

Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

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While the academic debate on security has broadened in recent years, it has failed to cohesively include transnational organized crime and drug trafficking as a security issue. However, especially in weak states in developing and postcommunist regions, these phenomena are having an increasingly negative effect on security in the military, political, economic, and societal sense. Security issues in Central Asia are a prominent example of the links between drug trafficking and military threats to security. This is illustrated most clearly by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has been both a major actor in the drug trade from Afghanistan to Central Asia as well as the most serious violent nonstate actor in the region. The link between the drug trade and armed conflict is of fundamental importance to understanding the challenges to Central Asian security.

Since the end of the cold war, the concept of security has undergone a gradual shift. From a state-centric approach that defined security mainly in terms of military threats, the concept has been broadened and widened.¹ The academic debate presently affords greater importance to regional, intrastate, and transnational issues. These include economic, societal, and environmental security issues. This shift has occurred as the collapse of the bipolar world order and globalization processes in transportation and communication have increased links across geographic areas. While this has brought a host of beneficial effects, it has also had a dark side: nontraditional and transnational threats to security have risen to prominence globally, with the largest consequences in the developing and postcommunist world. As the bipolar confrontation at the global or systemic level no longer dominated world politics, security issues at the regional and state levels began to gain attention. Conflicts that have emerged in the post-cold war era have been dominated by intrastate conflicts

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over sovereignty itself, rather than interstate conflicts between sovereign actors.² As the perception of a globally threatened environment has increased, the role of the state as the obvious actor and object of security studies has been diluted.

Attempts to redefine and broaden security have expanded the notion of security threats to several sectors outside the military, including the political, economic, environmental, and societal sectors. Likewise, levels of analysis have been disaggregated, the study of security being structured into the systemic or global level; the sub-system level such as regional security; unit-level, typically state security; as well as subunits or individuals.³ In the past several years, the academic debate has done well in encompassing economic, societal, and environmental security, as well as identity-based substate challenges.⁴ However, the growing salience of transnational organized crime seems to have been largely bypassed in what Krause calls the “Gordian knot into which contemporary security studies has tied itself.”⁵

Specifically, the interplay between weak states and the rise of transnational organized crime has come to be a growing problem since the mid-1990s.⁶ The trade in illegal narcotics, in particular, arguably carries the largest societal, political, and economic consequences among transnational security threats. In areas as far apart as Southeast Asia and South America, the drug trade has come to affect the security of states, societies, and citizens at several levels of analysis and across sectors of analysis; at the individual, state, regional, and international levels of security; and in the societal, environmental, economic, political, and military sectors.⁷

Though increasingly seen as an important problem and securitized by numerous states, most obviously the United States but also countries such as Iran and Turkey, organized crime and the drug trade are still facing difficulties being accepted as security problems. Cable, for instance, begins his tentative discussion on drugs and the criminalization of the global economy in a wider analysis of economic security by noting that there are “question marks to be raised against treating the drugs trade, and international crime in general, as a ‘security’ problem,” and he concludes that “treating narcotics as a security issue deflects attention from hard political choices which may involve a move to decriminalization.”⁸ By contrast, as will be detailed below, this article argues that it is appropriate to treat transnational organized crime, and the drug trade in particular, as security issues. While this may be less obviously the case in industrialized societies with strong states, it is becoming increasingly clear in developing and postcommunist societies. That said, the changing dynamics of transnational crime, and the connections between it and terrorism, would tend to raise the question also for strong industrialized societies and states.

Drug trafficking affects the security of societies and states in a number of ways. Firstly, through increasing levels of addiction, petty crime, and drug-related epidemics (including AIDS), the drug trade affects human and societal security adversely. Indeed, as Phil Williams has noted, “drug trafficking poses one of the most serious challenges to the fabric of society in the US, Western Europe and even many drug producing countries.”⁹ In fact, the challenge has in recent years been the largest in “emerging” consumer markets near producing countries originally serving as transit routes, such as Russia, Pakistan, and Iran. Secondly, through its financial strength the drug trade exacerbates corruption in already weak states and infiltrates governments, thereby affecting the economic and political functioning of these states. As corruption incapacitates the state and makes it unable to protect and ensure the rights of its citizens, disaffection rises and ultimately leads to a loss of legitimacy: in Buzan’s terms, this results in a questioning of the idea of the state

by the population, leading to a higher risk of instability. In this sense, it has a negative effect on both economic and political security.¹⁰ Thirdly, through its linkages to violent nonstate actors including ideological and secessionist movements and terrorism, the drug trade is also an increasing threat to both national, regional, and international security in a military sense.

In fact, the drug trade affects both so-called “hard” or military security issues as well as “soft” security (such as economic and societal security).¹¹ In so doing, it practically penetrates the academic security debate: whether security is understood in a traditionalist, state-centered sense focusing on military threats, or in a wider, broader sense encompassing nonstate actors and nonmilitary threats, organized crime in general and drug trafficking in particular is an increasingly obvious element of concern in international security—although the political science and international relations debate on security has accorded this phenomenon scant attention (with several notable exceptions).¹² This article focuses on the role of drug trafficking in military threats to security; specifically, the connection between drug trafficking and violent nonstate actors and implications for security in the specific context of post-Soviet Central Asia. The article will focus on the role of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the main violent nonstate actor in the region in recent years, as an illustration of the link between organized crime and military security.

The article will begin by presenting Central Asia’s drug problem in general, since the ramifications of the drug problem far exceed the solely military sector of security. It will then shortly discuss the linkages between organized crime and national security conceptually, including most notably the existence of a continuum between criminal networks and armed ideological organizations. Subsequently, the article will detail the convergence between Islamic radicalism and organized crime in Central Asia, as well as the implications of this phenomenon for national and regional security in the Central Asian region.

Central Asia’s Drug Problem

One of the regions of the world where the security impact of drug trafficking has been rising most dramatically is in post-Soviet Central Asia. From having been a fairly unknown problem in the early 1990s, drug addiction and smuggling have become rampant in the region.¹³ This has followed the changing production and smuggling routes of Afghanistan’s heroin production.

Afghanistan: The Source

Afghanistan is not historically a major opium producer. Although opium has been grown in parts of the country for centuries, it was not until the late 1980s that it was a major producer of opium on the international scene. In the so-called “Golden Crescent” to which Afghanistan belongs, Iran was traditionally the main producer and consumer of opium. Bans on production in Iran led to Pakistan picking up the slack, and at the time of the Soviet invasion Afghanistan produced only 200 metric tons of opium yearly. Production passed the 1,000-ton threshold in 1988, and then grew exponentially during the civil war that followed the 1989 Soviet withdrawal. By that time, the damage done to Afghanistan’s population, economy, and infrastructure created an ever deeper vacuum that opium production stepped in to fill. Moreover, the end of direct superpower involvement in the country led

to a need for warring factions to secure finances through other means, including the drug trade. By the late 1990s, production had reached an average of over 3,000 tons yearly—a level that has been sustained with the exception of 2001, when the Taliban government's eradication briefly led to a large shortfall in production to only 185 tons. In 2002 and 2003, following Operation Enduring Freedom and the demise of the Taliban regime, production levels were immediately restored to pre-eradication levels. The year 2004 signified a quantitative but also qualitative change. A significant expansion (64 percent according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime figures) in production area to 131,000 hectares (ha) took place, though adverse climatic conditions meant low yield figures and a total estimated harvest of 4,200 tons. While the UNODC figures are the most authoritative available, estimates by the U.S. government are somewhat higher, indicating a cultivated area of 206,700 ha and a potential production of 4,950 tons of opium.¹⁴ More importantly, opium production has changed shape—having moved north and inland, and having spread out. It is now for the first time taking place in every single province of the country, and moving into less accessible and unruly areas in central Afghanistan as well as the country's northern provinces.

