



**China-Eurasia
Forum**



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SPECIAL NOTE

We are excited to have in this month's edition the featured analysis of renowned China expert Robert Sutter of Georgetown University's Schools of Foreign Service. His article, *The United States and China's Regional Policy*, expertly lays out how China and the United States engage each other throughout Asia and how their mutual presence affects one another's policy. This topic has particular implications for understanding China's policies towards Central Asia and how the continued presence of the United States in the region might affect China's growing relationship with Central Asia. Enjoy!

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ANALYSIS

The United States and China's Regional Policy

By Robert Sutter

Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

The author would welcome any feedback on this article and can be reached at sutterr@georgetown.edu

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American specialists and other outside observers seem to have little disagreement over most of the objectives of China's more active and flexible approach to surrounding countries in recent years. Through adept diplomacy and active high-level leadership interchange, Beijing seeks to reassure its neighbors, promote advantageous economic interchange, stabilize China's strategic environment, and isolate Taiwan. There remains disagreement over Chinese objectives toward the United States, however. Some specialists say China's primary long-term regional goal is to push the United States out of Asia and assert regional dominance. Giving U.S. policy a primary role in determining Chinese policy in the region, their analysis forecasts a generally negative outlook for the United States and the region—predicting more friction as China's rise puts it in conflict with the United States for influence in Asia.(1)ⁱ

Other specialists point to a more confident Chinese leadership approach to Asia. Chinese leaders over time have embraced economic interdependence and globalization as providing great benefits to them as rulers of China. They also have come to cooperate in multilateral groups and with the United States and to accept some of the benefits of U.S. primacy in world affairs. They forecast a generally positive outlook for the region and U.S. interests in Asia, as Chinese leaders see their interests best served by a cooperative stance that over time adds significantly to Chinese wealth and power.(2)ⁱⁱ

A third group of specialists, including this writer, seeks a middle ground. They judge that as Chinese officials cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism, North Korea, and other issues, there remain anti-U.S. tendencies in Chinese policy. The latter are currently held in check by circumstances, especially U.S. predominant power and influence in Asia. China's strategy in Asia is seen as contingent and U.S. power and policies play a big role in determining Chinese policy in the region. This school of thought acknowledges that there has been change in Chinese leaders' attitudes toward economic interdependence and willingness to work with U.S. primacy in many areas in the post cold war world, and that China has spread influence incrementally throughout the region. But these analysts are heavily influenced by an assessment of factors that appear to make China's recent stance tentative. Chinese leaders seem wary of pressures and events that could compel them to shift to different and perhaps more hard line positions in Asian affairs. As the acknowledged dominant power in the region, the United States is seen to loom large in these Chinese leadership calculations.(3)ⁱⁱⁱ

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Contingent policies based on pragmatic cost-benefit analyses developed during the post-Mao period as a central feature of Chinese leaders' decision making over foreign policy, especially regarding important issues along China's periphery in Asia.(4)^{iv} A review of the record shows that for two decades, from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s, the strategic focus of Chinese leaders was guarding and maneuvering against expanding and threatening Soviet power, especially military power, throughout China's periphery. This involved changing degrees of Chinese cooperation with the United States and its allies and associates, depending on variables including changing Chinese perceptions of the Soviet threat, the extent of U.S. resolve, and the assessed utility of alignment with the United States to counter the U.S.SR.(5)^v

The end of the Cold War saw U.S.-led Western reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown, stronger emphasis on nationalistic themes by Chinese leaders, and perceived adverse separatist trends in Taiwan backed by the United States prompting Chinese leaders to see the United States and its power and influence in Asian and world affairs as the new "hegemon," striving to pressure, intimidate, and hold back China's rise in Asia. Deng Xiaoping advised Chinese leaders to try to avoid confrontation, to "bide time," working to take advantage of developing international opportunities in order to build up China's "comprehensive national power" and secure a more advantageous world leadership position over the longer term. Chinese leaders continue to reaffirm commitment to Deng's maxims.(6)^{vi}

