

Conflict resolution of terrorist conflicts in Southeast Asia?

This article addresses the issue of resolving conflicts involving trans-national terrorism in the region of Southeast Asia. The existence of trans-national terrorist attacks and the increased amount of fatalities and injuries as a result of those attacks, have had a destabilizing effect on the targeted states and it has created an environment of increased insecurity for states and populations alike, as well as for ASEAN as an organization. The regular occurrence of terrorist attacks and the threat of terrorism have resulted in a de-securitization of the region and various attempts at conflict resolution have been made.

Conflicts involving terrorism presents specific difficulties for a conflict resolution process due to characteristics of this particular form of conflict. In cases where the terrorism is trans-national, it takes on a new dimension, which further affects conflict resolution processes. Successful conflict resolution then requires extensive cooperation and coordination of states regardless of the kind of conflict resolution attempted.

Also, the structural characteristic of the terrorism that surfaced in the region during the early 1990s, present obstacles with regards to conflict resolution. Unlike the traditional, mostly territorial or ethno-nationalistic terrorist organizations like the IRA, ETA or PLO, that has a clear hierarchical, centralized organizational structure; most terrorist organizations formed in the past two decades have loose cell structures and are organized in a horizontal manner. This presents problems regarding localization, intelligence gathering and the range effects that counter terrorism responses have.

By using the case of the trans-national, religious terrorist organization Jemaah Islamyiah as a single case study, this article identifies obstacles faced in attempting to resolve a conflict involving trans-national religious terrorism. The structural characteristics of trans-national terrorism, as represented by Jemaah Islamyiah, are analyzed and suggestions on how to circumvent impediments to conflict resolution due to this structure are presented. Moreover, the actions taken and attempts made at the national and regional level to combat the threat of trans-national and religious terrorism are analyzed and evaluated

The Phenomenon of Terrorism

Terrorism is an elusive concept. It is a kind of political violence but neither academics nor policymakers have reached consensus on a definition. Like every social phenomenon terrorism is malleable, constantly changing in appearance and evolving structurally, which demands much of any definition striving to be all encompassing. Although aware of the complexities associated with defining terrorism, a working, descriptive definition has been chosen for the purpose of this article. The definition adopted is that of the RAND/MIPTⁱⁱ database project, which states that:

Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.ⁱⁱⁱ

The classification criterion for the RAND/MIPT database project is that terrorism is defined by the nature of the *act*. No exception is made regarding the identity of the perpetrator or the nature of the underlying cause. The focus on the act itself rather than on actors or motives is also propagated for in the United Nations multilateral conventions on what constitutes terrorism.^{iv} Although the chosen definition includes state-terrorism, for the specific purpose of this article the focus will be exclusively on the sub-state kind of terrorism. Furthermore, in addition to dealing with trans-national terrorism, the focus of this article will be on

religious terrorism i.e. terrorism that is religiously motivated.

In the case of Southeast Asia, and also on a global level one of the most represented and increasing forms of terrorism is that which is religiously motivated. From 1968 to 1995 the number of international terrorist groups that had religion as their primary motivating force increased from 0 per cent to 4g per cent of all terrorist conflicts.^v Although every major world religion is represented in this statistic, Islam is seen as the dominant one in Southeast Asia.^{vi} In the discourse on religious violence it is essential that the point of origin in any discussion is that no religion is homogeneous and that generalizations about the nature of a particular religion *can not* be made due to interpretations made, or crimes perpetrated by a fraction of the religious group. Yet since the discussion will be on terrorist groups motivated by religion a brief description on some distinctive characteristics of religiously motivated terrorism will be provided for clarity.

Characteristics of Religious Terrorism^{vi}

Restraint

Terrorist acts perpetrated by religiously motivated terrorist groups are responsible for more severe acts of violence with a higher number of fatalities in comparison with terrorist acts committed by secular terrorists.^{viii} Despite the fact that only 25 per cent of the terrorist acts recorded in 1995 were attributed to religious terrorism they was responsible for 58 per cent of the fatalities. Moreover, all attacks claiming the greatest numbers of deaths (eight or more) were ascribed to religious terrorists.^x The reason for this increase in lethality can be found in a value system, legitimization mechanism and world-view that is radically different from non-religious terrorism.^x

Constituency

Whereas the traditional, non-religious terrorists had a real or self-proclaimed political constituency the religious terrorists do not. The constituency and the followers of the religion is one and the same, they represent nothing larger than themselves. Thus no restraint needs to be felt on behalf of a political constituency that has to be answered to.^{xi} Their constituency consists of themselves and God. As expressed by

