

# A Two Level Approach to Securitization: An Analysis of Drug Trafficking in China and Russia

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## **Abstract**

**This paper aims to explain how and why 'new' threats become securitized by examining the importance of both core values and capacity. The main conclusion is that social-political cohesion is a central element for 'new' threats to become successfully securitized. The findings in this paper suggest that the threat caused by drug trafficking has had a significant impact on the security of two Asian states - China and Russia. The paper has illustrated how and why China and Russia have sought legitimacy when taking extraordinary measures to counter drug trafficking.**

**Key Words: Security, New Threats, Core Values, Capacity, Political Agenda, Drug Trafficking, China, Russia**



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## **1. Introduction**

'New' threats are increasingly challenging the security of nation states. In the last three decades economic, environmental and social considerations have become salient as depicted by their inclusion on the political agenda of various states and organisations, which is a vital step towards the realisation of a new security paradigm that either encompasses 'individuals...either as substitutes or in conjunction with the predominant security object of the past – the state' (Åsberg & Wallensteen, 1998: 168). The process of securitisation is necessary for academics and policy-makers to understand how and why certain threats become issues of national importance and why others are kept off the political agenda. This is necessary in order for States and individuals to adopt and accept extraordinary measures to counteract threats.

The securitisation of threats has traditionally been regarded as a process dictated by sovereign states and their ruling regimes. States throughout history have been able to command the immediate mobilisation of their resources in order to ensure the survival of their State from objective or subjective challenges. These threats have typically taken the form of either being military or political in nature. Nevertheless, history is full of events that suggest that security (that which we secure against) should be broadened in order to provide safeguards against other issues that represent challenges to the security of individuals and states alike.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, attention has increasingly been focused on the dangers posed by 'new' threats around the world. International organisations and governments have increasingly focused their energies on countering threats such as terrorism, organised crime, and the increased number of refugees. The process of securitisation dictates to the nation state which of these 'new' issues are to become matters of national security (Buzan et al., 1998). In the strictest sense, such threats cannot be regarded as being new. For example, the first terrorist group, according to Kumm (2002), consisted of the Jewish zealots who fought against the Romans around the time of Christ. Organised crime has a tradition in 16th century Japan, where unemployed samurai gathered in gangs in order to take part in lucrative criminal activities. Issues relating to the threats posed by refugees can be seen from biblical examples. Although these examples suggest that the aforementioned phenomena have

existed for centuries, if not millennia, their intensity and ability to inflict harm seem to have increased in certain regions of the contemporary world; potentially challenging the economic, political, and social stability of states and regions alike. These threats have thus been put on the political agenda of legislatures throughout the world because of their increased salience.

Drug trafficking is a trans-national phenomenon that threatens both states and inhabitants across the globe. Drug trafficking is inherently connected with organised crime, which poses a direct threat to both weak and strong states alike, because it has the ability to undermine the authority and legitimacy of governments. Drug trafficking is also incompatible with the fundamental principles of Human Security. For example, drug trafficking has links to crime, disease, corruption, and terrorism. Drug trafficking has been regarded by international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Association of South East Asian Nations, as a particularly dangerous ‘new’ threat to state and individual security. The narcotics business is believed to be worth between US\$500 billion - US\$1.4 trillion annually, thus constituting one of the biggest items of international trade (Swanström 2003). According to data presented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC 2003) addiction to hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine has dramatically increased in the last five years from 51 million to 71 million. This dramatic increase suggests that drug usage has become a serious problem for the global community.

Drug trafficking has had, according to various academics, a significant impact on states that lack the proper degree of socio-political cohesion, such as in Bolivia, Columbia, Burma, Afghanistan and Kazakhstan (Swanström 2003; Cornell 2003 Dupont 1999). Albeit less recognised, drug trafficking can also have an impact on strong states such as the United States. For example in 1986, President Ronald Reagan put drug trafficking on the national security agenda due to its coercive effect on economic and social sectors.

Why do certain ‘new’ threats become securitized by nation states before others and thus receive the status of being critically important? This question is central to security studies and represents a real challenge for policy-makers and researchers alike. However, many academics argue that the concept of security can only be

understood by examining different elements whereupon core values become of paramount significance (Åsberg & Wallensteen 1998). Some challenges are existential, dictating the use of extraordinary measures by states in order to preserve fundamental principles such as national unity, human rights, and territorial integrity etc (Buzan et al 1998). In short, the character of the referent object dictates what constitutes a threat to security (Buzan et al 1998). But states cannot, with some exceptions, unilaterally securitize ‘new’ threats. An informal-agreement between the state and its audiences, among other things, is necessary to successfully securitize an issue (Buzan et al 1998). This paper will focus on the securitization of drug trafficking, with regard to its inherent incompatibility with Human Security and, as this paper will argue, the national security of certain nation states.

## **2. Research Design**

### ***2.1 Aim and Purpose***

*This thesis aims to explain how and why ‘new’ threats become securitized.*

To understand how and why (Lijphart 1971) certain ‘new’ threats become the subject of securitization, a closer analysis of states as well as individuals core values becomes necessary. There has been research and subsequent acceptance by the academic community of the importance of core values when discussing threats (Buzan et al 1998; Åsberg & Wallensteen 1998; Eriksson et al 2002).<sup>1</sup> The aforementioned discussion has also been broadened in order to focus on different levels of analysis (Buzan et al 1998 Buzan 1991; Åsberg & Wallensteen 1998).

This thesis will provide two levels of analysis 1) the state and 2) the individual. The reason for encompassing the individual, as one of two referent objects of this analysis is due to the author’s belief that the security of the individual must be considered, “either as substitute for or in conjunction with the predominant security object of the past – the State (Åsberg & Wallensteen 1998: 168).” This belief is shared by a large

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<sup>1</sup> “Many researchers stress that what is at stake in discussion about that which is threatened are core values; that is, those values that are considered more important than other values and perhaps even instrumental for the realisation of these other values (Eriksson & Noreen 2002).”

proportion of the academic community as well as by organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme, The Commission on Human Security, and the Human Security Network, to mention but a few. Human Security for the time being is, however, largely dependent on the state. Thus two levels of analysis are warranted in order to understand how and why new threats become securitized or not.

The research question will be as follows: *How and why do 'new' threats become securitized?*

In order to answer the research question, this paper will seek to explain how and why the present phenomenon of drug trafficking is a threat to the security of the unit (state) and the individual (human being). The author aims to answer the research question, partly but not unilaterally by adopting a Kantian approach, whereupon the core values of the referent object become significantly important when measuring threats. This will be accomplished by addressing the incompatibility between Human Security and drug trafficking by presenting linkages of the latter with increased drug addiction, HIV/AIDS, crime, and violent crime. Furthermore, this paper will examine how and why drug trafficking is incompatible with the security of states by focusing on organised crime, money laundering, corruption, and terrorism. The aforementioned analyses are interdependent and will thus help the author, through qualitative research, answer the main research question.

## ***2.2 Scope & Limitations***

This thesis will deal with the securitization process, as depicted by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wild (1998), Johan Eriksson, Erik Noreen (2002), Carl Johan Åsberg, Peter Wallensteen, (1998). Additional focus will be placed on the speech act and its ramification (s) on the development of 'new' threats on or off the political agenda (Buzan et al 1998; Eriksson & Noreen 2002).<sup>2</sup> The analysis will be qualitative as opposed to quantitative. The main reason for this is due to the fact that no security audit exists within the present international system. The 'new' threat as depicted from the research question will focus on the phenomenon of drug trafficking. The reason why the author chooses (has chosen) drug trafficking as the referent threat of analysis is due to the inherent danger that this challenge presents to individuals and states

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<sup>2</sup> "How it happens that some issues are placed on the political agenda as threats, while others do not (Eriksson & Noreen 2002; 3)."

alike. Drug trafficking, which will be explained in more detail in the following chapter, has increased in its intensity, and thus fostered a wave of crime and disease throughout towns, provinces, nation states, and regions alike.

It must be stated that, with regard to data collection, relevant information was more attainable for Russia than China. It should also be noted that this thesis focuses on the supply side rather than the demand side of drug trafficking. Furthermore, only internal as opposed to external factors with reference to securitization will be considered during case description and analysis. Drug trafficking as presented in both case studies will focus on narcotic addiction and its effects on crime and disease (soft threats). Moreover, both cases will focus on drug trafficking as related to organised crime, money laundering, terrorism, and corruption (hard threats).

### ***2.3 Cases***

The study conducted in this thesis will be based on two cases of securitization, both originating from Asia. The two cases upon which the process of securitization of drug trafficking will be analysed will be The People's Republic of China (China)<sup>3</sup> and The Russian Federation (Russia). The reason for the author's choice of the aforementioned countries is based on the following arguments: China and Russia have a population of approximately 1.3 billion and 145 million respectively, thus together constituting approximately 1.5 billion people or one quarter of the world's inhabitants (CIA 2003). The combined landmass of China and Russia is 26.2 million sq. km, approximately 17.5 percent of the world's total. China and Russia have a common border (3,645 km) and together neighbour 24 sovereign states. Furthermore, in line with the realist school of thought, both China and Russia can be regarded as powerful states due to the size of their standing armies, 375 million and 36 million respectively, and nuclear arsenals in relation to others (CIA 2003). The data collected has been from primary and secondary sources. An additional reason why the author selected China and Russia for further analysis is due to the many similarities that both countries have with one another with regards to securitization and the phenomenon of drug trafficking. Firstly, both countries represent major drug transit countries. China is used as a transit country by drug trafficking organisations smuggling narcotics from the Golden Crescent (colloquial term for Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) and the

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<sup>3</sup> Exclude Hong Kong SAR China, Macao SAR, China and Taiwan province, China.

Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand) to regional markets such as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), Taiwan, and Japan, as well as to international markets such as the United States and Canada. The illicit drugs being produced in the Golden Crescent are smuggled through neighbouring Russia in order to reach the profitable markets of the European Union. Both countries have large criminal networks, which in part control the distribution of drugs to the West. Both countries also have a large domestic market for narcotics. However, China and Russia have different political systems, which is important in order to check the validity of securitization as described by Buzan et al (1998). Russia is a federation, where the legislative power is predominantly held within the executive office. China is a communist state where social freedoms have increased since 1979, partly as a result of its economic aspirations.

### **The Peoples Republic of China**

When considering that Burma and Afghanistan, the largest opium producing countries in the world, border China it is not difficult to understand that the amount of illicit drug users in China has increased to an immense proportion, especially after China's shift towards a higher degree of economic and social freedom. Although China has not been considered as a traditional market for drugs, the increase in trafficking through China to markets such as North American and Europe has in turn created a domestic market (UNODC 2003). According to official Chinese figures, there are approximately one million drug abusers in China (PRC 2002). However, the real total is believed to be much higher. The Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi and Xinjiang have been especially consumed by the innate problems that drugs create, which include disease, crime, terrorism, and corruption.

### **The Russian Federation**

Drug trafficking has represented a large problem for Russia. Drug addiction has increased to a staggering high among the population. The Russian Ministry of Interior has estimated that roughly 2.1 percent of the population uses illicit drugs (approximately 2.5-3 million drug users in the country). The large increase in drug usage is primarily due to increased and inexpensive access to heroin. Most of the heroin used by drug abusers originates from Afghanistan. The narcotics initially entered the country with the intention of being sold on in Europe. However the

domestic market in Russia has ballooned in order to satisfy all of Russia's federal districts. Many of which have undergone a marked increase in corruption, crime, and disease. Some of these regions have also been subject to terrorist activity.

#### ***2.4 Definitions, Concepts and Terminology***

This section will elaborate on certain key definitions and concepts that will be used in this thesis. This paper will firstly provide a definition for organized crime as well as explain how it is inherently connected to drug trafficking. Secondly, a brief description of narcotics is warranted in order to distinguish between hard and soft drugs. Thirdly, there is a need to elaborate on the different levels of analysis in order to understand why referent objects other than the state can be analyzed in security studies. Fourthly, this section will provide explanations on the concept of security, as well as provide a definition for Human Security, which is necessary for the coherence and the applicability of the concept in relation to the research question. Lastly, the concept of political agenda will be explained in order to understand securitization.

##### ***2.4.1 Organized Crime***

The definition for organized crime according to the Encyclopedia Britannica is as follows: a complex of highly centralized enterprises set up for the purpose of engaging in illegal activities (Britannica 2000). This definition will be used in this paper. Although organized crime has existed for several hundred years, it has increased in its scope, and is now regarded as a 20<sup>th</sup> century phenomenon. Organized crime encompasses a range of criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, racketeering, vice, gambling, prostitution, and smuggling. However the main revenue for organized criminal groups, operating from different locations around the globe, is derived from the proceeds of drug trafficking, estimated to be worth up to \$1.5 trillion in 2003 (Swanström 2003).

##### ***2.4.2 Narcotics***

This paper will focus on hard drugs (cocaine, heroin, other opiates, barbiturates and amphetamine type derivatives) rather than on soft drugs (cannabis and hashish) due to the dangerous impact that hard drugs inherently have on the individual.