Throughout the 1990s, and arguably up to the present, the main obstacle to China's rise has been seen in Beijing as the United States and its allies and associates, notably Japan and Taiwan, but also India, NATO, and other international organizations and groups where the United States plays a leadership role in ways seen as adverse to Chinese interests. U.S. opposition and "containment" have been clearly evident to Chinese leaders in the clusters of security, economic, political and other differences that have made the U.S.-China relations the most complex U.S. bilateral relationship with any power after the Cold War.(7)^{vii}

China's negative views of the United States are grounded in deeply rooted suspicions of the United States on the part of Chinese elites, even Chinese academic and government specialists on U.S. affairs. These are reinforced by a national education system and media network that have

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conditioned broader Chinese opinion to think of China as a long suffering target of depredations and pressures from outside powers, with the United States as the leading oppressor in the recent period. Following the Tiananmen crackdown and the collapse of international communism, Chinese leaders gave greater salience to such nationalistic conditioning, having an impact on the sharp deterioration on Chinese popular views of the United States after the Cold War.(8)^{viii}

The George W. Bush administration employed incentives and disincentives from a position of overall strength in persuading Chinese leaders to pursue cooperative and moderate policies toward the United States, its allies and associates and others in Asian and world affairs. U.S.-China relations have improved despite the U.S. government's advances in support for Taiwan, missile defense, security relations with Japan, NATO expansion, sanctions on Chinese weapons proliferation actions, U.S. unilateral and militarily aggressive policies in Iraq, and other measures long sensitive to, and until recently sharply criticized by, China.(9)^{ix}

Perhaps the most striking Chinese move in recent years toward greater moderation and accommodation in Asian and world affairs has been the abrupt falloff in mid-2001 of the wide ranging and often very harsh Chinese public criticism of U.S. policy that prevailed throughout the previous decade. For years and with varying degrees of intensity, the U.S. was portrayed as the "hegemon," the focal point of a world-wide struggle fostered by Chinese polemicists and officials. Asia was the focus of Chinese charges centered on alleged U.S. efforts to contain China's rise, to split and weaken the country through interference in Chinese internal affairs, support for Taiwan and Tibetan separatists, and strategic alignments and deployments around China's periphery involving Japan, NATO's Partnership for Peace program in Central Asia, India, and Southeast Asian states.(10)^x

The Chinese decision to stop this public campaign has markedly improved the atmosphere in recent U.S.-China relations. Does this shift represent a basic change in China's approach to the United States in Asian and world affairs? Those who see a more confident Chinese leadership in the 21st century tend to believe that there indeed has been a fundamental shift toward "new thinking" in Beijing.(11)^{xi} Chinese leaders are seen as markedly less concerned and less prone to react sharply and negatively to U.S. policies and practices that in the recent

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past would have set off strident Chinese invective and other assertive actions. As a newly “confident” and “responsible” international player, China is assumed to have put aside its - until very recently - strong public efforts to work against U.S. influence and power in nearby Asia.

In contrast are those including this writer who find this argument unconvincing for several reasons. First, they see U.S. policies and behavior as markedly more hegemonic and offensive to long-standing Chinese sensitivities under the Bush administration in such areas as Taiwan, missile defense, U.S. defense ties with Japan, U.S. sanctions against China, and U.S. military posture in Iraq, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. How could long-standing and deeply rooted negative and suspicious Chinese elite views of U.S. policy in Asian and world affairs change so quickly? More likely in their view is a Chinese administration decision to mute anti-U.S. rhetoric and assertiveness for tactical reasons involving China’s need to maintain a cooperative relationship with the United States, rather than any fundamental change in China’s opposition to many aspects of U.S. policy in Asia and elsewhere.(12)^{xii}

In depth consultations with Chinese officials and specialists and other data reveal that Chinese officials carried out a reevaluation of China’s strategy against the United States in 2000-2001 and concluded that China did not want to be in a position of confronting alone the U.S. superpower.(13)^{xiii} U.S. military and other strengths backed by the Bush administration clear willingness to use them against opponents appeared as additional factors that have shown the serious costs for China if it continued a confrontational approach toward the United States. These circumstances favored muting differences for now and following Deng’s maxims to bide time, await opportunities while continuing to develop greater national wealth and power.