Meanwhile, there is increasing evidence that most of the processing of opium into heroin is now occurring inside Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Afghan opium was mainly produced in the Nangarhar and Helmand areas and adjacent territories, with relatively small production taking place in the northern province of Badakhshan. The production focus in the south and west of the country was also reflected in the main direction of smuggling. The largest increases in production are now taking place in the northern parts of Afghanistan. Concomitantly, the amount of opium—and therefore heroin—available in the neighborhood of Central Asia has increased considerably. In Badakhshan and adjacent provinces, a potential 720 tons of opium (72 tons of heroin equivalent) was produced in 2004, with an additional 530 tons in the northern and 340 tons in the northwestern provinces. About a third of Afghan heroin, or up to 160 tons, is hence produced in the northern half of the country and, given the current security dynamics, it is likely that most of that production is trafficked through Central Asia. Known heroin laboratories in Kunduz province and elsewhere in the north, as well as increased seizures, of heroin coupled with decreasing opium seizures, indicate that the main volume of drugs moving into Central Asia is in the form of heroin.

The amount of heroin transiting Central Asia is increasing rapidly. While heroin is the overwhelming problem, it must be noted that cannabis products grow naturally in the regions and are cultivated on large territories within Central Asia and the Caucasus (as is ephedra), and that synthetic drugs are gradually increasing in importance across Asia and the post-Soviet space. But the monetary value of this trade in the Central Asian context pales into insignificance in comparison to the heroin industry.

Effect on Central Asia

By the early 2000s, security at all levels in Central Asia had clearly been affected by the rapid increase in drug trafficking. While actual addiction rates are little known because of inadequate measuring mechanisms, the number of drug users in Central Asia and Russia have skyrocketed. More than a transit country, Russia has become a major destination market for Afghanistan's heroin smuggled through Central Asia. The country in 2003 had half a million registered drug addicts, mainly heroin users, and an estimated total of 3–4 million drug users—over 2 percent of its population.¹⁵ One of the world's fastest-growing AIDS epidemics has followed.¹⁶ Central Asia has

so far not seen a similar addiction epidemic, though heroin addiction levels are rising rapidly there as well.¹⁷ The societal consequences of high addiction levels in these poor states are gradually emerging, including rapid increases in AIDS cases as well as drug-related crime.¹⁸ Concomitantly, the economic and political impact of the drug trade in these states has also been significant, especially in the weakest states of the region, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the absence of a strong licit economy—and in the case of Tajikistan, a war-ravaged one—the large turnover and profit margins of drug trafficking have a serious impact on the state and society. For example, the value of the drugs trafficked through Tajikistan is estimated to be up to 30 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).¹⁹ This has created a severe corruption problem across the region at all levels. Low-paid government officials in law enforcement are bribed to look the other way as smugglers take a shipment through. More importantly, high-level government officials have also been known to be involved in the trafficking of drugs, implying not simply passive corruption in the form of bribe-taking, but the actual direct involvement of officials (in other words, state complicity) in the drug trade. In countries such as Tajikistan and possibly Turkmenistan, voluminous accusations of high-level participation in the drug trade by high government officials raises the question as to whether these states are infiltrated by criminal interests to an extent that merits the use of the term “narco-state.” For example, in May 2000, Tajikistan's ambassador to Kazakhstan was seized with sixty-three kilograms of heroin in his car.²⁰ Accusations abound of high-level government officials being implicated in the smuggling of narcotics in both Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.²¹

The crippling effect of drug addiction, crime, and corruption on the functioning of the already weak states in Central Asia is increasing rapidly and endangering societal and economic security as well as political stability. Yet the effect of drug trafficking is not limited to this. In fact, on a political and military level both national and regional security in the region has been severely affected by the collusion between avowedly ideological violent nonstate actors and drug trafficking.

Far from being separate phenomena, the Islamic radical movements and the narco-trafficking issues are closely related. Evidence from other parts of the world have shown that extremist organizations and organized crime very often live in symbiosis with each other, a symbiosis that occasionally turns into a merger—examples include Marxist guerrillas in Colombia, Kurdish Marxist separatist groups in Turkey, and ethnic secessionists in Myanmar. In the case of Central Asia, there is compelling evidence that the main armed antistate movement in the region—the IMU, which has conducted two separate armed insurgencies affecting three of the regional states—has been a major actor in the drugs trade through Central Asia.

The Nexus of Crime and Conflict

The ideal type of ethnic secessionist, ideological, or terrorist group that challenges state authority with violent means is that of a group striving for a higher cause, and therefore disinterested in (or even principally opposed to) the drug trade and other criminal activities. Transnational criminal networks, on the other hand, have traditionally not been treated as an international security issue. As Phil Williams notes, this is the case mainly because they are seen as “economic rather than political organizations; they do not pose the same kind of overt or obvious challenge to states that terrorist groups do; crime is a domestic problem; and law enforcement and

national security are based on very different philosophies, organization structures and legal frameworks.”²² The traditional division of these groups into mutually exclusive ideal types—the ideological and the criminal—is nevertheless an increasingly misleading description of the state of affairs of most armed antistate groups, as well as many criminal enterprises. As Kimberley Thachuk notes, traditionally “organized crime groups rarely co-operated with terrorist groups, or engaged in their activities, as their goals were most often at odds . . . yet, many of today’s terrorist groups have not only lost some of their more comprehensible ideals, but are increasingly turning to smuggling and other criminal activities to fund their operations.”²³ In fact, as Tamara Makarenko has noted, a security continuum can be conceptualized which places pure traditional organized crime on one end of the spectrum, and armed ideological groups at the other end. Between these two extremes, a “gray area” with all possible variations and combinations of the two exists, including a situation “where organized crime and terrorism are indistinguishable from one another.”²⁴

The impetus for this nexus between armed ideological groups and crime stems from the rapidly changing security environment in the post-cold war era, processes of globalization making transportation and communications easier, and the concomitant evolution of transnational organized crime. From having been more geographically circumscribed and specialized, transnational criminal networks now operate across continents, in alliances with similar groups elsewhere, and engage in any form of criminal activity that combines high profit with acceptable risk.²⁵

Violent nonstate actors typically venture into organized crime in order to finance their struggle, whether the struggle is intended to carve out an ethnic homeland for a minority group, to overthrow an incumbent regime militarily and take control of an existing state, or to seek to affect a state’s domestic or foreign policy through the use of terrorism. These groups encounter organized crime either because of their common underground status or in attempts to buy arms. States typically seek to counter armed challenges partly with force and repression, but also by cutting off the finances of the challenger. Already pushed underground, such antistate armed groups need money to acquire arms. In turn, their need for finances makes involvement in lucrative criminal activities an attractive option. Often, such ideological groups—or parts of them—come to shift their focus increasingly to the criminal sphere, particularly in the case of protracted conflicts. That is, the organization or movement either gradually shifts its nature to a predominantly criminal one, or acquires a criminal nature along side its ideological nature. Profit through crime, and often specifically the drug trade, becomes a motivation in its own right for the existence and cohesion of the movement.

