

# Does money make regimes survive?

- A constructivist re-reading of security in less democratic developing Asian states.



**Mikael Weissmann**

Department of Peace- and Conflict Research  
Uppsala University, Sweden

JUNE 2001

*This thesis was submitted as partial fulfilment of the requirements  
of a Master Degree in Peace- and Conflict Research (Fil Mag).*

*It was supervised by Niklas Swanström.*

# Table of Contents

---

SUMMARY.....	III
MAP #1: SOUTHEAST ASIA.....	IV
MAP #2: THE SPRATLY ISLANDS.....	V
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	VI
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES.....	VII

## *SECTION 1: Introduction & Methodology*

<b>1 INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT TO KNOW – JUSTIFICATION OF THE THESIS.....	3
<b>2 PURPOSE, DEFINITIONS, DELIMITATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY ...</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1 PURPOSE .....	5
2.2 DELIMITATIONS .....	6
2.3 DEFINITIONS .....	6
2.3.1 <i>Something about terminology</i> .....	8
2.3.2 <i>Something about sources</i> .....	8
<b>3 METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>4 ASSUMPTION AND HYPOTHESES .....</b>	<b>10</b>
4.1 ASSUMPTION.....	10
4.2 HYPOTHESES:.....	12

## *SECTION 2: The Case*

<b>5 CASE: THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE.....</b>	<b>14</b>
5.1 CASE CHOSEN AND THE REASONS THEREOF.....	15
5.2 THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE .....	18
5.2.1 <i>Course of Events</i> .....	20
5.2.2 <i>Negotiations and confidence building measures</i> .....	22
5.2.3 <i>Strategic Aspects</i> .....	25

## *SECTION 3: Analysis*

<b>6 ANALYSIS .....</b>	<b>28</b>
6.1 THE PROCESS .....	28
6.2 THREE THEORETICAL APPROACHES.....	30
<b>7 KENNETH WALTZ AND NEOREALISM.....</b>	<b>31</b>
7.1 1 <sup>ST</sup> READING: NEOREALISM-SENSITIVE LENSES .....	33
7.1.1 <i>1<sup>st</sup> reading: a deconstruction</i> .....	35
7.2 2 <sup>ND</sup> READING: ECONOMIC & POLITICAL SURVIVAL SENSITIVE LENSES.....	37
<b>8 ROSECRANCE AND LIBERALISM .....</b>	<b>38</b>
8.1 1 <sup>ST</sup> READING: ROSECRANCE-SENSITIVE LENSES. ....	39

8.1.1	<i>1<sup>st</sup> Reading – a deconstruction</i> .....	42
8.1.1.1	Rational utility maximising actors in World Politics?.....	44
8.2	2 <sup>ND</sup> READING: ECONOMIC & POLITICAL SURVIVAL SENSITIVE LENSES.....	46
<b>9</b>	<b>BUZAN, WAEVER &amp; DE WILDE - THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL .....</b>	<b>48</b>
9.1	1 <sup>ST</sup> READING: THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL .....	51
9.1.1	<i>The sectors reassembled and synthesised</i> .....	59
9.2	1 <sup>ST</sup> READING: A DECONSTRUCTION.....	60
9.2.1	<i>The story not told – the hidden agenda of the elite</i> .....	61
9.3	2 <sup>ND</sup> READING: ECONOMIC & POLITICAL SURVIVAL SENSITIVE LENSES.....	62
<b>10</b>	<b>TESTING OF HYPOTHESES .....</b>	<b>65</b>
10.1	HYPOTHESIS #1 .....	65
10.2	HYPOTHESIS #2 .....	66
10.3	CONCLUSION.....	68
<b><i>SECTION 4: A Constructivist framework</i></b>		
<b>11</b>	<b>A CONSTRUCTIVIST FRAMEWORK.....</b>	<b>69</b>
11.1	THE MISSING PIECES.....	70
11.2	THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY – A FRAMEWORK.....	72
<b>12</b>	<b>CONCLUDING THOUGHTS.....</b>	<b>75</b>
12.1	FURTHER RESEARCH .....	76
	<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>78</b>

## Summary

---

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the importance of economic factors for security in less democratic developing Asian countries (LDAC). The hypothesis is that economic factors are of equal importance with traditional security factors for the political survival of the ruling regime.

It is assumed that the underlying goal among LDACs is the political survival of the ruling regime and that this is the underlying reason for policy decisions.

This hypothesis is tested on the Spratly Islands dispute by applying three theoretical approaches on the case. The approaches are Kenneth Waltz's neorealism, Richard Rosecrance's liberalism and the Copenhagen Schools' framework for security analysis.

Each theory is analysed separately by first being read with for the specific theory sensitive lenses, thereafter is this positive reading deconstructed to find inconsistencies and flaws. Finally there is a second reading with economic & political survival sensitive lenses.

Based on these readings it is concluded that economic factors are of equal importance with traditional factors for the political survival of the regime, but that the policy making elite does neither accept, nor perceive that this to be the case which create problems in regard to policy implementation of this finding.

To verify this conclusion it is tested whether these traditional theories can explain the conflict patterns in LDACs in a general sense. It is concluded that they do work in the Spratly case, but that we cannot draw valid generalisations to LDAC states as a group from the results of the analysis.

It is concluded that the fundamental problem with traditional theories are that they are not developed for an Asian setting and further do not take the decision-making process in LDAC countries into account. Therefore we cannot be sure either about what the interests and goals of the decision makers are, nor understand how the dynamics of the decision making process works. This needs to be understood if we are to be able to transfer our theoretical conclusions into practical usage.

To be able to do this we need to construct a new framework to understand both the underlying process where the interests are formed and the general dynamics of the decision-making process. A new constructivist framework that can enhance our understanding of this process among LDAC states and hence make it possible to transfer our theories into a policy change is presented.


Lastly an agenda with future research needed to be done is presented.

Map #1: Southeast Asia



Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library's Map Collection. URL: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps>

**Map #2: The Spratly Islands**



Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library's Map Collection. URL: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps>.

## List of abbreviations

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBM	Confidence-Building Measure
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific
CSCT	Classical Security Complex Theory
EIA	the United States Energy Information Agency
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
LDAC	Less Democratic Developing Asian Country
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
PRC	People's Republic of China (China)
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
SCS	South China Sea
SLOC	Sea Lane of Communication
UN	The United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organization

## **Tables:**

Table #1: Claims made in the Spratly archipelago .....	19
Table #2 - Strategic aspects of the dispute .....	25
Table #3: The Process .....	28
Table #4: Levels of Analysis .....	50
Table #5: Security Sectors .....	50
Table #6: Level of Analysis - dynamic patterns .....	51
Table #7: Possible relation patterns of securitization .....	55
Table #8: Hypothesis #2 - results .....	67

## **Figures:**

Figure #1: Testing Proces .....	10
Figure #2: The policy making process - LDACs .....	73

---

# SECTION 1: Introduction & Methodology

---

## 1 Introduction

In traditional security studies the emphasis has always been on hard security factors such as sovereignty, military capabilities, geography etc. It is today questioned by many scholars whether other soft factors, such as environment, identity, economy and culture, should be brought into the security-equation, into the task of finding the reasons of conflict, peace and war.

Most theories have been centred on a western based thinking derived from western understanding, culture and philosophy. The empirical examples have consequently primary been drawn from European historical experiences and events. The result of this has been a concentration on strong, developed states interaction, the same states interaction with the developing world, and similar situations where we, the developed west, always are involved – the actual interaction among others themselves have virtually never been the focus of analysis.

We have arguably gone a long way in own quest for self-understanding. We have found that Democracies are not fighting each other, with the reservation that they are to be western-style liberal democracies, and further, that they might still fight anything else, anything that they do not perceive as fitting their own frame of liberal democracy (Owen 1994; Russett 1993). Extreme forms of economic liberalism claims the victory of free-market capitalism - capitalism as the final stage in history (Fukuyama 1989). We in the rich countries are worried about our environment, we are worried about nationalism, and we are worried about the world. But when we on the other hand start examining intra-other interaction, if we even care to so do, and other's security and conflict-environment we either assume that they are exactly as we are; as if a state where people are starving and the goal of the elite is egoistic self-indulgence have the same preferences and worries as we do. Or, as an alternative, we use a traditional neo-realist perspective, and then we do not have to further examine the world because it is by definition the same dynamics everywhere – a struggle for survival and relative power gains.

It seems like we often forget that before trying to understand and explain policy and behaviour we need to know both the underlying goals and aims of the actors, and also we need to understand how the structure and dynamics work, and how it works there, not here. Proponents of realism and *real politik* can of course argue that this is not the case, that all units (states) are in practice the same and their possible differences are of no importance for the outcome. A constructivist on the other hand can talk about the social construction of reality and state-interaction, but without remembering the fact that in most developing states the prime goal of the regime is its own survival, a survival that in these states is not to be re-elected but to by using all available means keep and presumably even try to increase its own power and security, a loss of which in the developing world risk having more implication than just loosing the power – is often also includes a risk of prosecution, sometimes even of death<sup>1</sup>. If we accept this as the underlying aim of policy, as we will in this thesis (see “Assumption” below), it seems reductionistic and narrow-minded to put such an emphasis on hard security factors, I believe. My hypothesis is that among developing less democratic Asian states/countries (LDAC<sup>2</sup>) economic factors are as important as traditional factors for the political survival of the ruling regime. The underlying idea behind this hypothesis is that without economic prosperity and growth there will be a risk of pressure against the regime. Both internal pressure – wealth and prosperity help keep the masses down and/or help keeping the possible opposition down and the elite satisfied, and externally - economy is important because it is fundamental for both the ability to compete on the international arena and the ability to keep the position in the balance of power and military capability games.

---

<sup>1</sup> The use of all available means can of course be argued to be the aim in more developed, western-style democracies to, but the tools and therefore the de facto options available are there severely restricted. This has fundamentally to do with the fact that the rule framework is set and you must, more or less, keep within it (Held 1998). Re-election does of course not have to be the goal, and the same can supposedly be the same in an LDAC state, but in those the number and range of tools and moreover the ultimate importance and incitement to stay in power is higher - the result of loosing power here might be death, or at least the risk of a severe loss of wealth, comfort and prestige (see for example Mansfield & Snyder 1995).

<sup>2</sup> The abbreviation LDAC is chosen before LDAS because of readability consideration, this even though the term state will mainly be used in this thesis.

## 1.1 Why is this important to know – justification of the thesis.

When concentrating on only hard security factors when analysing and exploring the international realm we create an image of the world that automatically has a tendency to become weighted towards a worst case scenario world. We must not create a worst case scenario of course, even though arguably that happens all too often, but even if we avoided worst case scenarios what so ever, it would still be highly likely that we ended up with a Hobbsian perception of the world. We do not end up there because we want to, but because of the self-fulfilling features of traditional theory; when the emphasis is always on hard factors such as survival, anarchy, military capabilities and power anything but such an end result would be strange.

The problem is not to be found in theory itself, but in the interaction between theory and reality. The real, physical world, is not so dark, pessimistic and hard as theory implies, this we can easily observe if we simply take one step back and look at not only the marginal cases where conflicts and wars occur, or seem imminent and unavoidable. Most of the time, in most places, there are no wars, and conflicts are solved, managed or avoided without the return to violence. As a matter of fact in most cases states even follow to the existing international rules and laws<sup>3</sup>.

To be able to avoid the above problem we need to put more emphasis on softer factors and their importance for security. The better we can understand and develop the framework trying to explain the reasons and dynamics of conflict, war and security, the better our understanding of the world will become. This though, is only the first step; by including softer, non-traditional factors we will be more able to solve conflicts and avoid war. This is because when widening the scope of security and the number and types of factors and variables included we will be able to increase the possibility of reaching a compromise, this firstly because of the increased number of issues to bargain and log-roll about, and secondly by changing at least some of the emphasis away from traditional zero-sum variables such as power and

---

<sup>3</sup> This point is borrowed from Tim Dunne.

territory<sup>4</sup>, and last but not least these “new” soft factors put into the equation are less prestigious than traditional ones and can easier be negotiated about.

In developing states in general, and developing Asian ones in particular, the most common approach to security today is either some form of a traditional one concentrating on military capabilities, sovereignty, territory and survival etc, or one of a more critical form which fundamentally challenges the traditional concentration on state as the primary unit, challenges positivism and sometimes even the fundamental features of reality. These theories moves the emphasises to for example individual security or on the other side of the spectrum the importance of environment for the survival of humanity and the globe. None of these two approaches to security are in fact, I would argue, helping us in our understanding of the pattern of conflict today in a way that are helpful; one is tasteful but utopian, the other will just lead to decay and war<sup>5</sup>.

If we instead put the emphasise on the importance of economic factors for security I believe we can enhance our understanding. Especially if we when concentrating on developing sates combine this with the underlying importance of political survival, the we, I believe, can create a framework that makes it possible to understand the world as it is today, not as we would like it to be, nor how it is if concentrating on worst case scenarios. By this approach we can move the emphasise away from security issues that in reality can notbe, or at least are extremely unlikely to be, solved at least in the short- or medium run, and instead realise that we can make progress in the management of conflicts without absolutely trying to solve them. This is not to say that non-traditional issues have not been on the agenda, the

---

<sup>4</sup> Whether power is to be considered a zero-sum variable is of course questionable, especially considering the increased emphasis on economic power which by definition allows for absolute gain, as opposed to classical definitions of power.

<sup>5</sup> This is especially true when we are concentrating on less democratic developing states where if applying a more traditional security framework (e.g. Vasquez 1993; Waltz 1979) we will realise that the number of factors predicting the escalation of conflict into war are so many that war will seem imminent and unavoidable. The same is the case when western thinkers and public start arguing for individual security and the global environment; it is of course intellectually stimulating but in states where the main aim is to survive the next day it seems a bit utopian, sometimes even patronising, to start arguing for the importance of for example a more restrictive pollution policy, the importance of education or the right to vote as fundamental human rights.

problem is that they always have been, and tend to be, in a sense on another agenda than the one for traditional issues; an agenda that is hierarchically lower and hence less important. This problem can be avoided by starting from the underlying assumption of political survival: if the hypothesis of the equal importance of economic factors and traditional factors for the political survival of the regime can be shown (see “Hypotheses:” below), this would be a strong argument for putting all these factors on the same agenda and hence give them a more equal weighting. This would increase the possibility of bargaining and compromise, especially considering that a too a strong concentration on traditional issues inherently increases the risk of violent conflict and instability<sup>6</sup>, situations that would be disastrous for the economy of the states involved and logically therefore dangerous for the regime’s survival and standing<sup>7</sup>. To sum up, with this new perception and new tools the possibility to avoid conflict and to solve and manage the ones already in action would increase.

## **2 Purpose, definitions, delimitations and terminology**

### **2.1 Purpose**

The fundamental purpose of this thesis is to examine the importance of economic factors for the political survival of the ruling regimes in less democratic developing Asian states. The question is whether economic factors are of equal importance to traditional security factors in regard to regime survival. Basically, we will explore the possibility to move away from traditional security factors and instead increase the emphasis on soft, especially economic, factor when attempting to manage and solve conflicts among less democratic Asian states, something that would be the case if the question asked is affirmed.

There are two more concrete, specific purposes. First to examine the importance of economic factors in the South China Conflict to be able to see if a move from traditional issues can be made in this particular case, second to examine, explore and

---

<sup>6</sup> When concentration on traditional factors the stakes are higher and miscalculations, misunderstandings, brinkmanship and stress can rather easy lead to spin-off crisis that are hard to disarm, and just because of such a concentration on hard issues a spiral of violence can easily be started. (Lebow 1981; Vasquez 1993: ch 5)

<sup>7</sup> This linkage can for example be seen in the China-Taiwan incident in 1996 when after China had launched missiles over Taiwan the international capital fled and the Taiwan government had to step in trying to save their currency and stock market (Far Eastern Economic Review 1996).

problematise the theoretical difficulties which occur when applying a theory on a setting for which it was not specifically made (here western theories on Asian settings).

## **2.2 Delimitations**

The delimitations will be presented and explained in more detail all through this thesis where they occur, so here we will only briefly present the delimitations and scope of the thesis.

Geopolitically we will limit our research to less democratic developing Asian states, and our empirical analysis and applications will be done on the conflict in the South China Sea with concentration on the dispute in the Spratly islands. The timeframe examined will primarily be 1974 to 2000, with emphasis on 1988 to 2000. Though the timeframe does not matter much in this thesis where the emphasis is on the exploration and analysis of theoretical approaches where the case is used mainly an empirical tool in this exploration – this is not supposed to be an in depth analysis of a specific case.

The theoretical frame will be limited to three theoretical approaches, liberalism, neorealism and the Copenhagen School. Within each of these broad schools of thought we will concentrate on the central claims as presented by respective Richard Rosecrance (liberalism), Kenneth Waltz (neorealism) and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde (Copenhagen School).

## **2.3 Definitions**

There are a number of fundamental concepts that need to be explained to avoid misunderstandings, though as with delimitations concepts will be further explained along the way, and most of these definitions will be restated later.

*Less democratic developing Asian state* is a fundamental unit of reference in this thesis and consists of three parts. With *less democratic* is meant that it does not fulfil the western requirements of a fully democratic system, though it does not necessary have to be a dictatorship – e.g. a country in a democratisation process such as Indonesia would qualify as less democratic. *Developing* refers to the fact that neither failed states or industrial states are the referent objects in this analysis. *Asian* refers to both the geographical location and the ideational identity of the state.

The concept *political survival of the ruling regime* is a social construct that is problematic to define, as we will see in this thesis. As for its definition we at this point only need to understand its negative form – the ruling regime has failed to survive when it has lost its power to rule to a new regime.

There are three units that will occur repeatedly that needs to be defined. *The ruling regime* is the part of the elite that has the power over state policy, e.g. the Communist Party in China. *The military*, sometimes referred to as *the military complex*, includes the whole military structure. *The other elite* by which we refer to those influential actors that do not belong to any of the other two group – in practice this will most of the time be the elite with interests mainly in the business and financial sectors.

In this thesis two types of security factors/issues are used, *traditional* and *non-traditional*, or *soft*, security factors. Traditional ones are those based on a materialistic perception of the world such as territorial integrity and military capabilities (cf neorealism). Non-traditional ones are those based on a more ideational perception of the world, such as economic and environmental issues (cf Constructivism). *The oil factor*, which has a prominent position in the Spratlys can be located in any of these two groups, but it will in this thesis be biased towards being a soft security factor unless otherwise specified.

We will numerous times refer to *the liberal world order*, *the liberal international economic order*, *the globalisation project*, *the free market capitalism system* and other similar but synonymous words – the current world order based on the perceived beneficial effects of liberalism, free trade, competition and a free world market. For the purpose of this thesis we do not need to in depth examine the differences between these concepts, as done especially in the writings of political economists, but we only need to know what fundamental ideas and perception of the world it refers to.

*The level of analysis* problem also needs to be mentioned here. In general it is the traditional system/state/individual definition that is referred to, but it is important to notice that the Copenhagen School has its own framework for its analysis (see “Buzan, Waever & de Wilde - The Copenhagen School” below).

With the *claiming states* we refer to Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei that are those with competing claims in the Spratly archipelago.

### **2.3.1 Something about terminology**

Some might consider the use of terms in this thesis as being not clear, nor dogmatic enough. Those have probably already started to be annoyed by the approach taken in the definition section above where the definitions might not be clear, complex and deliberate enough. I would disagree and claim that the above definitions are the ones and in the form needed for the purpose of this thesis. The point I am trying to make is not that definitions in them self are of no importance, I believe the opposite, but that they have to be in the form appropriate for the purpose towards which they are going to be used. Hence it is in this thesis, I would argue, more important to examine and concentrate on the testing of our hypotheses than on in-depth analyses of all different definitions of for example regime survival. This have been, is, and will continue to be done by others elsewhere.