##### ***2.4.3 Levels of Analysis***

The academic and political community in favour of broadening security concepts have argued that 'new' threats, other than the traditional military and political ones,

represent a far greater challenge to the global community in the new millennium. As a result several academics have illustrated this point by giving qualitative suggestions regarding different levels of analysis when describing security (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al 1998; Åsberg & Wallensteen 1998; Wæver 1994) Barry Buzan, gives foundation to this modern political thought by arguing that “existential threats can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question (Buzan 1998; 21; Buzan 1991).”<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, Buzan (1998) argues that the referent object of security does not necessarily need to be the nation state. Instead he argues that there are several levels of analysis when focusing on security, such as the international system, international subsystem, units, subunits and individuals (Buzan 1998: 6). This thesis will focus on two levels of analysis namely the unit (state) and the individual or individuals (human being).<sup>5</sup>

#### ***2.4.4 Human Security***

The concept of security has for a long time been interpreted according to narrow guidelines/principles, that is, the security of the State from objective or subjective military and/or political threats. The Realist tradition of security focuses on principals, but gives additional emphasis on how security can be achieved (Åsberg & Wallensteen 1998). Furthermore, security according to the Realist tradition is a zero-sum game, i.e. a State’s security is another State’s insecurity. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the bi-polar world, academics and politicians have sought to redefine the concepts of security in order to accommodate the new world order. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) first introduced the concept of human security in 1994 (UNDP 1994). The UNDP argued that security needed a new paradigm that provided security for individuals as well as the State. The Commission on Human Security (CHS 2003) provides two reasons as to why the concept of security should be broadened. The first reason being, that the state is not always able to provide security to its inhabitants. The second reason being, that it is sometimes the state that poses the threat to its own people. The UNDP report argues that human security can complement the concept of state security. Although there are many definitions of human security the UNDP gives the following definition: “Safety from

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<sup>4</sup> This albeit controversial, definition (of security) gives a large enthuces on the core values [character] of the referent object and thus basis for additional analysis (more on core vales in the next section).

<sup>5</sup> Buzan et al (1998) draw analysis from different sectors. According Buzan et al (1998) certain sectors attract referent objects. For example the state will traditionally focus on threats that are military or political in nature that according to structural realism pose a clear threat to countries sovereignty or territorial integrity and individuals focus on political and societal sectors.

such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression and [the] protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (UNDP 1994:23). In short, freedom from fear and want. Therefore, human security is compatible with the principle of human rights. In addition the UNDP (1994) argues that the following aspects of security must be fulfilled in order to provide human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Human security is nevertheless a deeply contested concept. This is due to the fact that it lacks a precise definition. This lack of a clear definition has according to Paris (2001:3) “diminished the concept’s usefulness as a guide for academic research or policymaking.” Even the academic supporters of human security (usually neo-realists and post-modernists) as a new concept, are concerned with the lack of its clear applicability towards real life. However, they remain united in the belief that traditionalist-type state and power-based concepts of security are not sufficient to provide security in the present international system. Although there is a clear lack of theoretical theory, which academics can use to prioritize threats, there still exists what the UNDP considers to be global security threats. This list encompasses five distinct threats i.e. disease, famine, pollution, terrorism, social disintegration, and drug trafficking (UNDP 1994). The aforementioned threats according to the UNDP “travel the globe” and are therefore given “critical” status by the author. However, as before, the UNDP does not give sufficient definition or answer any questions regarding how these threats are ranked. One might suppose that all the aforementioned threats are equally important. In conclusion, due to the fact that academics and policy makers have not managed to construct a sound theoretical structure to the question, this study will rely on the definition presented by the UNDP and focus on health, personal, and political security.

#### ***2.4.5 Political Agenda***

The last concept that this section will focus on is the political agenda. The political agenda is a crucial element that must be elaborated upon in order to understand how and why ‘new’ threats become securitized. In general there are two main approaches to or definitions of the political agenda, namely 1) the elite-based and 2) the pluralist-based approach. The former, according to Eriksson & Noreen (2002: 3), “focuses on formal political power and strategically-placed decision-makers high up in the hierarchy.” The latter is a broader concept of political agenda that encompasses the

agenda of the media and non-governmental organisations. This thesis will primarily focus on the elite-based paradigm. Adhering to Kingdon's (1995: 3) argument that the "political agenda reflects those issues that key-decision makers wish to focus at a particular moment." And that it is the "political-agenda of key decision makers that requires explanation (Eriksson & Noreen 2002: 10)." The pluralist-based approach suggests that other decision makers also have a certain degree of influence on the political agenda. The Media or NGOs have the capability to push or highlight certain issues, which according to Dearing & Rogers (1996: 6-8) can explain the success or failure of placing an issue on the political agenda.<sup>6</sup> This local level approach has the capability to influence general public opinion and thus influence decision-makers. This approach will also be used on an ad-hoc basis.

### ***2.5 Methodology***

The findings of this thesis are based on primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include official documents, reports, and statistics. The secondary sources include articles, books, and internet sources. This thesis can be regarded as qualitative as opposed to quantitative. Although quantitative data will be used, this paper will rely heavily upon qualitative analysis. Alternatively, case studies are used in order to make a comparative analysis. A comparative analysis is justified because of the nature of the research question. A comparative analysis should provide the means to validate the interpretation of the primary and secondary literature as well as provide a basis for testing the theory and thus make suggestions for theoretical development.

## **3. The Drug Trafficking Phenomenon**

The scale of drug trafficking has increased to such an extent that it is historically unprecedented. The volume of illicit drug usage in the present international system, according to the UNODC (2003), has augmented to a stunning 200 million people. This suggests that 5 per cent of the globe's six billion people are narcotics abusers. The production of illicit drugs in some regions of the world has increased in-line with the rise in demand to cater for larger numbers of narcotics users. The international

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<sup>6</sup> There is a distinction between the official and hidden agenda. However due to the inherent difficulty of methodologically analysing and explaining the hidden agenda, the official agenda will serve as the main focus of analysis.

narcotics trade is organized by different networks, which control the criminal activity from the production phase through to the consumer markets. The networks that organize this trade are international but are primarily based in Russia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Columbia, Nigeria, and China.

In order to understand why certain states have recognised drug trafficking as a threat to their national security some explanation is warranted of the phenomenon itself and its links to other threats that affect the security of individuals and states alike.

### ***3.1 Health & Crime***

Drug trafficking invariably promotes drug abuse and addiction among individuals and within communities. The health problems directly linked to drug addiction impair family life and productive employment. In addition, drug addiction constitutes a burden upon society by drawing on limited government services. For example, drug abuse in the United States was found to impose a 44.1 billion dollar burden on the economy (UNDCP 1995).<sup>7</sup> “In the United Kingdom, the total identifiable costs associated, directly or indirectly, with drug abuse in 1988 were conservatively estimated at 1,821 million, with 80 percent of this being the replacement value of stolen goods. Investigating, legal, and sentencing costs were other categories and preventative and medical costs were relatively minor (UNDCP 1995: 17)”. Thus drug abuse promotes the likelihood of other, non-drug but drug-related, crimes occurring. “Intravenous opiate use increases criminality several fold; and many heroin addicts are not interested in obtaining treatment. The close connection between drug use and criminal behaviour is supported by many studies (UNDCP 1995: 24).”<sup>8</sup> A national survey in the U.S. examined the relationship between drug use and criminal behaviour. Results show that “drug use is a strong correlate of being booked for a criminal offence, but age is the more important correlate of criminal involvement (UNDCP 1995: 25).” The sharpest rise in crime was, according to the UNODC (1995), recorded between 1980-1995 and 1975-1989, and the major areas were drug-related crime and robbery. According to certain state agencies there is a high correlation between drug addiction and violent crime, such as armed robbery, rape

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<sup>7</sup> “Calculations were based on a human capital approach, which is based on the value of productivity in terms of market earnings and imputed value for housekeeping services (UNDP).”

<sup>8</sup> Considering that heroin addicts need large amounts of money to pay for their addiction every day (\$20-\$300), it is not surprising that drug addiction promotes crime.

and murder etc. Although no official global statistics are available the aforementioned correlation presents a worrying indication. And suggests that if drug trafficking were to proliferate further – violent crime would also increase, thus constituting a negative trend affecting personal security.

### ***3.2 Disease***

First, there is a strong link between drug trafficking and disease. Sexually Transmitted Diseases such as HIV/AIDS (HIV is the first, latent stage of AIDS) and Hepatitis C are commonly spread through the use of shared needles between narcotics abusers. According to the United Nations Drug Control Programme (1995), and other health related organisations there is a strong correlation between Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) and intravenous drug users (IDUs). There are also health related reports which argue that the rise in STDs in Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, and the Caucuses, in the last decade, coincides with drug trafficking routes. Dr Beyrer (2002) director of the Johns Hopkins Fogarty AIDS programme argues that there is a very high likelihood that an uptake of heroin use, followed by explosive outbreaks of HIV infection, would occur in communities living along drug smuggling routes. For example, of those people who are infected by HIV/AIDS, intravenous drug users account for 80 percent in Thailand, and 88 percent in Central Asia - both regions are regarded as being drug trafficking regions (Beyrer 2002). The aforementioned figures compared to, for example, Europe, where 33 percent of intravenous drug users carry HIV/AIDS, are staggering and give a clear indication of the threat represented by the proliferation of drug trafficking routes. Furthermore, infected narcotics users can infect non-narcotics users through sexual relations. This tendency, especially among the youth, will further spread the threat presented by the disease to individuals, societies, and state alike. The economic costs of STDs are large, both in terms of direct health costs and in terms of the human resources on the legal market. In certain countries in Africa the disease has contributed to a/the distortion of socio-economic growth.

### ***3.3 Corruption***

Revenues generated through the international drug trade are used for corrupt purposes (Swanström 2003; Dupont 1999; Kramer 2003). The figures from the corruption percentage index suggest that states involved in the drug trade are clearly affected by

corruption (TI 2003). The high level of corruption in countries which produce or traffic drugs, such as Columbia, Peru, Tajikistan, and Burma illustrates this point. Narcotics traffickers commonly corrupt state institutions in order to run their business more effectively, promoting instability and chaos. Among the institutions that have been particularly subjected to corruption by drug traffickers are law enforcement agencies (police, customs, and border guards), judicial institutions (judges) as well as local or state governments (politicians). Typical acts of corruption include the payment of bribes made in order to escape detention or conviction. For example, criminal groups involved in drug trafficking will bribe border guards or police officers 'to look the other way'. Other acts of corruption include the rigging of political elections and trials. Swanström (2003: 10) notes that other and more coercive acts have been used in order to "penetrate the sovereignty of states and to control internal as well as international affairs." The corruptive inclination of certain state institutions invariably penetrates social-political cohesion and thus has the capacity to undermine the legitimacy and functionality of governments. "Corruption and State weakness that the international drug trade has created and sustains create leverage over the political elite and the political institutions (Swanström 2003: 10)."

### ***3.4 Drug economy***

The UNDCP (1996) has estimated that the drug trade is worth up to US\$500 billion dollars annually. Apart from the weapons industry, the illegal drug industry is the largest in the world. According to certain estimates the drug trade is worth up to US\$1.5 trillion annually, which is approximately the equivalent to 4.5 per cent of the World's gross work product (Swanström 2003). It must be noted that figures emulating from the illicit drug industry must be treated with caution due to the inherent non-transparency of the industry. The drug trade has had significant negative implications on the international economy, especially in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Caucuses. According to UNDCP (1996) reports, the drug trade has the capacity to partly control the economies of states that have a relatively weak legal economy. This is especially true when analysing narcotic production countries such as Bolivia, Burma and Jamaica. In Bolivia, the drug trade has controlled 15 percent of its gross domestic product. In Burma the drug trade is estimated to be equal in value to that of legal exports. The same can be argued for Jamaica (Swanström 2003). Other countries that are predominantly not involved in

the production of narcotics, but constitute an important country of transit for drug traffickers, are also affected by the drug trade. For example in today's Tajikistan, the drug trade controls 30-100 percent of the gross domestic product (Swanström 2003). This suggests that the drug trade has affected the economies of production and transit states alike (Swanström 2003). However, most transit states, such as Thailand and Iran, have stronger economies when compared with production states, and are thus more able to offset the emergence of a large illicit economy.

According to certain estimates, half of the money earned annually from the drug trade is laundered through the international financial system. (Swanström 2003). Given the magnitude of the estimates (\$300billion – \$1.5trillion), the economies of the countries involved are likely to be overwhelmed by drug money. “In the case of countries whose economies are is dependent on commodities, sharp falls in the world prices of these commodities may increase the importance of drug money to these national economies (Swanström 2003: 6).” Therefore, in these countries the markets in legal goods have decreased in relative importance due to the increased access by drug trafficking organisations and the impact that this has had on national economies. “Laundering of this scale, primarily due to the success of drug trafficking, gives illegal networks the power to criminalize legal assets and thus corrupt and co-opt state functions to an extent that is unprecedented in modern time (Swanström 2003: 7).”