Examples of this development exist in parts of the world as varied as Colombia, Turkey, and Myanmar. In Colombia, Marxist rebels of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), and to a lesser extent the ELN (Ejército Liberación de Nacional) as well as right-wing paramilitary groups of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia gradually engaged in crime in the course of their 40-year conflict with the Colombian state.²⁶ Beginning with abductions and moving into the smuggling and processing of cocaine grown originally in Peru and Bolivia, these groups gained tremendous economic and political strength. This strength increased as the cultivation of coca moved into Colombian territory outside state control—at present about 40 percent of the country’s territory.²⁷ Experts now assess generating profits from the cocaine business as one of the primary aims of these groups.²⁸ In the case of Turkey, the militant Marxist and Kurdish nationalist PKK (Partya Kerkeren

Kurdistan) started an insurgency in 1984 that denied the Turkish government full control of a number of provinces in the southeastern part of the country.²⁹ The Gulf War, the power vacuum in northern Iraq, and external support (especially from the Soviet Union, Syria, and Greece) played a large part in the PKK's rise.³⁰ It managed to assert a dominating role in the trade of heroin along the Balkan route from Afghanistan through Iran and Turkey to Western Europe. Laboratories turning morphine base into heroin were located in the unruly southeast of Turkey; Istanbul became a key transshipment point of drugs toward Europe; and Kurdish networks in Western European countries played a crucial role in the marketing and distribution of the drugs. Together with the extortion of money from Kurdish communities in Europe, heroin trafficking became the PKK's major source of income.³¹ In Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), an ethnic secessionist armed group, has similarly come to control much of the production, trafficking, and marketing to China of opiates grown in the areas under their control.³²

A group's involvement in crime, of course, changes the equation of its relationship to the state and to society. Crime enriches the group, making it possible to acquire more sophisticated arms, to employ more fighters by paying them, to corrupt state officials, and to propagate its ideology to the population. Hence, crime and its proceeds makes the group a more dangerous adversary to the government, and often results in a further weakening of the state—including through the antistate group wresting control over parts of the state's territory from the government. This territory is then used for criminal activities—including the production, processing, and smuggling of narcotics. In this sense, crime and drugs are instrumental in enabling a group to threaten the security of the state at its very foundation—the monopoly on the use of force and control over territory—but also to threaten the security of individuals, since a group with a criminal interest is unlikely to care much about the population in the areas it controls or where it conducts armed operations.

As will be shown below, the development of the IMU in the late 1990s indicates striking similarities with the development of erstwhile ideological groups acquiring a criminal nature such as the PKK, FARC, or the UWSA. Although the IMU was decimated by the American-led military operations in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, an understanding of its nature holds important implications for understanding the security of Central Asia, both in the near past and in the future. Below, the concomitant rise of drug trafficking and radical Islamism in Central Asia are detailed.

The Rise of Radical Islam in Central Asia and the IMU

Since the independence of the Central Asian states, authorities, local analysts, and foreign observers alike have perceived a threat of a radical Islamic wave engulfing the region.³³ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a religious revival has undoubtedly taken place which is potentially benign and stabilizing, filling a void created by the collapse of the communist value system. Governments initially embraced the religious revival, while trying to keep religious activity under state supervision. However, Tajikistan's descent into a murderous civil war in spring 1992, pitting the former communist elite against an opposition force that contained strong Islamic elements, altered threat perceptions in the region. This conflict led to desperate efforts in the four other regional states to check the development of political opposition, which was considered disloyal and subversive by nature. In particular, Islamic currents in the opposition were targeted and outlawed.

Central Asian elites have been battling with fervor against the increasingly potent orthodox and politically radical forces in the region, exemplified by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. These radical brands of Islam, often terming themselves Salafist,³⁴ have their spiritual influences not chiefly from the traditional moderate Hanafi Islam practiced in Central Asia, but from the Saudi Arabian Wahhabist tradition of Hanbali Sunni Islam and the related extremist Deobandi school, nominally a branch of Hanafi Sunni Islam.³⁵ Hundreds of young men from Central Asia have been, and are currently, enrolled in Deobandi religious seminaries (*madrassas*) in Pakistan's northwest frontier province and similar-minded institutions elsewhere. Sponsored by Saudi Arabia, these seminaries earned a reputation for forming the ideological backbone of Afghanistan's Taliban movement. Ever since the 1970s, however, young men from Central Asia illegally left the Soviet Union to study in the Islamic world, bringing politicized and often radical views of Islam home with them.³⁶

Roots of the IMU

The roots of the IMU date back to 1990, in the city of Namangan in Uzbekistan's Ferghana valley. A group of men in their early twenties representing the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), led by Tohir Yoldash and Juma Namangani, built a new mosque in the city and tried to enforce an Islamic dress code and behavior. They increasingly fervently demanded the declaration of Uzbekistan as an Islamic state—a demand that was rejected by the government of Islam Karimov. The group split off from the IRP and formed the Adolat (Justice) Party, which managed to gain prominence in the Ferghana valley during 1991 by channeling the political mobilization of the population toward political Islam, restoring order through street militias, and in fact attempting (sometimes successfully) to challenge the local government and law enforcement bodies and taking over their roles.³⁷ Adolat also received emissaries from Saudi Arabian religious charities.³⁸ The government, apparently unable to judge the strength of the Islamic feelings in Fergana or to devise a strategy to deal with the mounting challenge, remained passive for several months. Only in March 1992 was Adolat outlawed and a crackdown ensued, forcing its leaders into exile in Tajikistan—where Yoldash and Namangani aligned themselves with radical forces in the Tajik opposition and participated on their side in the civil war. Namangani's military prowess—he had been a Soviet paratrooper fighting in Afghanistan—made him useful there, and he took the Tavildara valley in northeastern Tajikistan as his base. Meanwhile, Yoldash toured the Islamic world (including Chechnya, Turkey, and Pakistan) playing an entirely different role than that of Namangani: Yoldash was the IMU's ideologue, whereas Namangani was its guerrilla leader. The IMU opposed the 1997 peace accords that ended the Tajik civil war, and both Yoldash and Namangani decided to break with their former Tajik allies. A serious crackdown on Islamic movements in the Fergana valley was in full flow at this moment, prompting an exodus of potential recruits that ended up with Namangani in Tajikistan.³⁹

With this new strength, Namangani moved to Afghanistan, where the Taliban were now extending their power, and formally founded the IMU in Kabul in 1998. In early 1999, a series of bomb explosions rocked the Uzbek capital Tashkent and almost killed President Karimov. The IMU was blamed for these terrorist attacks, though its culpability has yet to be convincingly determined. At this point, a part of

the IMU under Namangani moved back into Tajikistan, asserting its position in the Tavildara valley bordering Kyrgyzstan's section of the Ferghana valley.