Before continuing, there is one other thing needed to be said about the use of terms in this thesis: "state" & "country" are used interchangeably, the same is the case with "the ruling regime" & "political survival", and "security studies"& "peace/war/conflict research" if not otherwise specified. The type of state, whether a state is to be considered a nation-state or not, and the state-nation problem is of little importance in this thesis and if not specifically specified is something not directly taken into consideration.

### **2.3.2 Something about sources**

In my quest to find the best, most relevant, accurate and valid sources I have used different methods in this thesis. I have on the one hand used traditional sources such as books and articles in well reputable and peer-reviewed journals, but also moved beyond this and used pieces from magazines, news, reports, the internet and official statements from the actors involved.

I am aware that not all my sources are available in print which in some sense can create a problem when in the future trying to examine the same sources. This is in a sense unfortunate, but the benefit of for example using on-line sources by far exceeds the drawbacks of not using them. The fact is that today the most up to date information and reports are to be found on the World Wide Web, and furthermore that information taken from the web does not by necessity mean that it is less accurate and valid. You of course have to be more critical when evaluation these sources, but most of the ones used in this thesis are from prominent academic


institutions, official government agencies and well reputable news services, hence they must not be considered as reliable as in-print sources. And one good thing not to be forgotten with on-line material is that it can be reviewed much easier, by a click, while print material have to be found, sometimes even ordered from elsewhere.

### **3 Methodology**

In this thesis we will use a qualitative case-based approach to examine the problems and questions asked. We will chose one appropriate case and use different theoretical approaches and different lenses to read and re-read it thoroughly, this to be able to conclude whether, and to what extend, the hypothesises used hold. But before examining the case we will go through the assumptions and hypothesises made.

## 4 Assumption and Hypotheses

Figure #1. Testing Process



### 4.1 Assumption

The basic and underlying assumption made in this thesis is that the political survival of the regime is the ultimate goal to which all policy decisions ultimately can be traced. This suggestion is by no means new and many will of course agree

with this thesis without any major reservations, though some would oppose it. The opponents can in principle be located within one out of two different schools of thought: firstly progressive, critical and post-modern thinkers who would argue that this is an all too narrow and too a negative assessment of the elite and regime in these countries, and secondly, structural realists who on the other hand would argue that the type and personality of the regime is of no importance due to the constraint given by the inherent anarchical structure of the international system<sup>8</sup>. There are of course differentiations between the extent to which different scholars would agree, but especially among specialists on Asian security this assumption has been widely accepted (Alagappa 1998a). This assumption could be supported by all forms of different theory; for example psychological theories about the mind of the individual being (selfishness), election theory (the goal of being re-elected/staying in power), empirical theory (all through history rulers have in general been less than happy to leave the realm of power) just to mention a few. Additionally, the rulers in less democratic developing Asian states can today simply look around and see what has happened to other ex-rulers in the region and the world<sup>9</sup>, and furthermore they can also observe the general tendency in the international society to demand accountability for abuses done while in power – it is far from likely that today's leader would be able to feel absolutely safe anywhere tomorrow<sup>10</sup>.

The underlying assumption is hence the following:

*In less democratic developing Asian states the underlying ultimate goal is the political survival of the ruling regime. This aim is always the underlying cause of policy decisions.*

---

<sup>8</sup> All structural realists and neorealist would of course not accept this claim, but regardless of this progression of theory this fundamental assumption is still inherent in the fundamental principles of their theories.

<sup>9</sup> The most explicit examples are the fait of former leaders in the Philippines and Indonesia where leader with a relatively good reputation, at least internationally, have been prosecuted for their acts when in power.

<sup>10</sup> This has been made explicit and real through the development of human rights law and events such as the arrest and extradition of General Pinochet, and further institutionalised by the decision by the UN to create a permanent international war crimes tribunal.

## 4.2 Hypotheses:

Let us now continue our exploration with examining the two hypotheses we are testing and analysing in this thesis. Hypothesis I is the main one to be tested, and hypothesis II is to be used to either re-confirm or falsify the conclusion in regard to hypothesis I (see “Figure #1” above).

Hypothesis I:

*Economic factors are of the same importance as more traditional security factors for the political survival of the ruling regime in less democratic developing Asian states.*

Hypothesis II:

*Traditional theories of security, war and peace cannot explain conflict patterns among less democratic developing Asian states.*

We have above briefly discussed the reasons why these hypotheses have been chosen, and what we will do here is to go deeper and concentrate on more specific reasons for these choices, this with a starting point in previous research done.

When examining the research done in the area of security studies both in general, and also in regard to LDACs, we find that there is a strong tendency to concentrate on either economic factors or traditional factors. There have of course been some attempts made trying to bridge and combine the two sides, especially in the area of (international) political economy (Gilpin 1987; Frieden & Lake 1990; Keohane & Nye 1989), but not solely there but also in security studies itself (Buzan et al 1998). Political Economy has gone a far way and the theories and research it presents has been enlightening in many ways, both for the understanding of the global system and for the understanding of states themselves – the problem is that by being a separate discipline they have had problem getting their claims accepted as important in the sense of security and security policy outside its own discipline. Furthermore, to the extent political economy refers to and analysis LDACs it is mainly on a system level – Asia and the world market, and Asia vis-à-vis global capitalism, or on an individual level – what can be done about poverty and intra-state economy-related problems? To sum up so far, what have been, and is, analysed is not something that by the international society and other actors are considered as being security issues, and hence following this automatically becomes less important in the security discourse. The attempts made within security studies itself have been more

deliberate and successful, especially those made by the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). These have been successful in reconfiguring and broaden the scope of security, including among many other non-traditional factors, economic factors (see “Buzan, Waever & de Wilde - The Copenhagen School” below).

My belief is that this broaden approach to security is more accurate, but that it to be both applicable and useful in a policy sense needs to be narrowed down to only economic factors. Such a move would make hypothesis I more clear and manageable, and furthermore economics is what will be most essential for the states short to medium-term survival, and also what the ruling elite, and the elite on the international arena, seemingly believes to be of foremost importance.<sup>11</sup>

To continue with the second hypothesis made, it is made because many questions whether our western theories can accurately be applied in an Asian setting. All these theories are based on western philosophy, western culture, tradition, history and belief systems. Can they then just be applied on Asian culture, tradition and belief systems without alterations?<sup>12</sup> It is therefore essential to examine whether the claim made in hypothesis I is valid or not, firstly to confront this claim itself, but also to increase the validity of the testing of hypothesis I. By the combination of these two hypotheses we will be able to make a fair, valid and accurate claim when making our final conclusion, a conclusion that because of the method chosen will be more difficult to counter and moreover easier to use as a base for policy decisions than normally the case in this kind of research. Or to put it another way, this method will increase our prospects of making a difference.

We are now aware and understand what we are going to study and why this study is important to do, further we are aware of what hypothesis we are going to

---

<sup>11</sup> With a hypothesis including other non-traditional factors such as for example environmental sustainability we would not be able to reach a concrete conclusion. This would make it difficult to identify which of the factors in the hypothesis are the most important ones, this leading to a situation where opposing sides can easily pick what they feel suit their aims and hence we would risk making little progress. Economy is something that both can, and is believed by the policy makers, to be important, that can make a difference.

<sup>12</sup> I am well aware of the fact that “Asia” is not a homogenous region, and neither am I suggesting this. This crude simplification is simply made to make it possible to in a practical and simple way test the second hypothesis where we will make a comparison with Europe. Therefore I consider this simplification as being acceptable for the purpose of this thesis.

test, and why and how these have been derived and defined. Therefore it is time to continue our journey and move to the next section where we will choose an appropriate case on which to apply this framework, a case which is representational for all the states in our frame and hence one from which we can draw valid generalisations applicable on other conflicts involving less democratic Asian states.

---

## SECTION 2: The Case

---

### 5 Case: The Spratly Islands dispute

There are numerous conflicts and potential conflicts in the Asian region which to choose between. This is of course on the one hand good in the sense that it offers many cases to choose between, but on the other hand this also results in a risk of subjectivity when deciding which case to choose. The available conflict exists on all levels, ranging from internal struggles in single countries<sup>13</sup>, through bipartisan inter-state conflict<sup>14</sup> to conflicts on the system level<sup>15</sup>. They are of all sorts, from classical inter-state wars<sup>16</sup> to low intensity conflicts such as piracy<sup>17</sup>, water resources<sup>18</sup>, drugs<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> For example separatist movements in India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines, just to mention a few of many. These conflicts are not single faced but of all kinds; anti-government movements in Indonesia, war-like independence struggle in Mindanao, intra-religious conflicts in India and so forth.

<sup>14</sup> Territory: India-Pakistan, India-China, China-Vietnam and Japan-Russia; Water: Singapore-Malaysia; Oil: China-Vietnam and China-Japan; Drug Trafficking and Logging: Thailand-Laos, just to mention a few cases out of many.

<sup>15</sup> The Asian region harbours both active and potential conflicts involving nuclear proliferation (North Korea, China, Pakistan, India and potentially also Taiwan and Japan), Sea Lines of Communication (The Malacca strait and The South China Sea), Trade (especially Japan and China, but also other states) where regional actors' interests and behaviour effects not only the region but the also the interests of the larger international society itself.

<sup>16</sup> India-Pakistan.

<sup>17</sup> Ranging from rough- to state sponsored piracy (Carpenter & Wiencek 1996; Chalk 1997:ch 2, 1998; Vagg 1995).

<sup>18</sup> In the form of water supply and irrigation problems due to rivers floating through several regions and states, to mention a few (Harrison 1993:195-204).

<sup>19</sup> Inter-state drug trafficking is a very real but Janis-faced problem creating incomes for some governments while problems for others (sometimes both; in Burma for example both the government

and environmental conflicts<sup>20</sup>. We could continue with this rhetoric, though I believe the point has been made so let us instead concentrate on the case chosen and the reasons thereof.

### **5.1 Case chosen and the reasons thereof**

Among the many possible cases available I have decided to choose one major hot spot, the South China Sea (SCS), and there concentrating specifically on the dispute over the Spratly Islands. There are numerous reasons for both the general choice and the more specific limitations of it; the SCS-conflict involves several states and is a multifaceted conflict with high stakes where many both traditional and non-traditional security factors are in play. The limitation of concentrating on the Spratly Islands is quite natural because this specific sub-conflict is the most complete and dynamic one. Other sub-conflicts such as the ones in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Paracel Islands, includes a narrower range of factors and less actors, and in the end it is the Spratlys that is the central dispute in the South China Sea. Therefore the Spratlys creates the most appropriate sub-conflict to test our hypothesis on - any other choice would have been reductionistic and wrong.

It could of course be argued that we should have chosen to study the whole area and the full conflict, that this would give us a better understanding and make it possible to draw more accurate conclusions. This would not necessary be the case. Such a choice would include conflicts not following the same dynamics and on different stages of management and solution, and furthermore with different actors; for example some specific sub-conflicts, especially those not involving China, has been both better managed and furthermore have better prospects to be solved. In short, the choice of the whole conflict instead of the more specific Spratly dispute would both be more complex in itself, and also risk being less clear and hence create more opportunities to question and counter the conclusions made by those whose beliefs and interests are contradictory to the results of this study.

---

and the opposition generates money for their survival/struggle from drug related activities) in for example Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Vietnam and Thailand (Chalk 1997: ch3; Friman 1996; Kumar 1996)

<sup>20</sup> Dupont 1998; Homer-Dixon 1994; Maddock 1995; Swain 1993.

## **Level of Analysis**

The case involves many different actors on different levels which give leverage in regard to the level of analysis problem<sup>21</sup>. This leverage is extremely important because without it not all theories we are using can be said to have gotten a fair and equal chance on their own right, this because they are not all using the same level as the primary one. The leverage offered by the situation in the Spratlys is here at least as good as any other conflict available for analysis.

## **Security factors and variables**

There is a wide range of security factors present. Traditional factors and variables such as sovereignty, territorial disputes, history, nationalism, arms build-up/race<sup>22</sup>, security dilemmas and so forth are all present and hence their importance can be taken into account and properly analysed. Non-traditional factors are also present: there are environmental issues with the potential of being securitized, economic prosperity- and growth are always present in the political environment. Natural resource problems, especially in regard to oil<sup>23</sup>, and the threat of the free and safe sea-lanes of communication are present, and this is just to mention a few. In sum, the case itself will not limit the choice of variables for any of the theoretical approaches that will be tested.

## **Policy doctrine and policy practice**

Also in regard to policy doctrine and policy practice the Spratly dispute offers a wide range of empirical examples of all practices from realism and *real politik*, through pragmatism and *ad hoc* solutions, to examples of second track diplomacy,

---

<sup>21</sup> National decision-makers, national and international firms, states on both a regional level (the direct claimants of the Spratlys, but also other states such as Japan who are dependent on the SLOCs) and external states (particularly USA which has made a firm stand in regard to the importance of the SLOCs), for international law (The use of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in managing and solving territorial disputes) and international practice (the ability to keep up the multilateral agreement of peaceful solutions of conflict between the claimants). All images are as we can see represented.

<sup>22</sup> What term to use here depends on the definition preferred, but regardless or term chosen there is a high level of build-up in military capabilities in all the claiming sates around the South China Sea.

<sup>23</sup> Whether to consider oil and other natural resources as traditional or non-traditional factors is a question in dispute, this is especially true in regard to oil, which is of extreme importance for the military forces and other primary functions in society.

confidence building measures (CBMs) and attempts to find solutions in multilateral forum or by using international law. Hence the case will not limit the analysis on this point either.

### **Assumption**

The basic assumption (See “Assumption” above) made in this thesis holds for the claiming states in the case chosen, though in different ways and arguably to a different extent. The dynamics beyond the goal of political survival in different countries does of course differ; China and Brunei might be different entities where the concept of political survival works in totally different ways, but despite this the regimes in both countries still want to stay in power<sup>24</sup>.

### **Asian Values and Cultural Relativism**

When the choice of conflict was made the “Asian Values” and “Cultural Relativism” debates were problematised and taken into consideration<sup>25</sup>. The choice of case created a dilemma of whether to pick a case only including states which without question could be considered “Asian” in all aspects or not doing so. On the one hand, if going for a case consisting of only states that are “Asian” in a strict sense, the debates would with no doubt be present and of importance, but on the other hand by just having states which must be considered rather homogenous seen from a Asian values perspective there risk being a limitation on the possibility of comparison. If we instead would chose a case including a mixture of states, as would be the case if we for instance decided to pick a case located in the Caucasus, we would then be more able to compare states intra-case and also create a bigger potential for inter-case and inter-region comparisons. But we would also create questions whether the factors implied by Asian values and cultural relativism are at all present; it might be something totally different that we have missed that are the causes of the conclusions made.

---

<sup>24</sup> Arguably, the concept of power might be defined differently in these two states (and in other states) but whatever power means locally the regimes can be assumed not wanting to lose it. The exact definition *per se* is of limited importance for the analysis in this thesis.

<sup>25</sup> For the “Asian Values” debate see Camilleri 1994; Dupont 1996; The Economist 1998; Kausikan 1993; Neier 1993; Pattern 1996, and for the “Cultural Relativism” debate in a broader sense see Bull 1979; Booth 1995; Brown 1994; Dunne & Wheeler 1999: ch 1, 3; Vincent 1986: 4-37.

In the end the conclusion was reached that the most appropriate for this thesis was to choose a pure case, this decision based on the following reasoning and logic: this way we will be able to maximise our probability and potential to reach valid conclusions, at least to the maximum, extent possible considering the scope and size of this thesis and cases available. If a comparison will be considered appropriate and legitimised it is a question for future research. By leaving such a comparison for future research it will also be possible to then make a more thorough and extended comparative analysis that in the end is giving more valid results. If the other option would have been chosen, there would have been a quite substantial risk that no concrete and valid conclusion would have been possible to reach; we would only create more confusion in regard to the issue. And lastly, the Spratly dispute is in most other senses very good case, as we will see below.

## **5.2 The Spratly Islands dispute<sup>26</sup>**

The Spratly Islands are a 600 times 800 kilometres large area consisting of 230 or so rocks, shoals, caves and sandbanks which is located some 500 kilometres south-east of Vietnam, 500 kilometres west of the Philippines and 1300 kilometres south of China. Of these islets only 25 are permanently above sea level, the rest are covered by water on high tide, and furthermore only 7 of these 25 islands are having an area of more than 0.5 square kilometres<sup>27</sup>. These islets have never been capable of supporting continuous human settlement<sup>28</sup>, and none have come under the effective

---

<sup>26</sup> This will be a rather brief description of the conflict and those interested in getting a more complete understanding of it can find that in Amer 1996; Catley & Keliat 1997; Lee 1999 and Valencia 1995.

<sup>27</sup> The number of islets is depending on source and definition used and ranges from 100 (CIA 2000) to over 400 (Leifer 1996b) depending on source used. The numbers are not in fact important and it is quite natural with a discrepancy considering the type of islets that the Spratlys consists of. The definition chosen in this thesis is the one made by Azhari Karim, a fellow at the Maritime Security and International Relations division of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (1997: 2).

<sup>28</sup> Though many of the claiming states are trying to argue the opposite; being able to sustain human settlement is one of the pre-requisites in the UNCLOS demanded from an island if it should be given its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Such a zone around one of the features would give the state controlling that particular feature control over the resources in a large part of the archipelago. This is quite unlikely to happen considering that the features cannot in any reasonable sense sustain human settlement – but it is a simple and rather risk-free argument to make in the quest for control over both the Spratlys' existing and potential economic resources (For in depth discussion see Chiu & Park 1975; Furtado 1999; Park 1987).

jurisdiction of any single state. Nonetheless this disperse group of islets have become a regional hotspot and the focal point of territorial disputes between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and The Philippines<sup>29</sup>.

*Table #1: Claims made in the Spratly archipelago*

<i>State</i>	<i>Claim</i>
China	The entire archipelago, based on historical rights.
Taiwan	The entire archipelago, based on historical rights.
Vietnam	The entire archipelago, based on historical rights.
Malaysia	Several islands west of Borneo, based on its exclusive economic zone in accordance with the law of the sea.
The Philippines	A concentration of islands in the western part of the archipelago, based on explorations made in the mid-1950's.
Brunei	No official claimant but claims the exclusive economic right of Louisa Reef, based on the law of the sea.

The importance of the Spratlys goes beyond the regional level because of the important sea-lanes passing through the area<sup>30</sup>. The free and safe passage through the South China Sea and the Spratlys are essential for the prosperity not only for trading nations such as Japan, but also for the USA which though not having revealed any official stance in regard to the claims, has made it clear that any action which can threaten the freedom of navigation would be very unwise to undertake<sup>31</sup>.

---

<sup>29</sup> Brunei has established exclusive fishing right around Louisa Reef in the Spratlys but have not publicly claimed the territory (CIA 2000), and Indonesia is indirectly involved as a claiming state in other areas in the South China Sea; these conflict sets precedence for each other and hence Indonesia has stake, though indirectly, in the Spratlys to.

<sup>30</sup> Roughly half the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the South China Sea and virtually all have to pass through or near the Spratlys. Both Northeast- and East Asian countries are heavily dependent on these sea-lanes not only for raw material and oil, but also for its trade and prosperity in more general terms. More than 80% of Japan's crude oil does for example pass through the South China Sea. (EIA 2000b).

<sup>31</sup> Cossa 1998. Joseph Nye, when US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security, even said to a pressman in Tokyo that the US would be prepared to escort ships to make sure that the freedom of the seas were uphold (Raman 1999). To what extent this stance also applies to the current Bush

These sea-lanes are of course of importance for the regional states as well, especially for Taiwan<sup>32</sup> and China<sup>33</sup>, but also in more general terms on the system level because of the connection between the freedom of the oceans and world trade. But let us now continue with a summary of the conflict so far before examining the strategic dimensions further.