### ***3.5 Terrorism***

Several terrorist groups are involved in, or have close ties to, the illicit drug trade. The U.S. Department of State (2002) argues that 12 of the 28 international terrorist groups listed in the 2002 National Drug Strategy Report, are to a certain degree involved in drug trafficking. The link between terrorism and drug trafficking is often based upon money and power. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA 2002) there are strong indications that terrorist groups in regions such as the Caucasus, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, have access to modern conventional arms due to their affiliation with the drug trade. Notable examples of terrorist organisations that have used the proceeds from drugs to fund their political activities include The Kurdistan Worker's Party, FARC, and Al-Qaeda. Although it is not clear how many terrorist or separatist groups are heavily involved in the drug trade, according to the DEA the number seems to be increasing. This increase can be

connected to the mounting financial costs of organising large-scale terrorist acts. For example the financial cost connected to the Al-Qaeda attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 has been estimated at being between \$5 million to \$20 million dollars. The large amounts of money generated from drug trafficking may potentially increase or promote the cycle of violent crime. The indications are particularly worrying due to the fact that in the last five years such large-scale terrorist activities, which mostly target civilians, have become more commonplace.

## **4. Theoretical Framework**

This chapter is divided into five sections. All of which are necessary in order to give a theoretical base to and understanding to of the research question. The first section focuses on security with reference to the approach provided by Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998). The security model provided by Åsberg and Wallensteen highlights the importance of core vales, threats and capabilities and is applied to two referent objects namely, the state and individuals. This categorisation is necessary in order to distinguish human security from state security. The third Section focuses on Securitization as presented by Buzan et al (1998) in order to incorporate individuals as key actors in/for successful securitization. Moreover, the thesis provides the tools necessary in order to understand the speech act, which will be discussed in the fourth and final section of this chapter.

### **4.1 Security**

Åsberg and Wallensteen, authors of *New Threats and New Security: The Post Cold War Debate Revisited* (1998), provide a revealing contribution to the security debate. Their paper focuses on evaluating security concepts in order to find a functional security paradigm that encompasses ‘new’ security threats, for the future international system. Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998) provide a theoretical security modal that makes a systematic comparison possible. Their model will provide a fundamental basis for this thesis and is necessary for answering the research question. Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998: 169) argue that the following ‘elements correspond to an important aspect of what security is, namely, 1) core vales, 2) capabilities, and 3) threats.’ They argue that all three elements are necessary in order to understand

security. Additionally their relationship to each other is equally significant. Åsberg & Wallensteen (1998: 169) define the elements in the following way:

“Core values are related to aspects of whom or what we want to be secured. Threats will tell us which the challenges and dangerous are directed against these core values. And capabilities refer to the resources and actors, which can handle the threats, and thus provide security.”

Further analysis of core values, threats, and capabilities is, however, warranted in order to understand their dynamic and interdependent relationship on each other and security. The first element that this paper will elaborate on is the critical importance of core values when measuring an actual, or potential, threat. The referent object of security analysis has different core values due to the differences in character (Buzan 1998). The key according to Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998) is to define which principles an actor wants to protect. Åsberg and Wallensteen argue that in order to identify core values opposed to ‘normal’ values, one should focus on the principles that states, societies, and international systems are built upon. For example, the core values for states usually encompass one or several of the following principles: sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity, democracy, etc. Evidently all states are different. As a result, core values will vary from state to state. Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998: 170-171) note, “If the core values are not protected, state, and societies cease to exist.” However when encompassing the individual as the referent object of security analysis, it becomes exceedingly more challenging to list all principles, let alone identify core values. A referent object’s core values will vary depending on preference between the different sectors such as economic, political, societal, environmental, and military (Buzan et al 1998). Åsberg & Wallensteen (1998) suggest that some core values are inter-linked.<sup>9</sup> It should also be noted that certain core values are incompatible with each other. Furthermore, new core values may materialise into the contemporary debate, however, some core values, such as security of the state, remain paramount.

The distinction between what is threatening and what is perceived as threatening is critical in order to identify and assess threats (Wolfers 1962; Buzan et al 1998; Åsberg and Wallensteen 1998). This distinction also clarifies why certain threats are put on the agenda, while others are not. As stated earlier, ‘new’ threats cannot be measured

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<sup>9</sup> Sovereignty and territorial integrity is a notable example.

without a linkage to core values. And since these core values differ depending on the character of the referent object, it is impossible to make a universal categorisation of which threats are more harmful than others. In traditional terms the state has always been the referent object of security, which has addressed the incompatibility between military and political threats to a state's core values. The identity of these threats has traditionally been defined as being formed of conscious threats by antagonistic actors, usually belligerent states (Wolfers 1962; Buzan et al 1998) However, due to the end of the Cold War, military threats to the sovereignty and survival of many countries, especially in the Western world, seem to be less significant. Non-state actors (terrorism and organised crime) and structural conditions (epidemics, floods, and the depletion of the ozone layer) can also pose an objective and subjective threat. For example, the issue of terrorism has occupied the political agenda of many states, especially after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. These threats have thus forced policy-makers to widen the concept of security in order to protect core values. Åsberg & Wallensteen (1998) make an important note stating that threats can challenge more than one core value. For example, military invasion threatens fundamental principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity. Unilateral threats can also challenge different referent objects. For example organised crime threatens core values such as the state monopoly on violence as well as human security, where the individual is the referent object. Secondly, threats can have different implications over time. Buzan (1991: 134) states "the more intense a threat, the more legitimate the invoking of national security as a response to it."

The third element, which will be elaborated further, is the importance of capabilities (Åsberg and Wallensteen 1998). Capabilities are used to protect fundamental principles from threats. Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998: 175-176) argue that there are two main categories of security providers, the unit (state) and the international system. The five main security categories are: international system, international subsystem, units, subunits, and individuals. Other researchers have made theoretical arguments concerning the present and future capabilities of subunits (e.g. non-governmental organisations) and individuals (e.g. social movements). Undeniably, these actors have had some success in putting issues on the political agenda, however they cannot be categorised as security actors according to Åsberg & Wallensteen (1998) because they lack the resources and ability to provide security. Although subunit and individual

empowerment is commonplace, it cannot be measured with the dominant capabilities of the state to provide security (Åsberg and Wallensteen 1998). For this to change, structural and attitudinal changes are warranted in the present world order (Åsberg and Wallensteen 1998).

The international system can be categorised as a security provider. International organisations have numerous mandates that provide a range of capabilities to maintain security for a region or the globe. Nevertheless, the main weakness of international organisations is structural. Although the end of the Cold War significantly decreased the constraints incurred by international organisations, they are nevertheless still subject to divergent policies and interests of member states. For example the five permanent members of the UN Security Council all have veto powers that inhibit the collective machinery to function as the founding United Nations charter suggested. States on the other hand have successfully provided security and will continue to act as security providers in the future. The state has an abundant, but not unlimited, amount of resources “to effectively protect core values from threats and achieve security (Åsberg and Wallensteen 1998: 176).”

Individuals have several core values, which include peace, human rights, citizenship, social equality, etc. Other values may include basic education, living standards, health care, fair trade, and protection from violence. The problem for security studies is that the list is infinite. However, due to the fact that there has been no quantitative research on this area, the author will only apply those values as stated in the Declaration of Human Rights. This, albeit stark, generalisation of an individuals core values is necessary in order to draw a functional framework for analysis. Furthermore, the Declaration of Human Rights is universal and as such gives a degree of legitimacy. As stated earlier, the number of threats to human security is infinite, though by focusing on a limited number of core values, the number of threats can be reduced.<sup>10</sup> The next step is to connect the core values depicted in the Declaration of Human Rights (all of which are regarded as being equally important) to a secondary framework. The secondary framework in this case will be based on the United Nations Development Programme. The UNDP, together with the Commission on Human Security, and other UN organisations, represent the mechanism that promotes the Declaration of Human

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Rights. The author will focus on the importance of personal, health, and political security out of the following list provided by the UNDP (1994) namely: economic, political, personal, health, community, food, and environmental security. Although not theoretically sound, this framework does provide an adequate basis for analysis.

The following models are based on the Åsberg and Wallensteen (1998) security model. In short, levels of analysis are key when defining ‘new’ threats in the present international system. Thus, this paper will implement two levels of analysis namely the unit (state) and individuals (human beings) into the security modal.

<b>1. State Security Model</b> based on Åsberg & Wallensteen (1998)		
<b>Threat→</b>	<b>Core Values</b>	<b>← Capabilities</b>
Multiple	e.g. State (survival) National Unity Market Economy Democracy Environment Human Rights	Yes

<b>2. Human Security Model</b>		
<b>Threat→</b>	<b>Core Values</b>	<b>← Capabilities</b>
Infinite	UNDP definition Political Personal Health	Emancipation

The security model presented in box one encompasses the state as the referent object of security. The State usually has several core values that need to be protected, such as, sovereignty, national unity, democracy, etc. Furthermore, states usually have the capacity to protect themselves against threats that are incompatible with core state values.

The security model presented in box 2 encompasses the individual as the referent object of security. The individual, according to the authors, encompasses the values depicted by the United Nations Development Programme’s definition of Human Security, with an emphasis on personal, health and political factors. Therefore, it presupposes that the individual regards human rights as a key concern. Individuals have had some success in providing security for themselves (emancipation). However,

individuals usually lack sufficient resources and are thus dependent on the state to provide security.<sup>11</sup>

The mergence of the human security model into the state modal is necessary in order to achieve security for individuals. The merger of the two models will empower both referent objects. The individual will gain power and the state will gain legitimacy when counteracting threats. The next two sections will elaborate more on this theory.

#### ***4.2 Securitization***

In *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wild (1998) argue that security can be broadened to include other threats beyond the traditional military and political domain. In general, Buzan et al (1998), in line with neo-realist tradition, argue that security depends on the character of the referent object in question. Meaning that Buzan et al (1998) understood the significance of core values, threats, and capabilities as described by Wallensteen & Åsberg (1998) in order to understand what security is. Securitized, according to Buzan et al (1998:23-24), means that the issue is “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” In order to understand why certain threats are securitized, further explanation is necessary. Firstly, an existential threat is more important than other issues, thus taking priority due to its incompatibility with the actor’s core values. Secondly, extraordinary measures are warranted in order to counter the objective or subjective threat. This suggests that an actor can break normal political rules such as commanding secrecy, “levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task (Buzan et al 1998: 24).” This, according to Buzan et al (1998:24), does not mean that an actor must adopt extraordinary measures, “only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resources for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimise emergency measures or other steps (special measures) that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threat, point of no return.” The difference between emergency measures and special measures both being

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<sup>11</sup> The state usually has significant resources to provide security for the people.

categorised as extraordinary needs further classification. The scale of the threat is paramount in order to distinguish between the two. The term ‘emergency measure’ implies large-scale action (e.g. nationwide action, or troop deployment), whereupon ‘special measures’ suggests more moderate action (new legislation, campaigns, regional or provincial based action). Furthermore, the audience must accept these emergency measures or special measures (Buzan et al 1998). This point is of paramount importance in order to understand successful securitization. According to Buzan et al (1998: 25) “accept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that order always rests on coercion as well as consent.”

Modal based on Buzan et al 1998  
**Successful securitization**  
 existential threat + emergency  
 measures or special measures +  
 acceptance of the people

“Since securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case (Buzan et al 1998:25).” In a sense the “securitizing agent needs to obtain permission from its audience to override rules that would normally bind it (Buzan et al 1998: 25).” According to Buzan et al (1998:28) “at some point it must be argued in the public sphere why a situation constitutes security and therefore can legitimately be handled differently.”

“Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules nor solely by existential threats but by cases of existential threat that legitimise the breaking of rules (Buzan 1998: 26-27).” Buzan et al (1998:24) also make an important distinction by stating that there are cases where the violation of rights and other extraordinary means are commonplace and “where security arguments are not needed to legitimise such acts (Buzan 1998:24).” Autocratic states, such as North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, have a tendency of non-adherence to rules. Nevertheless, Buzan et al (1998:24) state that “rules exist in all societies, and when an actor uses the rhetoric of securitization, the issue in question is placed beyond normal bounds of political procedure.” It should also be noted that there are significant differences between autocratic states, some are ruled by a dictator, (North Korea, Turkmenistan) others by a party (China, Singapore). Autocracies ruled by a party tend to be much more concerned with establishing legitimacy for their actions (interunit acceptance) than states that are run by dictators. In short, Buzan (1998: 26) suggests that successful securitization has three general steps, existential threat, emergency action or special measures, and acceptance by the interunit by breaking free of rules. Successful securitization is thus based on unit/interunit acceptance. Without this cohesion Buzan et al (1998) argue that a threat has only been subjected to a securitizing move (an actor presents an issue

as a threat) not of an object being securitized.<sup>12</sup> Buzan et al's (1998: 27) definition and criteria of securitization is as follows: "securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects."

### ***4.3 Merging of Theory***

As stated earlier, the individual usually does not have the capacity in the present international system to provide security for himself/herself. The state on the other hand has adequate resources needed to counteract threats. However, the symbiotic relationship between the state and individuals in the context of securitization suggests that individuals have a certain degree of power that can be used to alleviate the importance of individual core values, thus promoting their own existence or human security.

