* there were only one solution to the problem.”<sup>23</sup>

Security is defined and valorized by the threats which challenge it.<sup>24</sup> In legal terms threat is defined as “a declaration of intent to injure another by doing an unlawful act, with a view to restraining his freedom of action.”<sup>25</sup> The definition was developed for the human being, however, state also has similar vulnerabilities to the threats, since eventually individuals comprise the state per se. Buzan argues that the institutions of the state (so human beings) are much more vulnerable to the physical threats than the idea of the state as an object of security. Thus meaning that institutions can be easily destroyed physically than can ideas.<sup>26</sup> A threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political “we” from dealing with any other questions. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.<sup>27</sup> With this approach, it is possible that any sector, at any particular time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense. But even here one can argue about the way of defining these standard cases as military or political.<sup>28</sup> The intensity of threats<sup>29</sup> depends on the following conditions:

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<sup>21</sup> Definition offered by Giacomo Luciani, quoted from Buzan, Barry. *People, States, & Fear*, p. 17

<sup>22</sup> Keohane, and Nye. *Power and Interdependence...* p. 7

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>24</sup> See, p. 133, Ullman (1983). “Redefining Security.” *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 129-153.

<sup>25</sup> “Threat” definition from “Encyclopedia.” Online. Available. <<http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/t1/threat.asp>> (5 May 2003)

<sup>26</sup> Buzan. *People, States, & Fear*, p. 86

<sup>27</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 21

<sup>28</sup> Waever, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Lipschutz, “On Security.” *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html#txt10>> (22 Mar. 2003)

<sup>29</sup> Buzan. *People, States, & Fear*, pp. 134-138

- ✓ Range in space. How close is the threat in the geographical terms? Is the threat emanating of an immediate proximity, e.g. neighbors? Examples could be Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, China vs. Vietnam, or more recent case, apart from military, is negative effects from Columbian drugs and war on drugs that led to the loss of state control over the drug trafficking, and caused human insecurity within the country and its immediate neighbors.
- ✓ Distance in time. It is more of a time range, it depends is the threat of an immediate character? Or is it a latent and hidden but still present threat? How long will it take for that threat to take shape, and challenge the target? The example of the latent and hidden (not always) but still present threat could be the effects from the global warming.
- ✓ Probability vs. consequences. Sides involved in the implementation of the threat, should calculate the consequences, in case the threat will be carried out. For example, at present North Korea is threatening and blackmailing U.S. since they know that the latter will not deal with them as with Iraq, because North Korea has nuclear weapons, and they demonstrated their commitment and seriousness of threats by launching several missiles over Japan. U.S. knows that North Korean leader is capable of implementing the threats by nuking U.S. territories, and its allies South Korea and Japan.
- ✓ Historical dimension. This aspect usually defines how the states perceive the threats based on their existing pre-beliefs. Based on the past history the states will try to shape their foreign policies, considering state interests, in order to diminish the historically experienced vulnerabilities. Examples of this could be China's fear of Japan's re-militarization and the Baltic countries suspicion of Russian influence over their security.

Different states have different types of vulnerabilities that shape their susceptibility to the posed to particular threats. In order to analyze how different states prioritize the aforementioned vulnerabilities one should differentiate between strong and weak states. For that reason the section below will enlighten us on the concepts of weak and strong states.

### 2.2.2 Strong States vs. Weak States

All states are vulnerable to military and environmental threats. Nearly all are open to economic threats, and many also suffer from basic political and societal insecurities.<sup>30</sup> In order to analyze the difference why countries perceive and react to various threats differently it is important to distinguish between weak and strong states. As Buzan defines “strength as a state neither depends on, nor correlates with, power.”<sup>31</sup> For that reason, here we are talking about strong and weak states,<sup>32</sup> rather than strong and weak powers that are defined in terms of military and economic power in relation to other states.

Strong state is considered to be strong, where the “national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference, and where the idea of state, its institutions and its territory will be clearly defined and stable in their own right.”<sup>33</sup> It could assumed based on the definition of a strong state that the perception of threats, and thus shaping of national security would focus on the external threats rather than on internal, since threats arising within the domestic domain do not pose a threat to the stable and strong administrative and political institutions. Thus, the threats in strong states perceived coming from outside that challenge “its independence, political identity and way of life.”<sup>34</sup> The features assigned to the strong states mainly can be found in the developed world, where the state building is complete and the state institutions are consolidated. Countries and peoples with a strong sense of identity and social cohesion know who they *are* and who they are *not* (this being the essence of successful nationalism). Consequently, they presume to know what threatens them and they can take appropriate steps in response.<sup>35</sup> To name a few France and Germany could be examples of strong states.

The existence of societies not well suited to the demands of complex economic and political relations, defines much of the problem of weak states in the Third World.<sup>36</sup> Usually the state administrative and political institutions are rather weak and unable to meet the posed threats to the national security, thus the state has many vulnerabilities. Opposite to the strong states, the weak states have “high level of concern with

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<sup>30</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 97

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98

<sup>32</sup> E.g. Buzan argues that Austria, the Netherlands and Norway could be considered weak powers but strong states.

<sup>33</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 100

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103

<sup>35</sup> Lipschutz, “On Security.” *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available.

<<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#xt14>> (22 Mar. 2003)

<sup>36</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 98

domestically generated threats to the security of the government.”<sup>37</sup> Kal Holsti notes that “the security between states in the third world, among some of other former republics of Soviet Union, and elsewhere has become increasingly dependent upon security within those states.”<sup>38</sup> Based on the aforementioned definitions, it could be stated that in weak states, the social-political cohesion is loose they are internally challenged and suffer from political instability. Thus, weak states are often vulnerable to the internally generated threats, rather than focusing on the external threats.

In weak states the national security formulation is rather vague, since “the security of governments becomes confused with the security of states.”<sup>39</sup> Ayoob states that the Third World state elites’ major concern – indeed, obsession – is with security at the level of both state structures and governing regimes.<sup>40</sup> The following table by Buzan in brief demonstrates what is considered to be strong and weak states.

**Vulnerabilities and types of state by Buzan<sup>41</sup>**

|       |        | Socio-political cohesion                     |                                                 |
|-------|--------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
|       |        | Weak                                         | Strong                                          |
| Power | Weak   | Highly vulnerable to most types of threat    | Particularly vulnerable to military threats     |
|       | Strong | Particularly vulnerable to political threats | Relatively invulnerable to most types of threat |

The majority of weak states may find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and politically penetrated, and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build stronger state.<sup>42</sup> Meaning that weak states might suffer from the authoritarian rulers, dictators, where the state control in the hands of a small group of corrupted ruling elites, that have a tight grip over the political and economic development of the country, that control is usually reached through manipulations, frauds, and secured by regular suppressions of the ruled “subjects”. The common feature among weak states, is that overwhelming majority of states had a colonial experience, where their natural resources were drained to feed the colonizing power. After the decolonization process, many of those countries faced the formed pattern “object-for-exploitation”, where the whole economic infrastructure was shaped in a one-way relation to supply the exploiting country, and no system was built in the exploited countries for their economic development, and more importantly, sustainable

<sup>37</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 99

<sup>38</sup> Holsti, Kalevi. *The State, the War, and the State of War*, p. 15

<sup>39</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 102

<sup>40</sup> Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Predicament...* p. 4

<sup>41</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 114

development. In the table below, according to Buzan the following features and conditions define state as a weak state. Since, this research is focusing on Central Asian republics, it is worthwhile to define are they weak, or relatively weak or strong states?<sup>43</sup>

| State Condition                                                             | Kazakhstan                                                                                                                                                                                | Kyrgyzstan                                                                                                                                                      | Tajikistan                                                                                                                                                                         | Turkmenistan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Uzbekistan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| High level of political violence                                            | Exists but not high. Opposition mostly in exile or imprisoned <sup>44</sup> .                                                                                                             | Becoming high, due to some issues getting politicized <sup>45</sup> . Opposition mostly in exile or imprisoned <sup>46</sup> .                                  | High level of political violence led to the outbreak of the civil war (1992-97), at present opposition leaders included in the government.                                         | High. On November 25, 2002, there was an attempt on life of President Niyazov supposedly by his ex-ministers <sup>47</sup> .                                                                                                                       | High. In February 1999, there was an attempt on life of President Karimov supposedly by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Opposition mostly in exile <sup>48</sup> .                                                                                                                          |
| A conspicuous role for political police in everyday lives of citizens       | Reports of violence used by police; harsh conditions in prisons sometimes leading to deaths. Law permits security forces to interfere in privacy. Cases of arrests for political reasons. | Cases of arrests for political reasons. Allegations of corruption. Reports of violence used by police; harsh conditions in prisons sometimes leading to deaths. | An estimated 50 extrajudicial killings. Arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, beating and torture of prisoners widespread. There were reports on illegal searches by Gov. forces. | No reports on politically motivated disappearances, which does not mean that there are any. Opponents are charged on false charges that justify their unjustified imprisonment because of their difference in opinion over the political ideology. | Interference in private life of political activists is reported. In every day life, there is a high degree of purge and control of religious schools and mosques. Absurd situations like once a person has a beard he might be easily detained in the police custody as an Islamic fundamentalist |
| Major political conflict over the ideology to be used to organize the state | No political conflict over the ideology                                                                                                                                                   | No political conflict over the ideology                                                                                                                         | During the civil war, there was a conflict between old-communist backed ideology, and Islamic groups.                                                                              | No political conflict over the ideology. Any opposition is tightly controlled and 'taken' care of by the ruling regime.                                                                                                                            | Between IMU (want to create Islamic Caliphate in Ferghana Valley) and more secular government under Karimov                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Lack of coherent national identities within the state                       | Identity creation based on the old history of titular nationality, Kazakhs.                                                                                                               | Identity creation based on the old history of titular nationality, Kyrgyz, though there are competitions among regional clans                                   | During the civil war there was a clash between Gharmi, Pamiri and Kulyab people.                                                                                                   | Identity creation based on the old history of titular nationality. Turkmenistan is practically a mononation.                                                                                                                                       | Strong national identity.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Lack of clear and observed hierarchy of political authority                 | Clear hierarchy of pol. authority, though contested.                                                                                                                                      | Clear hierarchy of pol. authority, though contested                                                                                                             | Opposition was given some ministerial seats                                                                                                                                        | Clear hierarchy of pol. authority, though contested                                                                                                                                                                                                | Clear hierarchy of pol. authority, though contested                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| A high degree of state control over the media                               | Media relatively free & can criticize the Gov. corruption                                                                                                                                 | Media relatively free & can criticize President. Some attempts to restrict freedom of media.                                                                    | Severe restrictions on media. Two journalists killed in 1995.                                                                                                                      | No freedom of press. Freedom of speech severely restricted.                                                                                                                                                                                        | Freedom of speech is very limited. Media and internet censored. Gov. does not tolerate criticism of its actions. Some foreign newspapers banned.                                                                                                                                                  |

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 99

<sup>43</sup> Some of the information was produced by author based on her knowledge of the region, the rest of it was quoted from the project report "Drugs and Development in the Central Asian Republics prepared by Alexander Seger (GTZ) in June 1996 in Bonn, Germany.

<sup>44</sup> To name few: Mr. Kazhageldin, ex-Kazakh PM is in exile, Mr. Duvanov is a journalist who wrote some articles in opposition to the government currently is in jail.

<sup>45</sup> In March 2002, in Ak-Syi district in Kyrgyzstan there was a clash between civilians, and police, during which 6 civilians were killed and 61 injured. The demonstrators demanded to release the jailed Deputy Beknazarov.

<sup>46</sup> To name few: Human rights activist Mr. Dyrlydaev is in exile in Austria; ex-Minister of National Security Agency Mr. Kulov is currently in prison.

<sup>47</sup> Niyazov said the main organizer of the attack was former Deputy Agriculture Minister Sapar Iklymov. Niyazov said Iklymov was aided by former Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov, former Deputy Prime Minister Khudaiberdy Orzov, and former Turkmen Ambassador to Turkey Nurmukhammet Khanamov. All of those former officials have come out as opponents of the Turkmen regime and all are wanted in Turkmenistan on corruption charges. On April 21, 2003, Mr. Niyazov requested Swedish government to extradite Sapar Iklymov, and Boris Shikhmuradov based on the aforementioned charges.

<sup>48</sup> To name few: Abdumanob Polat in U.S.; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

The first column of the table outlines the conditions offered by Buzan characterizing weakness of a state. Based on those five conditions I analyzed on whether CARs are weak or strong states. After brief analysis of the features that define the weakness of the state, it is possible to elaborate that CARs mainly fall into the defined category of weak states, with little exceptions in conditions related to the national identities, and clear political hierarchy, which is present in almost all CARs, but contested, and vulnerable to the domestically produced opposition groups. In weak states the power over the state decision-making that shapes domestic and foreign policies is usually accumulated in the hands of the ruling regime that develops the national security against the threats perceived to pose a danger to the existence of the ruling regime per se.