### 5.2.1 Course of Events

There are no consensus about the historical aspects of the conflict and the different claimants uses their own historical doctrine as a base for their claims, and this is just one example of the underlying complexity of the dispute. In China it is embedded in the national identity that the Spratlys have been part of the motherland since ancient times (Kim 1998; Swanström 2001), though the facts used to justify this are under dispute among scholars; it is questionable whether the presence of Chinese fishermen can be used to justify China's claim of the whole archipelago (Chung 1991; Bennet 1992). Based on the same historical foundation Taiwan makes the same claim as China, and Vietnam dates its claim back to the time of Emperor Gia Long who ruled in the early nineteenth century (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988: 2-3). In contrast to these claims, The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei only trace there rights back to events in the twenties century<sup>34</sup>. Here it is important to notice that whatever the case, it is highly questionable whether historical presence can from an international law perspective at all be used to justify claims over territory.

---

administration is questionable, especially considering its concentration and narrow definition of national interest.

<sup>32</sup> Taiwan is heavily dependent on imported energy sources and 60% of Taiwan's energy needs are derived from imports which passes through the South China Sea, and furthermore, Taiwan is a trading state which's prosperity is directly related and depending on free sea-lanes (EIA 2000b, 2001).

<sup>33</sup> Especially due to the fact that China has since the early 1990's been a net-importer of oil (EIA 2000a; Salameh 1995) and the demand for imports is expected to increase in the coming years (EIA 2001a).

<sup>34</sup> *The Philippine's* claim is based on explorations made in the 1950's and consists of what is called "Kalayaan" (Freedomland) which includes 53 islands and islets (Ceres & Doyo 1991: 18-19; Wiencek 1996: 212). *Malaysia's* claim is based on the publication of an official map December 1979 underlying which is the law of the sea (Leifer 1996b: 238). *Brunei's* claim is based on its continental shelf in accordance with international law (Leifer: 1996b: 4).

If we now instead move forward and examine the more recent history, we can there see that the French established domination over the Spratlys in the late nineteenth century. This occupation was interrupted by the occupation of parts of the islands by the Japanese forces during the Second World War. After the war the colonial status quo was challenged, firstly by the exiled Chinese government and secondly by the People's Republic's own demands of the archipelago in August 1951 when the Japanese Peace Treaty was drafted and later signed at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September the same year. This claim was immediately matched by Vietnam and later confirmed by the Republic of Vietnam when it was established in 1955. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the other hand did not make any demand out of political reasons, and instead acknowledged China's claim in 1956. This position was later changed after the post-Vietnam War unification and when in turn Vietnam occupied several islands that the Saigon government had held at the end of the War. This occupation was later enlarged and in time Vietnam was present on 21 islands. Meanwhile, in 1974, China forcefully took control over the Paracel Islands north of the Spratlys, but did not yet establish a foothold in the Spratlys itself. This did not happen until 1988 when it secured control over 6 islands after a brief naval clash with Vietnam over the control of Johnson Reef. During these years, the Philippines had also taken control, in 1968, over 3 islands, and did in 1978 extend its claims.(Leifer 1996b: 238-40)

On 25 February 1992, China passed its "Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones" law by which all of the Spratlys and several other archipelagos officially became part of Chinese territory, and furthermore reserved the right to take all necessary measures to prevent and stop all so-called harmful passage of foreign vessels through Chinese territorial waters, territorial waters which now, according to China included the whole South China Sea. Five month later, the 22 July, the foreign ministers of ASEAN<sup>35</sup> issued a joint declaration on the South China Sea that emphasised "the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means"(Quoted in Leifer 1996b: 94) and urged all parties to exercise restraint to create a positive climate for a resolution of the conflict. Vietnam, not a member of ASEAN at this point in time, gave the

---

<sup>35</sup> Association of Southeast Asian Nations, members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

declaration a positive response. China's response on the other hand was the opposite and more straightforward – it subsequently seized Da Lac Reef in the Spratlys within days of the declaration. (Leifer 1996b: 94-5, 236-40)

During the next few years, until 1995, the intensity of the conflict was relatively low. The conflict was visible primarily in two forms, firstly through the building of different structures by states on quite a few of “their” islands, and secondly, by the granting of oil concessions and exploration of the same. These concessions often involved foreign firms, preferably US ones, this as a way to acquire expertise, legitimacy and arguably also protection against interference from other claiming states<sup>36</sup>. (Leifer 1996b: 239-40) This relative calm changed in 1995 when the Philippines found out that Chinese forces had occupied Mischief Reef which was claimed by them. This incident created military activities from both sides, though it stopped short of military conflict possibly mainly because of the unequal power of the two states. This incident did not get much response from either the US, or the ASEAN, in the ASEAN case plausible because of the financial crisis currently under way, but it was present on the China-Philippine bilateral agenda for years to come. There was even a discussion in the Philippines whether it was possible that China might invade the Philippines. (Raman 1999)

Since 1995 there have been no major incident, but the building and upgrading of constructions have continued and there have been several incidents of detainment of foreign fishermen. The military build-up also continues after the financial crises induced downturn. (Swanström 1999: 97-9)

### **5.2.2 Negotiations and confidence building measures**

There have been many attempts made to find ways to manage and solve this conflict, both formal and informal ones. Whether they have been successful or not is depending on personal requirements and definition of conflict management, but whatever the case and definition chosen we can see that there have at least not been any major escalation of the conflict and it has with few exceptions not been as violent as might be expected – there have been few direct military confrontations and with the exception of the 1974 incident virtually no casualties. It has basically been a

---

<sup>36</sup> By involving specifically US firms it is presumed that in the case of violence or threats the US fleet would act as protection and a guarantee of security and safety.

conflict where the claiming states seemingly have gone out of the way to avoid not only violence on a larger scale, but violence at any scale. But on the other hand, it seems like a solution of the conflict, if a solution is at all possible, lies far away in the future. This is regardless of approach taken and perception of the conflict and its dynamics.

Formal negotiations between the conflicting parties have been virtually non-existent, and when such negotiations actually have occurred there has been little progress made. The only thing the claimants can agree about is that the conflict should be managed by peaceful means. One of the basic problem hindering processes is the power difference between China and the other states (Swanström 1997). On one side is China who is aware of its relative power advantage and has with this as a base developed a “Three Nos” policy to deal with the Spratly issue: China refuses (1) any form of internationalisation of the issue, (2) any form of multilateral negotiation, and (3) to specify its territorial claims (Valencia 1995: 12). It seems unlikely that China will change this policy in the near future considering that its power advantage is not decreasing but the opposite<sup>37</sup>. On the other side is the other states that would prefer multilateral negotiations and/or an internationalisation of the issue, this to create a more equal weighted base for discussion than the one offered by China; bilateral negotiations where China has a strong advantage.<sup>38</sup>

Informal negotiations have taken place and have seemingly been making more progress, though they have not solved the underlying problems. Arguably informal contacts have helped avoiding a possible escalation of the conflict by giving the actors opportunities to communicate with each other without having to be under public scrutiny which increases the leverage; by an informal framework the parties can communicate with less risk of loosing face and without being forced to make official commitments, factors that are of extreme importance in Asian tradition and culture<sup>39</sup>.

---

<sup>37</sup> Possibly with the exception of the balance with Taiwan.

<sup>38</sup> For a more in depth discussion see Swanström 1999: 107-9.

<sup>39</sup> For a more in depth discussion see Swanström 1999: 109-12.

Confidence building measures and Second-Track diplomacy has been undertaken and has had some progress, though there is of course the inherent problem with this form of soft approaches, that they have a tendency to not reach far in the end. There have been informal working groups, for example within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) where in 1997 China even accepted to put the South China Sea conflict on the agenda, and there are yearly informal meetings initiated by Indonesia since 1990. Whether this form of measures will, or have made, any real difference is under dispute; some considering them as being the way of the future (Antolik 1996), while others consider forums such as the ARF as being meaningless talking-shops (Robyn 1998: 115; Tow 1997: 25-30).<sup>40</sup>

There has not been much external involvement in the attempts to manage the Spratly dispute and the SCS conflict, though external actors do participate and observe the forums and the CBMs. Essentially almost no one of the directly involved states really want external interference in something that they consider being their internal affairs. China is against external involvement what so ever, and even the ASEAN states themselves which are the ones which presumably would have most to win on external involvement are divided and cautious about interference (Abdullah 1999; South China Morning Post 1999). The only party who are clearly positive to external involvement, and also has tried to involve the USA and Japan, is the Philippines (Morada & Collier 1998: 572-5). To understand this we must remember here firstly that the ASEAN countries have internal disputes that they prefer to keep just so, internal, which risk being exposed if external actors get involved, second that many of them have internal problems they do not want to get scrutinised<sup>41</sup> – something that would risk happening if for example the UN got involved, and thirdly that China has veto power in the UN Security Council<sup>42</sup>.

---

<sup>40</sup> For a more in depth discussion of CBM and track-two diplomacy in general see Swanström 1999: 112-20, and for ARF see Leifer 1996a.

<sup>41</sup> These states have a Human Rights record and practice that they prefer not having scrutinised, or at least not risk getting used as leverage against themselves in a bargaining situation.

<sup>42</sup> This fact creates obstacles because of the importance of the security council in an international law perspective – its support is needed for interventions and sanctions.

### 5.2.3 Strategic Aspects

Now we have examined how the dispute manifestates and what has been made to manage it. In this section we will now concentrate further on the strategic aspects of the conflicts and try to identify the issues that underpins the conflict. The ones identified in this thesis are the following:

---

*Table #2 - Strategic aspects of the dispute*

- (1) Territory
    - a. Sovereignty and Control
    - b. Prestige and Nationalism
  - (2) Regional Balance of Power
  - (3) Economic Aspects
    - a. Natural Resources
    - b. Growth and Prosperity
  - (4) SLOCs
- 

(1a) The importance of territory should not be underestimated, and the conflicting claims over sovereignty is by many seen as the core and primary aspect and goal of the claiming states. The underlying idea is basically that, firstly territorial disputes are zero-sum, secondly, are by tradition non-negotiable, thirdly, are quantifiable, and lastly are considered extremely important by especially hard-liners and the military. In short, territory is the *raison d'être* on which sovereign, independent states are based.

(1b) In the Spratly dispute territory also has a very real internal dimension in the form of the national prestige and identity invested in the South China Sea, and hence the Spratlys. For China territorial integrity is embedded both in its historical tradition and national identity<sup>43</sup>, and furthermore in policy doctrine and policy behaviour. It is

---

<sup>43</sup> The Chinese position on territorial integrity goes back to the Qin dynasty (221-206 B.C.) when China was first unified and there is a tradition of "great national unity" (*da yi tong*) embedded in Chinese culture. This tradition holds that unity is better than division and that division is temporary and abnormal while unity is permanent (Xinbo 1998: 129). Hence for the Chinese its territorial integrity is not a question of if but when - time is of little importance, one day China will once again be unified.

also quite questionable whether the Chinese Communist regime could survive the pressure that would come both from within and below if concessions were made on its territorial claims in the Spratlys (Xinbo 1998). Other states such as Vietnam and the Philippines are in similar situations, for them to making too many concessions on territorial issues would risk give opponents the ripe moment they are waiting for to overturn the ruling regime, or at least attempt doing so.<sup>44</sup>

(2) The Spratly Dispute is also of direct importance for the regional stability and balance of power. By itself the Spratlys might seem unimportant, but the disputes in the South China Sea and neighbouring areas are interconnected and work as precedence for each other. If for example one course of action is accepted in the Spratlys you can assume that it if successful is likely to be used in other regional disputes, and the other way round. What need to be remembered here is especially the regional history and perception of China; the regional states have had bad experiences of a greater China all through their history and perceive China today in the light of these experiences and are therefore quite convinced that today's rising China is expansionistic and just waits until the power-balance is right for them to once again strike. In short, any concession made towards China is perceived to change the regional balance of power, either directly or indirectly, in a negative way. (Le 1994) Western scholars are in dispute over whether this need to be the case, but regardless of their opinions the locals prefer emphasising the zero-sum features of power, China's changed war doctrine and creation of blue-water capabilities. The last thing they want is Chinese forward bases in the Spratly Islands, and emphasises this before other acts undertaken by China that might be emphasised by westerners. This is also one of the major reasons to why the regional states, except China, are in principle positive to a continued strong presence of US-forces in the area - US presence is perceived to be the only working protection against China.

(3a) One of the economic aspects, the importance of natural resources, are non-disputable and there have been plentiful written about this particular aspect of the conflict, especially about the oil factor (Amer 1999; Ba 1994; Blanch & Blanch 1995;

---

What a unified great China are to consist of is disputable, and under dispute, but regardless of this the mindset exists.

<sup>44</sup> We should here also keep in mind that in these countries the military are in positions of power, and the fact is that the military if any considers territorial issues as being of extreme importance.

Salameh 1995; Snildal 2000; Valencia 1985, 1995, 1997). But here we should be aware that even if the oil-factor from a western, up-down perspective seems to be the most important, this must not absolutely be the case considering the extreme importance of fishing in the surrounding states. The South China Sea ranks as one of the richest fishing grounds in the world and is surrounded by some of the most fish consuming countries in the world and hence the value of fishing is high. Furthermore, fish is important for the expected increase in food demand in the future, this especially in China where fish is predicted to largely increase in importance in the future because of China's combination of low fish consumption and relative lack of agricultural land. (Catley & Keliat 1997: 44-65)

(3b) The other economic factor identified is more abstract, less traditional, but it is none the less as real and important. The importance of continuing economic growth and prosperity is explicit policy in all the claiming states (Alagappa 1998a: 611-97; Nathan 1998: 545; Xinbo 1998). In China for example the leaders have even put a slogan forward on this theme: *fu guo qiang bing* (rich country and strong army) emphasising the importance of economic growth (Xinbo 1998: 143). For these aims to be achieved there is a need for good economic conditions, such as stability, law and order – conditions that will not be existing if the conflict escalates too much.

In theory there could be assumed to be a negative trade-off between an offensive, conflict-prone policy towards the Spratlys and economic growth and prosperity, though in practice it is almost impossible to fully understand this dynamic. Because of this discrepancy between theory and practice there will always be a certain economic risk involved in any policy decision, a risk that ultimately depends on the reflexive interaction between the actors involved. To sum up, economic factors are always present but hard to understand and define.

(4) As we have seen above the SLOCs are important and have both Regional- and Geo-strategical implications. Threats to the free and safe SLOCs would be devastating for not only the regional trading-states economy, but possibly even their survival could be threatened considering the need for especially imported oil which risk being lost without safe SLOCs. The SLOCs are also important for the current liberal world order and the US self-image; the US has invested a lot of prestige and arguably *de facto* committed itself to the protection of the principle of free navigation in the region. The liberal world order itself is today also dependent on the freedom of

the seas – one of the fundamental underlying assumptions on which the global interdependence, trade and continuing prosperity rest is the possibility of free, safe and efficient transport. In short, safe passage through the Spratlys and the South China Sea is not only a regional interest but has implications for everyone.

---

## SECTION 3: Analysis

---

### 6 Analysis

There are in innumerable theories on the theme of war, peace and security in the international system. These cover different sections in different ways, are concentrating on different images, and uses different assumptions. We can of course not cover them all here and the selections made in this thesis can hence of course be questioned. The attempt made is to try covering a wide range of theoretical approaches in both an ontological and epistemological sense, this way I believe we can succeed in making a fair attempt to analyse if any of the major existing theoretical approaches can explain the pattern of conflict in our case. By re-reading the case with different lenses I hope to be able to enlighten the case-theory relationship from several angles and hence be able to draw a more accurate and inclusive conclusion than would otherwise be possible. So let us now continue with a presentation of the methodical process we are going to use.

#### 6.1 The process

---

*Table #3: The Process*

1. *Can more traditional theories of security, war and peace explain the course of events and the general dynamics of the Spratly dispute?*
    - a. *1<sup>st</sup> Reading: pure form*
      - i. *deconstruction of first reading*
    - b. *With economic & political-survival sensitive lenses?.*
  2. *Test of hypothesis I*
  3. *Test of hypothesis II*
-

(1) The first question to be asked is whether more traditional theories of security, war and peace can explain the course of events. (1a) We will first examine to what extent the particular theory in its pure form can explain the course of event in the South China Sea<sup>45</sup>. My belief is that even if a theory is not fully applicable it will still partially help us understand the course of event, and give us at least some tools which to be used in coming examinations. It is also important to give a theory a fair chance to on its own terms be applied before a possible dismissal of it. [1a.i] After this first reading has been made with a for the theory positive lenses, it will be deconstructed. The purpose of this deconstruction is not to dismiss the conclusions drawn in the first reading, but to put these into perspective.

(1b) After the above exercise we will re-read the case with economic & political survival sensitive lenses, this with the particular theory as a base. Through this exploration we will be able to see whether a linkage can be found between economic factors, political survival and the specific theoretical approach currently being used. The question we are trying to answer here is whether our first hypothesis can be falsified, confirmed or none thereof by the particular theory.

(2) After having done this examination of all the selected theories we will put the different pieces together to see whether our first hypothesis has been falsified, confirmed or neither by traditional theory.

(3) Hereafter we will test our second hypothesis to see if traditional theory is at all applicable on both the case chosen and/or at all on this type of states. This will be done regardless of the result in the testing of hypothesis I; if it is falsified or if we have found no evidence it is obvious that we need to know whether the theories used are at all relevant for the case and the chosen frame of states. This so we are not only concluding that the theory does not work and hence draws the conclusion that economic factors do not matter when the problem in fact is in the applicability of the theory itself. If on the other hand it is confirmed we still need to know whether it is the result of a coincident or not, and moreover if the thesis can be re-confirmed it will

---

<sup>45</sup> With pure form it is here meant the theory in its more traditional, unaltered form. I will not use developed and altered forms created for specific purposes, nor quasi-forms where only parts of the original theory has been used.

make the conclusion more convincing and hence it will be easier to argue for the importance of economic factors place and importance on the agenda.

## **6.2 Three theoretical approaches**

When deciding which approaches to security to choose in this thesis the aim and emphasise is to get representations from the whole spectra of approaches, and further at the same time making a comparison between these theories possible. For this to be achievable we have to concentrate on those specific theories that are fundamental and concentrate on the central arguments and claims of broader schools, and further be cautious about their internal comparability.

The theories that will be used are first of all Kenneth Waltz's neorealism. Waltz's neorealism was chosen in competition with Buzan's Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) (Buzan 1991), Vasquez's explanation of the onset and expansion of wars (Vasquez 1993), and Lebow's (1981) theory on the nature of international crisis. Neorealism is more appropriate for this analysis than the other theoretical approaches considered; it is a positivistic theory which has for a long time had an almost hegemonic position - hence it is important to examine it closer. Further, it is an excellent theory to be compared with liberalism (see below). The CSCT has been developed further by Buzan and the COPRI and their new approach will be used in this thesis, so also using CSCT would concentrate too much on Buzan. Vasquez's theory put a lot of emphasise on relatively equal states and the explaining of world wars, which it does well, but the situation in the Spratlys is not one of relative equalness, also Vasquez is not as streamlined to be compared with liberalism. Lebow's theory is excellent but because of its constructivist features if chosen it would leave the realist stand without defence and appropriate representation which would undermine the validity of this thesis.

Thereafter we will examine liberalism, here it will be in the form of Richard Rosecrance's theory of interdependent trading states. This choice of Liberal approach was done in competition with Robert Keohane's theory of Complex Interdependence (Goldstein & Keohane 1993; Keohane 1984, 1998; Keohane & Martin 1995; Keohane & Milner 1996; Keohane & Nye 1977). The reason for choosing Rosecrance is that his theory is more pure in the sense that he does not in the same way as Keohane integrate belief systems, ideas and other cognitive approaches to policy making. The Complex Interdependence theory might be accurate, but it is not appropriate to use

as a Liberal contrast to Waltz, and further it is questionable if the underdeveloped institutions in the region can be said to have reach such a level of development required by institutional theories - regionally the countries prefer informal diplomacy before institutional settings in a Western sense. In essence, Rosecrance draws out the central and fundamental core arguments of liberalism and is hence most appropriate as representation for the school in a comparison such as this one.