Indeed, the Bush administration officials privately warned Chinese counterparts in early 2001 against continuing strident anti-U.S. Chinese rhetoric.(14)^{xiv} As the United States seemed to be determined to confront its enemies and likely to remain the dominant power for some time, other power centers, even Russia, were reluctant to confront or seriously challenge U.S. leadership. Under these circumstances, Chinese officials recognized that China was in no position on its own to challenge the United States and to try to balance U.S. power, even in nearby Asia. This effort would attract few allies and would endanger core Chinese

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interests in maintaining stability and promoting economic development.(15)^{xv}

Second, reflecting clear limits on China's accommodation with the United States in Asia, Chinese policy continues to work over the longer term to weaken the predominant U.S. role around China's periphery. In the lead-up to the Iraq war, China continued to straddle the fence, privately pledging not to block U.S. military action but siding publicly with France and others in calling for protracted inspections. Beijing's work to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program still falls short of U.S. expectations in seeking more concrete pressure on the North. Chinese officials told U.S. media of their impatience with U.S. demands for support on Iraq and North Korea, without any change in U.S. policy where it matters most to China—i.e. Taiwan. A more forceful U.S. stance on North Korea would alarm China, which very likely would take strong measures to block the U.S. pressure.(16)^{xvi} The day-to-day interface of U.S. and Chinese military forces along China's periphery has not been without significant incident, even as the two powers endeavored to resume more normal ties after the April 1, 2001 EP 3 episode. Perhaps of most importance, deep U.S.-China divisions continue to be seen in the continuing clash of long term U.S.-China interests in the region—particularly the continued PLA buildup targeted at Taiwan and U.S. forces that might help Taiwan, and U.S. military preparations to deal with Taiwan contingencies. They suggest that a major breakthrough toward strategic cooperation is unlikely.(17)^{xvii}

Third, theories regarding learning and change in international relations(18)^{xviii} show that Chinese leaders, deeply influenced by nationalistic feelings and anti-American conditioning, will have great difficulty “learning” a more broadly cooperative approach to the United States in Asia. Imbued with such a suspicious mindset regarding the United States, Chinese leaders are unlikely to change their minds unless some major defining event causes them to do so. It is difficult to see such an event in recent Chinese foreign policy.

Fourth, there remains plenty of evidence that Chinese leaders continue to oppose U.S. policy in many areas, notably U.S. support for Taiwan and U.S. strategic leadership on a number of sensitive issues in Asian and world affairs. While much less public after mid 2001, the opposition is seen in a variety of venues and materials. The recent book based on files of Chinese leadership deliberations shows graphically and repeatedly

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that suspicion of and opposition to U.S. policy in Asia remains a driving force in Chinese policy.(19)^{xix}

To deal with these adverse trends but avoid confrontation with the United States, Chinese leaders have settled on a longer term approach that for now tries to balance real or potential adverse U.S. power and influence in non-confrontational ways, often coming in “under the radar” of U.S. decision makers and Asian leaders and thereby avoiding adverse consequences for Chinese interests. The competitive and antagonistic aspects in China’s stance toward the United States in Asia show more in some areas of Asia than others. They are clearly evident regarding Taiwan and Japan, and less explicit in other areas.

In conclusion, the pattern of post cold war Chinese strategy in Asia emphasizes conventional nation building and gradually strengthening China’s influence by a Chinese leadership more focused on domestic issues than expanding foreign power. It reflects greater Chinese confidence, seen in more moderation on territorial issues and more initiatives involving bilateral ties and multilateral arrangements.

Chinese officials remain highly sensitive to the policies and power of the United States and U.S.-backed allies and associates, especially Taiwan and Japan. North Korea represents another source of uncertainty at times independent of the United States. While China cooperates with the United States on a number of Asian issues, the overall rise of U.S. power and assertiveness in post cold war Asian and world affairs has many drawbacks for longstanding Chinese interests in Asia. China has viewed negatively or with suspicion greater U.S. support for Taiwan and Japanese military activism, U.S. ballistic missile defense, strengthened U.S. military deployments and closer military cooperation in Central, South and Southeast Asia, and closer U.S. military and foreign policy cooperation with India and Russia.