### **2.2.3 Perception and Manipulation of Threats by States**

In legal terms a threat is distinguishable from an assault, for an assault requires some physical act that appears likely to eventuate in violence, whereas a threat may consist of words only or an act that is not violent.<sup>49</sup> However, when it comes to states, threat sometimes is enough to lead to the violence, or provoke other defensive actions based on the perceptions, and existing pre-beliefs about the source posing a possible threat. A threat becomes a national security issue depending on the intensity with which the threat operates in relation to the particular vulnerabilities of a given state and also (not always) according to the beliefs of the policy makers of a state over a given time period.<sup>50</sup> As Ayoob notes:

... issues such as economic deprivation and environmental degradation do not automatically become part of the security calculus of Third World states; they do so only when they gain enough prominence to be able to produce political outcomes that can threaten the survival or effectiveness of states and regimes. In other words, non-political issues that have the potential to endanger the well being of Third World states and regimes become security problems only when they are able to intrude into political arena<sup>51</sup>

Quite where on this spectrum issues begin to get legitimately classified as national security problems is a matter of political choice rather than objective fact.<sup>52</sup> In weak states, the ruling elite often tries to politicize, even the issues that relate to the day-to-day life, in order to ensure its survival. In weak states, the political elites are ultimately responsible for meeting challenges to state and regime security, their perceptions are

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<sup>49</sup> "Threat" definition from "Encyclopedia." Online. Available. <<http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/t1/threat.asp>> (5 May 2003)

<sup>50</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 134

<sup>51</sup> Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament...*p. 190

<sup>52</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 115

important in defining the security problems faced by Third World states.<sup>53</sup> For that reason the range of threats perceived and manipulated by the ruling elites is an array and myriad of combinations. If to follow the definition offered by Ayoob, anything can be considered and securitized as a threat to the state, if the threats might affect existence or even undermining of the ruling regime. In weak states the referent object for securitization gets harder to define, and thus gives a way to the increasingly domestic agenda of threats.<sup>54</sup> Often, in weak states “the security of the government becomes confused with the security of states, and factional interests are provided with a legitimacy which they do not merit.”<sup>55</sup> It seemed, in this scheme of things, a relatively easy proposition to shift the allocation of resources from one threat to another, so long as the new threat was conceptualized in terms of the state and couched in the language of “national security.”<sup>56</sup>

The security agenda is developed by the government that includes different government agencies, and whole bureaucratic state machinery, in weak states, often pursues own interests, and the power is concentrated around ruling elites. Given the total size of government machinery, what might be characterized as self-interested elite rule can encompass a rather large group.<sup>57</sup> In weak states, it is often a case, when the ruling elite defines or manipulates for its own good what poses a threat, and how to tag that threat, if it is military, political, economic, etc. types of threat. In weak states, “trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one's opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of *securitization* of an issue to gain control over it.”<sup>58</sup>

As Lipschutz states “a threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state would not be limited in what it could or might do. Under these circumstances, a problem would become a *security* issue whenever so defined by the power holders.”<sup>59</sup> Thus it can be concluded, in weak states whatever poses a danger to the position of the ruling elite can be perceived as a threat, and based on the interests of those elites those threats can be manipulated and thus become a security issue.

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<sup>53</sup> Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Predicament*...p. 191

<sup>54</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 104

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, p. 102

<sup>56</sup> Lipschutz, “On Security.” *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#txt6>> (22 Mar. 2003)

<sup>57</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 84

<sup>58</sup> Waever, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Lipschutz, “On Security.” *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html#txt14>> (22 Mar. 2003)

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*.

## 2.3 National Security of Weak States

Broadened concept of national security includes traditional military and political sectors, relatively new, economic, environmental and societal sectors. This brief discussion on the types of the old and new security sectors is an integral part for the case analysis and understanding what the weak states see as threats to their national security, and which sectors are of priority character.

### 2.3.1 Military Security

Military security is the core for the whole formation of security studies. Where the state, mainly governments, and in weak states, ruling elites, are the central object for the defense against external and internal military threats. At present time, strong states are less vulnerable to the direct military attack from other sovereign state (exception the terrorist groups, e.g. Al-Qaeda) due to its developed military capabilities, growing interdependence, and in general, obsolescence of interstate wars. However, it does not necessarily mean that strong states do not use their military forces against other “non-democratic” sovereign states, they use them for the persuasion of their own national (usually economic) interests,<sup>60</sup> often veiled under humanitarian intervention, and as recently, U.S. war on terrorism in Afghanistan and ruling regime in Iraq. For a leader trying to instill the political will necessary for a national society to respond effectively to a threat to its security, a military threat is especially convenient.<sup>61</sup> Military security also can lead to the paranoia and be a comfortable justification, in the former the non-existent threats fall into the securitization due to the misperception and in the latter, the state shapes what will fall into the military security, based on its own interests and vulnerabilities. Military security plays a role in defending the state attributes such as idea, territory, and its population. Military security is developed in order to protect and mainly avoid any situation that would lead to the attack on states social-political institutions, mainly from external challenges.

"Because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly, military threats are traditionally accorded the highest priority in national security concerns. Military action can wreck the work of centuries in all other sectors. Difficult accomplishments in politics, art, industry, culture and all human activities can be undone by the use of force. Human achievements, in other words, can be threatened in terms other than those in which they were created, and the need to prevent such threats from being realized is a major underpinning of the state's military protection function. The threat of force thus stimulates not only a powerful concern to protect the socio-political heritage of the state, but also a sense of outrage at the use of unfair forms of competition."<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Or as Buzan states "in general the major powers are not driven to use force abroad either by rivalry with each other or by internal pressures. *Security: A New Framework*...p. 63

<sup>61</sup> See, p. 135, Ullman,(1983). "Redefining Security." *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 129-153

<sup>62</sup>Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 117

However, in weak states, the military security is often targeted against its own population, and other internal opposition groups. Thus the governments in those states, lavishly use the suppression of the riots, and any sign of discontent with their rule, by deploying its police forces, and very often military forces (curfews, army in Yugoslavia), initially designed to fight against armies of foreign states. Reiterating the fact, that in weak states, military security is often focused on its internal threats rather than looking outward, unless it is seriously challenged by other states. Since the security is a dynamic field, and military security in its old Cold War terms is obsolete. Given the nature of new threats (terrorism, drug-trafficking and etc.) the military sector is getting redefined and some states are developing new strategies how to face those new challenges.

### **2.3.2 Political Security**

The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions organizing the ideology are the normal target of political threats.<sup>63</sup> Often weak states are vulnerable to the threats to the political security. Since most of them suffer from the external challenges to their sovereignty, and internal questioning of the state ideology. Political sector is mainly about the nonmilitary threats to sovereignty.<sup>64</sup> Sovereignty is important, which if simply put means self-government.<sup>65</sup> Sovereignty is what defines state as a state. Where state, as it was defined in previous sections, consists of three components, idea, physical base and institutions.<sup>66</sup> Sovereignty matters in relation to the external states, meaning that sovereignty cannot be threatened domestically, for that reason “sovereignty divided among states, but not within them.”<sup>67</sup> Sovereignty is especially emphasized in the newly emerging states, and weak states.

As we said, political security is about protecting idea of state and the institutions that develop that ideology. Other types of vulnerability, whether economic or ecological, become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival.<sup>68</sup> In political security, mostly threats to the idea and institutions of states matter. Examples of threats to the political security can range from corruption, breaking laws (weakening the system), propaganda and etc.

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<sup>63</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 142

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 141

<sup>65</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 67

<sup>66</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 150

<sup>67</sup> Buzan. *People, States. & Fear*, p. 67

<sup>68</sup> Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament...*p. 9

### **2.3.3 Economic Security**

Buzan mainly defined economic security in terms of state capability to mobilize accumulated profits for the military mobilization; mercantilism, market protectionism. 'Economic security'<sup>69</sup> may mean (at least) two rather different things. Either, it may be understood narrowly as the economic foundations of military power; or, it may be seen as an aspect or dimension of security in its own right. The former interpretation would mean that the state is trying to secure its military security through strengthening its economic security, especially the buying capacity, which is to have enough means to buy weapons for the defense of the state. In addition, it could be contemplated that the economic power, in case the need arises, may be transformed and diverted into almost anything and any security sector.

As for the second interpretation of economic security that is a dimension of security in its own right, it would in practice mean economic warfare. Namely, many states have striven for economic self-sufficiency<sup>70</sup> as a means of security: by stockpiling 'strategic materials' as well as ordinary goods they may make themselves less vulnerable to economic warfare, hence more secure.<sup>71</sup> If to follow this interpretation of the economic security, then one could say that most of the developed countries reached the level of economy that (hypothetically) could be used to ensure their military security, while developing countries are trying to develop economic sufficiency in order to decrease the physical vulnerability to the military threats from its adversaries. Thus it could be assumed that both strong, and weak states base on the economic security as a foundation for its national security. Threats to the economic security (apart from economic warfare interpretation) include money laundering, frauds, and corruption that weaken the economic institutions and systems (e.g. bankruptcy of banks) of, especially, weak states. Economic security is closely linked with the political and societal security, all these types of security closely intertwined.

### **2.3.4 Environmental Security**

Buzan states that environmental threats are generally unintentional.<sup>72</sup> Environmental threats are the result of the destructive human activities. People, who run big industrial

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<sup>69</sup> Bienen, Henry, "Power, Economics, and Security. The United States and Japan in Focus" and Buzan. *People, States & Fear*, pp. 230-269

<sup>70</sup> Kyrgyzstan for example is trying to transform its gas systems used for heating houses into the electricity based, since Uzbekistan often closes the gas delivery to Kyrgyzstan.

<sup>71</sup> Fischer, Dietrich. "Invulnerability Without Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defense." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1982, pp. 205-225

<sup>72</sup> Quoted from Waever, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Lipschutz, "On Security." *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html#note43>> (22 Mar. 2003)

companies often take what they want from the nature, without thinking about the possible harms, e.g. massive tree logging, that might lead to the desertification, and soil erosion; excessive catch of one type of fish, the disappearance of which leads to the starvation of other fish that feed upon it, and thus e.g. unbalanced growth of harmful water plants and etc. The vivid result of the environmental threat could be Aral Sea between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The over drainage of the sea in order to irrigate the vast fields of cotton (at which Uzbekistan's economy is oriented) that requires large quantities of water led to the catastrophic shallowness of water level, and thus the emergence of the large patches of dry areas full of salt, that is in its turn carried by wind to the fields around that become useless for the crop planting.

Environmental threats are of a global character, they can rarely be contained within a region, not mentioning a country. The best example can be the global warming, that leads to the negative changes in the climate (weather) all around the world. However, even realizing that environmental threats carry global feature, some states politicize this matter, and use all their leverages to ensure that some conventions for the protection of the nature will not pass through, since it would harm the interests of the concerned states. Scrapping of the Kyoto Protocol by U.S. could be an example. In order to stop the depletion of the ozone layer countries should cut the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that are usually produced after burning oil based products (gasoline) and coal. And U.S. is number one producer of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Thus the ratification of Kyoto protocol is not in interests of the American industrial (oil) companies. The latter example shows the direct link to the economic sector (interests), where the latter prevails in importance over the environmental threats. Environmental security, as other sectors, cannot be viewed in isolation, and as Buzan, who have analyzed the concept "environmental security," and its use, recommend that environmental problems be treated as part of the economic field. "The security label is one solution," according to Buzan, but he tends to prefer the other path: to "identify environmental issues as part of the economic agenda."<sup>73</sup> As other sectors of the national security, environmental sector is closely intertwined with the political (what gets politicized, e.g. Chernobyl catastrophe), economic (Kyoto protocol), and societal sectors (starvation leads to the migration of the population thus leading to the overuse and depletion of the natural resources at one place, that might lead to the conflict, which then falls into the military, and political sectors).

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<sup>73</sup> Waever, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Lipschutz, "On Security." *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html#note55>> (22 Mar. 2003)


### 2.3.5 Societal Security

Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community.<sup>74</sup> A society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live as itself.<sup>75</sup> When we talk about the identity, it often implies culture. Thus challenges to the culture, such as Americanization (Coca Cola), introduction of foreign words, assimilation by other bigger ethnic groups (Kazakhs fear of Russian large population) and etc. might be viewed as threats. Under objects of societal security can be clans, tribes, religions, nations, and race.<sup>76</sup>

As with unemployment and crime, these are the threats primarily to the individuals; only if they threaten the breakdown of society do they become societal security issues.<sup>77</sup> The unemployment might be caused by migration of other communities and economic problems (e.g. economic crisis that led to the cut in job places), thus proving that societal sector is closely linked with other sectors of the national security.

## 2.4 Conclusion

Living in the era of globalization, when communication, and movement of people in general become easier, the threats also became easy to deliver. Nearly all countries are open to economic threats, and many also suffer from basic political and societal insecurities.<sup>78</sup> This chapter aimed to create the theoretical framework for the analysis of the case study on drug trafficking in the Central Asian region. The important concept of weak states was introduced, and it was outlined how the weak states see and perceive the threats, and it was defined what does pose a threat to the national security, to the state per se, namely to its territory, idea of state, and state institutions.



This chapter analyzed that national security comprises five sectors, as it is shown above. This figure is important since it will facilitate the application of the theory to the

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<sup>74</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 119

<sup>75</sup> Waever, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Lipschutz, "On Security." *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html#txt58>> (22 Mar. 2003)

<sup>76</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security: New Framework for Analysis*, p. 123

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, p. 121

<sup>78</sup> Buzan. *People, States & Fear*, p. 97

case, thus linking threats posed by drug trafficking to the national security of weak CARs.

Next chapter will focus on the case study of drug trafficking in CARs, the routes for trafficking, and other statistical data will be given, and analyzed. It will be defined what is considered to be illegal drugs, and what is drug trafficking. What are the effects from drug trafficking on the society, economy, environment, political and administrative institutions. It is important to analyze the effects of drug trafficking on all five sectors on the national security, in order to get clear and complete picture of the real scale that will facilitate in developing early warning and prevention policies against threats posed by it.

### Chapter III: Case Study: Drug Trafficking in Central Asia

This chapter will introduce the case on drug trafficking in Central Asia. The research will focus on the region rather than on the specific states, since drug trafficking cannot take place within borders of one state, rather it transcends the borders of several states. Present research will draw attention to the new drug trafficking routes along the Central Asian republics originating in Afghanistan. It will also give some statistical data on the rise in drug addiction, drug seizures and the analysis will be given. This chapter is important as a basis for the analysis of the case and application of theory to it in Chapter IV. Afghanistan will be only mentioned as a country in where the drugs originate, the author is not intending to analyze the security scenarios in Afghanistan.