Lastly, we will examine a middle way, here this middle way will be represented by The Copenhagen School of Peace Research's (COPRI) approach to Security analysis (Buzan et al 1998). The reason for this choice is that COPRI offers a comprehensive framework for security analysis that have been well developed, and further this development has taken place primary in the post-cold war era. Other "middle ways" such as Constructivism (Adler 1992, 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992, 1994, 1999) and Rationalism (Bull 1977, 1979; Dunne 1995, 1999; Dunne & Wheeler 1998, 1999; Vincent 1974, 1986, 1990; Wheeler 1996, 2000) are less appropriate for security studies. Alternatives such as Critical Security Studies (Campbell 1993; Klein 1994; Krause & Williams 1996) "only" challenges, as opposed to explains, conventional security studies. This in the same way as is the case with critical theory (Ashley 1988; Booth 1995; Linklater 1982, 1990, 1998) and postmodernism (Enloe 1989, 1994; Walker 1993).

## **7 Kenneth Waltz and Neorealism**

Kenneth Waltz traditional neorealist theory (1959, 1979, 1986) is one of, if not the most prominent and fundamental international relation theories we have. This theory is one that must be examined both because of its claim of being positivistic, but also because it has for a long time been more or less a hegemon which has been either the base where other theories has started<sup>46</sup>, or the theory for them to oppose, deconstruct and refute<sup>47</sup>. It is therefore appropriate to start our theoretical journey

---

<sup>46</sup> The most explicit example of this is the English School which has brought realism further in its attempt to build a bridge between realism and revolutionism. See for example Bull 1977; Bull & Watson 1984; Dunne & Wheeler 1999 and Vincent 1986 for theories, and Dunne 1998 for a historical overview of the development and theories of the English School.

<sup>47</sup> The most deliberate attempt, and arguably one of the most successful ones, to do this has been made made by Alexander Wendt who with his constructivist approach takes on Kenneth Waltz in his own

with neorealism and give it a fair examination, especially considering the wide claim that *real politik* and realism is inherent in Asian states, and then especially in China's, culture and history which has been made (Alagappa 1998a: especially 65-111; Catley & Keliat 1997: 209-12; Johnston 1995; Swaine & Tellis 2000).

In his *Man, the State, and War*<sup>48</sup> Kenneth Waltz (1959) identifies three images of war that are the underlying reasons and the causes of the problem of war; human nature, bad states, and the anarchical international system. Waltz's theory uses a Hobbsian perception of human nature and concludes that humans are bad and evil beings whose life is just a quest for more power, a quest that not ceases until death. The perception of states is similarly dark; there will always be "bad" predatory states that causes conflict because in accordance to the laws of politics big states will always absorb smaller states, it is even their right to do so, and the reason to this is the anarchical features of the international system. Or as Waltz put it, "War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it. Among states as among men there is no automatic adjustment of interests. In the absence of a supreme authority, there is then a constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force" (Quoted in Dunne 1999: 1).

Twenty years later Waltz published his *Theory of International Politics* which is the neorealist key work where his classical model of the structure of the international system is presented. His belief is that there was a need for a simple model of the international system, not necessary an absolutely true one, but one that can help us understand certain patterns of behaviour - in the same way as there are economic models explaining and simplifying the economic reality. The model he presented argues that we can ignore anarchy - it is and will always be the ordering principle of the international system, and the units can also be ignored because they are

---

right. Wendt believes Waltz asked the correct question, but found the wrong answer and therefore presents a social theory of international politics as an alternative to Waltz's systematic theory (Key works: Wendt 1992, 1999; also Wendt 1987, 1994, 1997). Critical Theory and Postmodernism in general is of course also incompatible with realism, but they are not using the same starting point, nor the same frame, for their analysis. Though more direct criticism do exist: Ashley 1984; Cox 1989; Keohane 1986; Kratochwil 1993 and Linklater 1995 are good examples.

<sup>48</sup> Whether the theories presented in *Man, the State and War* is to be considered neorealism is of course disputable, but regardless it is the foundation from which Waltz later works can be derived and it is here he first asked and tried to answer the fundamental questions.

functionally similar - there is no need to open the black box. The only thing that matters is the relative distribution of capabilities between states, because it is a self-help world where none but the particular state itself ultimately care for its survival and well-being.

One other fundamental argument in Waltz's theory is the beneficial features of a bi-polar system, as opposed to multi-polar ones. He claims that multi-polar systems are inherently unstable and creates a high risk of miscalculations which in combination with the for all states common security dilemma, self-help and rationality increase the risk of war. Bi-polarity, on the other hand, both makes socialisation easier and further decreases the risk of miscalculations, and hence the risk of war; it is possible for two great powers to balance each other, but when there are more than two and these never can trust each other there can be no stable balance.

### **7.1 1st Reading: neorealism-sensitive lenses**

One of the inherent problems with neorealism is that it leaves a fair bit of room for subjectivity and values. Subjectivity in the sense that it is easy to "prove" neorealism on marginal cases and also to dismiss other cases arguing they do not fit into the frame assumed by the theory - this in the same way as problems with economic theories are argued by economist not to be the result of flaws in the theories themselves but as results of market failures. It is also easy to when analysing a specific case pick and emphasising those factors and occurrences supporting neorealism and dismiss others as non-important because of the hierarchical division between hard and soft factors within neorealism. Because of this problematic feature we will after having read the case with neorealism-sensitive and positive lenses deconstruct this first reading to find the flaws and disputable parts in it. This way I believe we have not only been objective, but also given neorealism a fair chance on its own terms.

The ideas of the underlying dynamics works well in regard to the Spratly dispute. The actors have so far acted egoistic and rational to maximise their own power and utility. There is a security dilemma present and the states are definitely fighting for survival, at least that is how they themselves perceive the situation. This is obvious in the case of Taiwan, who without doubt tries to avoid a real threat of being absorbed by mainland China, and in the Philippines which after the Mischief

incident internally debated whether China might conquer them and requested for US protection. In a more general sense it is the common collective historical memory and perception of China as an expansionistic state which aims to once again become a great, unified China, which is by the regional states perceived as, maybe not as an imminent, but in a little bit longer run very real threat to their safety and survival. There are many factors that indicate this; China has the regional military advantage, has changed its military doctrine, and has official intention to, and is already on the way to acquire blue water capabilities. This perceived threat of the regional stability is also increased by the US withdrawal and Japan's revision of its *National Defence Program Outline* in 1995 (Soeya 1998: 212-3) by which Japan officially changed to a more conventional defence posture including a pledge to defend its sea lanes as far as 1000 nautical miles offshore<sup>49</sup>. The neorealist assumption of mutual distrust is definitely present; in this case nobody trust anyone but themselves.

If we look a bit more specific at the actions of the actors in the light of neorealism a strong argument can be made for the accurateness of neorealism. All states try to increase their military capabilities as much as they possible can and are hence following Waltz's theory by attempting to increase their security through the accumulation of means to wage war. The importance of self-reliance, also being a logic of neorealism, can also be identified here in the behaviour for example in regard to the (potential) oil in the Spratlys which is extremely important for the military self-reliance of the surrounding countries (in particular China).

We can also see that China's policies are following the logic of *real politik*; it uses its relative and continuously increasing power advantage to maximise its possibilities in negotiations, or by refusing to negotiate at all, with its adversaries. It knows that it is in a position of power and that this power position will almost certainly increase as time passes, and it adopts policies based on this knowledge (Cf Christensen 1996). The rational of *real politik* is also present in the rest of the claiming states, but in other forms. These states also tries to adopt the most efficient and utility maximising policies that they can, this most explicit in the avoidance of military confrontations with China and the request for US protection. *Real politik* is also the

---

<sup>49</sup> Kenneth Waltz (1993) has argued that Japan will be the next great power and will be forced to increase its military capability, this including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The opposite is argued by Michael May (1993).

policy of the US; the only thing it cares about is free navigation<sup>50</sup>, otherwise it is not US national interest (Cf Kissinger 1993) - hence US has no official policy at all, and tries as far as possible to not get into trouble and conflict, especially in regard to China<sup>51</sup>.

If we examine the regional Balance of Power we can see that it is regionally weighted towards China's advantage. During the Cold War this was not relevant because there were a bi-polar world system where China and the Soviet balanced against the US, and after the Sino-Soviet split the two balanced the Soviet. But now in the Post Cold War era this world balance no longer exists and the former bi-polar balance have been exchanged for an unstable regional multi-polar system, this because the balancing of China and what now is Russia are no longer part of US national interests. Hence the importance of ASEAN and similar regional groupings and cooperations has increased as potential balancers against China.

#### **7.1.1 1<sup>st</sup> reading: a deconstruction**

That there is a distrust and fear between the claiming states and especially a fear of China is beyond doubt and question. A similar case could be made about the pursuit of security through the accumulation of means to wage war. It is arguably a flawed and narrow perception of security which concentrates on military security, but this is however the perception which exists among the conservative elite, the ruling regime and the military in the involved countries. It is however more questionable to pin-point the importance of oil and security - is this at all about the military or has it to do more with energy, economics and/or self-reliance in a more principal and broader sense?

---

<sup>50</sup> There are also the "China Threat" school which argues that China has to be contained and balanced by the US because of its aim is to become the world-power. This perception is based on claims that China is strong, unified and extremely nationalistic and that evidence shows that China is expansionistic, or at least uncompromisingly irredentist. Further its behaviour is anti-Western and the defence modernisation is threatening not only to the region but beyond. Underlying this perception is firstly a value gap on interdependence between China and the West, and secondly a fear of China's potential power capabilities and the fear of a regional power vacuum (Bernstein & Ross 1997; Nathan & Ross 1997; Vogel 1997).

<sup>51</sup> For example the US did not inform the Philippines that the Chinese had occupied the Mischief Reef even though they almost certainly must have known of such a presence. If going beyond the Spratlys we can see *real politik* in the Tiananmen Square "incident", as the US officially refers to the massacre.

The importance and practice of *real politik* is beyond doubt, but it needs to be qualified. If the US has no national interest except free navigation, as neorealism would argue, then we can assume away US interference in any other cases. The US fleet has superior powers and can without doubt protect the free navigation if needed, then why does not the less powerful states cooperate more<sup>52</sup>, or why does not China do anything? At least one of the parties should do something if they are rational, which they are according to neorealist theory, because there is not a balance of power and a stable *status quo* situation, and as long as the free navigation is not threatened US would not interfere as we have seen above. To conclude, at least one piece is here missing.

The regional balance of power as presented above exposes that neorealist theory is in it self reductionistic. It is assuming great powers with equal strange, and when applied on a fundamentally different situation the result will be an *ad hoc* construction as the one in this case. Such an *ad hoc* constructions is not stable, as here for example we can first of all question the whole analyses *per se*, and could further ask whether ASEAN and other regional “alliances” are of the kind presumes by neorealism. In short, neorealism is as we have seen not made for a situation like the one in the Spratlys.

Lastly, if neorealism works we must ask why there have not been more violent activities. Even when focusing our analysis on the positive sides of neorealism, as we have done here, we can see that though it could be argued to work fairly well, there are still pieces missing. In sum, without looking outside the box, and without including other tools and perspectives neorealism cannot explain as well as we must demand from a positivist theory. The most concrete example of its failure to predict and explain is in regard to the question why China has not conquered any islands occupied by other claimants, something that would be logical for it to do. This is of course if they do not take other than neorealist factors into consideration.

---

<sup>52</sup> Even though cooperation is not normally in line with neorealist logic cooperation to balance China would be rational and in line with *real politik*.

## 7.2 2<sup>nd</sup> Reading: economic & political survival sensitive lenses

Economic aspects are in neorealism traditionally only given importance as far as they are of importance for the ability to compete in the build-up and increase of the accumulation of power and means to wage war. In short the idea is that without a stable and growing economy a state will first of all risk falling behind in the arms race - military build-up is extremely expensive, and second, without a strong economic base a state will not be able to successfully handle a war - in comparison with war even an arms race is cheap and in a total war all resources are in the end of importance for the final outcome. Is this relevant in the Spratly dispute? It could be argued to be so, as in for example China where their "rich country" policy emphasises the importance of economic growth as the key to the development of the general national strength (Xinbo 1998: 143-5), though this is arguably too far away from traditional neorealism. In theory neorealism is correct, but to say that the prime function of economic growth is to be able to win an arms race is not an accurate description of the situation and development in the Spratlys, it is more of an exposure of the inherent narrowness and simplified, even false, world view traditional realism assumes for itself to work in. On the margin it might be correct, but the margin is just that, the margin, and ultimately in most cases we are far from anything even close to such a marginal situation.

The political survival lens has to be very flexible to be able to fit into the neorealist frame, and if being so flexible we have passed the line of what to accept from neorealism in this thesis; the character of the units is irrelevant because they are functionally similar, and if we were moving into the second image to explain the conflict it would, according to Waltz himself, be reductionism.<sup>53</sup> It would of course be possible if the purpose of this thesis were to reconstruct neorealism to, by using our assumption of political survival as a base argue that in fact this form of survival is the prime concern of the national interest (from the regimes perspective that is). And then we could possibly build a neorealism-plus theory which could work - though this is unlikely to be helpful and would probably instead create a dirty *ad hoc*

---

<sup>53</sup> For an interesting and progressive use of realism see Glaser 1995.

construction – it is then better to instead use other theories better suited for such a task. Furthermore, this is not the purpose of this thesis to do.

## 8 Rosecrance and Liberalism

The core of the traditional liberal position is simple and straightforward: based on the assumption that states and individuals are rational utility maximising actors it argues that the gain of trade provides valuable benefits to any participating state, this following David Ricardo's theory of "comparative advantage"<sup>54</sup>, and trade further does not induce any of the costs and risks of war. This increased interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading in comparison with the alternative of invasion and violence. This proposition is even more accurate today when the development of modern technology has increased the cost and risk of aggression, especially in the light of the comparative advantage of defence that today exists.

This liberal position was first made popular by Richard Cobden in the mid nineteenth century when he argued that free trade united states because of the anxiousness and dependence on each other's prosperity and happiness it created (Cobden 1903). This idea was in 1933 developed further by Norman Angell who argued that due to modernisation war could no longer be profitable and had in fact become a commercial suicide, an argument to which he later added that if war still occurred, even though futile, this was because of failure among the leaders to understand the unprofitableness of war, not on flaws in the theory itself (Angell 1933).

Richard Rosecrance has provided the most extensive and current update of the Cobden-Angell theorem and his works will therefore be the base of this analysis (Rosecrance 1986 (key work), 1989, 1992). Rosecrance argues that states have to choose between becoming "trading states" or "territorial states", the former gaining wealth through commerce, while the later are obsessed by military expansion. The modern world where war are too costly push states towards the "trading state" alternative, an alternative that not only is a peaceful one, but one where they "can do

---

<sup>54</sup> Ricardo 1963: ch 7, or Salvatore 1995: 30-40, 49-52 for a short presentation. It is worth noticing that there are situations where the theory of comparative advantage fails (Salvatore 1995: 33-4).

better through internal economic development sustained by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land” (Rosecrance 1986: 24-5). In short, trading is today more profitable than invasion.

For liberalism there is no downside to this interdependence, as realist claims<sup>55</sup>, and the only opportunity cost that matters is the one between trading and not trading. Rosecrance does himself not even fully accept the opportunity cost of an end to trade, that is the utility a state would have gained if choosing another path than trade which it has failed to acquire by choosing trade which’s benefits it loosed when trade ends, something that most other liberals do accept. The claims made by realists, as for example by Kenneth Waltz, that interdependence can be defined as trading links that are costly to break is refuted by Rosecrance who means that such a definition of interdependence has missed the fundamental nature of the concept<sup>56</sup>.

It is further argued by liberals that interdependence restrains the underlying aggression leading to war which in liberal theory is coming from the individual and the state level, this is the diametrical opposite of the realist perception - according to liberals it is the decrease of interdependence that allows for such aggressive tendencies to come forward<sup>57</sup>. Or as John Stuart Mill put it in 1848: “It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which act in natural opposition to it.” (Quoted in Howard 1978: 29)

### **8.1 1st Reading: Rosecrance-sensitive lenses.**

The advantage of trade over war can be clearly identified in the Spratly dispute. If this advantage would not have existed there would almost certainly have been a totally different course of events and a different more violent and hostile picture would have been painted. This is in principle the first time in history when these

---

<sup>55</sup> Realists even claim the opposite, that economic-interdependencies in fact increases the likelihood of war and crises because of the dependencies on imported goods vital for the defence and survival of the state (Mearsheimer 1990, 1992; Waltz 1979, 1982).

<sup>56</sup> There are also those with a more moderate perception, as for example Keohane and Nye who have pointed out that interdependencies can be uneven and that this risk leading to reasserted power relations (Keohane & Nye 1977, 1989).

<sup>57</sup> In his *The Rise of the Trading State* (1986) Rosecrance uses as empirical examples the two World Wars which he assess as being ultimately driven by domestical forces.

states have been able to such a large degree avoid violent conflicts and war with each other (Alagappa 1998b). Rosecrance's argument about the push towards becoming a trading state has been confirmed; all the claiming states are both highly dependent on cross-boarder trade and their position and participation on the neoliberal world market. Even China, which arguably is the state with the highest potential of self-sufficiency, has accepted unprecedented compromises to try getting accepted as a serious participant on the world market and to become a GATT member – this can most explicitly be seen in its courtesing of the US to obtain a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. No regime, possibly not even its hardliners, would suggest that it would be more profitable, that is in the sense meant in liberal theory, to invade instead of trading.

There is an advantage of defence between the claimants which are separated by water<sup>58</sup> states that furthermore has no, or limited, naval capabilities to succeed with such a conquest (E.g. Ross 1999). Any invasion in the area would create severe line-of-supply problems, and the distances between the states make the D-day look small and simple in comparison – it is even highly questionable if China has the capacity to even invade Taiwan, and there the distance is relatively short<sup>59</sup>. There are two further factors that are important here, firstly the “US-factor”; the US-Navy is in a superior position in all aspects and could easily defeat any of the claiming states navies, and even easier cut of an invading states line of supply<sup>60</sup>, and secondly that the involved states themselves because their trading state characteristics have little value except their trading-based potential, hence conquering is not the same as getting a states market value, but more of the opposite because of the mobility of international capital and the non-physical features of trading capacity (Pauly 1997; Strange 1998).

---

<sup>58</sup> Not all states are separated by water, but to be able to obtain control over the Spratly archipelago there would almost certainly need to be some water crossings. Further, considering the type of terrain, defence would be at an advantage also in land based invasions. The Vietnam War and the Mindanao uprising are good examples of this defence-advantage.

<sup>59</sup> This point is borrowed from Professor William Tow.

<sup>60</sup> What the US would in fact do is under dispute; the “China-Threat” proponents would always argue for intervention, others would argue that it is not a US National Interest, and the more moderate would argue that an intervention should be executed if the SLOCs were threatened, or if the circumstances in some other way were exceptional. We should keep in mind that China do possess long-range nuclear capability which could be used to retaliate if the US went too far.

Let us continue with interdependence and the question whether it has constraint aggression? We can first conclude that there exists an economic interdependence between the claiming states (Beeson 2000; Takahashi 1997). To exemplify, China is Taiwan's second largest export market after the USA, this even though they are currently in conflict (Cliff 1998: 301), the trade between the historical adversaries China and Vietnam has increased enormously since the opening of the border in 1988 (Womack 1994), and over 20 per cent of ASEAN's trade is between the member states (World Bank 2001b), member states that are not always all too friendly with each other. The gains the claiming states have obtained by trading is enormous; the average GDP growth in the region has averaged 7.5 per cent in the last decade (1990-1999), as compared with 2.5 per cent worldwide, 3.5 per cent among other low & middle income countries, and 2.3 per cent in high income countries (World Bank 2001a). This growth is expected to continue to average above 5 per cent per year among the claiming states in the 1999-2003 period<sup>61</sup>, and during the same period the increase in exports of goods and services is expected to average 10 per cent annually<sup>62</sup> (World Bank 2000a-d). To sum up, the opportunity cost of not trading is extremely high and these states are both interdependent and heavily dependent on a favourable environment for trade, an environment that pre-supposes peace, or at least a freedom from wars.