The IMU Military Operations

In August 1999, the IMU conducted its first military incursion into the Batken region in Kyrgyzstan, catching the Kyrgyz military by complete surprise and prompting a mobilization of the Uzbek army. Namangani, who organized the incursion, managed to secure informal permission to transit the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border. The time was chosen during delicate negotiations between the Tajik opposition and the government on the implementation of the 1997 peace accord. Tajik authorities, under these conditions, were unwilling to confront Namangani.⁴⁰

The IMU contingents launched an attack that focused on the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, as well as on the Vorukh and Sokh enclaves in southern Kyrgyzstan. These are small islands of territory belonging to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, respectively, but entirely surrounded by mountainous territory belonging to Kyrgyzstan and with little or no road communication to their respective homelands. These enclaves have been the subject of much discord between the three states, posing difficult questions of transportation, road links to the mainland, administration, and so on. These enclaves are also known for their strong Islamic sentiment. Of the enclaves, Sokh is the largest, comparable to the Gaza Strip in size (325 km²) and with a population of 43,000, whereas Vorukh has a population of 25,000.⁴¹

An IMU detachment estimated at fifty members occupied a mountain village in the Batken region in early August 1999. A first IMU action conducted by twenty-one militants then took a mayor and three government employees hostage on August 9 in a village in the Osh district, also in southwestern Kyrgyzstan. They initially demanded the release of political prisoners in Uzbekistan. However, the Kyrgyz government secured the release of the hostages on August 13 for a \$50,000 ransom and a helicopter to fly them to Afghanistan.⁴² A larger group of fighters then moved in on the Batken region, capturing a meteorological station and the commander of the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry Forces.⁴³ On August 23, the IMU seized further hostages, including four Japanese geologists. On October 25, the hostages were released, the IMU reportedly managing to extract a sum of \$2–5 million from Japan in exchange.⁴⁴ After receiving the ransom and as increasing snowfall was threatening to close the mountain passes, the IMU detachments retreated to Tavildara aided by the mediating intervention of the IMU's old ally from the civil war in Tajikistan, now Tajik minister of emergencies, Mirzo Zioev. Uzbek pressure had now built up on Tajikistan so much that the authorities made significant efforts to convince Namangani to leave the valley for Afghanistan. Hence several Russian Army helicopters airlifted the main IMU contingents, including militants' families, from two camps in Hoit and Sangvor into Afghanistan, where Namangani and his men spent the winter in camps in Kunduz and Mazar-i-Sharif.⁴⁵

A year later, the IMU struck again. In August 2000, Namangani arrived back in Tavildara with several hundred men. He launched a series of significantly more sophisticated attacks, mainly into Kyrgyzstan, and this time the scale and geographical spread of the incursions was much larger than the previous year. The southern Surkhandarya district of Uzbekistan was targeted, as were the mountains just north of Tashkent, Uzbekistan's capital. However, the main thrust was in a simultaneous launching of several coordinated diversionary offensives of units of fifty to one

hundred men each across the mountains separating Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and toward Batken and the Sokh and Vorukh enclaves. Several foreign mountain climbers—including four Americans—were taken hostage, but were all able to escape their captors.⁴⁶ As operations ended, Namangani was again flown to Afghanistan by helicopters probably belonging to the Tajik ministry of emergencies.⁴⁷

Making Sense of the Incursions

These two episodes raise numerous questions regarding the IMU's intentions in staging them. Whereas in 1999, the IMU took the Central Asian militaries by surprise, by 2000 both the Uzbek and Kyrgyz armies were considerably more prepared. Kyrgyzstan had in fact consistently ignored military reform in the 1990s, but after the Batken incursion of 1999 was forced to invest large resources (including significant amounts of foreign aid) in order to improve its border guard capacity and special operations forces. But as much as they startled the Central Asian region and led to efforts by regional governments to shore up their defense structures, the IMU incursions were in both cases too small to pose a serious long-term threat to the governments or territories of Central Asian states—shedding doubts on their real motivation, since the incursions only woke up the Central Asian militaries and exposed their weaknesses.

One explanation that has been advanced is that the IMU sought to replicate the “Tajik model”—i.e., force the Uzbek government to negotiate with it and share power.⁴⁸ Yet this is implausible, given that the IMU detachments apparently did not want to enter the Ferghana valley. They could easily have moved on into Ferghana in 1999, but chose not to do so—in spite of that being their main officially stated aim. Kyrgyz National Security Minister Misir Ashirkulov has conceded that “the Uzbek militants could have easily penetrated into Uzbekistan using mountain tracks.”⁴⁹ The self-avowed state of the Kyrgyz army in 1999 was such that it could in no way have stopped the well-armed militants should they have chosen to continue into Uzbekistan instead of occupying Kyrgyz mountain villages for weeks.⁵⁰

As the militants could hardly have expected to take control of the Ferghana valley with their numerical strength, the argument that the IMU sought to force the Uzbek government into negotiations is implausible. While the militants did not move into Uzbekistan in 1999, they did conduct high-profile but minor skirmishes on Uzbek territory in 2000. These seemed to have had more of a public relations purpose—to embarrass the Karimov government by showing the IMU's ability to surface close to the capital Tashkent. Moreover, had the IMU had serious political intentions, it would likely have held on to the hostages instead of quickly surrendering them for ransom. It has been advanced that the hostages produced a rift within the IMU, with the more religious parts led by Yoldash wishing to hold on to them, whereas Namangani was interested only or mainly in the ransom.⁵¹

Another explanation is that the IMU moves were being dictated from elsewhere—by the Taliban high command, or by Osama bin Laden. This explanation bears some logic: this was the time when the Taliban was aggressively trying to wipe out the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, which was squeezed back into a small territory near the Tajikistan border. As the Northern Alliance received most of its assistance through Central Asia and specifically Tajikistan, the IMU operations could conceivably have been designed to sow unrest there in order for the Taliban and Al Qaeda to finally eliminate the remaining threat to their power in Afghanistan.