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that it is rather difficult to obtain data on Turkmenistan due to its isolationist policies, and tight state control over any going out information that criticizes or casts a shadow over the ruling regime.

#### 3.1 Drug Trafficking in the Central Asian Region

In this section the analysis and routes for trafficking opiate-based drugs, mainly heroin, will be given rather than cannabis, and synthetic drugs<sup>79</sup>. The reason is that cannabis<sup>80</sup> is not widely trafficked for the international market, rather for the domestic or regional consumption, and it does not cover the costs and risks incurred by trafficking it into the far distances, especially through territories of many states.

As Interpol states that more than 65% of the Afghan opiates are exported via the (CARs) countries<sup>81</sup> that percentage indicates the growing popularity of trafficking routes through the CARs. In its resolution<sup>82</sup> the U.N. body, the Commission of Narcotic Drugs, stated that it is concerned by the increase in trafficking in illicit drugs, in particular opiates, from Afghanistan through the States of Central Asia, and by the serious threat that such an increase poses to security and stability in the region and beyond.

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<sup>79</sup> Trafficking of synthetic drugs in Central Asia is not as widely spread yet as opiate based drugs

<sup>80</sup> There are herbal cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish)

<sup>81</sup> Interpol. *Fact Sheets: Heroin*. Online. Available. <<http://www.interpol.int/Public/Drugs/heroin/default.asp>> (27 March 2003)

<sup>82</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *CND resolution 44/12 "Cooperation in countering illicit drugs in Central Asia*. 29 March 2001: 1 page. Online. Available: <[www.unodc.org/unodc/resolution\\_2001-03-29\\_5.html#\\*](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/resolution_2001-03-29_5.html#*)> (12 April 2003)

### 3.1.1 Definition of Drugs and Drug Trafficking

This thesis will focus on the trafficking of the heroin<sup>83</sup> (opiate based drug) that originates in Afghanistan, since the amount of heroin trafficked reflects the great demand at the recipient side and it is popular due to its potency, handy to transport and high profitability.

Opium is the name for the latex produced within the seed pods of the opium poppy, *Papaver somniferum*. The plant is believed to have evolved from a wild strain, *Papaver setigerum*, which grows in coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea. In 1805, the German pharmacist Friedrich W. Serturmer isolated and described the principal alkaloid and powerful active ingredient in opium, he named it *morphium*. In 1898 the Bayer pharmaceutical company of Germany was the first to make available this new drug, 3,6-diacetylmorphine, in large quantities under the trademarked brand name Heroin, initially used as a cough suppressant for tuberculosis, and to combat morphine addiction. Since the morphine base is about one-tenth the weight and volume of raw opium, it is desirable to reduce the opium to morphine before transporting the product any great distance. The process of converting morphine into impure heroin (*diacetylmorphine*) simply requires hot water, and acetic anhydride.<sup>84</sup>

Opium cultivation and consumption is not a novice for CARs, opium was used for traditional purposes, and was chewed against fatigue and toothaches. For example, Kazakhs traditionally served *koknar*, a drink consisting of a mixture of alkaloids of the opium group (morphine, codeine, narcotine, heroin and dionine), along with hydrocarbon, protein, resin, oil, and pigments, during national and religious holidays or at funerals.<sup>85</sup> And Kyrgyzstan provided 16% of the world's legal supply of opium from 1916 to 1973.<sup>86</sup>

The high addiction, dependency, and abuse of narcotic drugs pressed the international community to control the usage of narcotic drugs, and frame them into the legal forms. There are three major U.N. conventions for the illicit drugs control: Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) limits production of narcotic drugs for licit medical and scientific purposes only; Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) was developed in order to curtail the negative and rapid dependency on synthetic drugs, as LSD, and other stimulants; and Convention Against Illicit Trafficking (1988) was developed as international community realized it is hardly possible to solve the threat of drugs without joint efforts, sharing of data, in order to meet the challenge from growing illicit drug trafficking.

A large part of the opiate-based drugs, mainly heroin<sup>87</sup> originating in Afghanistan, are trafficked through CARs and sold in Europe. This thesis will focus on drug trafficking,

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<sup>83</sup> From poppy to heroin: harvesting opium→extracting morphine→morphine to heroin base→ heroin purification

<sup>84</sup> *Opium, Poppy Cultivation, Morphine and Heroin Manufacture*. Online. <http://opioids.com/jh/index.html> (4 Apr. 2003)

<sup>85</sup> Olcott, Martha Brill and Natalia Udalova. *Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia*. Working Paper Number 11, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2000. 31 pages. Pp. 8-9


<sup>86</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drug and Development in CARs*, p. 10.

<sup>87</sup> Heroin falls into the controlled by U.N. psychotropic substances

since it is conducted on a wider scale, than on production and consumption<sup>88</sup> of drugs in the territories of the CARs.

### 3.1.2 Hierarchy in Drug Trafficking System

Drug trafficking comprises, as in any business, management chain, administrative hierarchy, demand and supply market, own clientele, established 'business links' (along drug trafficking routes) and people who traffic. According to Tamara Makarenko the following groups of actors participate in ensuring (securing) production and trafficking of Afghan illicit drugs.<sup>89</sup> They are drug mafia, transnational criminal groups, insurgents, terrorists and warlords. All of them are important links in the chain of drug trafficking. Farmers, peasants were not included into this chart, since this research is about trafficking, rather than production.



Local drug mafia in our case is mainly within Afghanistan's territory. The groups that interest us are transnational criminal groups, warlords, insurgents and terrorists. The transnational criminal groups have own distinct hierarchy, and controlled territories. The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the CARs to build their own political and economic institutions. Being pre-occupied with the market reforms, opening own banks, and forming own armies left loopholes, and gaps to be filled by the criminal groups. Due to the lack of the regional database<sup>90</sup> on the transnational criminal groups that are involved in the drug trafficking from Afghanistan through territories of several CARs to Russia, it is

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<sup>88</sup> Heroin production within CARs is miniscule, while consumption is growing along the trafficking routes.

<sup>89</sup> Makarenko, Tamara, "Drug Trafficking in Central Asia." *Nordic Institute of Asian Studies*. Online. Available. <<http://eurasia.nias.ku.dk/Gems/Nytt/Tamara.pdf>> (20 March 2003)

<sup>90</sup> May be they exist, but personally I have never heard of them

difficult to measure the number of groups (their size) involved. Though, there is some information about the drugs trafficked by warlords, and insurgents. According to Bolot Januzakov<sup>91</sup>, Secretary of Security Council of Kyrgyzstan, Juma Namangoni,<sup>92</sup> ex-leader of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Uzbek warlord) controlled about 70% of drugs moving via the “northern route.”<sup>93</sup> And he had close links with the Taliban, and United Tajik Opposition, whose activities ranged between being drug mafia and insurgents. IMU tried to break through to the territory of Uzbekistan in 1999, and 2000 through Kyrgyzstan coming from Tajikistan and Afghanistan, in order to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and to build a Caliphate in the Ferghana Valley. Conversely, Interpol representative said that insurgents’ Islamist ideology was a smokescreen for the major drug trafficking. To some extent, it could be plausible, for two reasons: 1. IMU, may be, was trying the new route through Batken, the south of Kyrgyzstan, and was testing the reaction of the Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies; 2. IMU may be was distracting attention of the regional military forces by engaging with them in the shoot out, while drugs were trafficked through other alternative routes. Initially IMU movement was driven by religious ideology, but it seems that extremely high profits from drug trafficking corrupted them. And it could be said that now they turned to trafficking as a priority over ideology because of the high promising economic turnover, and started carrying features of transboundary criminal group rather than religious movement.

Among other warlords Shah Masood’s Northern Alliance in the north of Afghanistan was and still heavily involved in drug trafficking as a source of income. They imposed taxes on opium crossing over to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.<sup>94</sup>

### **3.1.3 Demand and Supply**

Trafficking is the crucial link in the chain between illicit drug production and consumption.<sup>95</sup> As Olcott correctly notes “these states (CARs) are situated between the world’s largest illicit opium producers and the most lucrative markets in Western Europe.”<sup>96</sup> As a supplier Afghanistan has become the world’s largest illicit opium producer. The situation with opium cultivation was slightly stabilized for a very short period of time, since in 2001 (and before in July 2000) the Taliban regime banned the

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<sup>91</sup> Olcott, Martha Brill. *Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road*, p. 11

<sup>92</sup> Ex-leader of IMU, who was announced to be killed during U.S. bombings of Afghanistan

<sup>93</sup> Northern route is described in the section below “Routes”

<sup>94</sup> By Ahmed Rashid quoted from Olcott, Martha. *Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road*, p. 8

<sup>95</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002*, p. 78

<sup>96</sup> Olcott, Martha Brill and Natalia Udalova. *Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road*, p. 4

opium production, and the global opium cultivation was reduced by 35%.<sup>97</sup> But after the Taliban fall, and up to now, the control over the Afghan drugs is scattered in the hands of the warlords. New Afghan government does not have full control over the drug production, and trafficking, especially in the northern part of the country, which is far from the capital of Afghanistan.

There are two Afghan provinces that account for more than 80% of the whole country production, namely Helmand (southwest) and Nangarhar (northeast).<sup>98</sup> Moreover, according to UNDCP, in Badakhshan (north), the cultivation of opium increased from 2,458 ha in 2000 to 6,342 ha in 2001.<sup>99</sup> This is important for this research, since the drugs produced in that northern part are trafficked through CARs.

In addition, there is a small cultivation of poppies in Penjikent in Tajikistan, Samarkand in Uzbekistan, however, the amount of opium cultivated is not cost-effective for trafficking, and moreover, often those fields are destroyed by law enforcement agencies.

It is logic of the market, if there is a demand then supply side is increasing, and vice versa, thus demand-supply are in a self-corrective relationship. As for the demand side, "a few spectacular cases at the Uzbek-Afghan border have attracted attention"<sup>100</sup> one of them is the interception in August 1993 of 1.2 metric tonnes of heroin or morphine base bound for Turkey and in early 1995, at least one seizure of acetic anhydride (which is used for processing morphine into heroin) from Kyrgyzstan via Uzbekistan bound for Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan.

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<sup>97</sup> UNODC. *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002*, p. 6



<sup>98</sup> UNDCP data quoted from Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development in CA*, p. 8

<sup>99</sup> UNODC. *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002*, p. 45

<sup>100</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development in CA*, p. 12

Intercepted heroin in kilograms (final destination mainly Western Europe) in Central Asia

| State                    | 1995          | 1996         | 1997            | 1998            | 1999            | 2000            | 2001            | 2002            | Subtotal by countries |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Kazakhstan               | 0             | 0            | 43              | 24.196          | 54.269          | 262.4           | 137             | 167.69          | <b>688.555</b>        |
| Kyrgyzstan               | 0.199         | 30           | 4.404           | 24.732          | 26.87           | 216.78          | 170.898         | 271.25          | <b>745.133</b>        |
| Tajikistan               | 0             | 6.35         | 60              | 271.471         | 708.802         | 1882.929        | 4200            | 3,958.18        | <b>11087.734</b>      |
| Turkmenistan             | 0             | 0            | 1948            | 495             | 240             | 200             | 0               | 400             | <b>3283</b>           |
| Uzbekistan               | 10.06         | 18           | 70.269          | 194.679         | 324.843         | 675             | 467             | 256.3           | <b>2016.151</b>       |
| <b>Subtotal by years</b> | <b>10.259</b> | <b>54.35</b> | <b>2125.673</b> | <b>1010.078</b> | <b>1354.784</b> | <b>3237.109</b> | <b>4974.898</b> | <b>5053.422</b> |                       |



Charts are built on data obtained (data for 2002 received by email from UNDCP FO in UZ) from p. 98, UNDCP drug report for 2002. <[www.undcp.org](http://www.undcp.org)>

Data on Tajikistan for 2001 is obtained from "Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighboring Afghanistan and the Response of ODCPP p.6 <[http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg\\_drug-situation\\_2002-10-01\\_1.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_drug-situation_2002-10-01_1.pdf)>

The zeros in the table above, do not necessarily evidence that the countries did not intercept drugs at that time, but rather they did not present reports. Based on the received numerical data, two charts were drawn one is showing the heroin interceptions in Central Asia by year and the other is shown as a percentage of heroin seizures by each Central Asian countries between 1995-2002 period.

The table on interceptions evidences about several factors. Kazakhstan was more or less showing the stable figure in interceptions. Kyrgyzstan's interceptions increased 10 times from 26.87 kg in 1999 to 216.78 kg in 2000. That increase in the flow of drugs could be the result of IMU intrusions in 1999 and 2000 thus opening of the new route going through Batken, and bumper harvest of opium poppies in 1999.

In Tajikistan in 1997, the Government signed a peace agreement under U.N. auspices with the United Tajikistan Opposition (UTO). There is a strong suspicion that UTO for financing its activities was involved in drug trafficking and production on the territory of the neighboring Afghanistan. And starting from 1997 and forward, Tajikistan shows rising figures in interception, since UTO entered the government thus, at least, openly was not involved in the drug trafficking.

Turkmenistan shows a drop in seizures from 1948 kg in 1997 to 495 kg in 1998. There is no data on what led to the decrease in seizures. But there are events that took place, for example, in 1995 the Russian border guards in Turkmenistan were not given the prolongation of their stay along Turkmen-Afghan border, while Turkmenistan could not secure its borders with Afghanistan. At the same time seizures should be higher, because Iran sealed its borders, and thus Afghan drug mafia turned to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan routes. There is a hypothetical assumption that Turkmenistan's government gave a "green light" to traffic drugs from Afghanistan, type of parallel economy, earning cash for the state with the government's silent agreement.