With the above analysis in mind, has the economic interdependence between the opposing states restraint the underlying aggressions? Yes, this must be said to be the case. As we have seen ("The Spratly Islands dispute" above) there are without doubt underlying conflicts and aggressions between the parties, and the Spratlys is in virtually all literature seen as one of, if not the most, potent and dangerous hot spot in the East Asia and south-pacific region. These aggressions have not transformed into any large scale violence, and this can not be said to be because of other factors such as for example the advantage of defence and the geographical features or lack of military capability – such factors could have been the reason for the absence of inter-state wars, but it can not explain the relative absence of even

---

<sup>61</sup> China 7.2%, Malaysia 5.1%, the Philippines 4.3% and Vietnam 5.8%. No data for Taiwan and Brunei available from the World Bank (World Bank 2000a-d).

<sup>62</sup> China 10.5%, Malaysia 6.0%, the Philippines 9.3% and Vietnam 9.3%. No data for Taiwan and Brunei available from the World Bank (World Bank 2000a-d).

minor violent clashes over small islets in the archipelago – the capabilities needed for such missions do exist among most of the parties. In the Spratlys even a perceived risk of instability risk being economically negative for the countries involved, and a war would precisely as Angell argues be a commercial suicide for all the states involved. Further, the more interdependent the states become, the more expensive and hence unlikely an escalation of violence would be – this allows for a positive perception of the future.

### **8.1.1 1st Reading – a deconstruction**

There can be nothing said about the suggestion of a relative peace in the area and the profitability of trade compared with war, and the same is true in regard to the capability to invade and the advantage of defence, and further in regard to the importance of regional and non-regional trade- and market relations, and also in regard to the restraining factor of interdependence. But if we look beyond this first image and examine liberalism more critical another more complex picture surfaces.

Even though there are gains from trade and a comparative advantage existing there are issues that take precedence over profit, issues such as internal stability, regime survival, sovereignty and territorial integrity – this can for example be seen in the Tiananmen square incident where the Chinese government took an economic risk to safe-guard their own existence. Important here is also to be aware that the theory of comparative advantage is based on an assumption of the positive effect of absolute gains, as opposed to relative gains. If a state has a zero-sum, relative gain perception of the world conflict can be rational because it can increase the relative balance. It can here be presumed that out of principle a state can often accept a small loss as long as its adversary loses more. This is especially true in situations where the decision makers themselves do not lose, which they do not necessary need to do just because the state they are ruling so does<sup>63</sup>.

The market does care about neither the state, nor its individuals, or the regime ruling it, this resulting in that the market by many is perceived as a threat to the sovereignty and regime of states *per se*. This is especially true in regard to communist

---

<sup>63</sup> This discrepancy of interests between decision makers and the state they are ruling have been seen all too often especially in less democratic states where it seems like the prime consideration of the ruling elite is not the well-being of the country itself but more narrow ones – for example its own and its families wealth.

states such as Vietnam and China. Because of the above facts regimes are seldom willing to unconditionally fully accept economic liberalism (Mann 1997; Strange 1987, 1991, 1994, 1998; Weiss 1997). Further, even if we assume that the market-system is unconditionally accepted the system itself is first of all imperfect and there will always be market failures, and second its inherent boom-burst features risk undermining the stability of states, regions and possibly even the global system. This was something we could see example of this in the Asian financial crises (Karunaratne 1999).

The restraints linked to interdependence are not absolute. They do definitely restrain aggression to a certain extent, this firstly because of the cost linked to the end of trade with the opposing party (and possibly its allies), and secondly the loss of good will and trust from the rest of the global market system. But there are still other issues than economic ones, and there is a trade-off between those, and further there are issues that are non-negotiable – the survival of the state and the regime for example. There is one more thing needed to be noticed, that trade and traditional security agendas mostly are kept apart. The reason to this is that there are seldom a situation where someone is willing to take the place of the actor that out of principle are making a point by ultimately linking trade and non-commercial, more traditional issues. In general terms we can observe this in the general failure of trade embargos and more specifically in US's China policy where it does not combine its trade agenda with other issues (Livingston 1996).

Rosecrance's argument about the push towards becoming a trading state is accurate among the claiming states, but needs qualification. This choice does not have to be an absolute one; a state can keep some territorial state features but still primarily being a trading state. This has arguably happened in the Spratly case when the states have overlying security concerns in the form of internal stability, or for Taiwan the continuum of its *de facto* independence (as opposed to *de jure*), which in combination with the political survival of the regimes creates a situation where on the margin trading concern will be neglected and overruled <sup>64</sup>.

---

<sup>64</sup> Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have internal stability problems, Taiwan's *de facto* independence is always threatened by China, and the Chinese Communist Party has a problematic task in combining its Socialism with free market capitalism.

To sum up, the Liberal theory works well under normal circumstances, but fails in marginal cases. Basically this is because of the by liberalism assumed goals of policy , the accumulation of utility and maximising of profit, which when taken to the edge are ultimately in fact of little importance. Fundamentally it could be said that liberalism and neorealism combines; they each concentrate and explain the situation where the other fails.

Let us now before continuing with our next reading examine one of the fundamental flaws of liberalism, a flaw that is derived from the attempt to transferring a theory from the realm of economics to the realm of world politics and security.

#### **8.1.1.1 *Rational utility maximising actors in World Politics?*<sup>65</sup>**

The main general objection to the traditional liberal position is in regard to its assumption of rational utility maximising actors. These objections exists on two levels, firstly it has been questioned whether in fact states and individuals are at all rational and utility maximising, and secondly in the problematising of the concept of utility itself. If we start with utility, in classical economic theory utility can be equalised with quantifiable monetary value, but if we move away from this narrow definition more or less anything can be utility, even in economic theory. When going further and applying a theoretical frame not specifically made for the situation, as for example when using the concept of utility on the world system and inter- and intra-state relations, problems surface: Is the well being of the people the utility for a state? Is it the survival of the regime? How can we quantify prestige? Does monetary value take precedence over sovereignty?

Even if a definition of utility could be found and agreed about, which would make it possible for the actors to be rational towards something, it is far from certain that these actors would actually do so. For actors on the international arena there are so many odd factors that have the potential to break any general definition of utility that you can never be certain about the accurateness of a particular definition. In diplomacy and high politics there are so many small things that can go wrong, and out of prestige be hard to correct, this is especially true in the Asian setting we are

---

<sup>65</sup> This section includes many terms borrowed from economic theory and a more throughout explanations of these can be found in Salvatore 1995; Schotter 1997 and Stiglitz 1993.

examining in this thesis where the losing of ones face is one of the absolutely worst things that can happen.

In our case failures predominantly occur because of none risk-neutral actors and problems with the calculation of expected utility<sup>66</sup>. The actors in our case, and on the international arena, are not always risk-neutral; some are risk averse and instead of maximising expected utility they prefer to minimise potential losses, while others are risk preferrers which do not care about losses and plays a high stake game attempting to maximise potential utility. There is also an inherent problem with correctly calculating and quantifying the expected utility on which to base the game of strategy which is going to be played. These problems are mainly because of the imperfect information problem and the problem of reflexivity. International politics is a traditional game of imperfect information with many or no equilibriums where the participants are fully aware of neither the features of the game-board, nor how it is perceived by their opponents<sup>67</sup>. The problem of reflexivity can simply be explained as follows; knowledge relates to facts, while participants' decisions relates to something in the future. This something will when it is converted into facts incorporate the participants' decisions, hence there are no absolute facts to base a decision on because these facts are the result of one selves and others decisions. These decisions are themselves also effected by the actors perceptions of each other intentions. In short, everything effects everything and continuously create the ever changing social reality we are existing in<sup>68</sup>.

To sum up, the basic underlying theoretical assumption has forgotten to take the thinking human being and the imperfect reality into consideration. Therefore we have to be careful and critical and not only accept a neat theory as this one as the truth.

---

<sup>66</sup> Other possible failures of the rational-actor and utility-maximising model is for Moral Hazard problems, Adverse Selection, Public Goods, Free-Rider problems, Information Problems and externalities, just to mention a few (Schotter 1997: ch 14, 16-18).

<sup>67</sup> For a more extensive description of this and other forms of games see for example Schotter 1997: 213-51.

<sup>68</sup> The problem of reflexivity is adopted from and highly influenced by the writings and ideas of George Soros, and also by the ideas and philosophy of Karl Popper. For a more extensive description of the theory of reflexivity see Soros 1995.

## **8.2 2<sup>nd</sup> Reading: economic & political survival sensitive lenses**

The importance of economic factors in liberal theory has already been made quite clear above, though a few more things need to be added to the above discussion.

In the neoliberal world order that today exists there is pressure coming from all directions to adopt the rules and customs of this order. It is not only for a certain regime to choose which path to take - a state that does not choose to accept the neoliberal order will be severely penalised. The LDACs, including the states in this case, are heavily dependent on the rich countries for their economic growth; they are highly dependent on their know-how, technology and investments. Also for LDACs the treatment given in regard to trade-barriers and lending conditions are vital for their prosperity and growth. In fact LDACs seldom get a fair treatment in regard to trade barriers, barriers that according to the GATT treaty and the WTO should in principle not exist at all (Conklin 1996; Thomas 1997; Winham 2000). And these states can do little but hope for a relatively good treatment - and thereafter what happens is either that they must accept so called "voluntary export restraints" or risk to become targets of other non-tariff trade barriers<sup>69</sup>. Another problem is created by the much needed favourable, in interest and repayment terms, loans from the IMF and the World Bank which both demand adoption of their own policy programs aimed at "curing" the "sick" state, programs which basically demands that the state adopts policies in line with free market capitalism; reduction of the public sector, opening up for foreign competition, privatisation of public companies and deregulation of the financial sector and so forth.<sup>70</sup>

This might seem to be fairly unproblematic, but the opposite is in fact the case from the perspective of both the LDAC states, and from their ruling regimes perspective. These conditions and constraints that from a western perspective might seem rather innocent are for the states in the Spratly dispute factors that undermine both the independence of the state and its regime's survival. All the states in this case, except Taiwan, have problems, or potential problems, with their internal stability, and to avoid an escalation of these problems the government needs to be

---

<sup>69</sup> Explained and exemplified in Salvatore 1995: 257-96.

<sup>70</sup> In the waters of Asian financial crises there has been a debate about whether the cures offered by our western institutions are the solutions in the Asian setting.

able to keep up a high level of control over many aspects of the society, a control that is problematic to combine with the demands made from IMF, the World Bank and other donors<sup>71</sup> - to accept these demands would mean moving power from the regime to individuals, foreigners and other actors. Internal instability and violence not only undermines the economic prospects and growth potential of the state, but also the safety of the ruling regime - there is a real risk of such instability and violence when the public obtains more freedom. Here we shall also remember that both China and Vietnam are socialist states which makes them even less compatible with the capitalist world order<sup>72</sup>.

The problem is that at the same time as the states need foreign investments and loans to be able to keep up their growth and increase their prosperity, we must also be aware that if this development does not increase fast enough there will be pressure from both the inside and the outside threatening the ruling elite. Internally prosperity is needed both to keep the masses content, and possibly even more to keep the elite content - the elite can fairly easy stir up the discontent in supporting groups and/or the army, and the army can in these quite militarised states often be easily pursued by promises of increased support by the new regime after the *coup d'etat*.

The military factor is always problematic; a regime in an LDAC state cannot survive without the support of the military and hence it does always have to be taken into consideration when policy decisions are made.<sup>73</sup> The military can never be completely satisfied and always consider its funds being too small, and this puts pressure on the government to keep up the growth of the economy to be able to keep the military content.

---

<sup>71</sup> Even "unconditioned" aid and loans either presumes that something will happen, for example democratisation, or some condition will have to be present for the aid or loan to be offered in the first place.

<sup>72</sup> It can of course be argued that in fact China and Vietnam are not socialist, but in this thesis we are considering them as such because that is their official standing.

<sup>73</sup> Often the military is directly involved in the decision making process, sometimes it is even the military that is the government. Whatever the case there is never a division between the military and the political sphere as it is in the West (if this is the case here could of course also be argued about, but such a debate is beyond the scope of this essay).

There is also an external pressure from the international elite to conform to the western standards. Both the political- and the business elite pressures the LDAC state to accept and adopt to the neo-liberal world order, preferably to accept all the features without questioning them at all. Such an acceptance would risk being the end of the regime by the moving of power from the political to the private sphere, not accepting it would risk undermining the economy, which also as we have seen risk undermining the regime. To sum up, there is always a trade-off for a state between introvert self-sufficiency and extrovert interdependence policy. There is no “correct” answer to this trade-off dilemma – political survival is not possible without the market, nor in the arbitrary hands of it either.

## **9 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde - The Copenhagen School<sup>74</sup>**

The Copenhagen School aims to create a new comprehensive framework for security studies by widening the scope of security and dissolve the artificial boundaries between security studies and international political economy. The method used to succeed with this is to dissect and disaggregate world politics and analysing the parts and this way when putting them together again having increased the transparency and understanding of the complex world. This is hoped to increase the possibility to desecuritize issues after having reached a better understanding of what security is and how it comes about; who can securitize issues? what can be securitized? and why does this happen? To simply this brief presentation of a rather complex theoretical approach there will be a more extensive use of tables than usually the case in this thesis, this to structuralize and simplify the concepts of the theory. It is here important to be aware that the definition of concepts will be also developed in the readings, and further that the definitions created in the readings need not necessary be exactly the same as in the presentation - the presentation is based on the theory in general and the readings on the case chosen for this thesis.

---

<sup>74</sup> The Copenhagen School includes several scholars with different perspectives and ideas, and further it has also developed over time both on an individual and an aggregated level. In this thesis the Copenhagen School’s approach is the one presented in Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* which was published 1998.

The Copenhagen School accept the idea that security ultimately has to do with survival and existential threats, but they move beyond more traditional theories both in the sense that they uses all levels of analysis and further considers security as being a socially constructed concept and a self-referential practice - there is according to them no such thing as "real" security threats. For something to become a security issue it needs to be securitized, and a successful securitization needs three components; (1) existential threats, (2) emergency action, and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules. To only break the rules or the fact that a threat to existence exists is not enough, these two components must be combined by using the case of an existential threat to legitimise the breaking of the rules in question.(Buzan et al 1998:25-26)

Let us now examine the process of securitization. The securitizing actor performs a speech act by declaring something, the referent object, being existentially threatened. Whether this attempt to securitize is successful is not decided by the securitizing actor but by the audience of the security speech act. The ultimate decision is hence an intersubjective one which ultimately rests on neither the objects, nor with the subject but among and in the interaction between them. There are also functional actors who affects the dynamics between the securitizing actor and the referent object and are of importance in the process and decision of securitization - for example corrupt firms that can play a central role in political security. (Buzan et al 1998:30-42)

Actors and objects, i.e. the units of analysis, are not strictly specified by the Copenhagen School and can be anything from an individual to the international system itself, and their features and relative importance are different in different sectors and on different issues. Five levels of analysis are used by the Copenhagen School: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals (Table #4). (Buzan et al 1998:5-7)

*Table #4: Levels of Analysis*

(1) International systems	The largest conglomerate of interacting or interdependent units that have no system above them.
(2) International subsystems	Groups of units within the international system that can be distinguished from the entire system (e.g. international organisations).
(3) Units	Actors composed of various subgroups, organisations, communities, and many individuals that are sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g. states, transnational firms & nations).
(4) Subunits	Organised groups within units that are able to affect the behaviour of the unit (e.g. bureaucracies & lobbies).
(5) Individuals	

For analytical purposes five different security sectors are identified, the Military sector, the Environmental sector, the Economical sector, the Societal Sector and the Political Sector (Table #5) (Buzan et al 1998: ch 3-7). The purpose of this separation of sectors is to confine the scope of inquiry and decrease the number of variables to more manageable proportions by looking at the whole but concentration on one dimension at a time. It is emphasised that this disaggregation is only for simplicity and clarity, and that to achieve understanding the parts must be reassembled again so the relations between them can be observed.

*Table #5: Security Sectors<sup>75</sup>*

SECTOR	DESCRIPTION
Military	Mainly threats to the state that involves the military forces. Can also be threats to the military itself.
Environmental	Can be securitized on the Micro- and Macro extremes (the survival of species, humanity and the globe). Otherwise it tends to be harder to securitize, at least without help from other more traditional sectors.
Economical	Only in extreme cases as survival of populations, but there are spillovers into other sectors which can create security issues indirectly (e.g. low economic growth can decrease the relative power in the international system (Gilpin 1987; Kennedy 1989)).
Societal	Threats to large collective identities that can function without the state (e.g. nations and religions).
Political	Non-military threats to the sovereignty and/or ideology of the state. International regimes and international society can be threatened when their norms, rules and institutions are undermined.

---

<sup>75</sup> These sectors are in Buzan et al (1998: 22, ch 3-7) broad, socially constructed concept and as a result this presentation will be abstract and blurred.

Each sector is analysed on four points: (1) its security agenda, (2) the referent objects and securitizing actors, (3) the logic of threats and vulnerabilities, and (4) whether there are regionalizing dynamics. (Buzan et al 1998: 163-79)

After all sectors have been separately analysed they are reassembled and synthesised. The different unit-levels' relative weight in different sectors are first summarised, and then on an aggregated level it is examined both whether there are linkages across the sectors; what can be said on the aggregated level of the weighting of different levels of analysis, and are the regions consistent cross-sectors wise? Further, if there are discrepancies in the relative actor-sector weighting; how do different actors perceive security in different sectors? In this final analysis the levels of analysis presented above are combined into four different dynamics; global, non-regional subsystem, regional and local dynamics (Table #6) which helps when comparing the sectors. (Buzan et al 1998: ch 8)

*Table #6: Level of Analysis - dynamic patterns*

(1) Global	Operates on the system level.
(2) Non-Regional subsystem	Operates on the sub-system level, nonregional subunits
(3) Regional	Operates on the sub-system level, geographically coherent
(4) Local	Operates on the sub-unit level

## **9.1 1st Reading: the Copenhagen School**

When reading the case with Copenhagen School-sensitive lenses it is important that we keep the blurred borders between the different sectors and the interaction between them in mind. Some issues might surface in several sectors, sometimes with different securitizing actors and referent object, and others will seem to be missing. It should also be emphasised that this is not a complete analysis of the case, which would be beyond the scope of this thesis, but an attempt to in a few pages examine the explanatory power of this theoretical approach on the Spratly dispute and LDAC states. Further, both because this is an application on an already chosen and defined case, but also because such an examination is not the purpose of this thesis, the question of whether there are rationalising dynamics will not be examined.

This reading will start with the environmental and societal sector where few examples of securitization can be found, and thereafter continue with the sectors in which the security agenda of the Spratlys is concentrated.

### **The Environmental sector**

The environmental sector has not been successfully securitized in the Spratly dispute by any of the actors. This is essentially because there is not many issues that could be securitized. Environmental issues are usually system or local level threats (Buzan et al 1998: 71-92, 165) and on the uninhabitable islets of the Spratlys there are no environmental issues that can have system level implications, and further there are no local level referent objects who's existence can be threatened by environmental issues<sup>76</sup>.

### **The Societal sector**

Security in the societal sector is problematic in regard to the Spratly case, this because societal security is ultimately always about identity, the identity of large groupings that can work independently of states. Such groupings do not exist in the Spratlys because of its geographical features, and further there are no nations, tribes etc that have significant identity stakes in regard to the dispute.

This is unfortunate because in the larger regional security pattern societal security is present. In line with the "Asian values" debate there is the theory of a "Clash of Civilization" (Huntington 1993) which have implications on societal security - the perception that westernisation threatens the whole Asian identity. There are also a similar dynamic on the local level between various minorities, in particular between over-sea Chinese populations and the locals - the Chinese feel that their Chinese identity is threatened by the local and the locals on the other hand are also afraid on there own because of their historical memories of an ethnical greater China that mighty resurface (Buzan et al 1998: 134). The threat from the liberal world order on

---

<sup>76</sup> It should be noted that environmental issues have been securitized in the region and hence the fact that it has not happened in the Spratlys is therefore not a result of a general dismissal of environmental issues importance for security as such.

the communist/socialist identity<sup>77</sup> could possibly also be successfully securitized, at least internally among the political elite in countries such as Vietnam and China.