Yet another possibility is that the IMU had identified the mountainous and impoverished southwestern Kyrgyzstan, around the Batken region in particular, as the most fertile ground to begin their building of an Islamic state in Central Asia. The area has ethnic enclaves (as mentioned above) which had been positively disposed to Islamic movements earlier. The IMU may have sought to cut off the area from Kyrgyzstan to create a self-proclaimed Islamic state there, from which they would spread into the Uzbek parts of the Ferghana valley.⁵²

These reasons are plausible as a part of the puzzle explaining the timing and nature of the IMU actions. Still, had the IMU desired to either destabilize Central Asia or establish itself in southwestern Kyrgyzstan, why would it have agreed so easily to accept a ransom for the hostages it had taken, to be flown back to Afghanistan to bide its time, and to once again come back to the area—with a much higher state of alert and readiness on the part of the local military forces? These questions suggest that there is a missing link in the analysis.

The IMU and the Drug Trade

Several aspects of the modalities of the IMU incursions suggest that they were in fact conditioned to a great extent by the drug trade. These include both the geographical areas targeted, the timing of the attacks, as well as the tactics used. That drugs transit Central Asia is no novel phenomenon. It has in fact been an increasing problem since the mid-1990s, as traffickers increasingly faced efforts by the Iranian government to curtail trafficking through Iran—the erstwhile chief smuggling route. As trafficking through Iran became dangerous and therefore expensive, Central Asian states—with their porous borders, newly established state authorities, and corrupt climate—became a major new trafficking route.⁵³ The first seizures of heroin and opium occurred in 1995–96, and quickly grew in size; in 2002, the five Central Asian states seized 5.5 tons of heroin, mainly in Tajikistan.⁵⁴

The highway between Khorog on the Tajik-Afghan border and Osh, the largest city in the south of Kyrgyzstan, became known as the major transit route for drugs into Central Asia in the late 1990s, very much due to it being the only major highway linking the Afghan border to the population centers of the region. By the late 1990s the Khorog-Osh highway came under increasing scrutiny from the Kyrgyz government, aided by the United Nations Drug Control Program, which identified Osh as a major drugs transshipment point and which sought to limit the smuggling through the highway in a joint project among regional states called the “Osh knot,” beginning in 1997.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, as production of opium in Afghanistan skyrocketed and Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan increasingly cracked down on drug trafficking, increasingly large quantities of opiates were being smuggled into Central Asia. The Taliban’s coming to power in 1996 initially led to a minor decrease in opium production, but from 1996 on the opium production steadily grew to 2,700 tons in 1997 and 1998 until it reached a record 4,600 tons in 1999, roughly double Europe’s estimated yearly consumption of opiates. Afghanistan now accounted for 79 percent of global opium production.⁵⁶

Concomitantly, traffickers now sought new routes into Central Asia in addition to the Khorog-Osh route. An important new route became the Batken route, whereby drugs crossed the Tajik-Kyrgyz border from Jirgatal and Garm in Tajikistan.⁵⁷ Importantly, Jirgatal and Tavildara, the strongholds of the IMU during the civil

war in Tajikistan and from where it launched its two armed incursions, lie along this route. This region was of particular interest to traffickers due to the mountainous character and remoteness of the region, the weakness of Kyrgyz law enforcement there, and most importantly the existence of the Vorukh and Sokh enclaves (and also additional, smaller enclaves such as the Qalacha and Khalmion areas in Kyrgyzstan administered by Uzbekistan, as well as Chorku, administered by Tajikistan). The enclaves suffer from a power vacuum, as neither the state they are geographically located in nor the state legally administering them are able to exert strong governmental authority there.⁵⁸ As a result, the enclaves became major hubs of the drug trade, as well as a storage point for heroin.

But the enclaves were also serving as forward bases for IMU militants. Already from 1997, militants were freely crossing from Tajikistan across the Korgon gorge, spreading their message and recruiting locals, across the Batken region but especially in the territorial enclaves.⁵⁹ The IMU militants apparently established routes for crossing the border with the help of the major so-called “drug barons” of the Osh region.⁶⁰ Indeed, the major destination for drugs in Kyrgyzstan is the city of Osh, where organized crime networks with well-established international contacts re-export the merchandise toward Russia and Europe.⁶¹

The geographic juxtaposition of the IMU’s camps and its activities in the late 1990s with the main areas of drug trafficking into Kyrgyzstan point, at the very least, to a symbiosis between the group and drug trafficking networks. However, as the 1999 events suggested, the IMU has also in all likelihood been a leading actor in its own right in the drug trade.

The timing of the August 1999 events is indicative, as it occurred during the very narrow time frame between the harvesting of the record batch of opium in Afghanistan in June, and the closure of the mountain passes due to snow from late September onward. In fact, in the complex political climate of Afghanistan and Central Asia at the time, the IMU was in a singularly well-placed position to control the drug trade from Afghanistan to Central Asia. The IMU had well-established links with the Taliban government and Al Qaeda, as even bin Laden allegedly provided the IMU with funding of several million dollars.⁶² The group had obtained bases in Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan, as well as offices in the diplomatic sector of Kabul and in Kandahar, the Taliban spiritual capital. In addition, the IMU had close contacts with its old comrades-in-arms in the former Tajikistan opposition, now in government. The Tajik government in turn had close links with the ethnic Tajik-led Northern Alliance under Ahmad Shah Masoud. In a situation where opposing political forces were controlling the main producing areas of drugs and the transit countries in Central Asia, the network of contacts built up by the IMU enabled it to freely move across Afghanistan and Tajikistan unlike any other known organization.

The 2000 attacks further illustrated this fact: they again occurred in the summer season, roughly a month after the last opium harvest in Afghanistan. This allows for the processing of opium into heroin, which is increasingly done in northern Afghanistan, before smuggling it out of the country. Moreover, the launching of simultaneous but small-scale incursions by comparatively small groups of fighters into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan makes the most sense if seen as a diversionary measure intended to create instability, confuse law enforcement and military structures, and thereby allow for the trafficking use of several mountain passes originally used by Tajik refugees fleeing the civil war to Kyrgyzstan in the mid-1990s. These passes

have since been taken up by traffickers of drugs, arms, and humans.⁶³ The IMU had made a practice of staging August incursions, but this did not take place in 2001. While other factors may have been at work, it is an interesting coincidence that 2001 was the year in which the Taliban ban on opium had gone into effect: there was simply no harvest in the Taliban-held Afghanistan that the IMU could smuggle out to Central Asia. There are nevertheless numerous reports that large stockpiles of opiates remained in the country following the large harvests in 1999 and 2000, and indeed also arguments that the Taliban eradication was only carried out in order to reverse the fall of opium prices.⁶⁴

Though popular, this analysis is doubtful, and runs counter to the logic of the Taliban's complicated record on opium production.⁶⁵ In fact, ever since taking Kabul in 1996 the Taliban had followed a relatively clear and consistent line: they had offered to cooperate on opium, and had taken symbolic steps toward beginning eradication. They did so, but did not follow up their decisions, as they had expected greater acknowledgement from the West: either in the form of assistance, or in the form of recognition. The Taliban were clearly under the impression of the existence of a more or less explicit *quid pro quo*: eradication of opium would be a step toward the integration of their country into the world, and would lead to assistance and recognition. This was the perception from which the Taliban authorities in early 2000 actually moved ahead with the eradication of opium. In March, they banned the levying of taxes on opium; in April, they publicly plowed a number of opium fields; and in May, visiting American narcotics experts stated that "the ban seems to have taken effect."⁶⁶ The Taliban's understanding that there was a *quid pro quo* is unmistakable: as a Taliban official put it, "We have done what needed to be done, putting our people and our farmers through immense difficulties. We expected to be rewarded for our actions, but instead were punished with additional sanctions."⁶⁷ Even if there were stockpiles, this nevertheless does not necessarily mean that the IMU was in control of them. As such, the lack of an insurgency in 2001—the year of opium eradication—strengthens the case of a criminal connection to the previous incursions.