Uzbekistan was showing a stable number in seizures, with a double increase from 324.843 kg in 1999 to 675 kg in 2000, this increase in flow of heroin, may be similar to Kyrgyzstan, when in 1999 and 2000 IMU was testing new drug trafficking routes, and bumper harvest in 1999.

In general, from the data by country shows the high figure of seizures at the Tajik-Afghan border, thus one more time evidencing the threat emanating from proximity to the largest opium producer. And it seems, there is a tendency for the increase of the drug flow from Afghanistan to the Central Asian routes, which is due to the closure and strict control of borders by the Iranian border guards.

The supply side is Afghanistan, trafficking territory is CARs (though consumption is increasing) and the demand side is Western Europe (through Russia, which is turning from the trafficker into consumer). Left alone, Central Asia would become a security risk due to the drug traffic. An influx of the Central Asian drugs into Russia would create a security threat.<sup>101</sup>

There are incentives to produce more drugs, if we would compare the prices, and how much the transnational criminal groups involved in the trafficking earn. Drug trade is probably the most profitable, and popular (meaning there is a demand) commodity after military weapons. According to UNDCP “the overall turnover of this illicit trade in opiates of Afghan origin can be roughly estimated at US\$ 25 billion annually.”<sup>102</sup>

In Tajikistan there is a big difference in price between heroin of low and high purity. In 2002-03 high purity heroin cost \$US/kg 6,000-7,000 and low purity cost 1,500-2,000.

**Opium and heroin wholesale prices<sup>103</sup> (U.S.\$ per kg)**

|                                       |   |                                            |   |                                      |   |                                           |   |                                     |
|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| Badakhshan AF op.<br>\$60-100 (1995)  | → | Khorugh TJ opium<br>\$120-140 (1996)       | → | Osh KG heroin<br>\$1,300 (1996)      | → | Bishkek KG heroin<br>\$3-4,000 (1996)     | → | Moscow RU heroin?<br>\$8,000 (1996) |
| Badakhshan AF op.<br>\$240 (May 2002) |   | Dushanbe TJ heroin<br>\$1,5-2000 (2002-03) |   | Osh KG heroin<br>\$4-5,000 (2002-03) |   | Bishkek KG heroin<br>\$6-10,000 (2002-03) |   | Moscow RU heroin<br>\$30,000 (2000) |

It is important to mention that we took prices of Badakhshan,<sup>104</sup> since it is the province located in the northeast of Afghanistan closest to the Central Asian states, and from where the drugs are trafficked. Looking how the price increases once enters Kyrgyzstan’s territory, it could be said that it is processed (refined) from opium into heroin somewhere in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan mainly sells opium to CARs that refine it into heroin on their territories.

Depending on demand, Afghan drug mafias sell raw opium, morphine base or the final opiate product, heroin, to criminal organizations and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that smuggle the products out of the country to other markets or to heroin processing labs.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Roy, S. Meena. “Russia and Central Asia: Problems and Prospects.” *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis*, Volume XXV, Number 3, June 2001. Online. Available. <[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\\_june01rom01.html#note](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_june01rom01.html#note)>(4 Apr. 2003)

<sup>102</sup> Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002. p. 12.

<sup>103</sup> Data for 1995, and 1996 was presented at Bishkek Workshop on Fight with Drugs in 1996. Quoted from p. 13. Seger Alexander, “Drugs and Development in CA”; data for 2000 was obtained from “Central Asian Drug Trade” <<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/centralasia/photo7.html>>; and finally data for 2002-03 was obtained by email from Research Expert at UNDCP Field Office in Uzbekistan.

<sup>104</sup> Badakhshan is a province in the northeast of Afghanistan, and Gorno-Badakhshanskiy region is region in Tajikistan.

<sup>105</sup> PBS. “Central Asian Drug Trade.” *Photo Essay*. Online. Available: <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/centralasia/photo7.html> (20 March 2003)

There is also an increase in prices and shift in plantations location between 1996 and 2002, it might be due to several factors: (1) on 27 July 2000, the Taliban issued a decree imposing a total ban on opium cultivation in Afghanistan, thus in 2001 the total opium poppy cultivation areas reduced by 91%, thus there was a temporary shortage of opium of Afghan origin; (2) it might be due to the fact that CARs tightened border control, thus costs of trafficking increased; (3) U.S. bombing of Afghanistan (mainly southern part) disrupted previously used routes and shifted them from the south to the north, closer to the borders of CARs and safer, to the aforementioned Badakhshan province.

**Average Opiates Prices in U.S.\$/kg. Overview (December 2002-January 2003)<sup>106</sup>**

| COUNTRY                   | HEROIN<br>WHOLESALE PRICES | OPIUM<br>WHOLESALE PRICES |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Kazakhstan <sup>107</sup> | 14,500                     | 1,167                     |
| Kyrgyzstan <sup>108</sup> | 6,833                      | 800                       |
| Tajikistan <sup>109</sup> | 6,833                      | 1,750                     |
| Uzbekistan <sup>110</sup> | 22,071                     | 3,407                     |

The drop in opium price in Kyrgyzstan might evidence about the availability of large amounts of opium that was obtained through newly opened drug trafficking routes (e.g. Batken).

### **3.1.4 Routes for Trafficking Drugs Through CARs**

There are several routes for trafficking drugs from Afghanistan, however, in this thesis only the northern route will be analyzed, and Balkan route will be mentioned in relation how it was losing its position that opened the way for the exploration of the new northern route. Balkan route will not be discussed in this research, because the drugs destined for this route do not usually transcend the territories of CARs, and since this paper aimed at analyzing drug trafficking in Central Asia, the northern route will be of an interest.

<sup>106</sup> Data obtained by email from Research Expert at UNDCP Field Office in Uzbekistan

<sup>107</sup> Average prices for cities Astana, Almaty and North, South, West and East Kazakhstan Source: Mol

<sup>108</sup> Average prices for Bishkek City and South, North-East Kyrgyzstan Source: Mol

<sup>109</sup> Average prices for Gorno Badakhshan AO, So'gd, Khatlon provinces. Source: DCA

<sup>110</sup> Average Prices for all Provinces and Tashkent Source: Mol

*Balkan route (Afghanistan – Iran – Turkey – Balkan countries – Western Europe).*

There appears to have been some shift in the pattern of the South West Asia – Europe route: trafficking along the traditional Balkan route was relatively stable, at least in 2000.

The Balkan Route was once the dominant route for trafficking opiate products to Europe. In recent years, as the Northern Route gained more prominence, the number of opiate products traveling through the Balkans has dropped from 80 percent to roughly 50 percent according to UNDCP and other sources. To make the trip through the Balkan Route, opium, morphine base, and heroin from Afghanistan are shipped directly to Iran or are transported to Peshawar or Quetta in Pakistan before crossing the Iran-Pakistan border for transport to Turkey. From there, opiates are then trafficked through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia or through a southern leg in Albania and Yugoslavia before heading to the rest of Europe. The seaport of Karachi, Pakistan is also a main trafficking center for shipments overseas.<sup>111</sup>

Within two last years, Balkan route is losing its previous importance due to the fact that it became very difficult to traffic through Iran and may be because new governments in the Balkan states are trying to gain control over the drug trafficking transnational criminal groups, and curtail the problem. Thus many routes shifted to the CARs. As it could be seen, unfortunately, the northern route that lies through the Central Asian territories is gaining more popularity, and so far it seems there is no tendency to lose that position. In this thesis, we will concentrate on the northern route.

*Northern Route.* Opiate shipments through the Northern Route -- also known as the Silk Route -- start at the northern border (Badakhshan) of Afghanistan. They wind their way through the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan before ending up in Russian or European markets.<sup>112</sup> In addition, the northern route is supplied either directly from Afghanistan or via the Islamic Republic of Iran, through Turkmenistan bound for Russia and Western Europe.

Trafficking of opiate based drugs,<sup>113</sup> namely opium and heroin, through northern route (CARs) drastically increased since 1998, if to believe the statistics of Interpol and UNDCP, as shown by the number of seizures -- 1.8 metric tons of opium in 2000 to 4.2 metric tons in 2001 at the Tajik-Afghan border. Before 1998, northern route was not widely used for drug trafficking unless some events caused the displacement of the traditionally<sup>114</sup> existing Balkan route.<sup>115</sup> UNDCP report offers two reasons: first, the opening up of access to/through Central Asia and its increased use as transit region for several years may have led to an increase in opium production in the north of

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<sup>111</sup>PBS. "How Afghan origin opium reaches the West." *Photo Essay*. Online. Available: <<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/centralasia/imap2.html#3>> (20 March 2003)

<sup>112</sup> Ibid

<sup>113</sup> Opium, heroin, morphine, and codeine

<sup>114</sup> It is estimated that during 1999 over 80% of the heroin seized in Europe transited the Balkan Route. The former Yugoslavian branch of this route which was disrupted for a number of years because of civil war apparently reopened for drug traffic during 1996 and continued to be active in 1999. (Interpol)

<sup>115</sup> Balkan route supplied via the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey, was the predominant channel of transportation used by drug traffickers until 1997

Afghanistan in 1998; second, reports from Interpol indicate that the deployment of Iranian military units along the Islamic Republic of Iran-Afghanistan border may have resulted in a sharp reduction of opiate smuggling across this border and an increasing use of Pakistan and the Central Asian States as transit countries.<sup>116</sup> Political instability and economic hardships have made the Central Asian region attractive to drug smugglers. In the light of the active usage of the northern route, there is a growing concern about the real size of the possible impact on the stability in the region.

A northern route comprises several routes originating in Afghanistan and transcending territories of CARs. The Afghan drugs are trafficked through CARs to Russia → Turkey and further to the Western Europe, though some trafficked to China, and further. In this paper we will concentrate on drugs destined to Russia, since the size of shipments is large and more transnational criminal groups involved because they have to transcend several borders in Central Asia. Majority of routes going through Central Asia connect to Russia, which is the main gateway of drugs for the Western Europe. For that reason, the trafficking routes linked for Russia will be given.

**Trafficking through northern route existing around 1995**

- Kabul (AF) → Termez (UZ) → Tashkent (UZ) → Moscow → Tallinn (EST)
- Gerat (AF) → Kushka (TK) → Ashgabat (TK) → Moscow → Western Europe

**Trafficking through northern route previous and existing**

- Badakhshan (AF) → Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO-TJ) → KZ, KG, UZ → Russia
- Badakhshan → Khorugh (TJ) → Osh (KG) → Ferghana Valley → KZ, KG, UZ → Russia
- <sup>117</sup>Badakhshan → Jergatal and Garm (TJ) → Batken<sup>118</sup> (KG) and Kadamjai<sup>119</sup> (KG)
- Badakhshan → Khorugh (TJ) → Altyn-Mazar (KG) ↔ Chon Alai Valley (KG) now Batken
- <sup>120</sup>Raushan Plateau → Zaalay Range → Chon-Alay Valley ↔ Altyn-Mazar (KG)
- <sup>121</sup>Murghab District in GBAO's → Khorugh (TJ) → Osh (KG) → Kyzyl-Art (KG)
- Mazar-e-Sharif (AF) → Termez (UZ)
- Badakhshan → Khudjand (TJ) → Lyailiyak (UZ) called **Lyailiyak route**
- Badakhshan → Pyandzh (TJ) → Dushanbe (TJ) → Moscow
- Badakhshan → Moskovskiy (TJ) → Osh (KG) → Kazakhstan → Russia

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<sup>116</sup> UNODC. Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999

<sup>117</sup> Called Batken Route

<sup>118</sup> Became popular, IMU fighters tried this route, and also had military clashes with state forces in 1999 and 2000.

<sup>119</sup> Southern district within Osh region in Kyrgyzstan

<sup>120</sup> Called Altyn-Mazar Route

<sup>121</sup> Called Kyzyl-Art Route

Here are only some routes that were known to the public and could be found by the author in U.N. and other reports on illicit drug trafficking. In reality, there are many more routes transcending Central Asia that are changing and adapting according to policies aimed at their elimination. From the direction of aforementioned routes it could be assumed that entry points for drugs lie through Tajik territories, and vast majority of drugs is trafficked through the south of Kyrgyzstan (became popular). And another entry point for drugs is Turkmenistan, but majority of Turkmen drugs are trafficked through Iran (more difficult) to Turkey (Balkan route). The increase in the traffic routes through Tajikistan evidences that borders are still rather porous. There is a vast and free movement of people on both sides of border due to strong ethnic links to Afghanistan, where about 25% of Tajiks reside, thus drugs mainly channeled though those connections, and family ties, plus weak border guarding, all factors contribute to the free flow of drugs into Tajikistan.

### ***3.1.5 Corruption and Money Laundering***

Drug trafficking system is rather cumbersome and needs 'cooperation' of many people who are bribed in order the system will work. Drug trafficking, to name few, led to the cooption of the criminal groups with the government officials, law enforcement officers, customs officers and border guards that led to the corruption at many levels. If to analyze the situation about the rise of corruption, it is easy to compare the miser salary of the state employee against the big bribes coming from letting to traffic the drugs. However, it does not automatically imply that all the officials and border guards are corrupted. In general, the rise in corruption relate to the economic hardships, weakness of the law enforcement institutions, and lack of mechanisms to combat the corruption.