Chinese leaders concluded three years ago that public and vocal efforts in the recent past to oppose and resist adverse U.S. policies and trends had become counterproductive, especially given the Bush administration’s power and firmness against adversaries and the strong opposition by Asian governments to great power contention. Nonetheless, Chinese officials continue to oppose U.S. dominance in Asia and world affairs, and to work against adverse trends involving the United States in more subtle and indirect ways. Also, they have become



more active in regional and other multilateral regimes in part to constrain U.S. power and channel it in directions compatible with Chinese interests. Chinese officials and specialists privately admit that Chinese leaders remain suspicious of the United States, and that changing the minds of the senior leaders of China will require a similar change in U.S. leaders' view and approach to China in Asia. (20)^{xx} Chinese officials at present are trying hard to find a way that China's rising power—its “peaceful rise”—will not lead U.S. leaders to react negatively, seeing a Chinese threat to U.S. power and leadership in Asia. They are not sure they will succeed. In the meantime they seem to believe, like Deng Xiaoping, that the overall growth of Chinese power and influence in Asia over the long term will secure Chinese interests in opposition to contrary actions and interests of the United States or others.

(Scroll to the end of the newsletter to view the end notes)

NEWS

1) Month in Review

Regional security, counterterrorism, and law enforcement

- Drug control officials from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) met for the first time in Moscow to map out new plans to combat international drug smuggling and review the results of “Channel-2003,” the region-wide drug control operations held in the autumn of 2003.
- During the recent meeting of G8 Finance Ministers in Boca Raton, Florida, Russia announced that it had secured the G8's support in the fight against the funding of terrorism in Central Asia. This new cooperation will take place within the Financial Action Task Force and is supported by the IMF, the World Bank, the United States and the United Kingdom.
- In a statement by Col. Gen. Boris Mylnikov, the Chief of The Anti-Terrorist Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States, he noted that cooperation between regional anti-terrorist agencies is important to the struggle against international terrorism in Eurasia in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution No.1373. He said, "Effective security in Eurasia is

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ensured by three organizations - the CIS's anti-terrorist center, the regional anti-terrorist agency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization." He made no mention of Coalition or NATO forces.

- Kazakhstan proposes to carry out a joint forum of the CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence in Asia) and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).
- Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha said the organization is ready for real cooperation with NATO on technical and operational issues.
- Kyrgyz police alerted Interpol to possible suspects in the March 2003 bombing of a Chinese bus bringing traders back from Bishkek to Xinjiang. The two suspects are Chinese Uyghurs.
- A blast thought caused by a suicide bomber killed two people and injured three others at a railway station in Zhengzhou, the capital of central China's Henan Province. No further details were available as of print.
- In a series of raids lasting three days, Russian Interior Ministry agents confiscated an estimated \$30 million worth of goods from 300 stalls rented by Chinese merchants in the "Emila" wholesale market in south Moscow. The Chinese government has criticized the action and demanded an explanation.

Meetings and summits

- The Russian and Kazakh Security Councils signed a plan of joint action for 2004. Cooperation will occur bilaterally and within the CSTO, SCO, CIS, and Eurasian Economic Community.
- Acting executive director, Vyacheslav Kasymov, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), stated that the RATS will officially open its doors on June 11, 2004, although it has been operating since autumn 2003.
- A Russian military delegation led by Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Manilov, deputy chief of Russian border troops, met in

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Dushanbe 16-20 February for talks with Major-General Nuralisho Nazarov, first deputy chairman of the Tajik Border Protection Committee, and Lieutenant-General Abdurrahmon Azimov, the chairman of the Tajik government's Border Protection Committee, to review the 11-year-old agreement on the legal status of the Russian forces in Tajikistan. Negotiations about updating the status of the Russian troops, the possibility of establishing a Russian base in Tajikistan, and the transfer of border responsibilities to Tajik troops have been going on since the bilateral security agreement, originally valid for 10 years, expired in May 2003.