An increasing consensus has indeed developed that the IMU was strongly involved in the drug trafficking from Afghanistan toward Osh in Kyrgyzstan, where the opiates were probably handed to trafficking networks that could ship them further north and west. Bolot Januzakov, head of the Kyrgyz Security Council, asserted in 2000 that the IMU controlled the majority, perhaps up to 70 percent, of the heroin entering Kyrgyzstan.⁶⁸ Drug control experts concurred with this figure.⁶⁹ Ralf Mutschke of the Criminal Intelligence Directorate of Interpol labeled the IMU "a hybrid organization in which criminal interests often take priority over 'political' goals," adding that "IMU leaders have a vested interest in ongoing unrest and instability in their area in order to secure the routes they use for the transportation of drugs."⁷⁰ During and after the 1999 incursion, law enforcement officials noted a threefold increase in trafficking attempts. Januzakov (in late 2001) noted that the volume of drugs trafficked into Kyrgyzstan increased significantly after the 1999 incursion.⁷¹ Regional crime expert Tamara Makarenko has noted that

all the events perpetrated by the IMU prior to September 11 indicate that the primary motivation of the IMU, under the leadership of military commander Juma Namanganiy, were criminal. Since 1999 the IMU was predominantly under the control of Namanganiy. Although he has

been described as a “born again” Muslim, there are no indications that he was a strict Muslim with any associated allegiances. On the contrary, prior to dedicating his life to the IMU it is believed that Namangani was involved in the drugs trade. As such, under his leadership, it is not surprising that the IMU was focused on securing its role as a leading trafficker of opiates into Central Asia.⁷²

It should be noted that the IMU never lived up to the reputation of a monolithic, hierarchically structured organization. Most studies of the movement seem to indicate at least two focal points coexisting, not without friction, within the IMU: the more guerrilla-oriented and criminal part of the organization led by Namangani, and the more religious part controlled by Yoldash.⁷³ As such, it is likely that a different set of motivations were behind the IMU’s actions. As Frederick Starr has termed it, the IMU is best understood as an “amalgam of personal vendetta, Islamism, drugs, geopolitics, and terrorism.”⁷⁴

The IMU after September 11

The IMU was heavily cut down to size at the battle for Kunduz in November 2001, as they defended the last Taliban stronghold in the north of the country. Namangani was killed by U.S. forces in the battle (though unconfirmed rumors that he remains alive have circulated), while the majority of the IMU’s fighting force was eliminated. Nevertheless, much of the IMU’s infrastructure inside Central Asia remained unscathed by the war in Afghanistan. In fact, recent reports suggest that two detachments of the IMU remain in Afghanistan, with one group in the Paktia and Kunar provinces—areas where the anti-U.S. forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are influential. The IMU also maintains a presence in several mountain passes of the Badakhshan province bordering Tajikistan. Elsewhere, another group is reportedly in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Province of China, while intelligence reports and observers in the region suggest that minor armed groups and sleeper cells remain in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.⁷⁵ Its religious leader Yoldash was thought to be in Peshawar, Pakistan, for most of 2002 and 2003, as a guest of the *Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam*, a Deobandi extremist party.⁷⁶

Events in the spring and summer of 2004 indicate that the movement has survived, though battered. On March 22, a Pakistani army offensive against “foreign terrorists” in the South Waziristan Agency of the northwest frontier province featured a “high-value target” first thought to be Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s second-in-command. Later, however, it appeared that the person in question, who nevertheless managed to escape the village of Kaloosha through a tunnel, was Yoldash.⁷⁷ Uzbekistan immediately demanded the extradition of apprehended IMU militants.⁷⁸ Only a week later, a series of explosions in Bukhara—and most importantly in Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent—took place, killing over forty-four people.⁷⁹ While these events led to beliefs that they were related, it appears that the timing was more a result of coincidence than design. The events in Uzbekistan surfaced only after a covert IMU bomb-making facility accidentally exploded, bringing the authorities’ attention to the group’s terrorist plans.⁸⁰ On July 30, 2004, suicide bombers blew themselves up outside the United States and Israeli embassies in Tashkent, killing six people.⁸¹ The Uzbek government blamed the underground *Hizb-ut-Tahrir* group, which shares the IMU’s aim of establishing

an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia but, at least publicly, advocates a peaceful path to this aim. Meanwhile, an unknown group called “Islamic Jihad of Uzbekistan” claimed responsibility, while most analysts believe the IMU was the real perpetrator.⁸²

This information suggests that while the IMU is not dead, neither is it at present a military threat to the regimes of Central Asian states. In one analyst’s words, it is nevertheless likely to remain “a disruptive but manageable force” in the region.⁸³ Had the IMU simply been an ideological group, this would have been reassuring news. Devoid of its military leader, without Al Qaeda funding, and scattered across the region, the public support that the IMU once enjoyed has also evaporated somewhat given its violent approach that even the most radical of Muslims in Central Asia disapprove of. Instead, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been gaining strength at the expense of the IMU.⁸⁴

But other factors work in favor of the IMU. Even if, as Central Asian security services estimate, the movement only consists of some 300 scattered fighters at present,⁸⁵ the continuing and increasing production of opium in Afghanistan implies that the IMU may acquire access to funds that could help it to rebuild its military strength. The inability or unwillingness of Western powers to invest significant efforts to stem opium production in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban makes such a scenario possible.

Conclusions: Counternarcotics Efforts and the Future of the IMU

In fact, as viewed initially the regional drug situation is only worsening, as production inside Afghanistan has moved northward, closer to Central Asian borders. Though suffering the death of its erstwhile military leader, the IMU lower-level commanders still have the experience and network that would enable them to keep up their drug trafficking business in Central Asia. For one, the IMU remains unique in its geographic reach. While it is unclear how far the different branches of the organization are actually in touch with one another, they operate in a large territory that includes several opium-producing areas of Afghanistan as well as the southern Central Asian republics. This provides the IMU with opportunities and networks to remain an important actor in drug trafficking in the region. However, the IMU has few options but to engage in the drug trade, as it has likely seen a decrease in its alternative sources of funding. Al Qaeda hardly possesses the means to keep subsidizing its Central Asian subsidiary, and international efforts to stop terrorist finance are likely to have made it harder for ethnic Uzbeks in Saudi Arabia to support the organization, as they did earlier. Drug trafficking is therefore likely to remain the major source of funding for the IMU, even if a return to a stronger ideological motivation takes place.