Corruption is seen as an instrument of drug traffickers and criminal organizations to keep governments weak and to reduce their own risk, that is, to facilitate their illegal business. Corruption undermines government institutions. It is appears to be particularly widespread in law enforcement institutions, that is customs, militias and the Russian border troops. It is also needless to say that systematic corruption in law enforcement agencies makes control of organized crime and drug trafficking an impossible task.<sup>122</sup>

However, the statement that the corruption is mainly among Russian border troops should not be understood literally, since also Russia's deployed 201 Motorized Rifle Division contracts the local Tajiks to serve as border guards. In early 2003, Mr. Gadoev,

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<sup>122</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development* p. 16,

the Head of the Agency for combat against illicit drug trafficking under Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs, said there is an increasing number of officers from the Tajik Ministry of Defense, who are trafficking drugs (couriers).<sup>123</sup>

Civil war in Tajikistan ended in 1997 by signing peace agreement under the U.N. auspices. Initially, Russian border guards were deployed in order to protect Tajik-Afghan border from overspill of the Afghan war, and to monitor ceasefire and keep peace but at present they mainly deal with the interception of drug traffickers and arms smugglers who are coming from Afghanistan, and to combat terrorism in the region. In late April 2003, Rakhmonov, sent a disguised message that Tajikistan will not probably renew the contract on stationing of Russian border guards, there are might be several reasons for that: the main one is that Tajikistan wants Russia to write off its debt of US\$300 million then Dushanbe will allow Moscow to change the status of the 201 Motorized Rifle Division into a Russian Military Base (4<sup>th</sup> base for Russia), and in addition will grant the optical-electronic complex "OKNO" a Russian status. The latter complex has a direct strategic importance for Russia's security on its southern border. Only two countries in the world have such optical-electronic complexes Russia and the U.S. Meanwhile there were talks that the U.S. offered Tajikistan US\$ 1 billion not to allow Russia to have a military base and "Okno" complex.

Then there less important by-reasons: firstly, as there are evidences that Russian border guards are engaged in drug trafficking and drug trading; secondly, at the same time based on the aforementioned indicators of drug seizures by Tajikistan, it shows the growing tendency in intercepting, thus some of the transnational criminal groups might not like an effective work of the Russian border guards, and through their connections to the high ranking officials in the Tajik government backing the withdrawal of the undesirable Russian troops; thirdly, Tajikistan is de-facto a colony of Russia. After the civil war (1992-1997) all the infrastructure of the country was destroyed, and Russia was rendering economic assistance thus also sometimes influencing the political direction of the country. For that reason, Tajikistan might to like to carry on the rebuilding of infrastructure on their own, and to take a step to avoid or break away from that economic and political dependency; fourthly, almost all CARs that are hosting the American and its allies military bases on their territories, receiving lavish financial means in return, in the forms of loans, credits, grants, and other technical assistance. Tajikistan is also hosting

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<sup>123</sup> TsentraZia. "V Tajikistane s nachala goda izyato geroina vdvoe bol'she, chem., za ves' proshlyi god." 15 May 2003. 3 paragraphs. Online. Available. <[www.centrasia.ru](http://www.centrasia.ru)> (20 May 2003)

U.S. military bases, but their scope of possible activities are limited by Russia's stronghold on Tajikistan's political decision making.

There is also a suspicion of corruption and cooption of the drug trafficking mafia with the Turkmen officials, and officers. Due to the information isolation policy pursued by the Turkmen leadership it is rather difficult to get any data or information from within the country. In 1997 there was an incident with Major Usachev, the head of the airport border guards unit, he caught big shipments of heroin<sup>124</sup> and he reported that fact to the Committee of State Security. After that report he was set up on charges of drug trafficking and sentenced to death. It seems that Turkmenistan's political leadership is well aware of the drug traffickers, but the government seems to turn a blind eye, thus obtaining high profits by letting to use their territory. In addition, in 1995 Turkmenistan requested Russian border guards to leave their territory, and Russian sources state that in that 1995 Russian border guards intercepted 2,500 kg of heroin at the customs check point Imam-Nazar close to Kerki.<sup>125</sup> In addition, in a March 21, 2002 report in the German news outlet Deutsche Welle was a quotation of a former Turkmen political prisoner saying that President Niyazov was involved in drug smuggling operations at Ashgabat airport.<sup>126</sup>

Another problem with the transnational criminal groups dealing with drug trafficking, apart from cooption with state officials, and officers, there is a growing concern with the laundering money received from drug trade. The organized criminal groups that obtain high profits from drug trafficking need to "laundry" the money, through some intricate bank operations, investing into legal enterprises, in order to clear the illegal profits, and turn them into legalized means. Thus there is a legalization of criminal means. Organized crime maintain "home basis" in countries with weak regulations, control mechanisms and law enforcement, while exploiting business opportunities, and to possibly launder the proceeds of criminal activities in third countries.<sup>127</sup> This is especially the case of Russian drug mafia, in the recent years they were laundering large sums of money through Kyrgyz banks that were vulnerable due to its western-style banking system.<sup>128</sup> At the Bishkek workshop on "Drugs and Crime: New Challenges,"<sup>129</sup> Kyrgyz

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<sup>124</sup> Online Database. "Turkmenskiy Tranzit." Online. Available. <[http://www.narkotiki.ru/press\\_5298.html](http://www.narkotiki.ru/press_5298.html)> (15 May 2003)

<sup>125</sup> Online Database. "Turkmenskiy Tranzit." Online. Available. <[http://www.narkotiki.ru/press\\_5298.html](http://www.narkotiki.ru/press_5298.html)> (15 May 2003)

<sup>126</sup> Rustem Safronov, "Turkmenistan's Niyazov Implicated in Drug Smuggling," p. 1. Online. Available.

<<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032902.shtml>

<sup>127</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 14

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>129</sup> The Bishkek workshop was organized by OSCE, UNDCP, and UNCPCJD in cooperation with Kyrgyz Government from 10-12 June 1996, with the participation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan,

delegation emphasized the dangers which 'dirty' money can pose to a small country like Kyrgyzstan and the need to get the parallel economy under control.<sup>130</sup> While Kyrgyzstan was acknowledging the danger, Turkmenistan's delegation stated that "money laundering was no problem in their country" it is hard to believe, especially considering the large drug shipments, and even more strange decreasing interceptions of drugs by Turkmen forces, that money laundering is not a problem. Does that mean that Turkmen government, since there are facts of cooption and even drug trafficking by Turkmen officials, is now laundering their own money?

In short, it could be concluded that law enforcement agencies are still weak, since they are under funded, and there is lack of regular training and upgrading of their expertise, all these make them easy to be corrupted. Corruption of the law enforcers, who are supposed to protect law, leads to the loss of public confidence in government's legitimacy to protect its population. However, it does not mean that law enforcement officers should be given broad terms of references, thus increasing the threat of "justifying their strong role to fight drugs, and crime to be used by them in support of authoritarian political regimes."<sup>131</sup> As for money laundering, it seems that some banks in CARs are benefiting from such large short-term 'investments' but in the whole it affects the development of banking system, and gives the opportunity for organized crime to legalize their means.

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Germany, the Holy Sea, Italy, Russia. Switzerland, and the USA as well as the Council of Europe, Interpol, and the World Bank were present as observers.

<sup>130</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 17

<sup>131</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 18


### 3.1.6 Consumption, Addiction and Rise in HIV

The table demonstrates the rise in addiction and drug consumption among the population along which the drug trafficking routes go through. Data on Turkmenistan is absent since the government does not present official reports to the UNDCP on the number of registered drug addicts, and it was not possible to get data on actual number of Turkmen drugs addicts because of the isolationist policies pursued by the ruling regime. Data is based on the reports submitted by the government agencies, and thus do not necessarily reflect the real situation. Most of the drug addicts do not officially register. Drugs abused in the CARs were mainly, cannabis, opiates, ephedrine, and some medical preparations. However, with the emergence of the trafficking routes, that led to the large influx of opiates, mainly heroin, there is an increase in abuse and addiction to it along the routes. The massive drug trafficking through various routes made the drugs more available, thus the prices decreased, and consumption increased.

**Registered drug addicts in Central Asia per 100,000 inhabitants**

| State                    | 1995         | 1996         | 1997         | 1998         | 1999         | 2000         | By countries  |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Kazakhstan               | 104.7        | 133.5        | 169.6        | 213.1        | 247.1        | 278.6        | <b>1146.6</b> |
| Kyrgyzstan               | 50.9         | 66.9         | 80.6         | 89.6         | 104          | 106.5        | <b>498.5</b>  |
| Tajikistan               | 15.6         | 16.2         | 10.2         | 25.2         | 44.3         | 68.5         | <b>180</b>    |
| Uzbekistan               | 29.3         | 33.2         | 37.5         | 41.5         | 48.8         | 57.9         | <b>248.2</b>  |
| <b>Subtotal by years</b> | <b>200.5</b> | <b>249.8</b> | <b>297.9</b> | <b>369.4</b> | <b>444.2</b> | <b>511.5</b> |               |

NOTE: Data on Turkmenistan is unavailable, since the government did not present the reports  
**Data obtained from UNDCP Illicit Drugs report p. 24**



Kazakhstan shows the growing number in addiction, previously it was cannabis and opium, but now growing addiction to heroin (by 1996 76% use cannabis, 20% opiates, 4% other preparations).<sup>132</sup> Tajikistan reports surprisingly low figures on registered drug addicts, it might be due to several factors: 1. after the civil war the hospitals for treating drug addicts stopped working and were not registering them; 2. drug addicts do not go for treatment, and thus do not register; 3. difference in the data collection techniques. In real situation, the number of drug addicts in Tajikistan should be the highest because practically all the entry points for Afghan drugs go through its territory.

Uzbekistan is also expected to show the higher indicator than it does. The fact that Kazakhstan shows higher number in addicts than Tajikistan do not mean that in the former there is more users, on the contrary in reality in Tajikistan there is the highest number of drug addicts, and abuses since there is a massive flow of drugs from bordering Afghanistan, and population is extensively involved in drug industry due to the high unemployment rate exacerbated by five years of civil war. These differences in the numbers might be the result of different practices in the information collection and registration. In general in the region, the drug addiction figures are much higher than presented. Immediate proximity to Afghanistan, porous borders made drugs available thus leading to the addiction among the population. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, social security nets practically disappeared. CARs are preoccupied with the economic development and there is no spare means for rehabilitating drug addicts.

The table of estimated actual drug addicts shows more realistic picture of the situation. Based on the table it could be said that there is an impressive increase for the last 8 years in rate of drug addicts off 100,000 inhabitants. For example, if to compare the upper limit of rate of the biggest drug users in Western Europe (per 100,000 inhabitants) in UK is 580 and Italy is 569, then one can assume about the danger of growing drug addiction among CARs.

| <b>Estimated <u>actual</u> number of drug addicts in Central Asia<sup>133</sup></b> |                         |                   |                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>State</b>                                                                        | <b>Estimated number</b> | <b>Population</b> | <b>Rate per 100,000 inhabitants</b> |
| <b>Kazakhstan</b>                                                                   | 165,000-186,000         | 14 860021         | 1,110 – 1,251                       |
| <b>Kyrgyzstan</b>                                                                   | 80,000-100,000          | 4 867481          | 1,644-2,054                         |
| <b>Tajikistan</b>                                                                   | 55,000                  | 6 131000          | 897                                 |

<sup>132</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 12

<sup>133</sup> UNODCCP. *Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighboring Afghanistan and the Response of ODCCP*, <[http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg\\_drug-situation\\_2002-10-01\\_1.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_drug-situation_2002-10-01_1.pdf)> p. 25

|              |                      |                   |                |
|--------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Uzbekistan   | 65,000-91,000        | 24 813109         | 262-367        |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>65,000-91,000</b> | <b>50,671,611</b> | <b>720-853</b> |

There is a growing addiction to the heroin (in CARs it is injected) that led to the drastic increase of HIV+/AIDS among the intravenous drug users (IDU). By May 2002 87,1% and 82% of HIV/AIDS cases respectively in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were among intravenous drug users. Among the reported HIV infection cases in Tajikistan 75,6% are injecting drugs users. And in Uzbekistan, the Republican Center on Prophylactics and Struggle Against AIDS reports that more than 60% of the HIV infections are among drug users.<sup>134</sup> It could be concluded, that there is a sharp increase in the addiction to the heroin trafficked from Afghanistan that also leads to the sharp growth of HIV/AIDS cases among IDUs among the populations of CARs.

### ***3.1.7 Initiatives at the Regional Level***

Some governments in CARs, began to realize and acted against the threat of drug trafficking at the institutional level, whereas Turkmenistan does not seem to view drug trafficking as a threat to country's security. Various activities were conducted in order to fight against drug trafficking and caused by it effects, such as corruption of law enforcement officers, and money laundering.

#### *Initiatives against drug trafficking*

National inter-ministerial coordinating bodies of formulating and implementing drug control strategies have thus been set up in Kyrgyzstan (1993), Uzbekistan (1994), Kazakhstan (1995) and Tajikistan (1995), only Turkmenistan does not yet have one.<sup>135</sup> All CARs, except for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, signed three major U.N. conventions related to the drug combat, and regulation (see the first section of this chapter). In August 1993 UNDCP opened a sub-regional office in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) for the cooperation between U.N. and five CARs in drug control matters.<sup>136</sup> Where in May 1996, all five CARs signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Regional Cooperation in Drug Control, which, if to say in short, covers following programs: strengthening of legal and institutional framework; strengthening of law enforcement agencies, through training and

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<sup>134</sup> UNODCCP. Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighboring Afghanistan and the Response of ODCCP, <[www.unodc.org/pdf/report\\_2002-06-26\\_1/report\\_2002-06-26\\_1.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/report_2002-06-26_1/report_2002-06-26_1.pdf)> p.237

<sup>135</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 20

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid*, p. 21

join regional cooperation; drug supply and demand reduction activities through data collection, and public awareness.<sup>137</sup>

On October 10, 2000, the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) was established by the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Tajikistan in a meeting in Astana. According to Putin, the main tasks before the five member-states of the EEC will be fighting international terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling.