Securitization, according to Buzan et al (1998), suggests that the people can either approve or disapprove a securitizing move (an actor presents an issue as a threat). The actor in this case according to the logic presented by Åsberg & Wallensteen (1998) is bound to be the state, due to the fact that the state has the capability (the sufficient resources) to counteract a threat by adopting emergency measures or special procedures. The element of capability, thus limits the issues that can be securitized. Individuals, except in extreme cases, cannot usually dictate what issues should be presented as being existential to a nation's security.<sup>13</sup> The social contract between the state and its citizens makes such a move very difficult. Therefore, the individual (Head of State, Minister, 'senior civil servant') acting on behalf of the state usually holds this privilege.

However, with reference to the logic presented by Buzan et al (1998), for securitization to be successful an issue must first constitute a threat to the state's core values as well as be incompatible with the people's core values (who accept the securitization move thus making an issue successfully securitized). Moreover, the incompatibility between the threat and the core values of the people and the state can

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<sup>12</sup> Buzan suggests that there is a large difference between a securitizing move (an actor presents an issue as a threat) and successful securitization. In order for a securitizing move to become a successful securitization it has to be accepted by the interunit (the people).

<sup>13</sup> One example of an extreme case is the emergence of SARS in 2002

remain mutually exclusive. For example, the state regards terrorism as a threat to national unity, and the people regard terrorism to be incompatible with human rights or personal security. This dual incompatibility gives the state the legitimacy to conduct extraordinary measures due to its acceptance by the people, who regard such measures as being beneficial to their own existence. This dual relationship gives power to the individual thus promoting Human Security. Buzan et al (1998:25) state that securitization can be studied the following way:

“The way to study securitization is to study discourse (speech) and political constellations (gathering): When does an argument with a particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effects to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.”

#### ***4.4 Speech Act***

Thus in order to answer the research question of why and how a threat becomes securitized one must focus on the process of securitization where upon the speech act (also called framing and problem definition) becomes of paramount importance (Buzan et al 1998; Waever 1994; Eriksson and Noreen 2002).

As Buzan et al (1998) have noted, the speech act can be explained as a rhetorical act, where an actor or actors formulate an issue in a manner that commands national attention (Waever 1994). Buzan states that it is the “utterance itself that is the act.” Eriksson and Noreen (2002:10) suggest that “it is a question of depicting and representing an issue, a phenomenon – for example, something that is perceived as threatening – in such a way that others listen and are convinced or are at least persuaded to pay attention to the issue.”

It must be noted that framing is linked to cognition (Eriksson & Noreen 2002). This is because cognition, which can be defined as the collective term for an individual’s cognitive and memory functions, is followed by an actor’s verbal expression of thought. According to Eriksson and Noreen (2002: 8-9) “it is our basic conceptions that determine how we perceive an event; the event is filtered through our prism of preconceived notions.” Thus cognition is an additional basis for an actors speech act.

For example, a tank crossing a national border. This tank can either be categorised as hostile or friendly (peace keeping mission), thus it is not the vehicle that is the attribute of this categorisation but the socially constructed relationship formed in an actors cognitive and memory function (Buzan et al 1998:30).

It must be noted that certain threats – mostly relating to military and political threats, have been institutionalised. Institutionalised threats are also related to cognition, in the sense that states can take emergency measures to defend themselves against military attack. This kind of threat does not need to be accepted by the people because extraordinary measures have been adopted by the state in the past and are automatically regarded as legitimate. For example the people of Poland automatically accepted emergency measures conducted by the State in the late 1930s as a result of fears related to foreign occupation.

## **5. Case study (China)**

This thesis will identify problems related to the phenomenon of drug trafficking in two nation-states, namely China and Russia. The following problems will be identified: drug abuse, crime, disease, organised crime, corruption and terrorism. These issues have been chosen in order to illustrate human security and traditional security concerns.

### **5.1 China**

The first section will focus on the Chinese state's core values as well as brief summary of China's history with reference to narcotics. The second section will focus on the trafficking, production, and consumption of narcotics in China in order to understand the nature of the threat. This essay will then focus on other factors such as the affects that drug trafficking has on crime, organised crime, corruption, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS in order to understand why political actors have decided to put drug trafficking on to the political agenda. It should be noted that each section includes segments of framing. This has been done in order to understand their individual significance to political leaders, as well as their dependent significance on drug trafficking. The last section will focus on the securitizing move i.e. the speech act

and extraordinary measures that have been employed in order to counteract the threat of drug trafficking.

### ***5.2 Core Values & History***

The Peoples Republic of China can be objectively regarded as a one party communist state with capitalist aspirations. China's security paradigm is largely based on realism or structural realism specifying the condition of anarchy and the principle of self-help. Fundamental principles in China include: territorial integrity, sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, and peaceful co-existence with neighbouring states. These 'Five principles of Peaceful Coexistence' are according to the Chinese Communist Party of paramount importance. One-China policy and National unity is of vital importance for/to the state.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the State has put a very high value on its economy, especially after Deng Xiaoping introduced economic reforms in the 1980s (Fairbank 1992).

Drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon in China. The Chinese have had problems with narcotics since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. The ruling Qing Dynasty was forced to sign a trade agreement with the British after losing the Opium War, which legalised the cultivation and import of opium in China.<sup>15</sup> Drug production in and foreign imports to China even increased in order to compensate for the growing opium habits of its nationals - estimated at being 15 million in 1890 (Meyer & Parssinen 1998).<sup>16</sup> Only after the opium suppression movement of 1906-1908 (Ch'ing reforms), did China succeed in curtailing the cultivation and consumption of opium at home and from abroad. Nevertheless, during the subsequent decades opium consumption increased yet again (approximately 20 million people in the late 1940s). It was not until 1948-1949, when the communists carried out large-scale reform that encompassed treatment and eradication programmes, that opium addiction and drug trafficking were stamped out to such an extent that in 1952 PRC proudly proclaimed itself to the international community as being a country without narcotics (Meyer & Parssinen 1998).

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<sup>14</sup> This is primarily due to the 'loss' of Taiwan to the KMT in the late 1940s but also because of separatist tendencies in Tibet and Xinjiang.

<sup>15</sup> The British actively promoted opium use in China at the end of the eighteenth century.

<sup>16</sup> Drug traffic hindered progress in China by impoverishing the nation economically, morally and physically.

### 5.3 Narcotics

The Chinese security forces seized a total of 14,000 kilograms of heroin/opium in 2001 – the largest cumulative seizure in the world (UNODC 2003). According to the figures presented by the United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2003:56) “China accounted for 91 percent of all heroin seizures in the East and South-Eastern Asia in 2001.” This figure represents a sharp increase from 1999, when the total amount of heroin seized was 5,364 tonnes (UNODC 2003). In addition China seized 2,820 kilograms of opium in 2001 – the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest total in the world after Pakistan (5,175 kg) and Iran (81,061 kg) (UNODC 2003). According to a United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO 2002) report the quantities of heroin trafficked from the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent to China were approximately equal, based on the amount of drugs captured by the Peoples Armed Police (PAP) and other Chinese security forces. Other researchers argue that most of the heroin comes from Burma (Chouvy 2002). According to experts large amounts of the heroin smuggled through China is intended for the North American market (Chouvy, 2002).

Seizures of Opiates and Heroin 1996-2001 in China (Kilograms)

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Opium (raw and prepared)	1745	1880	1215	1193	2428	2820
Opium (plant, capsule)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Opium (poppy seed)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Heroin	4347	5477	7358	5364	6281	13200
Morphine	178	358	146	NA	NA	NA
other opiates	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Source UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003

In 2000, China seized the largest amount of methamphetamine in East and Southeast Asia, approximately 20 tonnes. In 2001, Chinese security forces dismantled 44 methamphetamine laboratories, up from 26 in 1995, and none before 1990. Most of the laboratories were detected in South-Eastern provinces, notably Fujian and Guandong (UNODC 2003: 35). According to the UNODC (2003: 23) many of the clandestine laboratories belonged to organised criminal groups located in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The first drug seizure in China was reported in 1983 (UNESCO 2002). However, it was not until the early 1990s that drug trafficking into China started to dramatically increase. The proliferation of drug trafficking through China has come about as a result of several reasons. The two main reasons for the initial rise of drug trafficking in China are the following: 1) Chinese and Burmese reforms and 2) counter narcotic policies in Southeast Asia.

First, new routes originating from the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) as well as the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) have emerged due to the marked change in Chinese economic and political policy. The reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin in the 1980s and 1990s have, among other things, made it much easier for drug trafficking organisations to smuggle narcotics across the Chinese border. The loosening of border restrictions due to trans-national trade between China and Southeast Asia, as well as Central Asia, has at the same time improved the mode of access (in and out of China). The construction of new railways, highways and roads between China and Indochina has made it very difficult for Chinese border authorities to check all goods entering the country.<sup>17</sup>

The second factor that explains the marked increase of drug trafficking into China is the success of counter drug trafficking efforts in Thailand. In the past Thailand was a large cultivator and consumer of illicit opium. Furthermore, Thailand was used as a transit state by criminal networks to smuggle drugs from the Golden Triangle into Hong Kong, Taiwan, and North America. In 1984, the Thai government, recognising the large threat posed by drug trafficking to their national security, started to mount a nation-wide counter narcotics campaign. The campaign, regarded as one of the most successful in history, managed to significantly curtail drug trafficking activity in the country.<sup>18</sup> The success of Thai counter narcotics efforts forced drug trafficking

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<sup>17</sup> The Myanmar government legalised cross border trading in 1988. The legalisation was later propelled due to the fall of the Communist Party of Burma (1989) and the “subsequent appearance of the United Wa State Army. In addition China is prone to drug trafficking from Myanmar. This is largely due to the fact that Myanmar has an important Chinese population that consists of, among others, Panthay caravan traders, former Kuomintang (KMT) as well as CPB members, and local Kokang Chinese, all of whom are more or less involved in illicit cross-border activities and drug trafficking. The powerful attraction of both Hong Kong and Taiwan as major international trafficking nodes also adds to the appeal of the Chinese routes (Chouvy, 2002)”.

<sup>18</sup> The Thai government used a range of different tactics to curtail drug trafficking such as the alternative development programmes, the increased monitoring of the Thai-Burma border, and land reform. In 2000, the Thai

networks to find new routes. Drug trafficking organisations started to transit narcotics through China instead, due to its close proximity (as well as its loosening of its strict border policy).

#### Drug Trafficking Routes in China (UNESCO 2002)

Golden Triangle – Ruili – Kunming – Guangzhou – Hong Kong  
Golden Triangle – Kunming – east China Seashores – Taiwan  
Golden Triangle – Yunnan – inland China  
Golden Triangle – Yunnan – Shanghai – Europe, Japan  
Golden Triangle – Yunnan – east China Seashores – Canada, United States

Golden Crecent – Lhasa – Chengdu – internal China  
Golden Crecent – Ulumuqi – Lanzhou – Xi’an – north China cities

According to the White Paper presented by the Chinese National Narcotics Control Commission, there were 148,000 registered drug addicts in 1991 (PRC 2002). In 1995 this number rose to 520,000. And in 1999 the total figure was 681,000. According to the 1999 statistic, 0.054 percent of China’s total population of approximately 1.3 billion were regularly using illicit drugs (UNODC 2003). In addition 71.5 percent of the 1999 figure used heroin intravenously. Although there are cases of drug abuse in all 22 provinces in China, large-scale abuse has been identified mostly in Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian provinces. More recent figures presented by the Chinese government state that in 2001 there were approximately 1 million registered drug addicts in China, of which 901,000 used heroin/opium (Appendix 1). The second most popular drug in China was found to be amphetamines and it has been estimated that 10,000 people regularly use this narcotic. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the above mentioned data understates the actual drug-taking population in China. This is because of the stigma attached to drug addiction as well as the mandatory re-education of registered drug abusers in labour camps (PRC 2002). However researchers suggest that the real figure could be up to 7 million addicts in China today (Chouvy 2002).<sup>19</sup>

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government set up a territorial Defence Training Scheme that turned about 600 border villages into anti-drug trafficking outposts (Chouvy 2002).

<sup>19</sup> These figures include all illegal drugs, however heroin and ice account for 90 percent of the recorded consumption.

#### 5.4 HIV/AIDS

The first reported case of HIV/AIDS in China was in 1989, in Yunnan province (UNESCO 2002). Since then, the disease has grown at almost epidemic proportions. In November 2002, China's Ministry of Health put the figure as being 840,000 but estimated that there might be more than 1 million cases of HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS

##### **HIV/AIDS in Yunnan**

The increase of illicit drugs flowing from Burma through the Chinese province of Yunnan has had a clear toll on the people of that province. The province of Yunnan had the first reported case of HIV/AIDS among drug users in 1989. Yunnan has the highest HIV infection rate in China. In 1990, Yunnan was home to 80 per cent of China's HIV-positive individuals. The border town of Ruili is believed to be the main transit point for heroin. And consequently is one of the densest HIV/Aids per capita towns in China. Yunnan also has a thriving sex industry, which further causes the proliferation of disease amongst the general public.