Energy, trade, and infrastructure development

- China plans to build a railway linking the port of Dalian with Russia. The 840-mile railway will hug the coastline of Liaoning province and the border with North Korea before ending at Suifenhe, not far from Vladivostok. This announcement comes after a statement by Russia that Yukos will be able to ship 240,000 barrels, or 12 million tonnes, a day of crude oil to China by 2006 using rail links.
- China's oil imports in 2003 exceeded 100 million tons. China imported 91.12 million tons of crude oil and 8.24 million tons of refined oil in 2003, up 31.3 percent and 38.8 percent year-on-year respectively.
- Kazakhstan's national oil and gas company KazMunaiGaz will begin building the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to the border with China this summer, company President Uzakbai Karabalin said. The oil pipeline is the second phase of a project to build a trans-national pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China. The first phase, a 410-kilometer pipeline from Atyrau to Kenkiyak, has already opened.
- China's CNPC-Aktobemunaigaz produced 4.65 million tonnes of oil from Kazakhstan's Kenkiyak and Zhanazhol fields last year, up 6% from 2002, according to the Chinese Embassy in Kazakhstan. The company will open new wells to meet 2004 production plans of 5.3 million tonnes.



- Bilateral trade volume between China and India is expected to reach US\$10 billion by the end of 2004, compared with 2003's US\$7.6 billion.

SELECTED ARTICLES FROM OTHER PUBLICATIONS

2) Central Asia: Kyrgyz Rights Activists Call For End To Deportation Of Uighurs To China

By Antoine Blua
Eurasianet
January 21, 2004

<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/pp012504.shtml>

“Kyrgyz human rights campaigners are calling on the Central Asian republics to stop deporting members of the Uighur community to China, where they face the risk of being victimized. RFE/RL correspondent Antoine Blua reports that China's neighbors have on several occasions forcibly returned Turkic Muslim Uighurs suspected of being involved in pro-independence activities...”

3) Wary of China, Russia and Japan build trade

By James Brooke
International Herald Tribune
January 24, 2004

<http://www.ihf.com/articles/126447.htm>

“A century after the Russian-Japanese war broke out, the first in a string of conflicts between these Pacific powers, the two perennial adversaries now seem to be finally embarking on an era of economic cooperation...”

4) Newspaper Slur Angers Uighurs

By Galima Bukharbaeva
Iwpr's Reporting Central Asia
January 23, 2004

www.iwpr.net



“Kazak authorities come to defence of ethnic group attacked in media report in Almaty. Kazakhstan's sizeable Uighur population has been deeply shocked by a newspaper report branding them a "cunning people - separatists and terrorists". The article, "Kazaks face a hidden threat" was published by *Kazakhskaya Pravda* at the beginning of the month, and controversy over its content shows no sign of abating...”

5) "They Will Never Leave Now:" Analysis of Russian and American Activeness in CIS Countries

By Svetlana Babayeva, Yekaterina Grigorieva, and Nikolai Khorunzhy
Izvestia (from CDI Russia Weekly)
January 27, 2004

<http://www.cdi.org/russia/>

“Russia should make up its mind what is in line with its interests. According to the statement of Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Duma, made on the eve of US State Secretary Colin Powell's visit to Moscow, the Kremlin should bring up the matter of American military presence in Georgia and Central Asia. "Russia should ask questions concerning the US military presence in the countries bordering on Russia," he said. According to what information this newspaper has compiled, Powell too intends to bring up the matter of Russian presence in Georgia and Moldova, and Powell is not going to mince the words...”

6) Russia's Arms Sales Topped \$5 Billion In 2003

By Dmitry Litovkin
Izvestia (from CDI Russia Weekly)
January 28, 2004

<http://www.cdi.org/russia/>

“At the same time, experts note that 2004 could become very tense with regard to cooperation with China, Russia's other traditional partner in the sphere of military technology cooperation. By as early as spring, the European Union is prepared to lift the trade sanctions imposed on Beijing in 1989 in response to Tiananmen Square. As a result of that, the Russian monopoly on supplies of arms and military equipment to China could be broken. France and Germany, which are ready to offer to China



hi-tech electronic reconnaissance, navigation, communications and target designation systems - the weak points of the Russian defense industry - already have their sights set on developing this market...”