In May 2003, in Almaty at the meeting of Shanghai Organization on Cooperation<sup>138</sup> it was planned that given the rapid growth of drug trafficking, which is the main income source for the transnational crime groups, and international terrorists, in the nearest future to conclude the multilateral agreement on cooperation to combat trafficking of illicit drugs and psychotropic substances.<sup>139</sup>

And on 12-14 May, 2003, Joomart Otorbaev, Vice Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan met in Vienna with UN Deputy Secretary General A. Costa, Director General of UNIDO K.Magarinos, OSCE Secretary General J. Kubis discussing issue of forming in Kyrgyzstan an agency on drug control. OSCE already allocated funds for the training of the law enforcement officers on how to fight drug trafficking, organized crime, and new types of low-intensity conflicts.

At the same time, there are cases when some of the law enforcement agencies are using their power for political purposes, and fulfilling the orders coming from the top. For example in Uzbekistan:

“...some cases, opposition figures were charged with offences unrelated to their criticism of government policy, such as drug possession, weapons possession, or disorderliness. Opposition activist Ibragim Buriev was arrested on 30 March for possession of weapons and narcotics. The charges against him were based on planted evidence. He was released a month later...”<sup>140</sup>

In addition, there are parallel activities targeted at preventing crime in general, and especially drug related crimes. In 1995 UNDP<sup>141</sup> prepared a project to support the Kyrgyz government in the establishment of the new central department within the ministry of the interior dealing with organized crime, including drug trafficking, and corruption.

All the initiatives were initiated for a good purpose, but while analyzing the cooperation, agreements, and strategies by CARs, Russia, and other international

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid, p. 21

<sup>138</sup> Former name Shanghai Five. Participants were MoF Ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan

<sup>139</sup> “Ministry soveshalis’. Raboty nepochatiy krai.” *Vecherniy Bishkek*. 2 May 2003. Online. Available: <http://www.vb.kg/2003/05/02/politika/2.html> (15 May 2003)

<sup>140</sup> U.S. Department: Human Rights report for 1995:1112. Quoted from Seger, *Drugs and Development* p. 20

agencies, it seems that they are mainly duplicating each other, instead of supplementing. Thus it leads to the disproportionate distribution and allocation of time, staff, and funds. The lack of clear terms of references for the spheres of activities for different agencies led to the overlapping, and in that way complicating the implementation of initiatives in practice at the regional level.

### **3.2 Conclusion**

This section analyzed that there is a growing 'popularity' of the northern route, that is created and developed by the strong and well armed transnational crime groups, that co-opt with officials, officers at various levels, by bribing them or even working with them jointly in order to obtain profits from trafficking, that are further laundered through banks and other forms of investments. Along those routes there is a growth in drug addiction, especially to heroin, that led to the sharp increase in HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users. Given all these negative consequences that were caused/exacerbated by drug trafficking they seriously undermine the legitimacy of states in eyes of their populations to meet the challenge.

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<sup>141</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 22

## **Chapter IV: Synthesizing of the Case with the Theory: Drug Trafficking is a Threat to the National Security of the Weak Central Asian States?**

This chapter will aim to synthesize the results of the case study, with the chosen theory (Chapter II), and try to answer the research question *Does drug trafficking pose a threat to the national security of the weak Central Asian states?* In order to answer the question, I will analyze the impact of drug trafficking in CARs on the sectors comprising national security: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal. Further it will be analyzed if the political leaderships in CARs perceive drug trafficking as a threat? And what are the difficulties with the regional security complex?

### **4.1 Analysis**

In order to proceed to the analysis if drug trafficking poses a threat to the national security of the CARs, we should define in short to which specific areas of security, and what is the intensity and level of threat, range over the time and space. Namely:

#### ***Analysis of threats to the (type) security by:***

- ✓ Range in space. How close is the threat in the geographical terms? Is the threat emanating of an immediate proximity?
- ✓ Distance in time. It is more of a range in time, it depends is the threat of an immediate character? Or it is a latent and hidden but still present a threat? How long will it take for that threat to take shape, and challenge the target?
- ✓ Probability vs. consequences. Sides involved in the implementation of the threat, should calculate the consequences, in case the threat will be carried out.
- ✓ Historical dimension. This aspect usually defines how the states perceive the threats based on their existing pre-beliefs. Sometimes, the states shape their foreign policies based on the past history, in order to diminish the historically experienced vulnerabilities.

#### ***4.1.1 Military Security and Drug Trafficking***

Based on the theory and the case study it could be stated that there are several threats to the military security posed by drug trafficking. Drugs situation is amplified by the fact that Afghanistan, which produces 75 percent of world's opium, is of an immediate geographical proximity and shares borders with three Central Asian republics, as it is shown below.

**Borders of CARs with Afghanistan**

| CARs         | Length of border with AF in km | Ethnic minorities residing in Afghanistan |
|--------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Tajikistan   | 1,206                          | 25% of Tajiks                             |
| Turkmenistan | 744                            | 13% of Turkmen with other minorities      |
| Uzbekistan   | 137                            | 8% of Uzbeks                              |

The table above demonstrates the length of the borders shared with Afghanistan by CARs. The weakness of the economic sector is characteristic for all five CARs, thus the state budget cannot allocate sufficient financial means for the purchase of the technical equipment (for border guards e.g. surveillance equipment), and pay reasonable salaries to the border guards, law enforcement officers, in order to give them incentives to protect those long borders. For that reason, at present CA border guards cannot on their own, unless they will be funded and technically equipped, secure those long and troublesome borders.

Until 1995 the Turkmen-Afghan border was secured by Russians, with the help of the Turkmen border guards. After 1995 Russian border guards had to leave the country, since Mr. Niyazov did not find their services any more needed. The justification was that presence of Russians infringes the country's sovereignty. Turkmenistan officially pursues the politics of neutrality, in this way trying to build relationships with its neighboring countries. However, given the immediate proximity to Afghanistan, and the fact that Iran tightly guards its borders, thus more drug trafficking routes turned to Turkmenistan. Analyzing the amount of illicit drugs intercepted it seems that Turkmen border guards are barely efficient, or another explanation that they are involved in drug trafficking.

Tajik-Afghan border is secured by Russian and Tajik border guards. But recently, Mr. Rakhmonov hinted that Tajikistan would not probably prolong the stay of Russian border guards.<sup>142</sup> It would be a catastrophe at present time, since as in Turkmenistan, border guarding is very weak, due to financial and technical underdevelopment. It is important to mention that Tajikistan's Gorno Badakhshan is bordering with Badakhshan province in Afghanistan, where 90% of drugs for the northern route produced. Based on the previous incidents, it is noticed that drug traffickers entering the border of Tajikistan from Afghanistan, once spotted by border guards, always come into the direct exchange of fire with the Russian and Tajik border guards. The traffickers are usually, while crossing the border are supported by the intensive gunfire cover from the well armed drug traffickers. Russian border guards recurrently mentioned that drug traffickers' military

and assault arsenal outweighs theirs in terms of sophistication, precision, and power. There is a strong tendency that there are growing and merging powerful transboundary drug trafficking syndicates that could militarily challenge the weak CARs. The trafficking in opiates from Tajikistan via Kyrgyzstan to other countries is increasingly in the hands of organized groups.<sup>143</sup> In Tajikistan apart from drugs, arms also smuggled (plus human beings from all CARs), which is the topic for another study, however, it needs to be mentioned since it also exacerbates, and poses a military threat to the weak CARs. The drug trafficking is also facilitated by the fact that there are ethnic Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks that reside over Afghanistan, thus trafficking is also done through existing family, blood ties.

Another military threat emanates from Islamic fundamentalists, whose source of income for their activities come from drug trade. In 1999 and 2000, there were military incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that is claiming to create a Caliphate in the Ferghana valley, and overthrow the government of Uzbekistan, under Mr. Karimov. As Makarenko states “the IMU's activities have largely focused on transporting illicit opiates from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which were ultimately destined for Russia and Europe”<sup>144</sup> and as Interpol representative stated that the incursions of IMU in 1999 and 2000 were used to distract attention of regional security forces and governments from large shipments of drugs. So the linkage to drugs could look as following: the connection between drug trafficking and ethnic strife, in that disaffected groups may resort to drug trafficking to finance resistance movements and the purchase of arms.<sup>145</sup>

Since the direct military threats from other sovereign states became more or less obsolete, another forms of threats could be included into the military threats, e.g. transboundary criminal groups, terrorist groups, and as Buzan notes “both militias and mafias can serve their members as referent objects for military security.”<sup>146</sup> In modern broadened terms of military security, CARs are threatened by drug trafficking: firstly, in terms of range of space, and recurrent historical incidents, where Afghanistan is of an immediate proximity, and existence of well equipped transnational criminal groups, and regular exchange of fire at the poorly guarded CARs borders along Afghanistan, and two

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<sup>142</sup> For reasons see Chapter III

<sup>143</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 15

<sup>144</sup> Makarenko, Tamara, “The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism.” Online. Available. <[http://www.cornellcaspien.com/briefs/020201\\_CA\\_Terrorism.html](http://www.cornellcaspien.com/briefs/020201_CA_Terrorism.html)> (15 May 2003)

<sup>145</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 18

<sup>146</sup> Buzan, Barry, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p. 54.

armed IMU incursions; secondly, in terms of time and probability/consequences, drug trafficking criminal groups already proved that the poorly equipped border guards are not match for their military supremacy, it could be evidenced from the recurrent and even growing exchange of fire.

Given the realities of the time, and history, it could be said that strong states are less vulnerable to the military threats, due to its military supremacy, and strong economic performance. Where weak states are rather vulnerable, but lack of that military supremacy, and strong economic performance, usually keeps them pre-occupied with internal threats to their security, such as ethnic clashes and secessionist movements.

Military security also can lead to the paranoia and be a comfortable justification, in the former the non-existent threats fall into the securitization due to the misperception and in the latter, the state shapes what will fall into the military security, based on its own interests and vulnerabilities. There were negative cases when the agenda to combat drugs was used by political elites. Examples are: in Turkmenistan on 12 July 1995 at least 80 people were arrested after participating in a peaceful protest march. The government accused them being under the influence of narcotics.<sup>147</sup> And in Uzbekistan, opposition leaders were arrested and accused of drugs possession, among other accusations.<sup>148</sup>

It could be concluded that drug trafficking does pose a military threat to the CARs, if to follow the previous broadened vision of new security threats to the military sector. However, the problem should not be manipulated by the ruling elites for the crackdown of the opposition groups, and suppression of the impoverished population. The drug threat, in spite of its severe national security implications, is not inherently a military threat. Thus, the straightforward application of military firepower to this problem is not likely to be effective (e.g. case of Columbia).<sup>149</sup>

#### **4.1.2 Political Security and Drug Trafficking**

As we said, political security is about protecting idea of state and the institutions that develop that ideology. Other types of vulnerability, whether economic or ecological, become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions,

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<sup>147</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 20

<sup>148</sup> See Chapter III

<sup>149</sup> p. 544. Dziedzic, J. Michael. "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security." *Survival*, Vol. 31, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1989 pp. 540-557.

or regime survival.<sup>150</sup> Thus it could be said that corruption, and money laundering of proceeds obtained from drug trafficking in CARs by transnational criminal groups reached the level, when they become acute enough to acquire political dimension. Weak states are rather vulnerable to the political threats, where the administrative, financial, legal and political institutions are rather weak, thus corruption, and money laundering is posing a threat and hampers the transition to the democracy:

The tendency of governments to limit the degree of openness in politics and society is likely to be intensified by the desire of individual members of the government apparatus who are benefiting from links with drug traffickers and organized crime, to ensure that their activities do not become the focus of public and media scrutiny unfortunately, where drug trafficking is deeply entrenched and symbiotic relationships have been formed between the traffickers on the one side and government on the other and law enforcement officials on the other, than there are entrenched interests in limiting the emergence of democratic forms of governance.<sup>151</sup>

The cooption (sometimes through bribes) of law enforcement officers, border guards, state officials, and ordinary citizens (often pushed by economic necessity, and some of them because of their criminal nature) with the drug traffickers erode the existing state institutions by violating laws through committing drug related crimes that endanger lives of people. The social, along with the economic decline in the level of life, leads to the dissatisfaction with the government that cannot provide, ensure, and protect the rights of its citizens<sup>152</sup> and welfare system, thus leading to the questioning of the idea of state by its own nation. And when state and nation do not correspond – as is generally the case – there is a potential for destabilization.<sup>153</sup>

Apart from institutions, the ideology of some CARs was threatened. Examples can be IMU that criticized the rule of the president Karimov (who claims that Uzbekistan is a secular state), and called to overthrow his government, and create a Caliphate in the Ferghana valley based on Shariah rule. As it was said before, IMU's funds come from drug trafficking, and drug trading. Another example is the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-97) where United Tajik Opposition, representing pro-Islamic ideas, was fighting for the political power against old communist government, and it is believed that their funds were also coming from drug trading and trafficking.

A senior United Nations official, Pino Arlacchi, has warned that the vast heroin and opium trade in Afghanistan is endangering the political stability of Tajikistan and its

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<sup>150</sup> Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament...* p. 9.