2003).<sup>20</sup> This estimate runs in stark contrast from previous Chinese Communist Party (CCP) statistics, which in 2000 counted only 22,517 registered cases (PRC 2002). The United Nations AIDS programme (2003) has argued that the real figure of HIV cases in China could be up to 3 million. Other researchers have put the number at between 6 and 7 million. Serious outbreaks of HIV have been reported in 7 out of the 22 Chinese provinces. UNAIDS (2003) and a U.S.

intelligence estimate argue that the disease could afflict 20 million Chinese by 2010. Nevertheless, estimates must be treated with caution given the difficulty of calculating actual figures. It must be noted that the disease has a degree of stigma connected to it and thus makes it inherently difficult for Chinese citizens to get themselves tested. But these estimates do lend credence to claims that the epidemic is spreading dramatically. The Executive Vice Minister of Health, Gao Qiang, addressing the HIV/AIDS High Level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly stated that "the Chinese government has treated the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS as a serious threat to public health and safety, as a strategic issue for social stability, economic growth and national prosperity and security, and has given top priority to this endeavour (China AIDS Info. 2003)."

The sex industry, migration, and the trafficking of women, have all contributed to the problem of HIV-infection in China. However, the spread of HIV/AIDS is primarily due to drug trafficking and unsafe blood transfusion. For example, the United Nations Drug Control Programme has estimated that 70 percent of all HIV cases in 2001

<sup>20</sup> In 2001 the Chinese Health Minister, Zhang Wenkang, suggested that China could have as many as 600,000 cases of HIV/AIDS.

resulted from intravenous drug use (UNDCP 2003).<sup>21</sup> More recent figures presented by the CCP in 2003, suggest that narcotics use counts for 63 percent of HIV infection in China (China Daily 13 Feb. 2004). Xia Guomei, from the Shanghai Academy of Social Science and Chinese advisor from/to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS suggests that HIV infection has a geographical character. In the western and southern regions of China, such as Xinjaing, Qingai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong, the disease has spread through the use of shared needles amongst drug users, while people from the central provinces, such as Henan, Hubei, and Shanxi, have contracted the disease through illegal blood collection. The disease has then moved into the general population through unsafe sexual practises, especially among the Chinese youth who, it is suggested, are the main carriers of the disease.

The geographical character of the disease can be linked to drug trafficking routes. According to numerous researchers, among them John Beyrer (2002) and Pierre-

**HIV/AIDS in Xinjiang**

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is the only Muslim majority region in China. Xinjiang shares borders with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation. Around 78 percent of HIV-infection in Xinjiang has been accreted towards IDU. In September 2003, there were 7,893 HIV/AIDS cases in Xinjiang.

Arnaud Chouvy (2002), the spread of HIV/AIDS pandemic in China is directly correlated with the emergence of 'new' drug trafficking routes. Chouvy (2002) points out that the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in China in 1989/1990 coincides with the increased use of China as a transit state by drug trafficking organisations, as well as the spread of

heroin addiction throughout the country. Chouvy (2002) and Beyrer (2002) argue that the propagation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in China was initially due to intravenous drug users. Beyrer illustrates his opinions with the case of Urumchi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang, which shares a border with Afghanistan. "Urumchi is a remote place, not considered to be at risk for any reason. Yet it has the second highest HIV prevalence rate in China after Yunnan (BBC 15 Jun. 2000)".

### ***5.5 Crime & Violent Crime***

According to the CCP, 80 percent of males and females regularly involved in consuming narcotics are involved in other crime. Males support their addiction through theft and/or gambling and females prostitute themselves (PRC 2002). A

<sup>21</sup> Centre for Harm Reduction, United Nations Drug Control Programme, 2002. According to Kurlantzick 50 percent of all HIV/AIDS infected persons in China are intravenous drug users (page 72).

UNESCO (2002) project in Guangdong province supports these findings. “Of the 216 drug-related defendants found guilty in 1990, 1991, and 1992 at the Intermediate level People’s Court in Guangzhou, 119 or 55.1% had prior convictions for crimes such as theft and gambling (UNESCO 2002:125-126).” However, “among the 1,320 young criminals convicted in Guangzhou district in 1994, 1,080 (80%) said they committed crimes due to the effect of drugs (UNESCO 2002:125).” These figures are of significance because they support the claim that drug addiction is an important contributing factor in other criminal offences. The increase in drug trafficking has also led to an increase in violent crime especially in certain province such as Yunnan and Guangxi.<sup>22</sup> For example, David Hill (2004) points out that gunfights between law enforcement officers and drug traffickers has become increasingly commonplace. According to Hill (2004), the gunfights have resulted in the fatalities of five police officers and the injury to 26 frontier customs officers.

### ***5.6 Organised Crime***

A recent study suggests that there are more than 1 million people involved in organised crime in China (BBC 24 Oct. 2000). This figure has been supported by a UNESCO (2002) study that has focused on Guangdong province. According to their findings, 60% of those people convicted in Guangzhou Court in 1997 were involved in organised crime (UNESCO 2002). Notable examples of large criminal networks include the Sun Yee On, the Wo, 14K and the Dai Huen Jai (Hill 2004).<sup>23</sup> All of the above mentioned gangs are involved in the drug trafficking business. The exact figure of how much money these criminal groups earn from drug trafficking is inherently difficult to estimate. A recent study, conducted by a professor at Nanjing University, states that the gangs are heavily involved in drug trafficking. A notable example is the Dai Huen Jai, a Chinese based criminal organisation, which is heavily involved in narcotics smuggling from Burma through China to the United States. The Dai Huen Jai, are proposed as being a highly connected organisation with affiliations to the Chinese armed forces (Hill 2004). Hong Kong based triads are also firmly connected to the narcotics business in China. This is partly due to the easing of travel restrictions between Hong Kong and Mainland China. It should be noted that the Triads have been decisively connected with methamphetamine production in Chinese provinces

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<sup>22</sup> According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) there is a strong correlation between violent crime and drug trafficking in the U.S.A. However due to the fact that drug trafficking is not a homogeneous phenomenon one could presume that this linkage is multinational.

such as Fujian and Guandong (UNODC 2003). The Triads have also gained access to weapons and ammunition. This is unusual in China due to the fact that private ownership of weapons is prohibited and is illegal (UNESCO 2002).

Certain analysts argue that Chinese gangs earn approximately \$200 billion dollars from the drug trade (Galeotti 2000). Therefore, Chinese criminal organisations have initiated a range of money laundering operations. Galeotti (2000) argues that banks and companies in Guangzhou launder Triad money. Furthermore, the proceeds gained from drug trafficking have been invested in major construction projects and joint ventures in Shanghai, Fuzhou City, and Beijing (Galeotti 2000).

### ***5.7 Corruption***

In China, the problem of corruption has become a serious cause for concern ever since the economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. The gradual abandonment of the PRC planned economy and the drastic increase of market activity, promoted by former Presidents Zemin and President Hu Jintao, have inadvertently caused corruption to mushroom to dramatic proportions. Official statistics argued that corruption cost China at least US\$11 billion in 1999. The CCP has taken drastic action to subvert corruptive tendencies within the party itself. “Chinese authorities investigated some 36,000 cases of corruption in 2001 and more than 20,000 people were jailed (TI 2003b).” In 1995, President Zemin, openly admitting to the existence of pervasive corruption and declared a full-scale investigation and crack down of supposed corrupt officials. In 2000, President Jiang Zemin called for large-scale action in order to counter the threat posed by corruption, stating that it was “a matter of life and death” for the party. (BBC 5 Mar. 2000). The main reason behind this announcement was the amount of damage that corruption had done to the party itself. In 1989, corruption was identified as being a significant concern amongst the Chinese people in a nationwide survey by the official periodical, *Banyue tan*. The data presented in the survey stated that 78.15 percent of the participants regarded corruption as the number one concern followed by inflation (65.2%) and public security (38.9) (TI 2003b; *Banyue tan* 1989). In 2003, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index charts the level of corruption in China as being 3.5, with

a standard deviation of 1.0 and a high-low range of 2.0-5.5.<sup>24</sup> This low score suggests that corruption is a very real problem in China (TI 2003).

The funds used by organized criminal networks to corrupt Chinese officials are largely gained from the proceeds of dealing narcotics. These corrupt tendencies practised by Chinese cadres include taking bribes from drug trafficking organisations. Dozens of Chinese officials have been sentenced to prison/execution as a result of their affiliation with drug networks. For example in November 2003, Zhou Kun, head of a police anti-drug brigade in Guizhou, received the death penalty as a result of his affiliation with drug trafficking (Hill 2004). In 2002, six ministerial-level cadres were convicted of having accepted bribes from organised criminal groups. Among the six cadres arrested for corruption, was the former Governor of Yunnan Province, Li Jiating, who reportedly took a US\$120,000 dollar bribe from the Triads. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency argues that corruption is an important factor in narcotics trafficking (Hill 2004). Other notable examples include Liu Zhibing, former vice chairman of Guangxi provincial government and Cheng Kejie, vice-chairman of the National Peoples Congress. Both officials were convicted of numerous offences, including the harbouring of people involved in drug trafficking (BBC 20 Apr. 2000). This suggests that even senior levels of government are not free from drug related corruption.

### ***5.8 Terrorism***

The CCP has placed a very high premium on national unity. All attempts at secession have been counteracted immediately and harshly. The majority of these attempts of secession have taken place in Xinjiang and Tibet, both of which the CCP regards as being fundamentally part of China. The CCP has real concerns regarding the large Turkic Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang, which has had a history of opposition to Chinese rule. In the mid 1990s, Islamic movements with a desire for an 'East Turkestan' homeland in Chinese territory, started to intensify their struggle by committing terrorist acts against political targets (primarily CCP officials). As a result, the Public Security Bureau (PSB) mobilised its security forces in Xinjiang (Starr 2004)

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<sup>24</sup> Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2003. (A CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption i.e. 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)).

In early 2002, the Chinese Communist Party argued that Uighur separatist groups had strong ties with international Islamic terrorism. The CCP has asserted that hundreds of “Uighurs were training in Afghanistan and/or fighting for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Hill 2004).” Furthermore, “Chinese officials stressed that under the Taliban regime [the proceeds of] drugs bankrolled terrorists in Kashmir and above all Xinjiang (AEGE Geopolitical Drug Newsletter 2002).” Nevertheless, it must be noted that these alleged accusations are based on CCP reports and accusations, which are inherently non-transparent and biased. The free press has not, to the author’s knowledge, classified Uighur separatist groups as ‘narcoterrorists’.

### ***5.9 Securitization Move***

The agent of security, in this case the CCP, has made a securitization move in order to thwart the threat posed by drug trafficking. Speech acts have been promulgated to the people of China, and extraordinary measures have been taken. This includes measures to counter both demand and supply. The following section will illustrate what has been said and subsequently done in order to thwart the phenomenon.

#### ***5.9.1 Speech Act***

According to the author, the following quotations, from various senior CCP politicians/civil servants as well as official white papers, suggest that drug trafficking has been framed in a manner that suggests national importance. In February 2004, Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang stated that “China [was at] war against drugs (China daily 13 Feb. 2004).” A member of the national committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference stated that “China should enact a law so as to beef up anti-drug drives as soon as possible (China Daily 03 March. 2004). The 2002 PRC White Paper on Narcotics Control states, “launching an anti-drug struggle to eliminate the drug scourge is the historical responsibility of the Chinese government (PRC 2002).”<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> “Confronting the new drug problem, the Chinese government, taking an attitude of supreme responsibility to the state, the nation and the people, and mankind as a whole, and standing firm in strictly prohibiting illegal drugs, has adopted all necessary measures and done its utmost to ban illicit drugs for the benefit of the people (PRC 2002).” “To Vigorously promote the campaign against drugs. Crippling its own political, economic and social development, Afghanistan’s drug cultivation and trade also jeopardize regional peace and security.” Statement by H.E. Sun Yuxi Deputy Head of the Chinese Delegation on Security International Conference on Afghanistan (Berlin, 1 April 2004)

### ***5.9.2 Extraordinary Measures***

The CCP has taken a range of extraordinary measures to counteract drug trafficking in China. This includes the establishment of the National Narcotics Control Commission in 1990 and the setting up of a specialized Drug Control Bureau and a China Narcotics Control Foundation in 1998 (PRC 2002). China has enacted a series of legislation that includes a 15-day detention period for those people whom are found to be using drugs, and the compulsory detention of drug addicts in rehabilitation/labour camps (China Daily Feb. 13 2004). The CCP has also implemented a series of anti-drug campaigns, an example of which is a five-year anti-narcotic working plan that runs from 2003 to 2008 (China Daily 13. Feb. 2004). The campaign has so far focused on the drug-infested provinces such as Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian. The CCP has additionally engaged in a range of activities aimed at cracking down on corrupt government officials. The imprisonment of Zhou Kun, head of a police anti-drug brigade in Guizhou exemplifies this fact (Hill 2004). Furthermore, under Chinese law, anyone who is caught with large amounts of opium/heroin (over 50grams or 1kg respectively) can be given the death penalty if found guilty (PRC 2002).<sup>26</sup> As a further proof of its intentions the State has signed several multilateral and bilateral declarations of understanding regarding drug control.<sup>27</sup> This includes intensified co-operation with ASEAN from 2000 (ASEAN 2000). In 2001, China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization set up a drug control agency in the Central Asian region in order to thwart the threat of drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

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<sup>26</sup> “The ministry will also strengthen investigation and retrieval of illegal property and profit of drug barons and fight harder against drug-related money laundering during the campaign. In addition, all local police departments are urged to target traffickers in public places of entertainment “Entertainment places involving rampant drug deals will be closed down and their bosses will serve punishment (Peoples Daily 13 Feb. 2004)”.