Yigal Amir, the Jewish extremist responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, 'I have no regrets. I acted alone and on orders from God'.^{xii} Moreover, the potential group of victims is increased due to the exclusiveness of the terrorist organizations. All that are not members of the specific form of religion practiced by the terrorists are considered legitimate targets. This is how religious fundamentalists can sanctify killing people of the same religious faith as they are stigmatized as not righteous.^{xiii}

Legitimacy and clear objectives

Religion as a base provides the legitimization of violent struggle for a cause through interpretations of religious texts. As one example from the Qur'an demonstrates: 'Fight them and God will punish them at your hands, humiliate them and aid you against them and bring healing to the breasts of people who are believers.'^{xiv} The same message can be found in the Bible; 'The Lord said to Moses, Take all the leaders of these people, kill them and expose them in broad daylight before the Lord, so that the Lord's fierce anger may turn away from Israel.'^{xv} The gaining of legitimacy through religious sources also explains why it is important to receive a clerical blessing before the commitment of an act of terror.

It is advocated in the literature that as opposed to secular terrorist that have intelligible and clearly defined political, social or economic objectives, the religious terrorists lack these comprehensible goals.^{xvi} The lack of a clear objective or higher political goal can be debated, yet with regard to the instrumental target the religious terrorists seem to perceive this in a more non-traditional sense. Rather than viewing the instrumental target in the traditional sense, as an instrument or a mean employed to achieve the real political goal, religious terrorists seem to perceive the instrumental target not as a mean to an end, but as an end in itself. This can be seen in the increase in scope and devastation, resulting in more fatalities and injuries, that is commonly connected with religious terrorist activity.

World-view

The world-view of the religious terrorists is also remarkably different from that of secular terrorists in that they do not subscribe to the basic goodness of society or the system that they are part of, but rather see themselves as outside a system that is not worth preserving. In the words of Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr: 'the


world as it is today is how others have shaped it. We have two choices: either accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so we can construct the world as Islam requires.’^{xvii} This world-view places the religious terrorists on a path of fundamental systemic change rather than adjustments or reforms.^{xviii}

These characteristics make religious terrorism vastly different from the traditional forms of terrorism that is represented by organizations such as the PLO and IRA. It also makes them more dangerous as they are harder to define and more motivated.

Southeast Asia: “the second front in the war on terror”

The overall number of international terrorist attacks, both secular and religiously motivated, in Southeast Asia has increased in recent years. According to the RAND terrorism chronology^{xix} for the time period 1968-1985, a time span of 18 years, there were 90 recorded international terrorist attacks in the region of Southeast Asia and Oceania. For the following 18 years, during the period between 1986 and 2002 the international terrorist attacks in the region amounted to 194, more than twice as many as in the previous period. However, if one looks at the first half of the last time period, the period of 1986-1994 there were 125 incidents. Compared to the last half, the period between 1995 and 2002 there occurred 69 international terrorist attacks in the region. This shows a decrease in the occurrence of international terrorist attacks for the later half of the 90s and beginning of the 00s. This decrease is strongest in the end of the 1990s and the year 2000. Yet there is an increase in international terror attacks in the region in late 2001 and 2002. This upswing in terror attacks in the can be seen as a response to the September 11th attacks as a source of motivation for terrorist groups. This trend of international terrorist attacks coupled with fatalities and injuries of those attacks are illustrated in the graph below (fig.1).^{xx} Even though periodical declines exists in the trend it is clear that international terror attacks, all considered, have become an important source of threat since their first appearance in 1968.^{xxi}


(Fig. 1) Terrorism Trends In Southeast Asia



In a way the actual occurrences per year of an international terrorist attack is only a part in why it should be considered a source of threat. Another main focal point concerning religious terrorism as a threat is how many are killed or injured in those attacks (see fig.2). This since one of the characteristics of religious terrorism is the lack of restraint in the use of force. In the time span of 1968 to 1985 the terrorist attacks caused 158 injuries and 179 deaths. For the same length of time, 18 years, between 1986 and 2002 the number of injuries caused by terrorist attacks amounted to 617 and the number of fatalities climbed to 282. This represents an increase by 58 per cent with regard to fatalities and an increase by 290 per cent in the case of injuries.

Here one can observe an increasing trend in the growing number of injuries and fatalities in recent years. Out of the 617 injuries and 282 deaths from the terror attacks between 1986 and 2002, 139 injuries and 32 deaths occurred between 1986 and 1994. The other 478 injuries and 250 fatalities was the result of the international terror attacks between 1995 and 2002.^{xxiii} In a sense, if one wants to argue the de-escalation in international terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, this increase in fatalities and injuries is even more horrifying. This since it indicates that the scope of the attacks means less attacks are required to achieve the effect sought by the terrorists.