<sup>151</sup> Point made by Phil Williams (UNDCP Consultant) at the Bishkek Workshop (June 1996). Quoted from Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 19

<sup>152</sup> E.g. unable to curtail drug related crimes

<sup>153</sup> Buzan, Barry, *Security...*p. 153

neighbors.<sup>154</sup> About 120 tons of heroin per year travels to Europe via Central Asia. Threats posed by drug trafficking in terms of range in space, are not that important, unlike in military sector. But in terms of distance in time, the consequences from money laundering, corruption, law violation by committing drug related crimes, all undermine state institutions. In terms of probability/consequence and historical dimension, it could be said that Islamic fundamentalists, funded through drug trading, challenged the ideology of the present Uzbek government and based on previous incidents, it seems they are not giving up, rather they are merging, and finding through propaganda and financial incentives, more support among Uzbek population.

Political sector of CARs seems to be under the serious threat from drug trafficking, threats namely to the institutions, and the idea of states. All CARs are rather vulnerable to the political threats, since all of them are rather young, thus they are going through state building process, and their institutions are rather weak. CARs are considered to be weak states, where the idea of state is often challenged by internal opposition groups rather than external. Though CARs, as weak states, are vulnerable both to internal and external threats.

In conclusion, similar to military security, CARs were showing their preoccupation with internal threats, that were politicized as threats to the political security, and often manipulated for the suppression of the opposition groups, and diverting attention of the population from the economic hardships.

#### **4.1.3 Economic Security and Drug Trafficking**

Buzan mainly defined economic security in terms of state capability to mobilize accumulated profits for the military mobilization and mercantilism, in the form of market protectionism. Namely, many states have striven for economic self-sufficiency<sup>155</sup> as a means of security: by stockpiling 'strategic materials' as well as ordinary goods they may make themselves less vulnerable to economic warfare, hence more secure.<sup>156</sup> CARs fall into the category of weak states, and they fit the definition of being pre-occupied by the internal rather than external threats, the same situation is with the economic security. CARs are weak to compete with the international economies, and do not really have the stable market to protect, and they do not have surplus monetary funds that could be

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<sup>154</sup> "Afghan Endangering Central Asia." *BBC*. 20 Oct. 2000. Online. Available. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/982134.stm>> (12 May 2003)

<sup>155</sup> Kyrgyzstan for example is trying to transform its gas systems used for heating houses into the electricity based, since Uzbekistan often closes the gas delivery to Kyrgyzstan.

<sup>156</sup> Fischer, Dietrich, *Invulnerability Without Threat*, pp. 205-225.

easily diverted for the defense of the state, once the threat arises. For that reason, here we will talk about the internal vulnerabilities to the economic threats resulting from its institutional weakness. Threats to the economic security (apart from economic warfare interpretation) include money laundering, frauds, and corruption that weaken the economic institutions and systems (e.g. bankruptcy of banks) of, especially, weak states.

Drug trafficking poses a great threat to the weak economic institutions of the CARs. Drug trafficking halts the economic reforms due to corruption, money laundering. Corruption among the state officials, law enforcement officers and border guards led to the substitution of the legal economic way of earning money, thus undermining the very basis of the state. Corruption is mostly caused by the low subsidizing of state agencies (especially law enforcement agencies) by the government that left the (big) loops for the co-option with the drug traffickers that offer high profits.

“Needless to say when the crime of corruption is committed by those who are supposed to uphold law, the credibility of the legal apparatus of the state is put in question by the citizens...In that sense corruption threatens the very legitimacy of the state...”<sup>157</sup>

The economic decline created unemployment, thus creating a favorable soil for the new ‘volunteers’ for drug trafficking. Economic security is closely linked with the political and societal security, all these types of security closely intertwined.

In addition to the corruption, another threat posed by drug trafficking is money laundering, that is legalization of the illegally obtained proceeds through intricate bank operations, and investments. The western-style banking system of Kyrgyzstan is often used by organized crime groups based in Russia for investments and money laundering (from drugs).<sup>158</sup> Kyrgyz delegation emphasized the dangers which ‘dirty’ money can pose to a small country like Kyrgyzstan and the need to get the parallel economy under control.<sup>159</sup>

All CARs are countries with the transitional economies, and their economic infrastructure is rather weak and vulnerable to the threats posed by corruption, and money laundering. Some of the CARs might turn a blind eye on the large short-term investments in their banks from drug trafficking, without questioning the sources, in order to obtain profits. But in the longer term, it might have negative effects on the overall economy of the state, and most dangerously CARs with their weak institutions might become a harbor for money laundering.

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<sup>157</sup> UNDP/CPCJB/UNICRI 1995:9. Quoted from Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 16

<sup>158</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 15

<sup>159</sup> Seger, Alexander, *Drugs and Development*, p. 17

Thus it could be concluded that drug trafficking poses a threat to the economic security of the CARs, through corruption, and laundering of proceeds obtained from drug trafficking. Threats to the economic security cannot be measured in terms of range in space. But rather in terms of distance in time (already felt by some CARs), probability/consequences and historical dimension (proved that corruption and money laundering is already there, and consequences to be measured). It could be argued that threats posed to the economic sector by drug trafficking is among the most serious threats compared with other four sectors comprising the national security, since they are seriously damaging the weak and fledging economic sector of weak CARs.

#### **4.1.4 Environmental Security and Drug Trafficking**

Environmental security is a new phenomenon for the CARs, and also the most overlooked one. It is due to the transitional character of the newly formed CARs and lack of expertise rather than their ignorance. Buzan states that environmental threats are generally unintentional.<sup>160</sup>

Conversely, drug trafficking poses a threat to the environmental security, in terms of soil erosion that are under plantation of poppies and cannabis. Environmental degradation caused by poppy cultivation is more acute in Afghanistan, and also crop substitution problem, meaning that poppy cultivation outshadowed other crops due to its high cash profitability. It seems that environmental security, as other sectors, cannot be viewed in isolation, and as Buzan, who have analyzed the concept "environmental security," and its use, recommend that environmental problems be treated as part of the economic field. "The security label is one solution," according to Buzan, but he tends to prefer the other path: to "identify environmental issues as part of the economic agenda."<sup>161</sup> The latter is closely linked to the economic terms, such as preference over more profitable crop. Examples are large plantations of cannabis in all CARs, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, of opium in Tajikistan (Penjikent and Gorno-Badakhshan), Uzbekistan (Samarkand), Kazakhstan (Taldy-Kurgan and Kyzyl-Orda) and Turkmenistan, of ephedra in Kyrgyzstan. These plantations apart from eroding the soil, substitute and push out other crops, thus leading to the lack of crop diversification, that might lead to serious political, economic and societal problems, as it happened in Afghanistan and states within Golden Triangle. In addition, environmental threats include

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<sup>160</sup> Quoted from Waever, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Lipschutz, "On Security." *Online book*. 1998. Online. Available. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz13.html> (22 Mar. 2003)

the migration of the population because of the loss of the fertile lands. Meaning that once the soil will be eroded because of opium and cannabis planting without break (due to the interest in profit) and lack of crop variety. Erosion makes soil not good for use for a long time that would lead the population resettlement, which in its turn could lead to other political, economic and societal problems.

In terms of space, environmental threats are of an immediate proximity (soil), in terms of time, they might be dormant, but the effects might cause irreversible and severely harmful consequences. In terms of probability/consequences, both are present. As for historical dimension, it should be learned from lessons of Afghanistan and Latin America.

#### **4.1.5 Societal Security and Drug Trafficking**

As Buzan states the organizing idea in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community.<sup>162</sup> Under objects of societal security can be clans, tribes, religions, nations, and race.<sup>163</sup>

As with unemployment and crime, these are the threats primarily to the individuals; only if they threaten the breakdown of society do they become societal security issues.<sup>164</sup> Drug addiction, and HIV/AIDS outbreak along the drug trafficking routes in CARs are seriously threatening the breakdown of the society. Based on the estimated actual number of the drugs addicts in CARs, which is in average 720-853 per 100,000 inhabitants, it is quite a high indicator, given the fact that drug addiction and abuse is relatively new phenomenon in CARs. If to compare that 720-853 with the upper limit of rate of the biggest drug users/abusers in Western Europe (per 100,000 inhabitants) in UK is 580 and Italy is 569, then one can assume about the danger of growing drug addiction among CARs.

As it was said throughout the thesis, there is a growing addiction to the heroin among populations in the CA states, due to the drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Drug users in CARs prefer to inject the heroin (it is more economic thus cheaper), and often share syringes that led to the sharp increase in HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users. There is a spread of HIV/AIDS along the trafficking routes transcending CARs. For

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Buzan, Barry. *Security...*p. 119

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. 123

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., p. 121

example, Dr Beyrer from Johns Hopkins University conducted a research on Kazakhstan and linked the findings to his main hypothesis that "about a 100%" likelihood that an uptake of heroin use, followed by explosive outbreaks of HIV infection, would occur in communities living along drug smuggling routes."<sup>165</sup> There is a rapid growth of HIV/AIDS in the south of Kyrgyzstan through which several drug trafficking routes go through (e.g. Batken, Chon-Alai). Since drugs along the trafficking routes cost cheaper by satiating the market that leads to the price drop thus making drugs more affordable and available.

CARs institutions and agencies show contradicting, in terms of reliability, data on registered drug users, and HIV/AIDS. It is due to the difference in data collection, registration, financial shortages, and simply drug users do not want to be registered. For that reason, it is rather difficult to convince the decision makers that the scale of actual threats to the societal security, in terms of addiction, drug-related crimes, HIV/AIDS spread, is growing fast.

To name few, there are following threats to the societal security, especially to individuals, and society, in terms of range in time, space, and probability/consequences:

- There is a sharp rise in drug related crimes. According to UNDCP estimates from 1991 to 1993, detected opium cultivation and drug-related crime increased by 300 and 65 percent, respectively.<sup>166</sup>
- Women and children, especially in Tajikistan, are used as drug couriers
- Increased drug consumption (see Chapter III)
- Drug abuse leads to the loss of identity, and erosion of morals
- HIV/AIDS widespread among intravenous drug users. Link between drug trafficking routes and a sharp increase in HIV.

In terms of historical dimension, CARs should learn lessons from Pakistan, which has around 2 millions of drug addicts, mostly heroin, that seriously threatens the stability of the society. Iran was able to perceive the scale of the threat from drug abuse, and took measures on sealing borders, and pursuing other strategies aimed at decreasing and addressing the sources of problems caused/exacerbated by drugs. Thus, it could be assumed that drug trafficking poses a serious threat to the societal security.

#### ***4.1.6 Threat of Drug Trafficking to the National Security***

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<sup>165</sup> Mangai Balasegaram. "AIDS explodes on drug trafficking routes." *BBC*. 15 June 2000. Online. Available. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/778609.stm>> (12 May 2003)

<sup>166</sup> UNODC. *Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999*

After analyzing the threats posed by drug trafficking to the different sectors that comprise national security, it could be concluded that the posed research question was answered. *Drug trafficking does pose a serious threat to the national security of the weak Central Asian states.* As it was defined in chapter II state consists of: the idea of the state (nationalism, sovereignty); the physical base of the state (population, resources, technology); and the institutional expression of the state (administrative and political systems)<sup>167</sup> and drug trafficking challenges all those three components. Security is defined and valorized by the threats which challenge it.<sup>168</sup> The amount of drugs trafficked through the territory of CARs is on a steady growth, thus posing a serious threat to the national security of the countries in transition, with weak economic basis and socio-political cohesion. Economic instability and poverty in the region make it more vulnerable to this problem.<sup>169</sup>

| Threats <sup>170</sup>                                                                                   | Indicator | Range in space                                                                                                                                                       | Distance in time                                                                     | Probability vs. consequences                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Historical dimension                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Drug mafia<br/>Warlords<br/>Transnational<br/>criminal groups<br/>Insurgents &amp;<br/>terrorists</b> |           | Warlords from Afghanistan, of Tajik & Uzbek origins. IMU <sup>171</sup> intrusion into Uzbekistan. UTO <sup>172</sup> history, but links still exist. Hizb-ut-Tahrir | All those military insurgents pose an immediate threat, IMU attacked twice KGZ & UZ. | Criminal groups, insurgents, and terrorists already attacked militarily, thus causing serious destabilization within weak CARs. <sup>173</sup> Threats posed by insurgents include the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts. There are already drug trafficking routes, and CARs are facing the consequences. | Unfortunately, historical dimension of drug trafficking works against CARs. Meaning that CARs were within Soviet security ring, and 98% or more of the drugs produced and consumed in the Soviet Union were of domestic origin. <sup>174</sup> With the fall of the Soviet Union the borders were open, and security ring disappeared and drug trafficking as a relatively new threat started challenging CARs that did not have existing pre-beliefs about the real scale of threats it can pose. However, CARs could analyze and see that drug trafficking in Columbia, Bolivia, Afghanistan completely destabilized the state. Whereas countries in the Golden Triangle are suffering from drugs problem too. |
| <b>Corruption<br/>Money laundering</b>                                                                   |           | Cooption with law enforcers, border guards, state officials. Laundering of illegal proceeds in CARs banks. All these are of immediate existing proximity.            | Already acting                                                                       | Some of the CARs acknowledged the fact that money laundering is posing a threat. Consequences from corruption is not difficult to measure, and the same from money laundering.                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| <b>Consumption<br/>Abuse of drugs<br/>HIV/AIDS</b>                                                       |           | Large number of drug addicts<br>Outbreak of HIV/AIDS                                                                                                                 | Rapid growth of drug addicts that led to the sharp outbreak of HIV among IDUs.       | Probability is there already. I don't think it is necessary to mention the consequences from growth of drug addicts, and spread of HIV → AIDS                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| <b>Drug related crimes</b>                                                                               |           | Drug addicts need to sustain their habit, sometimes through illicit ways.                                                                                            | Many cases in CARs, that are posing a growing threat to the society.                 | Probability is there. Society is coming under the target. Thus there is a threat of loss (if not already) of belief in the government, to meet the challenges.                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

It was said that actual threats, as well as being impossible to measure, may not be perceived. That would not be the case with drug trafficking, since given the statistics by UNDCP on production, and most importantly trafficking, and level of rising addiction through the trafficked territories show that threat is measurable, and it is the question of making it priority by the government in order to gain status of actual threat. In CARs the

<sup>167</sup> Buzan, Barry, *People, States & Fear...* p. 65

<sup>168</sup> Ullman, *Redefining Security*, p. 133

<sup>169</sup> Roy, S. Meena. "Russia and Central Asia: Problems and Prospects." Online. Available. [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\\_june01rom01.html#note\\*](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_june01rom01.html#note*) (4 Apr. 2003)

<sup>170</sup> Drug trafficking

<sup>171</sup> Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

<sup>172</sup> United Tajik Opposition. The members of UTO were given ministerial positions in the Tajik government under the U.N. peace agreement.