<sup>27</sup> China is a part of the three principle United Nations Conventions on Narcotics: the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1989 UN Convention on illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

## **6. Case Study (Russia)**

### ***6.1 Russia***

This case will retain the same structure as above. As such the first section will focus on Russian state core values as well as its history in relation to narcotics. The second section will focus on narcotics production, trafficking, and consumption in Russia so as to understand the scale of the threat. The essay will then focus on other factors such as how drug trafficking affects drug abuse, disease, and crime, organised crime, corruption, and terrorism, in order to understand the nature of the threat. The last section will focus on the securitizing move i.e. the speech act and extraordinary measures as described by Buzan et al (1998).

### ***6.2 Core Values & History***

The Russian Federation can be objectively regarded as a federal state with democratic aspirations. Russia's security paradigm is predominantly based on realism or structural realism. State principles in Russia include: sovereign territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, and the market economy. The Russian Federation sets a high priority on the principle of national unity. For example, the Russian state has fought two internal-wars in Chechnya in order to counteract a breakaway Chechen State.

Large scale drug trafficking is a relatively a new phenomenon in Russia. Although narcotic substances were consumed in Russia before 1991, the former USSR did not participate in the illicit drug market either as an importer or exporter (Paoli 2004). Reforms introduced by Stalin in the 1940s eradicated the use of narcotics from the majority of Russia. Opium consumption in the USSR survived only in remote areas, such as the Russian Far East and the Central Asian Republics. Although narcotics became more accessible in the 1970 and 1980s – a large market never developed due to Soviet imposed constraints, and economic difficulties (Max Planck Institute 2000).

### ***6.3 Narcotics***

The Russian security forces seized a total of 1287.226 kilograms of heroin in 2001. This figure represents a huge increase from 1996, when the total amount of heroin seized was only 18.1 kilograms. In addition, Russia seized 862.645 kilograms of

opium in 2001. Thus constituting a sharp fall compared to figures from years 2000 and 1999 (2186 kg, 1507 kg respectively). Nevertheless the dramatic rise in “other opiates” from 18kg to 21469.7 kg between 1996 and 2001 compensates for the fall in opium (raw and prepared) (UNODC 2003). In sum, seizures in heroin and other opiates have dramatically increased between 1996 and 2001, suggesting that Russia has become a major transit state for drug trafficking networks. According to reports from the UNODC (2003) most of the heroin originates from the Golden Crescent, especially Afghanistan, and is shipped through the Central Asian Republics into the Russian Federation. Half of the heroin smuggled into Russia is intended for the European market, while the remainder is targeted for domestic use.

Seizures of Opiates 1996-2001 in Russia (Kilograms)

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Opium (raw and prepared)	1400,5	222,706	1803,7	1506,966	2186	862,645
Opium (plant, capsule)	19469,8	853,019	16511,36	18366,06	No Report	No Report
Opium (poppy seed)	No Report	No Report	No Report	No Report	18564	No Report
Heroin	18,1	24,027	442,9	695,085	984	1287,226
Morphine	45,141	6,037	15	2,427	2	11,024
other opiates	106,4	4,925	167,7	54,575	18	21469,68

Source UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003

In 2001, Russian security forces dismantled 740 methamphetamine laboratories. Although this represents a fall in detection, the overall trend between 1992 and 2001 is still extremely high. Laboratories have been detected throughout the Russian Federation with a concentration in Moscow and St Petersburg (UNODC 2003). Laboratories have been detected in diverse areas such as military facilities and universities.

It was not until 1992 that drug trafficking into Russia started to dramatically increase. The reason for the increase of drug trafficking through Russia is mainly due to the dissolution of the USSR, the Iranian narcotic reforms as well as the increase of heroin production in Afghanistan after the US invasion.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the slow transition to democracy and a market economy has fostered a growing market for drug use in the Russian Federation. The lack of effective border controls as well as ideological stigma has opened Russia into a transit country for drugs. The Iranian government has introduced a range of reforms in order to combat drug trafficking. The reforms, which included the death penalty for traffickers as well as an overall increase in border patrols, have made it much riskier for drug networks smuggling Afghan heroin/opium across the country. As a result large quantities of opium/heroin have been smuggled through Russia instead on their way to the profitable European markets (Chouvy 2003).

The American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban government as well as destabilising Al-Qaeda operations. However, an attractive alternative development programme for Afghan ‘opium’ farmers has not succeeded in curtailing heroin production. Thus the dissolution of the Taliban government has inadvertently augmented the drug production in Afghanistan. In fact, heroin production has dramatically increased since 2001 (UNODC 2003). Large quantities of Afghan heroin are smuggled into Russia via the Central Asian Republic (CAR) in order to be sold in Europe. This has also contributed towards a larger domestic market in Russia.

Examples of Drug trafficking routes (Chouvy 2003; DEA 2002)

- Golden Crescent - Troitsk - Iekaterinburg
- Golden Crescent - Orenburg and Oral – Samara
- Golden Crescent - Brarnaul - Novosibirsk – Irkutsk
- Golden Crescent - Omsk
- Golden Crescent - Novosibirsk
- Golden Crescent - Chelyabinsk
- Golden Crescent - Orenburg
- Golden Crescent - Ulfa
- Golden Crescent - Irkutsk

Increase in number of drug abusers in the Russian Federation

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Estimated number of drug abusers	1,27200	1,53700	2,24300	2,22200	2,26900	2,36500
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of drug abusers registered by medical institutions	243,670	219,173	287,689	359,067	451,603	506,850
Diagnosed as drug addict	90,409	113,349	156,231	198,345	297,598	364,010
Aged from 18 to 30	148,194	130,896	160,535	220,487	254,123	NA
Children and teenagers	38,843	39,230	47,170	52,598	50,079	NA

Source UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003

According to the data presented by the UNODC (2003) drug addiction and drug abuse since the mid-1990s has increased dramatically. Consequently, in 2001, when compared with 1996, the number of individuals registered as “drug addicts” increased by 303 percent (UNODC 2003). In absolute figures, these two groups comprised 364,010 in 2001, compared with 90,409 in 1996 (See Appendix 2). Particularly disturbing is the dramatic increase in drug abuse among adolescents and younger adults. In 2000, 50,079 children and teenagers used drugs, this is a 28.9 percent increase compared with 1996, when the figure was 38, 843. Men and women aged between 18-30 years have constituted the most effected group, consisting of 254,123 registered drug abusers in 2000, a 71 percent increase from 1995 when the number stood at 148,194. This constitutes a troubling trend, as a member of the Russian Academy of medical Science reported that between 1985 and 2000, the number of adolescents officially diagnosed with drug addiction increased fifteen times and their mortality rate by forty –two times. It should be noted that According to one national poll (N=1500) individuals ranked drug addiction as the “most dangerous” problem in Russian society, (Kramer 2003). According to Viktor Cherkesov, Chairman of the State Committee to Control the Trade of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, “About 4 million Russians citizens are drug-dependent; most of them consume drugs regularly and are drug addicts (Kramer 2003:114).” According to these figures drug abuse has increased in Russia by approximately 900 percent within a decade. This would also suggest that approximately 2.5 percent of the Russian population are in fact drug abusers/addicts.

According to Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 30 percent of drug users in Russia abuse heroin. This is huge increase considering that only 1% of drug users used heroin in 1991 (DEA 2003)<sup>28</sup> It should be noted that the average life expectancy after beginning to use heroin is approximately four and half years (Boev 2003:28). In addition drugs are being widely used throughout the country. In 2000, twenty out of eighty-nine constituent units of Russia registered at least 5,000 drug addicts (Kramer 2003) “This includes the Russian capital, were approximately 1 million Muscovites – 10 percent of the total

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<sup>28</sup> It should be noted that the most popular drug in Russia is cannabis.

population in Moscow use narcotics, including 150,000 “drug addicts” (Kramer 2003:14). The situation in St Petersburg is reported to be even worse (Kramer 2003:14). The Russian armed forces have also been affected by drug trafficking. In 2000, approximately 21,000 conscription aged-youths were declared to be unfit for military service as a result of ill health due to drug use. In 2000, one-fifth of all conscripts had a history of drug abuse (Kramer 2003)

#### ***6.4 HIV/AIDS***

In 2001, there were 200,000 HIV-infected people in Russia. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of people infected by HIV increased by 10 times (UNAIDS 2003). The UNAIDS in its global HIV/AIDS Pandemic report states that Russia has the fastest growing HIV epidemic in the world (Beyrer 2002). According to one national poll (N=1300) individuals ranked HIV/AIDS as the second largest problem in Russian society (Kramer 2003). Approximately 75% of the HIV infected people in 2000 were intravenous drug users, who had contracted the disease through the use of shared needles (Beyrer 2002). “In St Petersburg, approximately 300,000 intravenous drug users were tested as being HIV-positive (Kramer 2003:17).” According to Vadim Pokrovskii, director of the Health Ministry’s Centre for Preventing and Combating AIDS, the number of HIV/AIDS infected people in Russia today is around 1.5 million. The Russian Ministry of Health estimates that by 2008 close to 10 million males aged between fifteen and twenty will have become HIV positive (Kramer 2003). The Russian Irkutsk region in Siberia has been particularly affected. The Irkutsk region has the highest rate of HIV infection in Russia; in excess of 80% of those people infected by HIV in Irkutsk have been drug addicts (Beyrer 2002). Furthermore, the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS also has the capacity to further erode the recruiting pools for the Russian armed services.

#### ***6.5 Crime & Violent Crime***

The increase in drug trafficking has also led to an increase in crime and violence throughout the Russian federation. Approximately two-thirds of all thefts or robberies are connected with drug-abuse in Russia (Jane’s 9 Sept. 2003). Most of these crimes are committed by young people (Boev 2003:50). According to official figures, 70 % of male intravenous drugs users pay for their addiction by committing various forms of theft and 70% of female IDUs prostitute themselves (Boev 2003:50). According to Victor Pudikov, head of the state and public security department of the Security

Council of Russia, “drug-related crimes in Russia are growing every year (Pravda 26 Jun 2003).” There were 370 murders or attempted murders in the town of Vladivostok between January and June 2002. Officials argue that more innocent bystanders are being killed by erratic gunfire resulting from drug-related crime (DEA 2003). Gunfights between drug traffickers and Russian border guards have also become a regular occurrence. Chechen terrorists groups, which have been connected with the drug trade (see section 6.8), have also contributed towards an increase in violent crime. Large-scale attacks on urban areas such as Moscow and St. Petersburg have cost the lives of civilians (Pravda 24 Oct. 2002).

### ***6.6 Organised Crime***

According to Karaganov (1998) the increased narcotics addiction has contributed to the growth of Russian organized crime. A Russian newspaper claims that internationally organised drug rings, in co-operation with smaller ethnic organised groups, are in control of the estimated US \$5 billion dollar drug trafficking business (Interfax 21 Oct. 2003). According to the law enforcement authorities, the drug trade in Russia is highly organised. More than 4,000 criminal gangs are dealing drugs in Russia and more than 1,000 of these groups exhibit organised characteristics (Karaganov 1998). Karaganov (1998:7) further states that the ‘narcotics mafia’ in Russia has a comprehensive structure, which includes the “organization of the production, reprocessing, transportation, and distribution of the narcotic substances on a national scale.”<sup>29</sup> It must be noted that the drug mafia as described by Karaganov is not the Russian Mafia in the classic sense. The Russian Mafia according to Paoli (2004) is more involved and concerned with making money in the increasingly profitable, legal economy, and thus has no interest in trafficking illicit drugs. Nevertheless the idea that drug trafficking contributes towards Columbian type cartels, which actively infiltrate the countries economic and political power structure, has not yet emerged in Russia. Certain figures suggest that the Russian narcotics mafia launders US \$1 billion dollars per annum. Karaganov argues that the drugs mafia is involved in various embezzlement schemes in order to “clean” drug money. For example, in 1996 organized criminal groups spent 900 million roubles on stock acquisitions in order to launder illicitly earned money (Karaganov 1998:8-9). A

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<sup>29</sup> The ‘drug mafia’ has a non-ethnic composition i.e. it includes persons from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Afghans and Azerbaijan.

Russian criminal inspector supports these claims, stating that approximately one third of Russian's private entrepreneurs have links to the drugs trade (UNODC 1996).

### **6.7 Corruption**

The cost of corruption in Russia is estimated to be in the area of \$15 billion per annum, including \$1 billion in Moscow (Kramer 1994). This is not surprising considering that Russia has a score of 2.7 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (TI 2003).