The risk is therefore apparent that the drug trade will allow the IMU to acquire the financial wherewithal to survive, and even possibly to strengthen in the coming years unless counternarcotics strategies in the region are more effective. At a time when the regimes in Central Asian states are facing increasing economic and political difficulties, this implies a continuing threat to the political and military security of the region. Needless to say, the IMU remains interested in sowing instability in the region and would be the first to benefit from political instability in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan.

International efforts to counter the booming narcotics industry in Afghanistan and Central Asia are therefore a *sine qua non* for the success of counterterrorism in the region. So far, however, the focus on this issue has been far from adequate. In Latin America, the U.S. government seems to have clearly identified the drug trade as a primary financial source of terrorism, as evidenced by antidrug efforts in Colombia, including the forcible eradication of coca plantations. In Afghanistan and Central Asia, Western powers have by contrast so far shown little interest in the drug trade. Since Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States has not paid major attention to the issue. Only a very small amount (7 percent) of the heroin that reaches the United States originates from this region; moreover, the main U.S. objective in the country has been to secure stability and Afghanistan's political normalization. While the narcotics issue is a major long-term threat to stability and democracy, in the short term forcible eradication in the absence of alternatives for farmers could potentially have been more harmful. The U.S. policy in Afghanistan has focused on laying the grounds for a functioning state that can address the narcotics issue in the future. This policy has generated significant success, as illustrated by the presidential elections of October 2004 and Afghanistan's increasing normalization.⁸⁶ The main challenge is nevertheless to address the drug problem before it manages to completely pervade Afghanistan's politics and economy. The link between the drug trade and terrorist groups that target the United States or U.S. interests, which is becoming increasingly apparent, has also begun to change America's stance on the issue.⁸⁷ The IMU's links to the Al Qaeda network—which appear even stronger than was suspected before September 11—have driven home the point that the international drug trade is a global phenomenon, a threat not only to the countries directly affected but in many ways also to states further away.

If the United States has not made drugs a focus of its strategy, it has nevertheless done more than Europe. Although over 90 percent of the heroin consumed in Europe comes from Afghanistan, the EU and individual European countries with the possible exception of the United Kingdom have so far failed to bring the issue to the top of the political agenda regarding Afghanistan. Even the United Kingdom, as the lead nation in counternarcotics in Afghanistan, has so far failed in its ambition to address the issue. In Central Asia, it is the United States and not Europe that is bearing the main financial brunt of international drug control efforts. The main counternarcotics activities in the region are operated by the UNODC, specifically the creation of Drug Control Agencies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These projects are financed overwhelmingly by American and not European funds. As the EU has begun to implement its own Border Management Program for Central Asia (BOMCA) and Central Asia Drug Action Program (CADAP), the size of European efforts to address the narcotics problem in Central Asia is beginning to approximate the efforts of the United States in the region. A more suitable comparison would be Latin America, however, which is the main region of origin for drugs consumed in the United States. In this light, Europe's contribution to counternarcotics in Central Asia pales into insignificance in comparison to the billions of dollars spent by the United States in Colombia alone.

The situation in Afghanistan hence remains the key to developments in the rest of Central Asia. If Afghanistan fails to stabilize, opium cultivation there and drug trafficking through Central Asia is likely to keep increasing the way it did in the past decade—compounding the societal, political, and military threats to Central Asian security. Given the lack of international commitment in countering the drug problem

in Afghanistan and the deep involvement of members of the political elite of the country in the drug business (for no other reason than that it is the main source of capital in the country), it is highly unlikely that meaningful eradication of opium will be possible in the next few years.

Some of the factors that led to the emergence of radical Islam in Central Asia were and are based upon legitimate political and economic grievances.⁸⁸ However, the most overt manifestation of this political tendency is to a significant extent directed by greed. While officially claiming to seek the reestablishment of a political order that existed 1,400 years ago, the IMU is—as one of the most prominent examples of the integration of transnational organized crime and violent antistate movements—paradoxically a decidedly postmodern phenomenon. Prior to September 11, the IMU was showing clear symptoms of an organization whose motivational structures were gradually changing from the ideological to the criminal. At present, with the death of the leadership that was most involved in the drug trade, it is unclear whether the remnants of the IMU remain motivated by greed while seeking finances from the drug trade, or if a return to more ideologically driven motivations has taken place. Clearly elements of both could survive in symbiosis in the organization, as they seemed to do in the period before September 11.

The IMU's development illustrates the dangers of ignoring the security ramifications of the international production of, and trafficking in, narcotics. Treating the drug trade as a domestic law enforcement issue and thereby rejecting its implications for national, regional, and international security has only allowed the situation in Central Asia, just as in the Andean region or in Southeast Asia, to deteriorate. Transnational organized crime has in the past decade become far more sophisticated and multifaceted than it once was. It is a rising threat to the security of especially weak states. Yet the financial power it possesses, and its links to human trafficking and terrorism, clearly makes it an issue that also deserves attention in the security debate of industrialized countries.

Notes

1. For a review of the debate see Keith Krause, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2, 229–254 (1996).

2. See for example Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "The End of International War? Armed Conflict 1989–1995," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 3 (1995): 353–70; Kumar Rupesinha, ed., *Internal Conflict and Governance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

3. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 6–7.

4. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983 and revised edition, 1991; Vincent Cable, "What Is Economic Security?" *International Affairs* 71 no. 2, 305–324 (1995); Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as 'Tragedy?'" *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): 183–202; Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

5. Krause, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies," 247.

6. Tamara Makarenko, "Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: The Emerging Nexus," in Paul Smith (ed.), *Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia-Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism* (Hawaii: Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, forthcoming); Kimberley Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling Through the Cracks?" *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 10, no. 1, 47–67 (2001).

7. Following the levels of security laid out in Buzan, *People, States and Fear* and the sectors of security laid out in more detail in Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*. See also

Niklas Swanström, "Drugs as a Threat to Security: The Cases of Central Asia and the Caucasus," (presented at the 11th International Conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Institute for Political and International Studies, Tehran, Iran, December 8–9, 2003).

8. Cable, "What Is Economic Security?" 321, 323.

9. Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security," in *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the information Age*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 329 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).

10. Buzan Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 153.

11. For the debate on "hard" and "soft security," see, for example, *Ibid.*

12. Exceptions to this are Makarenko, "Transnational Organised Crime;" Thachuk, "Transnational Threats; Sabrina Adamoli et al., *Organized Crime Around the World* (Helsinki: HEUNI, 1998); Barbara Harris-White, *Globalization and Insecurity: Political, Economic and Physical Challenges* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Ivelaw Griffith, "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics," *International Journal* 30, no. 2 (1993–94); R. Matthew and G. Shambaugh, "Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities," *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 2 (1998): 163–175.

13. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003* (New York: United Nations, 2003); Martha Brill Olcott and Natalia Udalova, "Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road" working paper no. 11, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2000; Alexander Seger, *Drugs and Development in the Central Asian Republics* (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1996); Nancy Lubin, Alex Kaits, and Igor Barsegian, *Narcotics Interdiction in Central Asia and Afghanistan: Challenges for International Donors* (New York: Open Society Institute, 2002) Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, "Opiate Smuggling Routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 15, no. 3, 32–35 (2003).

14. "Estimated Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan," Office of National Drug Control Policy, <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press04/111904.html>. Accessed 20 August 2005.

15. John M. Kramer, "Drug Abuse in Russia: Emerging Pandemic or Overhyped Diver-sion?" *Problems of Post-Communism* 50, no. 6, 12–27 (2003) B. Boev, "Narcotics Abuse in Russia: Analysis and Forecasting of the Demographic Consequences" *Russian Education and Society* 45, no. 3 (2003): 43–58.

16. Tim Rhodes et al., "HIV Infection Associated with Drug Injecting in the NIS, Eastern Europe: The Social and Economic Context of Epidemics," *Addiction* 94, no. 9, (1999) 1323–36; Tamara Men et al., "Russian Mortality Trends for 1991–2001: Analysis by Cause and Region," *British Medical Journal* 327, (2003): 964–66.

17. In 2002–3, Kazakhstan had an estimated 180,000–250,000 drug users (1.39 percent of the population), Kyrgyzstan 60,000–75,000 (1.32 percent), Tajikistan 65,000–90,000 (1.25 percent), Uzbekistan 45,000–55,000 (0.2 percent.), while Turkmenistan's figures are estimated only at 13,000 (0.27 percent)—though they are highly unreliable. See Drug Trade in Eurasia Database (Uppsala Silk Road Studies Program), <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/drugsdatabase.htm>. Most estimates are from the UNODC, as well as government sources.

18. In 2000, drug-related crime in Tajikistan grew by 40 percent, and in 2001 by over 70 percent. See Konstantin Parshin, "Anti-Drug Trafficking Efforts Could Help Fight Terrorism," *Eurasia Insight*, September, 20 2001. On AIDS, see Joana Godinha and Laura Shrestha, "HIV/AIDS in Central Asia," World Bank Briefing Note, Washington, DC, March, 12 2002.

19. Tajikistan's GDP for 2003 is estimated at \$1.2 billion. Meanwhile the production of opiates in neighboring northeastern Afghanistan, which is mainly smuggled through Tajikistan, stood at 5,400 metric tons of opium—roughly equivalent to 60 tons of heroin. High-quality heroin was priced at \$7,000 a kilogram in Dushanbe, Tajikistan's capital, hence a value of \$378 million. Of course, all of this income is not generated in Tajikistan, but shows the value of the drug trafficking business as compared to the economic production in the country.

20. Interfax Kazakhstan, "Heroin Found in Tajik Ambassador's Car in Kazakhstan," May 22, 2000.

21. RFE/RL Newline, Tajik Leadership Implicated in Drug Smuggling," May 20, 1999; International Crisis Group, *Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan's Failing Dictatorship* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 27–28; Rustem Safronov, "Turkmenistan's Niya-zov Implicated in Drug Smuggling," *Eurasianet*, March 29, 2002; Alec Appelbaum, "Turkmen

Dissident Accuses Niyazov of Crimes,” *Eurasianet*, April 26, 2002; “Russia Turns Its Back on Turkmenbashi,” *Gazeta.ru*, May 27, 2003, <http://www.dogryyol.com/eng/print.php?article=354>.

22. Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security,” *Survival* 36, no. 1 (1994): 96.

23. Thachuk, “Transnational Threats,” 51.

24. Tamara Makarenko, “Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade,” *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 6, no. 3, 2002. <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr./haq/200203/0203a004.htm>

25. Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 61–97, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND); 61–97 Melvin Levitzky, “Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security,” *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 30, no. 2 (2003): 227–240.

26. Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

27. Richard Millett, *Colombia’s Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002); Rennselaer W. Lee, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counter-narcotics Policy,” *Orbis* 46, no. 3 (2002): 537–554.

28. See for example Rabasa and Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth*.

29. Svante E. Cornell, “The Kurdish Question and Turkish Politics,” *Orbis* 45, no. 1 (2001): 31–4; Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” *Orbis* 45, no. 1 (2001): 47–63; Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey* (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Nur Bilge Criss, “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18, no. 1 (1995): 17–38; Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990); Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey’s Kurdish Question* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

30. Suha Bolukbasi, “Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and the Regionalization of Turkey’s Kurdish Secessionism,” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 4 (1991): 15–36.

31. Drug Enforcement Agency Intelligence Unit, “Drugs and Terrorism: A New Perspective,” *Drug Intelligence Brief*, September 2002; U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy* 1992, 1996, 1998; Richard Cole, “Terrorism Feeding Off Habit of World’s Heroin Users,” *Salt Lake City Tribune*, December 16, 1996.

32. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Drug Problem and Looming HIV Epidemic,” *World Policy Journal* 19, no. 2 (2002): 70–75; Don Pathan, “New Drug Army Rules Atop ‘Golden Triangle,’” *Seattle Times*, March 3, 1999; Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, “Géopolitique de la Production et du Trafic de Drogues Illicites en Asie,” *Hérodote* no. 109 (2003): 163–89.

33. This paradigm was reflected clearly in the titles of some of the early books on the region: Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism* (London: Zed, 1994); Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad* (London: Harper Collins, 1995).

34. From the Arabic *Salaf*, meaning ancestors, referring to the idealized Islamic state founded by the Prophet in Medina and the immediate successors—the so-called “rightly guided caliphs.”

35. Sunni Islam recognizes four *maddhabs* or schools of jurisprudence: the Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, and Hanbali. The Hanafi tradition is the most moderate and tolerant of interpretation, whereas the Hanbali school is severely opposed to “folk Islam,” Sufism, and the incorporation of non-Islamic customs and traditions. Deobandism, while nominally Hanafi, was founded in the late nineteenth century in British India, with strong influences from the rigorous Wahabi strain in Saudi Arabia. On Deobandism, see Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

36. For a thorough overview of the development of radical Islam in Central Asia, see Vitaly Naumkin, “Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series 2003 University of California, Berkeley), 18–24. Also see Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

37. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia*, 20–21.

38. Michael Fredholm, *Uzbekistan and the Threat from Islamic Extremism* (Sandhurst: United Kingdom Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies Research Center, Report no. K39, 2003), 4.

39. Rashid, *Jihad*, 147.
40. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia*, 39; Rashid, *Jihad*, 159–60.
41. Alfred Appai and Peter Skorsch, *Report of the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism Assessment Mission: Central Asia, Border Management* (Brussels: European Commission, 2002), 24–27.
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