<sup>173</sup> Panicking was partially caused by inability of CARs to face the threats.

government inherited a rather solid historical setting from the Soviet Union legacy, and still perceiving threats in its traditional terms, as military and political, thus not considering drug trafficking as a serious threat to the whole national security of the state, that also includes economic, societal, and environmental sectors. Thus, maneuvering within the bureaucracy may be more important when the top decision-makers are inexperienced or pre-occupied with other matters.<sup>175</sup>

#### **4.2 CARs Perception of Drug Trafficking Threat**

Definitely, it is always easier to develop the responses to the direct and clear threats, e.g. military attack by other sovereign state, it does happen but given the existing treaties, conventions, and possible punishment, direct military assault is more or less obsolete. However, the new forms of threats are even more dangerous appeared.

...it is much more difficult to portray as threats to national security, or to organize effective action against, the myriads of other phenomena, some originating within national society, many coming from outside it, which also kill, injure, or impoverish persons, or substantially reduce opportunities for autonomous action, but do so on a smaller scale and come from sources less generally perceived as evil incarnate.<sup>176</sup>

As it was defined in the previous sections, weak state perceives and is vulnerable to threats emanating within rather than outside of its borders. Some of the Central Asian republics acknowledge the fact that drug trafficking is posing a serious threat, some not. Misir Ashirkulov, the Secretary of Security Council of Kyrgyzstan told that drug trafficking remains a big danger for the country's security. But he mostly meant in traditional military terms, based on IMU incursions to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan borders with Afghanistan, and suffers from the flow of drugs, however, they do not perceive it: "narcotics use in Uzbekistan is not a national tragedy... the real narcotic threat is Islamic fundamentalism."<sup>177</sup> It could be concluded, that Uzbekistan rather sees Islamic fundamentalism<sup>178</sup> as a threat to its internal security rather than other external factors, as weak states do. However, it could be argued that Uzbekistan has a problem in seeing the close connection between drug trafficking and Islamic fundamentalists who trade drugs for financing their activities. Tajikistan perceives drug trafficking as serious threat to its national security, but due to its weak state structure, that was severely

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<sup>174</sup> See p. 170. Lee, R. 1992. "Dynamics of the Soviet illicit drug market." *Crime, Law and Social Change*. 17:177-223

<sup>175</sup> Jervis, Robert, *Perception and Misperception...*p. 17

<sup>176</sup> Ullman, *Redefining Security*, p. 134

<sup>177</sup> Quoted from Seger "Drugs and Development..." p. 18.

<sup>178</sup> Uzbekistan has recently accused three Pakistani organizations—the Hezb-e-Hakat-e-Jihad (HHJ), the Devas-UI-Ershad (DUE) and the Islamic Ulema Society (IUS) of training clandestinely about 400 Central Asians at various centers in Pakistan with the task of carrying out terrorist attacks, destabilizing the situation and overthrowing the governments in

shaken by civil war, it cannot contain the problem on its own. For that reason the robust regional security complex might be the solution.

But the perception of the drug trafficking threats, should not lead to the “war on drugs” as in Columbia, which caused severe social problems and also led to the political legitimacy crisis, where the state is unable any more to use its powers to settle the problem in a peaceful way. As Ullman puts it correctly “state authorities frequently assume – sometimes with justification – that their foreign enemies receive aid and sustenance from their domestic opponents, and vice versa. They often find it convenient, in any case, to justify the suppression of rivals at home by citing their links to enemies abroad.”<sup>179</sup> But we could reinterpret it to our case: where state weak CA authorities assume that the domestic opposition are funding their activities by drug trading (in some cases it is true), thus using this convenient justification to suppress their political opposition.

Since drug trafficking cannot be contained within the borders of the state, the regional initiatives are important in meeting the challenge.

### **4.3 Difficulties of the Regional Security Complex**

CARs seem to be pre-occupied with their internal insecurities, rather than external. Despite many existing treaties, agreements, and cooperation initiatives among CARs, there is no real regional security complex in its true meaning:

A set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.<sup>180</sup>

CARs see each other as rivals (Kazakhstan vs. Uzbekistan for hegemony), or even enemies (Tajikistan vs. Uzbekistan), have the complementary economic products, and border disputes that prevent them from creation of a security complex. There are also other external factors that prevent the emergence of the solid security complex. Buzan defines two reasons on why security complex may not be present:

First, in some areas local states have so few capabilities that their power projects little, if at all, beyond their boundaries. These states have domestically directed security perspectives, and there is insufficient security among them to generate a local complex<sup>181</sup>.

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Central Asia. See Stobdan, “Regional Security Issues in Central/South Asia” Online. Available. <[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\\_99stp01.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_99stp01.html)> (10 May 2003)

<sup>179</sup> Ullman, *Redefining Security*, p. 131

<sup>180</sup> Buzan, Barry, *Security*...p. 12

<sup>181</sup> Buzan, Barry, *Security*...p. 12

It is true in the case of CARs, because the respective countries are preoccupied with their domestic politics, and meaning that unless CARs settle their internal challenges they cannot overstretch and focus on the external, and in this case regional politics, mainly related to the security issues. In addition, it is necessary to remind that all CARs of former Soviet Union emerged as independent states at the same time, and struggle with their state building and consolidation of all branches for the state formation. Moreover, all of the CARs are facing serious economic problems, and for that reason do not have surplus means to be diverted for the provision of their regional security.

The second occurs when the direct presence of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states. This condition is called *overlay*, which normally involves extensive stationing of armed forces in the area overlain by the intervening great power(s)<sup>182</sup>.

Domestic political fragmentation also makes the state exceptionally vulnerable to penetration by external political interests. It could be seen that starting post 9/11 U.S. deployed their military troops and established “temporary” military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Those bases are supposed to be used coalition forces in fight against the terrorism in Afghanistan. Many observers question the waning influence of Russia,<sup>183</sup> that how it allowed U.S. to enter its backyard. However, it does not mean that Russia distanced itself from the CARs, for example in April 2003, Russia also deployed its military forces in the Kant Airport in Kyrgyzstan, thus reiterating its position that Central Asia is in the national interests of Russia. It is obvious that Russia in the mid and long term needs secure all its borders, since Central Asia is bordering Russia, and the stability is of national interest for Russia. Russia several times warned about tighter control, since the drugs trafficked through CARs end up in Russia.

If to follow Buzan’s definition we could say that CARs are facing the *overlay* effect meaning that local security cannot be viewed in the view of the major powers presence that provide the security umbrella, and thus affect the regional balance in Central Asia. As Stobdan notes “in fact, Central Asian security in the coming years will be determined

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<sup>182</sup> Buzan, Barry, *Security...* p. 13

<sup>183</sup> 1. Russia is too preoccupied with its domestic problems, and cannot afford to overstretch itself to CA affairs. Given the fact that after the collapse of the SU, there is a vacuum in governing, which can be filled by the Islamic extremists. For that reason Russia, prefers to be filled by Americans; 2. Fear that in case the Islamic fanatics come to the power, it will increase the exodus of the refugees to the neighboring countries, thus over spilling to Russia per se; 3. Since Americans came to the region they will not tolerate drug trafficking thus possibly cutting the channels for the drug trafficking to Russia; 4. The easiest one, America will invest in the region, in that way create the “ready for use” market economy net, which would be handy for Russia’s future trade with CARs; 5. Mr. Putin is the first Russian President who didn’t have the complex of “Russia is an Empire” and focused on the development of country’s economy, army reforms, and need for financial assistance from U.S. influenced banks (IMF, World Bank). Thus Russia-U.S. well-calculated rapprochement can be seen as an alliance under the motto of the “fight with the terrorism” (Russia-Chechnya, and U.S.-Afghanistan), but at the same time as a persuasion of their national interests.

by international attention, as well as competition for exploiting and routing the region's enormous energy resources."<sup>184</sup>

In this view, it could be said that existing mutual distrust, and weaknesses of CARs prevent them from developing robust regional security complex to combat drugs. However, many initiatives were started, mainly with the involvement outside of CA powers, mainly Russia. But it seems that they are in most of the time duplicating each other, instead of supplementing. Thus it leads to the disproportionate distribution and allocation of time, staff, and funds. The lack of clear terms of references for the spheres of activities for different agencies let to the overlapping, and in that way complicating the implementation of initiatives in practice at the regional level.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

This chapter answered the posed research question, and it was concluded that drug trafficking does pose a threat to all sectors of CARs national security. It seems that some of the CARs do perceive the drug trafficking as a threat, while others do not. It might be due to the old type of thinking about security primarily in military and political terms. It was also analyzed that at present there is no a solid regional security complex, and the reasons why it is not there were mentioned, such as economic weaknesses of the CARs, competition among CARs, and superpower overlay.

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<sup>184</sup> Stobdan, "Regional Security Issues in Central/South Asia" Online. Available. <[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\\_99stp01.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_99stp01.html)> (10 May 2003)

## Chapter V: Conclusion

In conclusion, it could be said that I tried to apply the theory in analyzing the drug trafficking, namely in weak states, thus explaining in academic way that threats posed by drug trafficking can destabilize the country unless it is dealt timely, and appropriately, without lurching towards military means, but rather societal, environmental, social and economic development programs.

In Chapter I, the main research question, and sub questions were posed.

*Does drug trafficking pose a threat to the national security of the weak Central Asian republics?* After case study, and analysis, it was concluded that drug trafficking poses a considerable threat to the national security of CA states, namely, to the sovereignty, political, economical and administrative institutions, population, due to the distance (proximity to Afghanistan and central location of CARs); instability in Afghanistan (major producer) and Tajikistan (major trafficker); porous borders within CARs; weak and young controlling institutions; weak law enforcement forces; limited experience; and other features that pertain to the weak states, and states with the transitional economies. This conclusion was done based on the results received from answering the sub questions. That are:

*Who does traffic illicit drugs?* The system of drug trafficking similar to any business enterprise has demand and supply sides. The transnational criminal groups and drug mafia are the links between those two sides. They ensure the flow of commodity, which is in our case drugs, by creating elaborate networks by co-opting, bribing, paying, threatening of law enforcement officers, government officials, border guards, and civilians.

*Do the political leaderships in CARs see drug trafficking as a threat to their national security?* With such a rapid trends in drug trafficking that could be observed in the CARs, it is scarcely needs stating that drug trafficking is seriously challenging the national security of the CARs. Since at present, despite some CARs meager initiatives undertaken to fight drugs trafficking, CARs political leaders are preoccupied with their personal economic well being, and trying to stay in power by all means (purging opposition), and some of them disregard the drug trafficking threat as a serious, growing (steadily), and substantial threat to the national security of their respective states.

*Can CARs as a region jointly oppose the problem of drug trafficking?* After analyzing the existing treaties aimed at combating drug trafficking and security matters, it could be concluded that it is rather pre-mature to talk about the potential of the CARs to create a

robust regional security complex. It is due to many reasons, but the main ones are the existing competition among CARs, economic weakness, presence of proxy politics (presence of great powers), and the main one is the difference in perceiving drug trafficking as a threat to the security by CARs. For that reason, it could be said that drug trafficking and resulting from it problems cannot be yet met by the regional forces.

In general it could be said that it goes without saying that there is a huge difference between the direct military threats to military and political security posed by another country and those posed by drug trafficking. With the previous one, it is easier to define it in practical terms (such as presence of a foreign military army, military assault), and it is a threat to the existence of the state, and physically (immediate death because of the wounds?) affects almost all individuals, where the latter one does not directly and suddenly<sup>185</sup> threaten the lives of almost all individuals, and poses a threat to the immediate fall of the state. However, as a dormant and even more dangerous problem, drug trafficking crosses, interlinks, and affects many layers, such as state, nation, and individuals. To name a few dangers caused by it: drug trafficking through the territories of the CARs led to the availability of cheaper drugs that is directly linked with the increase of the HIV caused by the intravenous drug users; drug trafficking gave the 'chance' to many unemployed individuals to make quick money thus pushing many people to the trafficking activities, and also increased the rate of drug related crimes; drug trafficking also created the already large corrupted army of officials that are co-opting with the organized criminal groups.

In conclusion, it could be said that without curtailing the demand side, and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, which is the largest opium producer, drug trafficking routes through CARs will be kept used intensively. And it goes without mentioning that the domestic initiatives and policies aimed at solving the sources of drug related problems are paramount.

Definitely, after analyzing the threats posed by drug trafficking to each security sector, it could be concluded that problems in every sector should be handled on time and in ways that would prevent and avoid the necessity of employing the military power in problem solving. It is highly desirable that CARs should create one robust regional security complex, instead of creating 'toothless' complexes.

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<sup>185</sup> Exception could be drugs overdose

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