In 1995, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin introduced various measures to counter corruption such as the 'Clean Hands' anti-corruption campaign. This campaign was eventually replaced by the creation of a specialised Internal Security Directorate within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Paoli 2002). Russian President Vladimir Putin has also expressed concerns about corruption. In 2000, Putin created Russia's Federal District System, this was partly done in order to purge low- and mid-level regional corruption. In addition, Putin installed a Plenipotentiary Presidential Representative for each Federal District in order to keep corruption committed by regional politicians in check. (DEA 2003).

The phenomenon of drug trafficking has contributed to the corruptive tendencies of certain individuals in the Russian law enforcement agencies, military and political community. According to Russian sources, "on average, a little under one-third of the proceeds of criminal gangs goes towards 'buying a roof,' reportedly by paying off local officials and police officers (CSDG Bulletin 2001:4)". Kramer (2003) suggests that both the Russian Federal Border Service and the State Customs Committee are extremely corrupt.<sup>30</sup> Corruption has also increased within the armed forces. According to Karaganov (1998) approximately one hundred soldiers were convicted of drug trafficking in 1996 alone (CSDG Bulletin 2001). For example, officers in the Tajikistan-based 201<sup>st</sup> Motor Rifle Division have used supply convoys to bring drugs into Russia on return journeys (Kramer 2003).

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<sup>30</sup> Both the Federal Border Service and the Customs Committee accept bribes from the organised criminal groups by turning a blind eye to cross border smuggling (Kramer 2003).

## **6.8 Terrorism**

The Russian government clearly argues that Chechen ‘terrorists’ play a central role in the supply and distribution of illegal drugs. The Russian government states that Chechens supply and distribute narcotics (primarily opium and heroin) to North Ossetia, the Saratov region, the Kurgan region, and Western and Eastern Siberia (Paoli 2004).<sup>31</sup>

According to various sources there is a clear link between terrorism and drug trafficking in Chechnya. There are many reports that argue that Chechen war lords have opium plantations. For example, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reports that Russian authorities have found a narcotics lab in Grosni which belonged to the Chechen terrorist leader Shamil Basaev (4 Mar. 2000). Shamil Basaev smuggles the drugs into Russia by private airplanes (4 Mar. 2000). Grosni, the Vedeno district, and Serzhen – Yurto are reported as being the three key points of drug production in Chechnya. The profits made from drug trafficking are used for operational costs and the accumulation of arms. The scale of opium/heroin smuggling is suspected to be large - although oil smuggling remains the predominant means to acquire money for ‘terrorist’ activity.

## **6.9 Securitization Move**

The agent of security, in this case the Russian government, has made a securitization move in order to counteract the threat posed by drug trafficking. This includes speeches by ranking officials that imply a state of emergency, as well as the initiation of extraordinary measures. The following section will show what has been said and subsequently done in order to combat drug trafficking. Certain groups have taken demand-side measures that need illustrating (this inclusion is for illustration only).

### **6.9.1 Speech Act**

The Russian government has framed drug trafficking as an issue that commands national attention. Numerous Russian government statements support this claim. For example on September 4, 2002, President Putin labelled drugs as a national security

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<sup>31</sup> Russia has fought two military campaigns in Chechnya in order to stamp out Chechen separatist movements. As stated previously, the Russian government under both former President Yeltsin and President Putin regard Chechnya as a part of Russia proper and thus national unity is key in order to understand the reasons for the first and second Chechen war. In addition the oil pipelines that run through Chechnya from the Caucasus to Russia proper are of large economic importance. A successful breakaway Chechen Federation would provide a foundation for other Muslim regions to secede from the Russian Federation.

concern. “Everything we have in this area is a calamity,” he declared. “The scale of the tragedy is so great that it gives us no chance to just watch quietly what is going on in this area. Ordinary measures are insufficient. We need new proposals that will lead to a significance change in the fight against drugs (RIA-Novosti 4. Sep 2002).” In another statement President Putin stated that “the drug trade in Russia funds terrorist organizations, spurs illegal immigration, facilitates arms trafficking, and causes a collapse in overall living standards (DEA 2003).” In June 2003, Viktor Cherkesov, Chairman of Gorgakontrol stated that “The drug trafficking problem contains a huge number of threats, each of them dangerous enough if taken separately, but all of them taken together pose a real threat to national security (Pravda 26 June 2003)”.

### ***6.9.2 Extraordinary Measures***

The Russian government has taken a range of extraordinary measures to counteract the threat posed by drug trafficking. In July 2003 a new State Committee for Combating the Illegal Trade in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (Gosnarkokontrol) was created (Rossiiskaia gazeta 11 Jun. 2003). The new agency will ultimately have approximately 40,000 staff. The State has proposed and passed a series of new legislation in order to make drug controls more effective. For example the 1998 law “On Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances” states that individuals whom have a large quantity of narcotics with the intent to sell can be sent to prison for up to 15 years (Voposy narkologii 1997). The Russian ministry of health has vowed to set up 250 new drug rehabilitation centres as well as proposed new legislation in order to introduce compulsory treatment for all adolescents (aged under 15) found to be drug users, without parental consent. In addition the Ministry of Health has publicly announced plans to drug test all students and soldiers (ITAR-TASS 7 Aug. 2002). In June 2000, Russia engaged in multilateral activities with the Commonwealth of Independent States in order to combat drug trafficking. In particular Russia has pressured the Governments of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to take greater steps to combat drugs (ITAR-TASS 23 Aug. 2002). The Government has stationed military troops on the Russian-Kazakh border. The Russian government has also stationed 10,000 troops in Tajikistan in order to intercept drug smugglers coming from Afghanistan (ITAR-TASS 22 Apr. 2001). President Putin has even suggested that Russia reconsider its demarcation as part of a broader initiative to establish a

“common border” with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in order to create effective anti-drug cooperation (ITAR-TASS 22 Apr. 2001).<sup>32</sup>

Various NGOs have also taken steps to combat drug trafficking in Russia. Notable examples include Mothers Against Narcotics (MAN) and Drug Free City. MAN has delivered around 10,000 anti-drug lectures at schools and military bases. Drug Free City has staged anti-drug theme concerts educating people on the dangers of narcotics. Media agencies (both national and regional) published 3,000 articles on the same theme from mid 1998 to 2000 (Rossiiskie 4 Jul. 2001).

## **7. Analysis**

The first (China) and second (Russia) analysis will be divided into two sections in order to explain how and why drug trafficking has become securitized. The first section will focus on the state and give reasons as to why the state has taken/made a securitizing move in order to combat drug trafficking. The second section will focus on the interunit (individuals) in order to assess if drug trafficking has been successfully securitized. The third analysis will focus on the differences between both cases in order to understand the process of securitization. The last section of this chapter will focus on theoretical development.

### **7.1 CHINA**

#### **7.2 *Securitization move***

The CCP has framed drug trafficking as an issue that commands national attention. Numerous CCP statements and official documents support this claim. For example, Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang, framed drug trafficking in a manner that suggests the incorporation of extraordinary measures in order to thwart the existential threat i.e. the “War against drugs” (China Daily 13 Feb. 2004). Official CCP documents, such as the White Paper on National Drug Control, also frame the issue in the same manner i.e. “The Chinese government will wage an unremitting,

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<sup>32</sup> Russia has signed the three major United Nations Conventions on Narcotics. This includes the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention on illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Russia has signed approximately eighty inter-governmental and inter-agency agreements dealing with counter-narcotics cooperation. The Russian government cooperates with UNODC and the DEA, both of which have offices in Russia (both share intelligence with FSB)

thoroughgoing struggle against drugs nationwide and will not stop its efforts until drugs are eradicated (PRC 2002).” These official statements are extraordinary in their own right, considering that it was not until the mid 1980s that the Chinese government admitted to the existence of narcotics, let alone drug addicts, in China. This change in perception is primarily due to the nature of drug trafficking and how it has come to have a larger impact on more traditional threats, which are contradictory towards state core values in the last decade. As described in the case study, drug trafficking has an impact on threats such as: organized crime, money laundering, corruption, and terrorism. These issues, according to the Chinese state (structural realism, which the Chinese State has adopted), are more incompatible with fundamental principles compared to matters that have, according to the author, a more social orientation (addiction, disease, and crime i.e. Human Security).

As mentioned in the case study, drug trafficking enriches and promotes the proliferation of organized crime. The growth of organized crime has security implications because Triads and other organised criminal groups subvert the norms and institutions that underpin the society of the Chinese State. Chinese drug networks and Triads destabilize certain institutions through corruption. As noted by Former President Zemin, the war against corruption is “a matter of life and death” for the party.<sup>33</sup> Therefore drug trafficking has a clear impact on corruption, and thus is incompatible with the State’s core values. Furthermore, Chinese based Triads such as the Dai Huen Jai have the potential of becoming convergent centres of power, which threaten the political sovereignty of the state. This observation is primarily based on reports suggesting that members of the Dai Huen Jai have not only a military background but also military connections and thus an organizational maturity that exceeds most other Triad groups. Reports suggest that there are approximately 1 million people involved in organized crime in China. For the time being Chinese Triads are economically motivated; however there are examples in the present international system (Columbian cartels) of organized criminal groups, which have taken an active part in subverting state authority. Though this is not currently the case in China there is always that possibility that it may develop along these lines in the

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<sup>33</sup> In this case, government core values becomes confused with the state (Buzan et al 1991).<sup>33</sup> Although this statement suggests weak state categorization, the government has identified a key concern of the people and is willing to counter it through extraordinary measures.

future. Moreover, organised Chinese groups earn up to US\$200 billion annually from their various criminal activities, especially drug trafficking. Money earned from drug dealing is laundered by various means and then introduced into the legal Chinese economy. This kind of activity weakens state capacity, promotes an illicit economy and thus is incompatible with a state's core values, namely the market economy. Chinese reports claim that Uighur 'terrorist' movements are involved in drug trafficking in order to provide a financial base for terrorist activity against CCP officials in the hope of forming a breakaway East Turkestan nation state. As mentioned earlier, separatism is contrary to Chinese core values (national unity) and emergency measures have been taken in the past in order to thwart this particular threat. Nevertheless concrete evidence of 'narcoterrorism' in Xinjiang is lacking and thus its importance with regard to the securitization of drug trafficking is difficult to determine.

The CCP has taken a range of extraordinary measures to counteract drug trafficking in China. These include the recent establishment of a specialised Drug Control Bureau and various new legislation, which include the death sentence for individuals found guilty of selling large amounts of drugs (PRC 2002). The government has also implemented a five-year anti-narcotic working plan that has focused on the drug-infested provinces such as Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian (China Daily 13 Feb. 2004). China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization set up a drug control agency in CIS.

The scale of the securitization move initiated by the CCP, suggests that securitization has been focused on certain regions of China, most notably: Xinjaing, Qingai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and the Fujin province. Extra special measures have been taken by the CCP in these areas in order to clamp down on drug trafficking, organised crime, and corruption.

### ***7.3 Successful Securitization***

The phenomenon of drug trafficking poses a threat to the fundamental principles of individuals in China, especially in Xinjaing, Qingai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujin province. This is because of the scale of the problem as well as

its knock-on effects on other threats such as: disease, crime, and corruption, which is at variance with health, personal and political security.

Drug trafficking in China increased dramatically between 1996 and 2001. Security forces seized 14,000 kilograms of heroin/opium in 2001. This figure constitutes a 204% increase from 1996. Furthermore, seizures of methamphetamine during approximately the same time, also increased by an astounding 1438 percent. This high level of seizures suggests that drug networks have intensified their operations in China. A result is that access to hard drugs such as opium, heroin and methamphetamine has become more commonplace, which in turn enhances the likelihood of drug addiction becoming more widespread. Illicit drug use has proliferated to/in all provinces of China, though the majority of heroin addicts reside in Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong province. According to the Chinese government there are 1 million registered drug abusers in China, with 901,000 being drug addicts or 0.055 percent of China's total population of approximately 1.3 billion (PRC 2002).<sup>34</sup> However the real figure is believed to be up to 7 million. Drug trafficking has contributed towards the spread of disease in China, notably HIV/AIDS, which is incurable. There are 840,000 HIV/AIDS infected people in China. Nearly 65 percent of those people who carry the disease were infected through the use of shared needles among intravenous drug users (IDU). Six out of the nine most infected provinces are afflicted by mass drug addiction and drug trafficking. The six provinces are: Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong. Furthermore, the disease has then moved into the general population through unsafe sexual practices, especially amongst the Chinese youth who, it is suggested, are the main carriers of the disease. Additionally drug trafficking has also increased the likelihood of crime and violent crime, which are incompatible with personal security. Drug addicts are more likely to be involved in other crimes such as theft and prostitution and drug networks are more likely to use violence in order to run their businesses successfully (as noted in Yunnan and Guangxi). Considering that the drug trade is worth US\$200 billion dollars, drug trafficking also exacerbates corruption, especially among Chinese civil servants. Corruption is fundamentally contradictory to *freedom from want* and thus is a key concern for Chinese citizens -

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<sup>34</sup> 2001 statistics

especially after the opening of China towards a market economy. The fact that there is an extensive poverty gap in China suggests that corruptive tendencies among officials for economic self-gain promotes envy and anger amongst the population. The Chinese nationwide survey of 1989 supports this claim when it stated that 78.15 percent of the participants regarded corruption as the number one concern and the levels of concern are well founded bearing in mind that the Corruption Perceptions Index charts the level of corruption in China as being 3.5.