But can the above be traced and pinpointed in the Spratly dispute? There have been few attempts to directly securitize societal issues in the Spratlys, this mainly because there are easier ways to legitimise emergency actions to be found in other sectors. The Spratlys is more of a proxy and functional object that affects and can be used as a tool to influence the larger agenda, as for example the safe-guarding of Chinese identity for which the sovereignty over the Spratlys is of importance as an embedded feature in the Chinese collective memory.

### **The Political sector**

After having examined these two non-securitized sectors let us continue with those that are, and here start with the highly securitized political sector. Security threats in this sector are non-military threats to the organised stability of the social order that ultimately threatens the sovereignty of the state. These threats are concentrated on the ideas and institutions that hold the state together, a form of threats weak states are much more vulnerable to than strong states. Hence political threats are of high importance to LDAC countries as they are relatively weak.

In the case of the Spratly dispute there are two clearly identifiable objects we will focus on, firstly the survival and sovereignty of the state itself, e.g. the risk of disintegration due to demands for autonomy and independence by separatist groups, and secondly the survival of the regime of the state, e.g. opposition to the ideology and policies of the regime. The securitizing actors are here mainly to be found on the unit and subunit level, and there are functional actors of both internal and external origin.

Actions and events in the Spratlys have direct implications on the political order of the states because of the heavy weight given to them by these and their regimes. In the case of the states several have used historical legitimacy and spinned on the archipelago's importance in regard to the national identity and further its importance for the nation building process. This is especially true in the case of China where

---

<sup>77</sup> Communist/socialist identity should be differentiated from communism as an ideological tool to legitimise the ruling regime which falls into the political sector. Identity refers to the ideology in its own right and purer sense - "we" the communists/socialists.

making concessions about the Spratlys would risk threatening and undermining the national identity and perception of Chinese unity – if you for example ask a soldier in the Chinese navy why the Spratlys is important he will normally have no idea but still be certain that it is and be ready to die for it<sup>78</sup>.

Following from the logic of nationalism and the nation building process any change in the *status quo* in the Spratlys risk disturbing and undermine the legitimacy of the regimes in the claiming states, this both because of the reasons stated above and in addition as a direct result of the same regimes own political investment in the dispute – when committing as they have done they are playing a brinkmanship game by which they risk undermining their own survival. The largest risk here is connected with the existence of faction and oppositions both inside and outside the ruling regime that would not hesitate to use a window of opportunity if such a one appears, and in LDAC states that are relatively weak such opportunities are not unlikely to appear and can often successfully be used.

There are also other actors, especially in the military and among hardliner groups in the national elite, that have made security moves in regard to the Spratlys of pure selfish reasons; the military to create a threat to legitimise themselves, their actions and their need for money, and in the elite by those who's political agenda can benefit from such moves - e.g. hard-line faction in and around the ruling regime that through a failure by the current leaders can increase their power and possibly even take control of the regime.

There are also an external threat to the sovereignty of the state and the regimes coming from the system level from the liberal world order and the process of globalisation. The liberal world order and globalisation threatens to undermine both the states and the regimes through the idea of the economy's primacy over politics, something that risk undermine the relatively weak LDAC states where high levels of state control is essential for the upholding of the social order (cf post-capitalist-reform Russia).

### **The Military sector**

The prime referent object in the military sector is the sovereign territorial state, a unit that can be threatened both from external and internal sources; e.g. other states

---

<sup>78</sup> Example borrowed from Niklas Swanström (2001).

and separatist movements. Threats are also in this sector social constructs and are, other things equal, a function of military capabilities and the amity/enmity perception between the parties. In other words, nor in the military sector are there any such thing as automatic or real threats (even though in practice because of the existing hegemonic order this seemingly often is perceived to be the case) – military capabilities *per se* is not threatening until someone successfully securitize them (cf Wendt 1992). We should here notice that it has not to be the actual capability today that is securitized, but it can also be the fear of such capabilities in the future – as in the fear of an in the future strong China (Dibb 1995). Lastly, in this sector when enmity has gotten the advantage the issue is extremely difficult to desecuritize because when ones securitized the orthodox logic of military dialectics are given leverage, hence early intervention and preventive measures are of extreme importance to avoid such developments.

When reading the Spratly case we can identify two securitizing actors, firstly the national elite & regime, and secondly actors within the military complex (or combinations of the two – in weak LDAC states the line between the political and the military realms is often blurred, sometimes virtually nonexistent). There are five relation patterns in which securitization could be presumed to be found in a case such as the Spratlys:

---

*Table #7: Possible relation patterns of securitization*

- (1) China → Other
  - (2) Other → China
  - (3) Other ↔ Other
  - (4) System → Unit
  - (5) Subunit → unit
- 

(1) The other claiming states perceive China’s Spratly policy, its expansion<sup>79</sup> and more general nonconformative policy as threatening their own sovereignty and

---

<sup>79</sup> From their perspective the recovery of Hong Kong and Manchuria, and the Taiwan issue are examples of Chinese expansionism.

territory. This perception is internally shared by both the military and the regime of the states, and externally among all the states<sup>80</sup>. This in combination with the historical memories, the general fear of China, China's *real politik* and military build-up creates a local consensus that China is a very real threat to their survival, and further that this threat even if not being explicit and directly identifiable today will so be in the future – and the idea of the future is not a short, but an almost unlimited time-span in the regional historical and culture heritage and collective memory.

(2) The fundamentals behind China's securitization of military issues might seem strange from a western perspective. The other claiming states are small and can pose no threat at all to China, and further it seems virtually impossible that the US would make any military move against China, both because of the Chinese deterrence capability and because of the potential cost of US military engagement towards China – Chinese territory would not be an important national interest for the US and it would be extremely difficult to legitimise the costs and risk of such a project to the American public. But the Chinese have the opposite perception – the above arguments have misunderstood the Chinese position on territorial integrity which is shaped by a cultural and historical legacy reaching back thousands of years.

The Spratly archipelago and the whole South China Sea are parts of Chinese territory and hence the presence of US forces here is seen as threat, even though these have not committed themselves in the dispute yet. It is as we have seen above highly unlikely that the US would intervene in the Spratlys, but their presence in the area in combination with their bilateral agreements within the San Francisco system (Tow 1999; Tow et al 1997) and their posture and activities on the Taiwan issue both limits the leverage available for China and also, from a Chinese perspective, intervene and threatens their territorial integrity. This is especially true after the election of the Bush administration which's realist, though ambivalent, approach to international security is unlikely to benefit China (in comparison with the Clinton administration's "engagement" policy)<sup>81</sup>.

---

<sup>80</sup> As can be seen especially in their attempt to use ASEAN, ARF and other multilateral institutions to cooperate in their attempt to balance China.

<sup>81</sup> This perception became even stronger after the spy plane-incident April 2001 (Economist 2001a,c).

Also the other claiming states are threatening the Chinese integrity and sovereignty. They are occupying “Chinese” islands, and Taiwan is even considered as a part of the united China (cf the “one China, two system” policy). These opposing states are also trying to involve outsiders to make their case, as when for example the Philippines requested for US protection and support after the Mischief incident. The Chinese regime and military are probably aware of the limited strength among these states, as assuming no US interference, but especially the Chinese military have incitement to securitize the issues in this sector to increase their own importance, power and funding.

In the patterns 3-5 there have not been many attempts to securitize in regard to the Spratly dispute, and virtually none of those made has been successful. In the (3) relationship between the other states there could be possible issues to securitize, but it is not in the interest of these states to make moves directly or indirectly against each other when they have a common opponent in China that risk end up being the actual beneficiary of such moves. Further, there is no need to attempt creating other military security threats when China can always be used, this as long as we concentrate solely on the Spratly dispute – there are several other both potential and developed nodes of conflict between these states but an analysis of those are beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis.

Threats derived from the system level (4) and subunit threats (5) are not present in the Spratlys, though they do exist on the larger agenda and the Spratlys are here sometimes used as a proxy.

### **The Economic sector**

When analysing the economic sector we need to be aware that this sector is even more interconnected with other ones than is normally the case between different sectors. Economic factors are of importance for most sectors in one way or another, and there is often overspill from the economic sector – e.g. economic variables are of substantial importance in regard to a state’s ability to mobilise and fight wars. Because of the arguably narrow definition of security used by the Copenhagen School, that security ultimately has to do with survival and existential threats (cf “1st Reading: a deconstruction.” below), it can be presumed that there will be few issues from the economic sector that will be successfully securitized (but they can still be used as support for securitization moves in other sectors).

There are three major issues on the economic agenda that we can identify in the Spratly case: (1) natural resources, (2) the SLOCs and the freedom of navigation, and (3) economic growth and prosperity. The first two have been successfully securitized in regard to the Spratlys<sup>82</sup>.

If we start with natural resources they are of extreme importance especially in the form of fish and oil. Because of the relative unimportance of public opinion in the claiming states and also because of its “soft” non-traditional security features fish has not been the concentration of securitization among the claiming states. The concentration has instead been on oil which is an accepted factor of importance both in security studies and among the elites and hence is easier to successfully securitize.

The referent object here is the state. The claiming states are heavily dependent on oil, either as net importers forced to import at fluctuating and potentially high prices or as net exporters (Malaysia) being dependent on natural resources as an important source of income - whichever the case, there is an economic dependency connected to oil. A dependency which if decreased would create dividends that could be spent on other things, things that could help safe-guard the internal order and the social stability, and further help releasing resources to keep the military content - all these things are essential for the survival of a weak LDAC state.

The securitizing actors are the military and the regime. The military’s interest is based on firstly the possibility of extra funding, secondly on the importance of oil for military capabilities (oil is an issue that helps secure their military build-up), and thirdly because the safe supply of oil is of inherent importance for the military forces because without secure supplies the military capabilities in the event of war or conflict risk being severely damaged. The economic sector are also of fundamental importance for the regime for which internal social stability, a stability which is positively linked to a good economy and economic growth, and further because of spill-over effects from the economic sector into other sectors where the regimes political survival are also perceived as being threatened.

---

<sup>82</sup> Economic growth and prosperity has been securitized elsewhere, but not in the Spratlys specifically. Of course everything is interrelated and hence these issues are of indirect importance in the Spratly conflict to, but not on a level high enough to securitize them.

The freedom of navigation and the SLOCs are of importance to Japan, Taiwan and the US. For Japan and Taiwan they are essential for their possibility to survival as sovereign states due to their extreme dependency of trade and imports. SLOCs are of importance also for the other regional states, including the claimant ones, but there not to such an extent that it directly threatens their survival, and further it is subordinated other more stressing issues on the security agenda. For the US the stake is not so much its own survival as the development and function of the liberal international economic order – an order that is essential for the American international self-image and ideological standing<sup>83</sup>.

### **9.1.1 The sectors reassembled and synthesised**

In the dispute the environmental- and societal sectors are of no or little weight, this because of the inherent limits of the case and hence these two sectors can be left out. The emphasise is on political and military security, and their relative weighting depends on which actor's perspective is chosen – for the regime the political sector is the most essential one, while for the military actor(s) the military sector is the primary one. A realist could argue that in the marginal case the military sector will be the primary one and therefore it should always be given an overriding weighting, though the prime goal of all policies is the political survival of the regime, and it is possible for the regime to (at least partially) survive a loss of the state's territory (cf Taiwan after the revolution) so this argument does not hold here. This is because if the regime will fall the relative weighting between the two sectors are of no importance in the perspective of this thesis. What should not be forgotten here though is that the line between the political and military sector is blurred and that they often interacts, an interactions that is substantial especially in LDAC states where the line between political and military actors is blurred to. The conclusion here is hence that from the perspective used in this analysis the political agenda takes precedence.

---

<sup>83</sup> This was at least the case during the Clinton administration, but to what extent this policy approach will continue under the Bush administration is at this point in time is not totally clear. But as far as we can assess today it seems like there will be a return to old realist policies – Bush has so far emphasised that he will not risk harming troops unless America's vital interests are at stake and concentrate on homeland defence (The Economist 2001b), something that are almost the opposite of the Nye- and Cohen-doctrines of the Clinton administration. It can hence be considered questionable if the US would respond with might if called.

The importance of the economic sector induced security agenda is subordinated. Though the economic sector has as we have seen implications for other sectors and hence its importance for security in a wider more general sense is not to be forgotten or underestimated.

For external actors, that is the US, Japan and the liberal international economic order, the issues in the Spratlys with possible security implication is to be found in the economic sector – that is free SLOCs.

The examination of the dynamic patterns in regard to the level of analysis will be excluded because it is not essential for the purpose of this thesis, and further it can not be effectively applied on the Spratly dispute even if we wanted to so do. The reason behind its inclusion in the Copenhagen Schools analytical framework is that one of the aims of the Copenhagen School is to examine and identify regionalizing dynamics and regional security complexes on the subsystem level.

## **9.2 1<sup>st</sup> Reading: a deconstruction.**

This deconstruction will be a little bit different from the ones of liberalism and neorealism because of the Copenhagen School's constructivist approach – it does not in the same way claim to offer a key-book of security, but does instead present more of a toolbox to be used to help with the understanding of the social construction of security. Consequently we will not in the same way oppose the 1<sup>st</sup> reading as in the above analyses because the analysis itself has in a sense already been re-read in the 1<sup>st</sup> reading when explaining why certain issues were chosen.

For some it might seem odd to claim that the environmental and societal sector have not been moved towards securitization, and it is worth re-stating that though such issues have been securitized in the region this is not the case in the Spratlys where there basically is no such issues available – possibly except all the fish. The analyse of the political sector could be criticised by those with a more positive mindset than the one we have been using in our analysis – it could for example be argued that the elites in these states are not so pragmatic and selfish as my analysis suggests. The same argument could possibly be made about the analysis of the military. We should also be aware that it is always problematic to analyse the military sector of states that lacks transparency as in this case. The economic sector is problematic to; it is on the one hand of extreme importance, but because of the

traditional emphasise on hard security issues it often becomes subordinated or is left out. One of the reasons for not being included is the economic sector's complexity which makes it hard to grasp for non-economic scholars.

As we have seen above there are discrepancies in regard to the synthesising of the sectors into dynamic patterns in different levels of analysis. This is fundamentally because of three things, firstly because one of the major interests of Buzan and the Copenhagen School is to identify regionalisation and regional security complexes, something which is not the purpose of this thesis, secondly because the Spratlys is a too small case for enough dynamics to be found, and thirdly that in this case both the actors and the objects are found on the unit and subunit level which inherently limits the scope.

Regardless of this the Copenhagen School offers a framework for security analysis which even when not fully applicable as here provides a structure which both increases our understanding and by creating a frame simplifies comparisons between different analysis, and when more fully applicable than in our case it is a framework that for being of a constructivist kind is more systematical than most other ones in the same school.

### **9.2.1 The story not told – the hidden agenda of the elite.**

We have in our analysis identified three securitizing actors that are fundamental in the case: ruling regimes, military actors, and other elite groups. We have seen how they have acted, how they have made securitization moves and what referent object they have used - everything seems neat and fairly transparent but this is in fact not the case. We outsiders can never be sure about the real objectives of these groups, for example when analysing China there is always a risk to end up with the conclusion that ultimately everything depends on the objectives and real interests of the communist party, objectives and interests that we can never be sure about, hence even if not as a primary conclusion we always need to add a reservation in regard to this possibility.

Based on that the assumption about the aim of the ruling regime made in this thesis also holds for the military and the elite in general it can be argued that all these groups have themselves as referent objects. The groupings consist of individuals who are divided into factions within the groups, all of which have at least a certain degree of self-interest and also their own agendas. There will be one common feature of all

these actors – they do not want to lose their position of power with all its privileges – something that is especially true in weak LDAC states where the alternative to power can be quite harsh and sometimes even lethal (see “Introduction” above). In short, most actors do in the end care most about themselves.

This internal securitization will impact on the external securitization that we have analysed above, but will not be transparent but instead left behind closed doors. This is especially true in an Asian setting where there exists a strong preference for informal and discrete contacts. If we cannot expose, or at least better understand, this internal agenda and its dynamics will be quite difficult to in any efficient way manage and possibly solve conflicts; if only concentrating on the external agenda we might not even attempt to solve the real issues. We will get back to this later (see “The social construction of policy – a framework”), but let us now continue with our next reading.

### **9.3 2<sup>nd</sup> Reading: economic & political survival sensitive lenses**<sup>84</sup>

The fundamental base for the political survival of the regime is found in the economic sector, but this has not been understood by the ruling regimes themselves. If instead of only concentrating on traditional security issues we examine the underlying economics with an open mind we will see that these to can be, or rather is, of extreme importance – this seldom happens among the ruling elites in LDAC states that seemingly all too often are stuck in Cold War thinking. Also when the emphasise is moved to the economic sector it tends to be a move all the way to pure market liberalism and the principle of politics subordination to market forces. When read with sensitive lenses the surfacing picture is more diverse than either suggestion made so far.

Factors in the economic sector that can directly threaten the ruling regime and the survival of the state and its social order are numerous. If for example the basic human needs of the masses cannot be fulfilled there is a high risk of discontent and separatist struggles. To fulfil these needs the Spratlys’ fish is essential – the regimes

---

<sup>84</sup> This section is influenced by the ideas and writings of Geoff Dow, Susan Strange, Linda Weiss and Michael Mann.

might not be threaten today, but its longer term survival risk being undermine if not a resource so important for basic needs are not properly utilised.

The oil factor has direct importance both in the sense that it with a positive development can give dividends, and also it helps securing supply in especially the military sector – as we already have seen it hence helps avoiding social disturbances, military discontent and similar occurrences that risk undermines the state and the regime. We should here also remember that there are other natural resources than oil that can create incomes, such as natural gas and minerals.

One major importance of economic factors, in a securitization sense, is their spill-over effects. Economics is everywhere: to be able to maintain and develop the military needs money; to be able to handle war and mobilisation a strong economic base is needed because in the end all societal recourses will be used; to be able to keep its relative place in an arms race/build-up economic growth is essential.

There are also pressure coming from below and in the end it is questionable whether force solely can keep the masses quiet – this problem can be seen in democratisation processes around the world. There are pressures from within and around – wealth is needed to keep the elite and military content, and presumably, it seems, the ruling regime itself also wants a big piece for themselves to transfer to their own offshore accounts.

There are also external pressure coming from the system where the globalisation project and the expansion of the liberal economic world order want its toll – ultimately a total subordination to the market, the global financial system and arguably also a conversion to western style democracy. The globalisation project does not care about cycles of poverty, of dependencies, or about whether you becomes a winner or a losers – everything is about value maximisation and if this does not occur and/or if there are distribution problems it is just a market failure, market failures that are supposed to be solved by an even more uncritical and dogmatic adoption of the capitalist market system.

To fully grasp the importance of the globalisation project a larger case would be needed, but we can in the Spratlys at least identify it and see how thoroughly it is. On a smaller scale we can identify the use and need for foreign capital and expertise to explore the oil potential, and in fact that to start drilling would need even more

foreign involvement. Further, we have identified the dependency on oil imports as being of extreme importance, and the SLOCs are importance for the regional trade and hence the regional prosperity. One thing needs to be remembered though, when touching upon the liberal smorgasbord - one state cannot always have its pick. In the end you will often realise that you either more or less have to accept everything, or take nothing - it might not be a smorgasbord after all. There is of course some leverage, but weak and dependent LDAC states seldom have the same bargaining position as the rich, more developed countries have (cf dependency theory)<sup>85</sup>.

The SLOCs have implications on all levels. If not the freedom of navigation can be upheld in the Spratlys it risks having implication and undermine the whole liberal world order for which the possibility of safe transport is one of the fundamentals – such a large disturbance as the elimination of the SLOCs through the Spratlys would result in a real risk of disturbing the system itself. It will also, in addition to the indirect effects from disturbances on the system level, have direct effect on both the international subsystem level and the unit level where many actors are dependent on trade for their prosperity. It will also indirectly affect subunits such as the national elites with interest that are linked to economic factors depending on free trade.