7) West-east gas pipeline seeks to annually supply 20 bln cubic meters for 30 years

People's Daily Online
February 4, 2003

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200402/04/print20040204_133893.htm
1

“The national key project the great development in the west and the pipeline gas from west to east has witnessed a resource guarantee for a steady supply of 20 billion cubic meters annually for the 30 years in advance...”

8) US dissuades Sinopec from bidding on Iranian oil-field

People's Daily Online
February 06, 2004

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200402/06/eng20040206_134117.shtm
1

“A senior official at China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) lately stated, "Sinopec pays no attention to the US request" and "will do its utmost to carry on its bidding for the exploitation project in Iranian oilfield". Why did the American government decide to put direct pressures on Chinese oil companies? Experts believe that the "uncompromising stand of the Sinopec is the manifestation of "being somewhat prepared...”

9) HIV, STI's And Drugs In Xinjiang And Central Asia

By Eric D. Hagt
Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst
February 11, 2004

http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2110



“Regional trade and national security were the focus of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s January summit in Beijing. However, HIV/AIDS and associated drug trafficking problems in Xinjiang and Central Asia are growing at an alarming rate and pose a real crisis for all countries involved. Social, economic and political factors have all conspired to increase injecting drug use, high risk sexual behavior, rapidly spreading sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV/AIDS. In addition to the enormous human cost of the disease, the region’s stability will be in jeopardy if the SCO countries do not address these critical problems in a comprehensive and multilateral way...”

10) Chinese immigrants flood into the Russian Far East

AFP

January 27, 2004

<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2004/01/27/2003092628/print>

“The Golden Dragon Hotel, in **Russia's** main Pacific port and naval base Vladivostok, does not take Russians as guests. "We accept only Chinese," said the manager Ma Chan Bai, who explained that the 150-room hotel owned by a businessman from the northern Chinese city of Harbin catered exclusively to Chinese groups...”

11) The Man Who Would Be Khan

By Robert D. Kaplan

The Atlantic Monthly

March 2004

<http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/03/kaplan.htm>

“A new breed of American soldier—call him the soldier-diplomat—has come into being since the end of the Cold War. Meet the colonel who was our man in Mongolia, an officer who probably wielded more local influence than many Mongol rulers of yore...”

12) Russia In 2003: The Military and Foreign Policy

By Peter Rutland

Transitions Online (from CDI Russia Weekly)

February 20, 2004



<http://www.cdi.org/russia/>

“President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy received its most serious challenge yet in 2003, in the form of the war in Iraq. But Russia’s relationship with Washington survived the crisis over Operation Iraqi Freedom. Putin reiterated in an interview with the New York Times on 6 October that he had made a “strategic choice” in favor of US. The staying power of the Russia-US partnership surprised (and dismayed) many observers, who expected the hard-liners in the Bush cabinet to use the opportunity of the Iraq war to reverse the friendly relations President George W. Bush inherited from the Clinton administration. But in the wake of the Iraq war Bush accepted the advice of National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice to “punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia...”

ENDNOTES

ⁱ (1) Michael McDevitt, “The China Factor in U.S. Defense Planning,” in Jonathan Pollack (ed.) *Strategic Surprise?* U.S. Naval War College (forthcoming). Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, C.R. Neu, *The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Policy Toward China*. Santa Monica CA: Rand Corp. 2000. John Pomfret, “In its own neighborhood, China emerges as a leader,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 2001; Jane Parlez, “China races to replace U.S. as economic power in Asia,” *New York Times*, June 28, 2002; U.S.-China Security Review Commission, *Report to Congress July 2002*,

<http://www.uscc.gov/anrp02.htm>; Eric Eckholm and Joseph Kahn, “Asia worries about growth of China’s economic power,” *New York Times*, November 24, 2002; Thomas Woodrow, “The new great game,” *China Brief* III/3, February 11, 2003.