The lack of large-scale anti-narcotic grass-roots activity in China is primarily due to the Chinese political system. Communism fosters the belief that all social-political initiatives should be promulgated by the state. The state is primarily responsible for its people. Therefore, the CCP has not encouraged independent anti-narcotic initiatives from Chinese groups. Nevertheless, there has been some activity in those provinces that have been especially subjected to the threat of drug trafficking. For example in Xinjiang, The Thousand Mothers Association has mounted a campaign against heroin and alcohol abuse by educating the Uyghur youth (Starr 2004).

The interunit (human being) has accepted extraordinary measures (in this case special measures) adopted by the Chinese state because the phenomenon of drug trafficking is at variance to the core values of Chinese individuals. As stated earlier, the Chinese individual, according to the author, believes in the principle of human rights and its subset human security and places it above all other values. The Phenomenon of drug trafficking in China is incompatible with the *freedom from fear and the freedom from want* of individuals because it threatens health, personal, and political security (UNDP 1994).

It must be noted that the special measures adopted by the CCP are less intrusive than emergency measures and are thus more likely to be accepted by the interunit (individuals) as a means to deal with the existential threat. It should be mentioned that special measures have been exasperated in certain provinces in China such as Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian province. This includes a higher degree of secrecy, arbitrary arrests, wrongful imprisonment, wrongful execution, and the retrieval of alleged drug money/capital (CNN 26 June 2001). These measures, although contrary to human

security, are deemed legitimate because of the negative impact that drug trafficking has had on human security in these provinces.

#### ***7.4 Russia***

##### ***7.5 Securitization move***

The Russian government has framed drug trafficking as an issue that demands national attention. President Putins' September 4 speech illustrated this fact when he stated that "everything we have in this area is a calamity...the scale of the tragedy is so great that it gives us no chance to just watch quietly what is going on in this area. Ordinary measures are insufficient. We need new proposals that will lead to a significant change in the fight against drugs (RIA-Novosti 4. Sep 2002)." As illustrated in the case study, drug trafficking has an impact on threats such as organized crime, money laundering, corruption and terrorism. These issues, according to the Russian state, are of paramount importance because they are divergent with state core values. Threats such as drug addiction, disease, and crime have also become more salient because of their increased intensity and scope to do harm.

The phenomenon of drug trafficking has added to the growth of organized crime in Russia. Russian sources suggest that there are nearly *1,000* organized criminal groups in Russia which are engaged in the drug trade. The growth of the coercive power of organized crime threatens the political sovereignty of the state because they have the capacity to undermine and subvert the authority and legitimacy of the state (Dupont; 1999: 436). The Russian narcotics mafia challenges the state's monopoly on violence, as well as the state's monopoly on taxation (as exemplified in case). The Russian drug mafia also operates outside the rule of law thus weakening state capacity. For example, Karaganov argues that the Russian narcotics mafia launders approximately US\$1 billion dollars per year in order to utilise large sums of illicit money in the Russian Economy (Karaganov 1998). The growth of the Russian narcotics mafia has security implications because criminal organizations subvert the norms and institutions that strengthen the society of the Russian State. Sources suggest that approximately thirty percent of the proceeds made from drugs are used to corrupt civil servants. High levels of corruption within Russian state institutions, especially law enforcement, are not surprising considering Russia's low score on the corruption

perceptions index (2.7). The phenomenon of drug trafficking also subverts crucial institutions of the state such as the Russian armed forces. For example, officers from the Tajikistan based 201<sup>st</sup> Motor Rifle Division are reported as being heavily involved in the drug trafficking business. “In 1996 alone over one hundred people in the army were convicted of drug trafficking (Karaganov 1998:5).” This kind of behaviour undermines the authority and legitimacy of the government.

Drug trafficking sustains Chechen ‘terrorist’ activity. The Chechen separatist movement constitutes a stark threat against Russian national security. This is due to the state’s firm belief in national unity as exemplified by the mounting of two military campaigns. Drug trafficking by Chechen warlords such as Shamil Basaev, promotes the likelihood of arms accumulation as well as continued terrorist activities thus posing a direct threat to the political sovereignty of the state (Kommersant 4 March 2000).

The increase of drug usage as well as the proliferation of HIV/AIDS amongst the population is contrary to the aim of good government. This is primarily due to the high percentage of drug users in the country (approximately 2.3% of the Russian population uses drugs). Furthermore, the rapid increase of HIV/AIDS in Russia, primarily resulting from drug usage, poses a potential threat to state’s core values. It should be noted that drug abuse and HIV/AIDS, especially amongst the young, has demographic consequences that potentially threaten the security of the state (Boev 2003). In addition, drug abuse poses a threat to the capacity of the armed forces – 33 percent of all new conscripts are turned away because of ill-health (drug abuse and HIV/AIDS infection) (Kramer 2003:16), which can potentially have a direct impact on the sovereignty of the state.

The Russian government has taken a range of extraordinary measures to counteract the existential threat posed by drug trafficking. This includes the establishment of a new security agency, namely Gosnarko-kontrol. New legislation has been passed, which gives the state the power to take harsher action against drug smugglers and dealers. New clinics are being constructed, which will help rehabilitate those people found to be using hard drugs. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other states has increased. The Russian government has deemed the threat from drugs to be so

dangerous that it has even stationed 10,000 military troops in Tajikistan in order to intercept drug smugglers coming from Afghanistan (ITAR-TASS 22 Apr. 2001).

These measures suggest that the Russian state has taken emergency measures to combat the threat posed by drug trafficking. The formation of a large security agency such as Gosnarko-kontrol as well as the deployment of 10,000 troops to Tajikistan are emergency measures that are deemed to be warranted by the state due to impact that drug trafficking has on Russia.

### ***7.6 Successful Securitization***

The phenomenon of drug trafficking represents a threat to the core values of individuals in Russia. This is primarily due to the nature of the threat, which promotes drug addiction as well as disease, crime, and corruption. Therefore, drug addiction is incompatible with health, personal, and political security.

The large increase in drug trafficking between 1996 and 2001 suggests that Russia has developed into a major domestic market for narcotics. In 2001, there were 870,860 registered drug users in Russia. This figure represents a 160 % increase from 1996, when there were approximately 334,079 drug users. The increased access to narcotics has also contributed to drug addiction. Between 1996 and 2001, there was a 303% increase of people registered as “drug addicts.” Furthermore, there is a high correlation between intravenous drug abusers and the dramatic increase in HIV/AIDS in Russia. In 2001, there were 200,000 registered HIV/AIDS infected people in Russia, compared to 20,000 in 1991. Russian data suggest that most Russians who carry the disease were infected through the use of shared injection equipment. Good health is of paramount importance for the individual. Drug addiction and HIV/AIDS infection contributes to premature illness and death and is thus incompatible with individual core values such as survival, dignity, and livelihood. Drug trafficking has increased the likelihood of individuals being subjected to crime and violent crime, both of which are incompatible to Russian core values (personal security). Russian officials argue that the rate of drug-related crime is rising every year (Boev 2003:50; Pravda 26 June 2002). Two-thirds of all thefts are connected with drugs in Russia (Jane’s 9 Sep. 2003). Violent crime has also increased in Russia due both to Chechen terrorism and organized crime. As stated earlier, certain Chechen based terrorist

groups finance part of their operations through drug trafficking, these funds were more than likely to have been used to mount operations in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which cost the lives of civilians. Violent crime has also increased in Russia, particularly in the Russian Far East. In the town of Vladivostok, innocent bystanders have been killed by erratic gunfire from drug-related crimes (DEA 2003). Drug-related corruption erodes and undermines state institutions, which are supposed to represent and support the wishes of the people. Drug-related corruption thus runs in variance to democratic development in Russia. Therefore, drug trafficking is incompatible with the people's core values.

It should be noted that there has been a high degree of grass-root activity in Russia in order to counteract drug addiction. Various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local groups have launched various campaigns in order to educate the public, especially the youth, about the dangers of illicit drug consumption. Notable examples include Mothers Against Narcotics, and Drug-Free City. Demand-side campaigns promulgated by the Russian NGOs and Media can further help explain the reason as to why drug trafficking has been successfully securitized in Russia. Social movements against narcotics have given the state further legitimacy to take emergency measures against drug trafficking due to mutual acceptance that drug trafficking represents an existential threat.

Civil Society has accepted extraordinary measures (in this case emergency measures) adopted by the Russian state because the drug trafficking in Russia has contributed towards large-scale addiction, disease, crime, and corruption. Successful securitization has been achieved in Russia because of wide-scale civil concern (as illustrated by various national polls on this matter). Individuals have accepted the need for harsher laws and measures even though these restrictions may have intruded on civil liberties and rights.

### ***7.7 Comparative Analysis***

Although Russia and China have successfully securitized drug trafficking, there remains several important differences regarding their individual approaches i.e. speech act and extraordinary measures.

The phenomenon of drug trafficking given certain conditions can, as demonstrated in both case studies, threaten states. Both China and Russia have successfully securitized drug trafficking but for different reasons. This is not unanticipated considering that core values differ depending on the character of the state in question. Although many similarities do exist with reference to the threat posed by drug trafficking, it seems that Russia has securitized drug trafficking because it represents a real threat, whereas China regards drug trafficking as a potential threat.

The Russian government, led by President Putin, has clearly argued that drug trafficking represents an existential threat. The Chinese government, on the other hand, has been more moderate in its approach to the threat. However, Chinese statements and official documents clearly suggest that extraordinary measures are warranted in order to combat the threat.

The Chinese government has taken special measures instead of emergency measures to combat drug trafficking. Emergency measures would include an “American-type Plan Columbia” in Burma. The fact remains that 80 percent of all drugs produced in Burma are smuggled into China. Nevertheless, China has the leverage to pressure the Myanmar Government into curtailing drug cultivation, however, such steps have not been taken (largely due to structural realism, Burma represents a geographical buffer against historic adversaries, namely Vietnam, and large-scale intervention goes against the five principles of mutual coexistence) This has not been the case for Russia, which has launched several measures to combat drug trafficking, including the deployment of 10,000 troops in the sovereign state of Tajikistan.

China has primarily securitized drug trafficking on a provincial level, 7 out of the 22 provinces have been specially targeted by extraordinary measures. These provinces include: Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian province. These provinces have been targeted because of their close associations with drug addiction and drug trafficking. In Russia, drug trafficking and addiction is widespread. This includes Moscow and St. Petersburg. A national pandemic has broken out and crime has increased to an unprecedented level. Approximately 2 percent of all Russians are drug addicts. This could constitute a potential demographic threat, considering that most drug users are either adolescents or young adults.

Although drug trafficking may be perceived as posing a greater threat to Russia than to China, it must be remembered that drug trafficking in China has a historical dimension, which further legitimises the need for extraordinary measures. In a sense, extraordinary measures, in the case of drug trafficking have been institutionalised by the CCP, considering their efforts in the late 1940s.

Unlike in China, there have been a range of NGOs, groups, and individuals that have promoted the securitization of drug trafficking in Russia. This has helped legitimise the Russian emergency measures. This kind of grass-root level movement has not been very common in China. However, if the problem intensifies grass-roots participation is warranted because it will help the state find legitimacy for emergency actions throughout the country.

There is more credence to the claim that narcoterrorism exists to a greater extent in Chechnya than in Xinjiang. This is an obvious threat to the Russian State as exemplified by their initiation of two military campaigns, which have cost thousands of lives.

Both Russian and China have been significantly affected by corruption relating to the trafficking of drugs. Both Russia and China have a low score on the Corruption Perception Index: 2.5 and 3.5 in that order. However, corruption is regarded as being a greater threat in China (state and individuals) than it is in Russia due to its coercive affect on state legitimacy.

### ***7.8 Theoretical development***

The counteracting of existential threats such as drug trafficking is important in order to achieve both state security and human security. However, this thesis has only focused on two examples on how and why the state, through the people, can successfully securitize a threat. However there have been cases when this sequence seems to have been reversed i.e. when the people take steps in order to bring an issue onto the political agenda, which has then been successfully securitized following acceptance by the state (who has in turn taken emergency measures). The case of

SARS in China is a notable example of this reversal in sequence.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, future research is warranted in order to ascertain whether this kind of reversed securitization is feasible.

## **8. Conclusion**

This thesis has attempted to fulfil its aims and purpose. This thesis has explained how and why ‘new’ threats become securitized and has provided a two level approach in order to understand the dynamics behind post-cold war securitization. The importance of core values and capacity have been illustrated in the context of securitization and a relationship drawn between the importance of the state and individuals in the successful securitization of a threat. Furthermore, the thesis has elaborated on the importance of the state and individuals in order to successfully securitize a threat. Additionally, this thesis has given further insight into the threat posed by drug trafficking, and how it can affect state and human security alike.

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<sup>35</sup> In 2002, SARS was put on the Chinese state agenda largely due to Chinese social movements as well as pressure from international organizations such as the World Health Organization.

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