To sum up, whether economic aspects and factors are present is not the question, they are, but if you chose to see them or not. If we chose to see them and identifies their linkage to political survival we can increase the prospect for peaceful management and solutions of conflicts because of such factors less prestigious and (mostly) non-zero sum features.

We can after having done this economic & political survival reading identify two problems, firstly that in general social scientists have a tendency to concentrate on other factors than economical ones because of their area of expertise, and secondly that the Copenhagen School is not streamlined for economic readings – if to find approaches that is, we need to move into the realm of political economy, but then we will lose the emphasise on security studies that the Copenhagen School has. These theories hence need to be further developed and combined to make more accurate and extensive readings of economic factors and political survival possible, and

---

<sup>85</sup> China seems to be an exception because of its perceived to be unlimited potential market (Xinbo 1998). This perception is refuted by Gerald Segal (1999).

preferably such a combination should be combined with carefully selected parts of economic theory to enhance its validity.

## 10 Testing of Hypotheses

### 10.1 Hypothesis #1

*Economic factors are of the same importance as more traditional security factors for the political survival of the ruling regime in less democratic developing Asian states.*

Neorealism does not give any direct support for this hypothesis, though we saw in the second reading that it does accept that economic growth and prosperity is of importance for the ability to accumulate means to wage war, and to when war occurs survive. But fundamentally neorealism is about traditional security, and further it opposes the fundamental assumption of this thesis and hence it is difficult to apply in regard to this hypothesis. It could either be argued that neorealism falsifies the hypothesis, or that it is not applicable because of its inherent dismissal of the importance of regime survival. Regardless of what, it does in principle not give any support for the hypothesis, those we have identified one concrete example of the importance of economic factors which if seen in different light can be of importance.

Rosecrance's liberal approach does not only confirm the hypothesis, but takes it further and even subordinates traditional security factors. The general thesis that trade is more profitable than war is confirmed by both statistics and by the course of events, but there are reservations in regard to certain marginal issues and it is also pointed out that there is a trade-off among LDAC states between the need of control and the need of wealth obtained through market participation. But in the end and overall the hypothesis was confirmed.

The Copenhagen School does in its pure form allow us to, with reservation, to cautiously confirm the hypothesis; economics matter in itself but is subordinated the military and the political sector, but overspill from the economic sector is of importance for the organisational stability and social order in the political sector, and following the neorealist argument in regard to economic growth and economic prosperity's importance for the ability to wage war it does also spill over into the military sector. When we to this add the assumption made in this thesis the first hypothesis is confirmed; we have in the analysis of the Copenhagen School above seen that the regime can not realistically survive without factors in the economic

sector and hence that sector can no longer be considered being of subordinated importance. When we to this add economic & political survival sensitive lenses there are no longer any doubt what so ever in the confirmation of hypothesis #1.

We have here seen that hypothesis #1 can be confirmed by traditional theories, with the exception of neorealism, especially when read with sensitive lenses. But even when not using such specific lenses a cautious confirmation can be done, this strengthens the validity of the confirmation itself. This indicates that economic factors matter more than often perceived to do among the claiming states and also among those trying to understand and find ways to manage and solve the conflict. It also suggests that soft and economic factors should be given a more important place on the regional agenda, and further that in the end CBMs, forums and second-track diplomacy can make a difference. The problem with economic factors is that they officially are not seen as important, and further are difficult to effectively use in the internal propaganda – that is in comparison with historical memories, external threats and so forth.

But there is one thing we need to understand; it is correct that both the states in the Spratly case and other LDAC states want and need economic prosperity and growth, but not at any cost. The liberal world order might be good for the rich and powerful, but these LDAC states are not sure it would so be in their case, and further have a feeling that their position would not be an equal one. As if this would not be enough the regimes are well aware that their survival would almost certainly be undermined if they are not cautious with the adoption of the liberal agenda – they can observe the dismantling of the western nation states in the waves of globalisation, a dismantling that for them would almost certainly mean a loss of their position of power.

## **10.2 Hypothesis #2**

*Traditional theories of security, war and peace cannot explain conflict patterns among less democratic developing Asian states.*

This hypothesis will be tested in a two step process, first we will examine whether it holds in regard to our readings of the Spratly case, then we will test if it holds in regard to LDAC states in a more general sense. It should here be made clear that the purpose of this examination is not to examine whether a specific theory is perfect in regard to LDACs, but to see if it does not work in a more general sense –

remember that the purpose of this hypothesis is to validate the results in the testing of hypothesis #1 and no conclusions are supposed to be drawn based on hypothesis #2 on a solitary basis.

*Table #8: Hypothesis #2 - results*

<i>Theory</i>	<i>The Spratly dispute</i>	<i>LDAC</i>
Neorealism	Hold	Hold
Liberalism	Falsified	-----
Copenhagen School	Falsified	<i>(Falsified)</i>

Neorealism can explain certain specific events and certain patterns in the dispute, but fails in regard to the dispute as a whole. It fails to explain the virtual absence of violence between the states; it fails to explain why China has been so reluctant to use its superior military capabilities to increase its dominance in the region (remember that according to neorealist logic the US will not intervene).

The same is the case in regard to LDAC states in general. As we observed when testing our first hypothesis neorealism is not compatible with regime survival, which on its own severely decreases the explaining ability of neorealism both in a general sense, but especially in regard to this thesis – if it would explain the patterns would this then in fact be an explanation, or just a coincident considering that neorealism is not compatible with our assumption? Further, LDAC’s security problems are in most cases internal; internal struggles threatening the state’s composition and survival, as in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, internal threats to the regime, as in China and North Korea, and so forth. Basically neorealism assumes strong and stable states, presumable great powers, and is not made for the patterns of conflict in LDAC and other weak states today, hence we can once again see that our hypothesis holds.

Rosecrance’s liberalism can explain the patterns of conflict in the Spratlys accurately and quite well. In principle all its logic works, from the advantage of trade over war and the constraints created by interdependence to the push towards becoming a trading state. Liberalism must therefore be concluded to have reached such a level of accuracy that the hypothesis can be falsified.

No valid generalisation can be made from the knowledge obtained in the readings of the Spratly dispute. LDACs have so diverse features on all levels, and for liberalism to be applied we need to know more about their internal structure, their level of trade-dependency, level of development, and many other factors. That they are less democratic developing Asian states is just not enough. The region in which the Spratlys is located and the claiming states have reached a higher level of economic interdependence and are more integrated in the global trading system than many other states, though they are on the other hand not so special from all other LDACs that we can confirm the hypothesis with that as a base. There is hence a need for a more extensive analysis before we can test the hypothesis on LDACs, until then we can only conclude that we do not have the data needed to draw a valid conclusion.

The Copenhagen School can explain the patterns of conflict, which is expected considering that it is a broad constructivist framework for security analysis, hence in regard to the Spratlys the hypothesis is falsified. The only possible question here is in regard to the elite's hidden agenda ("The story not told - the hidden agenda of the elite." above). It is more problematic in regard to other LDACs - it is not possible to draw valid generalisation from the Spratlys because of the fundamental features behind the Copenhagen approach; when security is defined as something socially constructed and self-referential it is extremely difficult to generalise, and to generalise would in a way undermine the whole idea of a socially constructed self-referential security definition - if security is security it would no longer be a social construction. In sum, we have here a falsification of the hypothesis, but with strong reservations.

### **10.3 Conclusion**

The second hypothesis has been falsified in regard to the Spratly dispute by two out of three theories. That the hypothesis held in regard to neorealism is of marginal importance because neorealism did neither function together with our basic assumption, nor confirmed hypothesis #1, and can hence be dismissed as not applicable. The confirmation of hypothesis #1 in combination with the falsification of hypothesis #2 by both liberalism and the Copenhagen School makes a very strong case for the importance of economic factors. We can conclude that economic aspects should be given a more prominent role on the Spratly dispute's security agenda, a

move that would increase the prospects for future management and possible solutions of the dispute based on the less prestigious and non-zero sum features of economic factors – there need not be any losers anymore.

To change the world is of course not that simple and there are inconsistencies and reservations in the readings as we have already observed. There are especially four factors that will, and already do, create difficulties for economic security issues to get the place on the agenda that they deserve: the hegemonic order, fundamental issues, the military, and fear of an open society.

Among the elite in the claiming states, and also in the world more generally speaking, there is a hegemonic order in existence that subordinates economic issues under more traditional ones. This order needs to be broken down, or at least destabilised, so the perception of economic security issues can change and their importance can be acknowledged. There are also issues that are perceived to be fundamental for the survival of the state and the regime that are non-negotiable – what needs to be understood here is that even these issues are socially constructed and hence can be reconstructed (cf Wendt 1992 & 1999). The military sector also creates large problems when attempting to move away from a traditional perception of security – basically the military perceive its *raison d'être* and power-position to be threatened by any such move. There is also a fear of an open society which is the plausible end result if starting to adopt the liberal economic agenda – open society threatens the control, stability and hence ultimately the ruling regime, and sometimes even risk fragmentating the state, as can be observed in for example Indonesia.

---

## SECTION 4:

### A Constructivist framework

---

#### 11 A Constructivist framework

This section is directly related to our analysis of the Spratly dispute, but it is fully applicable on other LDAC conflicts and scenarios to. This is the case even though we above concluded that we have to be cautious with drawing generalisation from the readings of the Spratly case. These cautions are not relevant in the framework presented here; the problems explored here are fundamental and present in virtually

all LDAC states where the policy making agents and structures are very similar (see “The social construction of policy” below), and the small differences that can occur have no major impact on the general framework presented and further necessary small alterations of the framework can be made without undermining its general validity and functionality.

### **11.1 The missing pieces**

We have concluded that the traditional theories can explain the patterns of conflict in the Spratlys, but also that it should not be drawn any extensive conclusions from the conclusion made in the Spratly case. In the analysis made in this thesis we have used sensitive lenses and an in general for the theories positive approach – our purpose have not been to explain the conflict itself or to find a theory that can, but to test our hypothesis of the importance of economic factors. We have found that economic factors are of equal importance for the survival of the ruling regime, we have hence confirmed our fundamental hypothesis.

We have in the analysis of the three chosen theories seen that there are numerous unexplained phenomena and we have in principle made qualified guesses when assessing the interests of the elites, elites that ultimately are those that make policy decisions. Basically we do not know, cannot identify nor fully understand the underlying dynamics among the policy makers in these states, and hence we do not know the dynamics of these economic factors we have concluded as being important – we only know that they are important.

All through the analysis there have been reservations made in regard to issues that eliminate all other “rational” behaviour, both traditional ones as for example the risk of invasion, but especially everything that directly threatens the political survival of the regime. Survival of the ruling regime seems at first to be a simple concept, but the underlying dynamics are complex and it is difficult to identify the factors that by the involved parties are considered to be of importance – how does the regime perceive regime survival? There are among LDACs not any clear rules in the internal power struggle in the same way as in open western democracies, the stakes are higher (see “Introduction” above) and there is virtually no transparency in regard to the process. At the end of the day, our understanding and definition of regime survival is in a negative form – we know when a regime has failed to survive

and ceased to exist, but we cannot for sure know how the regime itself perceive and define the situation.

This problem can be seen when attempting to analyse potential threats to the regime's survival where we can identify what classical theory would regard as real threats, such as the risk of invasion and similar violent threat to the survival of the sovereign state itself, we can further identify things that must be considered threats, as internal uprisings, *coup d'etat* and similar events. We can also identify subjective threats, threats that we assume are being threats to the regime's political survival, but that we cannot be certain that the regime itself would agree about, as is the case with democratisation, poverty and separatist movements. To exemplify, a separatist movement or national poverty can instead of being a threat be used as a proxy by the regime to preserve internal order and their own survival.

The Asian setting with a fundamentally different, in comparison with the west, culture, value system, philosophy, history, tradition and perception of politics and the individual makes the dynamics even more complex to comprehend. Two enlightening comparisons: in western society the state is looked at with suspicion, especially in the US, while in China the state has historically been thought of as the protector of the people – the Chinese term for country is *guojia* where *guo* means state and *jia* family, the two fundamental units within which people live (Xinbo 1998: 123-4). Also the perception of the individual is another than in western culture where the focus is on the individual on her or his own merit, while in Confucian philosophy the individual is valued for his or her ability to develop and realize an inborn social nature which is to love other people and to live with them harmoniously (Yang 2000: 88) – arguably almost a dichotomy to our western system and philosophy.<sup>86</sup>

To be able to understand the meaning of regime survival and the fundamental factors behind policy and securitization we need to accept that regime survival is a social construction. When this is done we can start identifying the agents creating the concept and the structure in which policy is formed. When we have identified the agents and the structure it is then possible to explore the dynamics, norms, ideas and reflexive interaction through which policy and ideational concepts are created. When we understand these factors we can start explaining the unexplained phenomena,

---

<sup>86</sup> For a comprehensive review of the role of the individual in Chinese culture see Yang 1994.

stop making qualified guesses, assess the interests of the elites and better understand the underlying dynamics of policy and the actual meaning of political survival of the regime – as it is perceived and defined by those agents involved. If this can be successfully done we will have created better prospects for the future with the enhanced understanding, it will be possible to choose the most efficient and appropriate measures when attempting to manage and solve not only the conflict in the Spratlys but also other conflict among LDAC states.

## **11.2 The social construction of policy – a framework**

In LDAC states there are a strong bias for informal politics (Dittmer et al 2000) and further the interdependence and interaction between individuals have a prominent function in both Asian culture and politics. Interaction between individuals is of course of importance in western settings to, but not in the same fundamental way as in Asia; in Asia there are a different psycho-cultural foundation in existence and the importance of individual interaction are the primary factor for progress, prosperity, life and death - in a setting where individualism is not primary over collectivism and the whole social interaction has been institutionalised<sup>87</sup> in a tradition developed over several thousand years. As a consequence the major part of the policy process goes on in informal settings and the policy results are hence not known until the policies are made public and are implemented. This creates problem when examining a certain particular policy, but is not a major problem when building a general model as we do here.

The agents in this structure are the state's elite divided into three units: the ruling regime, the military, and the other elite. The ruling regime is the government of the state and it is the ruling regime that in the end makes the formal policy decision, the military is here used to refer to all different parts of the military forces, and the other elite are other influential groupings that do not belong to the first two, with the emphasise on business-related groups and individuals<sup>88</sup>. Each of these groups is in this framework divided into two components: individuals and factions, and each

---


<sup>87</sup> Institutionalised in a ideational sense – there are forms, words, traditions and processes for most forms of social interaction, it is not just informal “networks” in a western sense.

<sup>88</sup> The borders between the units are often blurred, especially between the military and the regime, though this does not *per se* affect the accuracy and validity of the process of this model.

faction and individual has its own interests and agendas, and all individuals belong to a faction<sup>89</sup>.

Now we have a structure and agents, so then it is possible to examine the policy making process. This will be done with the help of the model below.

*Figure #2: The policy making process - LDACs*



---

<sup>89</sup> This is a simplification; all individuals are not belonging to a faction, some might belong to several, all individuals might not have their own agenda and so forth. These discrepancies do however not make any major difference in this analysis.

The interests of the elite are fundamental to understand before trying to comprehend and grasp policy making in LDACs. To be able to so do we need to explore the dynamics and the process (1) through which these interests are defined. We have identified the following agents on the unit level: the ruling regime (R), the military (M), and the other elite (E).

These three agents have different interests and agendas, and what ultimately matters is their aggregated interest that will be settled after a power struggle. This aggregated interest are the same as the state's interests (I).

$$I = f(R, M, E)$$

Each of these agents has two types of subunits; factions and individuals. The interests of each unit are the result of an internal struggle between its factions (f) and individuals (i).

$$R = f(R_f, R_i)$$

$$M = f(M_f, M_i)$$

$$E = f(E_f, E_i)$$

This is a simple model of the process where we have assumed no inter-unit contact. That assumption does not hold in the real world where all units and subunits in the elite interact in a complex web of connections. Further, more often than not do individuals and also subunits have personal interest in more than one of the three spheres identified here - in LDAC states if you want to maximize your utility your best bet is to get involved in all spheres. Hence:

$$I = f(R, R_f, R_i, M, M_f, M_i, E, E_f, E_i)$$

We can conclude that the process and dynamics needed to be understood to fully understand state interests is extremely complex. Though it has not always to be as complex as it might seem - there are large room for simplifications. All variables do not have the same weight, and in most situations we can with little negative effect exclude some, or many of the variables - if deciding to only use the unit-level function the model will be quite comprehensible and neat, but even then we would still often be able to obtain a fairly good and accurate understanding of the

underlying interests. The bottom line is that what we have here is a tool, not a solution. It is up to each one to decide how, and how much of it to use.

It should also be emphasized that this formula in no way is limited to the understanding of the interests, but can be applied on many other issues as well. For example on how economic factors are perceived and defined by the elite, or how the regime defines its own political survival<sup>90</sup>. There are no inherent limits in the formula - such ones are to be found in the user.

(2) After the aggregated interests has been derived it will be redefined into the more concrete form of policy goals (3). It is these goals that we want the final outcome of the policy to be.

Before transferring these policy goals into an official policy external factors (4) is taken into consideration. Here different policy options are analysed in the light of external factors to decide which official policy (5) would be optimal for reaching the goals set up.

When the official policy is implemented external influences (6) interacts with the policy decision and the final outcome (7) is reached.

It should be made clear that the process after the first step is not in any way done solely by the ruling regime - we can assume that the other two groups are at least indirectly involved to. But how and to what extent cannot be generalized about here, and further is of little or no relevance for the model itself - the results would be the same.

## 12 Concluding thoughts

The framework we have presented can without doubt help us in finding some of the missing pieces, and to fill some of the gaps we have confronted in this thesis. This is especially important in regard to the definition and conceptualisation of regime survival, and also concerning the underlying dynamics and interests which has been a problematic theme in the analyses in this thesis. Further, it can help us in converting our findings in regard to the importance of economic security into practical application and usages - the above framework makes it possible to explore the development and underlying factors of economic issues and we will hence be

---

<sup>90</sup> To give an example of a possible reconfiguration of the formula: political survival =  $f(R_i, R_j)$ .

able to do more than just confirming our hypothesis when the framework is applied - we now have a tool helping us to more fully understand the dynamics, and also how they are coming about.

This framework further exposes the problems with traditional theories applicability on LDAC states when not including, or at least problematizing, different levels of analysis. Of course we can not always include all levels of analysis, and should not do so, but when moving a western-based theory from a western setting into an Asian one we need to at least consider the potential problems involved in such a fundamental change of environment.

One other benefit with this framework is that it automatically takes the Asian culture, values etc into consideration - you cannot analyse the Asian elite without taking their way of thinking into consideration with this framework. If you would attempt to do that your analysis would be wrong and lead nowhere.

It should be emphasised that the framework presented here is a starting point, not an end. It is not a developed theory which has been empirically tested and verified. It is an attempt to explain the flaws of traditional theories and to fill in the holes that have been found when writing this thesis. To fully develop and empirically test and verify this framework is not within the scope, nor purpose, of this thesis, it is a task for future research and another thesis.

## **12.1 Further research**

First of all there need to be a following up in regard to the conclusions made in this thesis - the importance of economic factors has been proved and more issue-specific and in depth research needs to be done to understand how to transfer our conclusions into a working policy. This is important because it can help managing the specific conflict in our case, both on its own but especially by helping raise the importance of economic issues in the second-track diplomacy and forums already in place.

This conclusion also has the potential of a broader implication among LDAC states, if more research were undertaken to find the dynamics. By being able to confirm hypothesis #1 in this study, it is not unlikely that the same thing could be done in other cases too. Because of the limited possibility to draw generalisations more research is needed both on other cases, especially more extensive ones, and

there is also a need for an exploration into other regions, especially those with a similar level of development, as for example many states in South America. If the conclusions drawn in this case are found to be applicable it can help us make a difference – economic issues are less prestigious virtually everywhere.