ⁱⁱ (2) For variations on this perspective, see, Michael Yahuda, “China’s Win-Win Globalization,” *YaleGlobal online*, February 19, 2003 <http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu>. Joseph Kahn, “Hands across the Pacific,” *New York Times* November 11, 2002 (internet version, accessed November 12, 2002). Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy.” *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2003. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org> (accessed November 1, 2003)

ⁱⁱⁱ (3) Robert Sutter, “China Remains wary of U.S.-led world order,” *YaleGlobal online*, June 8, 2003. Author’s consultations with 20 Chinese foreign policy planners and specialists, November-December 2003.

^{iv} (4) David Michael Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 1-36.

^v (5) John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993, p. 70-110. Michael Yahuda, *Towards the end of isolation*, New York: St. Martins, 1983. Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments after Mao*. New York: Praeger, 1986, p. 10-13.

^{vi} (6) Tony Saich, *Governance and Politics of China*. London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 274. Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the offensive,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 116/3 2001, p. 359. Nailene Chou West, “Low profile on foreign affairs set to continue,” *South China Morning Post*, December 24, 2003 (internet version accessed December 27, 2003)



^{vii} (7) Kerry Dumbaugh, *China-U.S. Relations*. Washington: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief 98018, updated regularly.

^{viii} (8) Joseph Fewsmith, *China Since Tiananmen*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 132-158.

Rosalie Chen, "China Perceives America," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 12/35, 239-264.

^{ix} (9) Michael Swaine, "Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 22*, February 2003. Robert Sutter, "Bush Policy toward Beijing and Taipei," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12/36 August 2003, p. 477-492.

^x (10) Authoritative official Chinese comment reached several high points of invective, notably when *People's Daily* "Observer" articles equated the U.S. military campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 with the Nazi advances in World War II and compared President Clinton with Adolph Hitler *People's Daily* May 27, 1999; *People's Daily* June 22, 1999.

^{xi} (11) For variations on this perspective, see, Michael Yahuda, "China's Win-Win Globalization," *YaleGlobal online*, February 19, 2003 <http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu>. Joseph Kahn, "Hands across the Pacific," *New York Times* November 11, 2002 (internet version, accessed November 12, 2002). Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2003. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org> (accessed November 1, 2003)

^{xii} (12) For a comprehensive assessment of recent China-U.S. relations see the article by David Shambaugh in Jonathan Pollack (ed.) *Strategic Surprise?* U.S. Naval War College (forthcoming)

^{xiii} (13) Consultations with several dozen Chinese foreign policy specialists and officials, 2001-2003.

^{xiv} (14) Consultations with Bush administration Asian affairs policy makers, Washington DC, March 2001.

^{xv} (15) Consultations with Chinese foreign policy officials and specialists, 2001-2002. Li Zhongjie, "Background report on the 16th CCP Congress: How to deal with the current international strategic situation," Beijing *Liaowang*, June 3, 2002, p. 3-9. Li Shaojun, "Where do opportunities lie?—Viewing future great power relations," Beijing *Shijie Zhishi*, January 1, 2003, p. 8-10. Gu Dexin, "The U.S.-Iraq war and China's national security," Beijing *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, April 20, 2003, no.4, p.20-22

^{xvi} (16) David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean peninsula," *Washington Quarterly*, spring 2003, p. 43-56. Robert Sutter, "China Remains wary of U.S.-led world order," *YaleGlobal online*, June 8, 2003

^{xvii} (17) Robert Sutter, "China's Rise in Asia," *PACNET IIA* March 7, 2003 <http://www.csis.org/pacfor>

^{xviii} (18) Robert Jervis, *Perception and misperception in international politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 217. Dan Reiter, "Learning, realism and alliances," *World Politics* 46/2 July 1994, p. 493.

^{xix} (19) Typical of the private negative leadership views of U.S. intentions was Hu Jintao who said:

"[The United States has] strengthened its military deployments in the Asia-Pacific region, strengthened the U.S.-Japan military alliance, strengthened strategic cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam, inveigled Pakistan, established a pro-American government in Afghanistan, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and so on. They have extended outposts and placed pressure points on us from the east, south, and west. This makes a great change in our geopolitical environment." Andrew Nathan and

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Bruce Gilley, *China's New Rulers: The Secret Files*, New York: New York Review Book, 2002. p. 207-209.

^{xx} (20) Interviews with Chinese officials and specialists, November, December 2003.