The framework presented in this section needs to be developed further both theoretically and empirically. The model, as has already been said, is in its current form undeveloped and more of a starting point for research than a full-fledged theory, but if developed it has a very good potential in helping us understand and explain patterns of conflict in less democratic states, an understanding that is important because there is a lack of developed theories in this area. My belief is that it can be used to understand the dynamics of virtually any settings where there is a lack of democracy and hence the decision making process is hidden and the importance of regime survival is fairly high.

Finally there is one major project that really needs to be done – the creation of a new framework to security analysis made specifically for the Asian setting. This is not to be only an artificial redevelopment of an existing theory but the creation of a new approach starting with no biases or assumption – basically we need to go back to the drawing board. Of course a redevelopment of an existing theory, such as for example the Copenhagen School, would be better than nothing, and would be a much smaller task. If such a redevelopment, which is also a more realistic project, was to be done properly it could significantly enhance our understanding of conflicts in Asian settings, how they comes about, how they work, and how they can be managed and solved.

## References

- Abdullah, Saifur Azhar. 1999. "No Need for Middlemen to Resolve Spratly Issue". *New Straits Times*, January 16.
- Adler, Emanuel. 1992. "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control". *International Organization*, 46/2.
- Adler, Emanuel and Michael J. Barnett. 1996 "Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities". *Ethics and International Affairs*, 10.
- Ashley, Richard. 1988. "Untying the Sovereign State". *Millenium*, 17/2.
- Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. 1998a. *Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . 1998b. "International Politics in Asia: The Historical Context". In *Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Amer, Ramses. 1996. *Spratlykonflikten (Världspolitikens Dagsfrågor)*. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet.
- . 1999. "The 'Oil Factor' and the Conflicts in the South China Sea". In *Olja - en förbannelse?*, eds. Farid Abbaszadegan and Franz Wennberg, Sällskapet för Assienstudier, Uppsala.
- Angell, Norman. 1933. *The Great Illusion*. New York: Putnam.
- Antolik, M. 1996. "'The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement'". *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 16/2 (September 1996).
- Ashley, Richard. 1984. "The Poverty of Neorealism", *International Organisation* 38 (1984) : 225-286.
- Ba, Alice D.. 1994. "Oil in the South China Sea: Prospects for Joint Development". *American Asian Review*, 12/4 (Winter 1994).
- Beeson, Mark. 2000. "The Political Economy of East Asia at a Time of Crisis". In *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (2<sup>nd</sup>)*, eds. Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Bennet, Michael. 1992. "The People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute". *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 28/2 (Spring 1992).
- Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro. 1997. *The Coming Conflict with China*. New York: Random House.
- Blanch, Bruce and Jean Blanch. 1995. "Oil and Regional Stability in the South China Sea". *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 7/11 (1 November 1995).
- Booth, Ken. 1995. "Human Wrongs and International Relations". *International Affairs*, 71/1 (Jan 1995).
- Brown, Chris. 1994. "Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations". *Millenium*, 23/2.
- Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- . 1979. "The Universality of Human Rights". *Millenium*, 8/2.
- Bull, Hedley and A. Watson, eds. 1984. *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Buzan, Barry. 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2<sup>nd</sup>. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Camilleri, Joseph. 1994. "Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Conflict Resolution: the Asia-Pacific Context".
- Campbell, David. 1993. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Carpenter, William M. and David G. Wiencek. 1996. "Maritime Piracy in Asia". In *Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, eds. William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek. New York: M.E. Sharp.
- Catley, Bob and Makmur Keliat. 1997. *Spratlys: the dispute in the South China Sea*. Hants: Ashgate Publishing.

- Ceres, M. A. and P. Doyo. 1991. "The Old Man and the Sea". *Sunday Inquirer Magazine*. Manilla, 7/22, 21 July 1991.
- Chalk, Peter. 1997. *Grey Area Phenomenon in Southeast Asia: Maritime Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism*. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
- . 1998. "Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia". *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 21/1 (Jan-Mar 1998).
- Christensen, Thomas J.. 1996. "Chinese realpolitik". *Foreign Affairs*, 75/5: 37-53.
- Chung, Kuang. 1991. "China's Claim of Sovereignty Over Spratly and Paracels Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective". *Journal of International Law*, 23/3 (Summer 1991): 399-436.
- CIA. 2000. "The Spratly Islands". *CIA World Factbook*. URL: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pg.html>. Accessed 25 May 2001.
- Cliff, Roger. 1998. "Taiwan: In the Dragon's Shadow". In Muthiah Alagappa, ed. *Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Cobden, Richard. 1903. *The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (4h)*. New York: Kraus Reprint, 1969.
- Conklin, John J.. 1996. "From GATT to the World Trade Organization: Prospects for a Rule-Integrity Regime". In *International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order*, eds. C. Roe Goddard, John T. Passé-Smith and John G. Conklin. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Cossa, Ralph A.. 1998. "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict". *CSIS PacNet Newsletter*, no 16 (17 April 1998). URL: <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac1698.html>. Accessed 15 May 2001.
- Cox, R.W.. 1989. "Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millenium*, 10 (1989): 126-55.
- Dibb, Paul. 1995. "Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia". *Adelphi Paper*, 295. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

- Dittmer, Lowell, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee, eds. 2000. *Informal Politics in East Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dunne, Timothy. 1995. "The Social Construction of International Society". *European Journal of International Relations*, 1/3: 367-389.
- . 1998. *Inventing International Society. A History of the English School*. London; Macmillan.
- . 1999. "Kenneth Waltz and Neorealism", *Tim Dunne Guest Lecture Series on the Conception of World Politics, no 4*, 9 August 1999, The University of Queensland, Australia (Unpublished).
- Dunne, Tim & Nicholas J. Wheeler. 1998. "Constructivism and International Legitimacy: Good International Citizenship and Post-Westphalian Statecraft". Paper presented to the panel on "Constructivist and Critical Approaches to International Political Theory". Third Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting of the International Studies Association, Vienna, September 16-19, 1998.
- , eds. 1999. *Human Rights in Global Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dupont, Alan. 1996. "Is there an "Asian Way"?" . *Survival*, 38/2 (1996).
- . 1998. *The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia (Adelphi Paper no 319)*. London: Oxford University Press.
- The Economist. 1998. "Asian Values Revisited" . *The Economist*, 25 July 1998: 23-25.
- . 2001a. "Crashing to earth". *The Economist*, 7 April 2001.
- . 2001b. "In an age without heroes, Special report: America's defence policy". *The Economist*, 2 June 2001: 29-31.
- . 2001c. "Seeing red". *The Economist*, 7 April 2001.
- EIA. 2000a. *China*. URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html>. Accessed 23 May 2001, last modified April 2000.
- . 2000b. *Taiwan*. URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/taiwan.html>. Accessed 22 May 2001, last modified October 2000.

———. 2001a. *International Petroleum Supply and Demand: Mid World Oil Price Case*, table 3. URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/3tab.html>. Accessed 20 May 2001, last modified April 2001.

———. 2001b. *South China Sea Region*. URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html>. Accessed 25 May 2001, last modified 21 February 2001.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. London.

———. 1994. *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the end of the Cold War*. San Francisco: Berkley.

Far Eastern Economic Review. 1996. "No constrains here". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 March 1996.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. and David A. Lake. 1990. *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*.

Friman, Richard. 1996. "Drugs as a Security Problem in Southeast Asia". In *Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, eds. William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek. New York: M.E. Sharp.

Fukuyama, F.. 1989. "The End of History". *National Interest*, 16.

Furtado, Xavier. 1999. "International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither UNCLOS?". *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 21/3, Dec 1999: 386-404.

Gilpin, Robert. 1987. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Glaser, Charles L.. 1995. "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help". *International Security*, 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.

Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework". In *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. Cornell University Press.

Harrison, Paul. 1993. *The Third Revolution: Population, Environment and a Sustainable World*. London: Penguin.

Held, David. 1998. *Models of Democracy (2<sup>nd</sup>)*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Homer-Dixon, T.. 1994. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases". *International Security* 2/1 (1994).
- Howard, M.. 1978. *War and the Liberal Conscience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations". *Foreign Affairs*, 72/3.
- Johnston, Alistair Iain. 1995. "China's New "Old Thinking"" . *International Security*, 20/3 (Winter 1995/96): 5-42.
- Karim, Azhari. 1997. "The Spratlys - A Strategic Profile". In *The Dispute Over the Spratlys*, IDFR Occasional Papers, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Kuala Lumpur.
- Karunaratne, Neil Dias. 1999. "The Asian Miracle and Crisis: Rival Theories, the IMF Bailout and Policy Lessons". *Intereconomics*, 34/1 (Jan-Feb 1999): 19-26.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kausikan, B.. 1993. "Asia's Different Standard". *Foreign Policy*, v92 (1993).
- Kennedy, Paul. 1989. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. London: Fontana
- Keohane, Robert O.. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- , ed. 1986. *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 1998. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy*, 110 (Spring 1998)..
- Keohane, Robert O. and Helen Milner. 1996. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little Brown.
- . 1989. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Glenview: Harper Collins.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory". *International Security*, 20/1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.

- Kim, Shee Poon. 1998. "The South China Sea in China's Strategic Thinking". *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 19/4 (march 1998): 369-87.
- Kissinger, Henry. 1993. "Foreign Policy Is About the National Interest". *International Herald Tribune*, 25 October 1993: 5.
- Klein, Bradley. 1994. *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1993. "The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-realism as the Science of Realpolitik Without Politics". *Review of International Studies* 19.1 (1993): 63-80.
- Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams. 1996. "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods". *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40, supplement 2: 229-254.
- Kumar, Sumita. "Drug Trafficking as an International Security Problem" In *Strategic Analysis* XIX/2 (may 1996).
- Le Ke Lam. 1994. "Defense Strategy for Coastal Region Examined". *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, October. Translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Asian Service, FBIS-EAS-93-216, 26 May 1994.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lee, Lai To. 1999. *China and the South China Sea dialogues*. Westport: Conn.
- Leifer, Michael. 1996a. *The ASEAN Regional Forum (Adelphi Paper 302)*. London: Oxford University Press.
- . 1996b. *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia*. London: Routledge.
- Linklater, Andrew. 1982. *Men and Citizen of International Relations*. London: Macmillan.
- . 1990. *Beyond Realism and Marxism*. London: Macmillan.
- . 1995. "Neo-realism in Theory and Practice" in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds. *International Relations Theory Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 1998. *The Transformation of Political Community*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Livingston, Marc. 1996. "The Big Game". *Newsweek*, 1 April 1996.
- Maddock, R. T.. 1995. "Environmental Security in East Asia". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 17/1 (June 1995).
- Mann, Michael. 1997. "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and the Rise of the Nation-State?". *Review of International Political Economy*, 4/3 (Autumn 1997): 472-96.
- Mansfield, Edward D.. 1995. "Democratization and the Danger of War". *International Security*, 20/1 (1995): 5-38.
- May, Michael. 1993. "Correspondence: Japan as a Superpower?". *International Security*, 18/3 (Winter 1993-94).
- Mearsheimer, John J.. 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War". *International Security*, 15/1 (1990).
- . 1992. "Disorder Restored". In *Rethinking America's Security*, eds. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton. New York: Norton.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1988. *The Huong Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagos and International Law*, Hanoi, April 1988.
- Morada, Noel M. and Christopher Collier. 1998. "The Philippines: State Versus Society?". In *Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Nathan, Andrew J. and Robert S. Ross. 1997. *The Great Wall and the empty fortress: China's search for security*. New York: Norton.
- Natlan, K.S.. "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation". In *Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Neier, A.. 1993. "Asia's Unacceptable Standard". *Foreign Policy*, v92 (1993).
- Owen, John M.. 1994. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace". *International Security*, 19/2 (Fall 1994): 87-125.
- Park, Choon-ho. 1975. "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands". *Ocean Development and International Law*, 3/1 (1975).
- . 1987. "The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources?". In *The Law of the Sea: Problems from an East Asian Perspective*, eds. Park

- Choon-ho and Jae Kyo Park. Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii.
- Pattern, Chris. 1996. "Asian Values and Asian Success". *Survival*, 38/2 (1996).
- Pauly, Louis W.. 1997. *Who Elected the Bankers?.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Raman, B.. 1999. *The Territorial Assertions: The Case of the Mischief Reef.* URL: [http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/world/w\\_1999\\_01\\_21.html](http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/world/w_1999_01_21.html). Accessed 15 May 2001.
- Ricardo, David. 1963 (1817). *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.* Homewood, Ill: Irwin.
- Robin, Lim. 1998. "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand". *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 20/2 (August 1998).
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World.* New York: Basic Books.
- . 1989. "War, Trade and Interdependence". In *Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics*, eds. James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp. Aldershot: Avebury.
- . 1992. "A New Concert of Power". *Foreign Affairs*, 71/2 (Spring 1992).
- Ross, Robert. 1999. "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century". *International Security*, 23/4 (Spring 1999): 81-118.
- Russett, Bruce. 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Salameh, Mamdouh G.. 1995. "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict". *Survival*, 37/4 (Winter 1995-96): 133-46.
- Salvatore, Dominick. 1995. *International Economics (5<sup>th</sup>).* London: Prentice-Hall.
- Schotter, Andrew. 1997. *Microeconomics: A Modern Approach (2<sup>nd</sup>).* New York: Addison-Wesley.
- Segal, Gerald. 1999. "The Myth of Chinese Power: It's time to see China for what it is". *Newsweek International*, 20 September 1999. URL: <http://taiwansecurity.org/News/Newsweek-The-Myth-of-Chinese-Power.htm>. Accessed 15 May 2001.

- Snildal, Knut. 2000. *Petroleum in the South China Sea – a Chinese National Interest?*. Cand Polit thesis, June 2000, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
- Soeya, Yoshihide. 1998. "Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives". In *Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Soros, George. 1995. *Soros on Soros: staying ahead of the curve*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- South China Morning Post. 1999. "The calm before the storm Greg Torode in the Spratly Islands". *South China Morning Post*, 14 March 1999.
- Strange, Susan. 1987. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony". *International Organization*, 41/4 (Autumn 1987): 551-74.
- . 1991. "Big Business and the State". *Millennium*, 20/2 (Summer 1991): 245-50.
- . 1994. *States and Markets (2<sup>nd</sup>)*. London: Pinter Publishers.
- . 1998. *Mad Money*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Stiglitz, Joseph. 1993. *Principles of Micro-Economics*. New York: Norton.
- Swain, Ashok. 1993. *Environment and Conflict: Analysing the Developing World*, Report No. 37, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden.
- Swain, Michael D. and Ashley J. Tellis. 2000. *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy, Past, Present and Future*. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Swanström, Niklas. 1997. "China's Foreign Policy Towards Southeast Asia: Continuity or Change?". Report for a joint project between Uppsala University and University Sains Malaysia, August 1997.
- . 1999. "Conflict Management and Negotiations in the South China Sea: The ASEAN Way?". In *Perspectives on the Conflict in the South China Sea: Workshop Proceedings*, Knut Snildal (Comp.), Workshop on the Conflict in the South China Sea, 24-26 April 1999, Oslo, Norway. Hosted by the project Energy and Security in the South China Sea, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.
- . 2001. *Foreign Devils, Dictatorship, or Institutional Control: China's Foreign Policy Towards Southeast Asia*. Department of Peace- and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden.

- Takahashi, Takuma. 1997. "Economic Interdependence and Security in the East Asia-Pacific Region". In *Towards a True Alliance*, ed. Mike M. Mochizuki. Washington: Brookings.
- Thomas, Jeffrey. 1997. *The New Rules of Global Trade: A Guide to the World Trade Organization*. Scarborough, Ont: Carswell.
- Tow, William. 1997. "Bilateral and Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific: Key Concepts". In *Bilaterism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific*, eds. William Tow, Russell Trood and Toshiya Hoshino. Brisbane: Uniprint, Griffith University.
- . 1999. *Assessing U.S. Bilateral Security Alliances in the Asia Pacific's "Southern Rim": Why the San Francisco System Endures*. Asia/Pacific Research Center, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, October 1999.
- Tow, William, Russell Trood and Toshiya Hoshino. 1997. *Bilaterism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific*. Brisbane: Uniprint, Griffith University.
- Valencia, Mark. 1985. *South-East Asian Seas: Oil Under Troubled Water*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1995. *China and the South China Sea Disputes: Conflicting claims and potential solutions in the South China Sea (Adelphi Paper no 298)*. London: Oxford University Press.
- . 1997. "Energy and Insecurity in Asia". *Survival*, 39/3 (Autumn 1997): 85-106.
- Vagg, Jon. 1995. "Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia". *British Journal of Criminology* 51/1 (winter 1995).
- Vasquez, John A.. 1993. *The war puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vincent, R.J.. 1974. *Nonintervention and International Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1986, *Human Rights and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1990. "Order in International Politics". In *Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations*, eds. J.D.B. Miller and R.J. Vincent. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Vogel, Ezra F., ed. 1997. *Living with China*. New York: Norton
- Walker, R.J.B.. 1993. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: Addison-Wesley.
- . 1982. "The Myth of Interdependence". In *Globalism versus Realism*. Ray Maghooori and Bennett Ramberg. Boulder: Westview Press.
- . 1986. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A response to my critics". In *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. R. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 1993. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics". *International Security*, 18/2 (1993): 44-79.
- Weiss, Linda. 1997. "Globalization and the myth of the powerless state". *New Left Review*, no225 (Sep-Oct 1997): 3-27.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1987. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory". *International Organisation*, 41(3), summer 1987:335-370.
- . 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics". *International Organisation*, 46.2, 1992: 391-425.
- . 1994. "Collective identity formation and the international state". *American Political Science Review*, 88: 384-396.
- . 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wendt, Alexander and Ian Shapiro. 1997. "The misunderstood promise of realist social theory". In *Contemporary Empirical Political Theory*, ed. K. Monroe. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wheeler, Nicholas J. 1996. "Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: a Review of the Ethical Claims of International Society". *Political Studies*, 1996: 123-135.
- . 2000. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Wiencek, David G.. 1996. "The Philippines". In *Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, eds. William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek. New York: M.E. Sharp.
- Winham, Gilbert R.. 2000. "The Uruguay Round and the World Economy". In *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, eds. Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Womack, Brantly. 1993. "Sino-Vietnamese Border Trade: The Edge of Normalization". *Asian Survey*, 34/6: 495-512.
- World Bank. 2000a. *China at a Glance*. URL: [http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fchn\\_aag.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fchn_aag.pdf). Accessed 25 May 2001, last modified 30 August 2000.
- . 2000b. *Malaysia at a Glance*. URL: [http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fmys\\_aag.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fmys_aag.pdf). Accessed 25 May 2001, last modified 9 August 2000.
- . 2000c. *Philippines at a Glance*. URL: [http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fphl\\_aag.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fphl_aag.pdf). Accessed 25 May 2001, last modified 5 September 2000.
- . 2000d. *Vietnam at a Glance*. URL: [http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fvnm\\_aag.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fvnm_aag.pdf). Accessed 25 May 2001, last modified 31 August 2000.
- . 2001a. "Growth of Output". Table 4:1, *2001 World Development Indicators*. URL: [http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/pdfs/tab4\\_1.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/pdfs/tab4_1.pdf). Accessed 25 May 2001.
- . 2001b. "Regional Trade Blocks". Table 6:5, *2001 World Development Indicators*. URL: [http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/pdfs/tab6\\_5.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/pdfs/tab6_5.pdf). Accessed 25 May 2001.
- Xinbo, Wu. 1998. "China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power". In *Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Yang, Chung-Fang. 1994. "Are the Chinese Really Collectivistic?: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Chinese Value System". In *The Psychology and Behavior of the Chinese*, eds. K.S. Yang and A.B. Yue. Taipei: Gueiguan.

———. 2000. "Psychocultural Foundations of Informal Groups: the Issues of Loyalty, Sincerity, and Trust". In *Informal Politics in East Asia*, eds. Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Photo on the front page is from "The South China Sea Informal Working Group" at the University of British Columbia's home page. URL:  
<http://faculty.law.ubc.ca/scs/>.