(Fig.2) Fatalities and injuries caused by international terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia and Oceania



It is argued that the increased lethality and intensity of terrorism can be explained by the increase in religious terrorism since the middle to late 1980s. Islamic terrorism is the most prominent kind of terrorism constituting a threat to Southeast Asia since it threatens the integrity and existence of the secular state and regional stability, but also due to the above mention unrestraint shown in attacks. Networks of Islamic terrorist groups are spread throughout the region making it the common threat of all states concerned, either as unwilling hosts of terrorist groups, targets of attacks or both. Religious terrorism also constitutes a threat to the moderate and conventional interpretations of religions by presenting an alternative to the mainstream religious interpretation and through condemning the religion in its entirety due to oversimplification. Acts of religious terrorism is represented in every major world religion, and this kind of terrorism share many characteristics regardless of what religion serve as its motivation. However, since the focus of this article is the region of Southeast Asia and the terrorist group of Jemaah Islamyiah, the analysis will concern only religious terrorism with Islam as its base of faith.

Factors promoting the rise of religiously motivated terrorism in Southeast Asia

On a structural and global level the end of the Cold War provides one explanation for the upsurge of Islamic terrorism. It is argued that after the Cold War, the discrediting of left-wing ideologies and the lack of manifestation of the expectant benefits of capitalism left a political and spiritual vacuum that needed to be filled.^{xxiii} However, the argument regarding the failure of capitalism to provide economic development does not hold true for the region of Southeast Asia, which experienced high levels of economic growth in the mid-1980s. Furthermore, the economic development was accompanied by a policy of relatively even income distribution, which would be deemed successful in relation to global standards.^{xxiv}

Yet, with regard to Islamic terrorism it is also important to view this post-Cold War ideological void in conjunction with the decrease in regard for Nasserite Pan-Arabism throughout the Arab world^{xxv}, especially after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. The disregard for ideological viewpoints and pan-nationalistic motives for mobilization and social change provides one explanation why religio-political Islam became a main instrument for expression of dissent, sometimes taking a violent form, serving as a vehicle of terrorism. In addition to these structural conditions two specific incidents indicated to Islamic terrorists that they could achieve their goals. First, the Iranian revolution in 1979 demonstrated that it was possible to create a genuine Islamic state based on the Shari'a, which is the outspoken goal of many Islamic terrorist organizations. Second, the retreat of the Soviet Union in 1989 after a decade of fighting in Afghanistan proved to the victorious multi-nationalistic Muslim forces that militant Islam could defeat a superpower.^{xxvi}

In Southeast Asia moreover, there was the more regional jihad, taking place in Sulawesi and Maluku.^{xxvii} Over 4000 people from the region participated, which is four times the number that traveled to Afghanistan, and the events have shaped a generation.^{xxviii} These events had a radicalizing and emancipation effect on Muslim communities. Many of the non-Afghan participants in the Afghan war, the so called Afghan-Arabs, were introduced to a radical and militant form of Islam and received training in terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare tactics. These conditions and events together provided a favorable environment for radical Islamic teachings to be spread and received by the public in states with Muslim populations. One such forum in Southeast Asia, in which the teaching of fundamentalist Islam blossomed, was schools in the region that had

been financed by Saudi Arabia and that subsequently taught Saudi Whabbism.^{xxix}

Many Southeast Asian states have a significant number of Muslims as part of the population and the region is also host to the state of Indonesia, which has the largest population of Muslims in the world. Thus in the sense of population configuration, the region serve as a significant sphere of influence and recruitment center for networks of Islamic terrorist organizations, and their presence is increasing.

Moving the Hub

The shift in the 'center of gravity of terrorism'^{xxx} as Rohan Gunaratna puts it, from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region was initiated in the early 1990s. This is when Lebanon was replaced by Afghanistan as the major terrorist training location, and the focus of international terrorism shifted eastward.^{xxxi} Of the Afghan-Arabs that participated in the war against the Soviet Union some came from Southeast Asia. They brought back military know-how and terrorist tactics as well as a radical interpretation of the Islamic faith to their region.

Also, Afghanistan trained Islamists visited Southeast Asia continuously during the last decade and made connections with violent domestic groups. Yet after the invasion of Afghanistan and the expulsion of the Taliban regime in 2001 that state could no longer serve as a safe haven for the protection and training of terrorists and Southeast Asia increasingly began to serve as the hub in the global terrorist networks. For example, the known JI member Hambali has disclosed information under interrogation, that after the U.S invasion in Afghanistan, the intention was to move the bio-weapons program, which was under development in Afghanistan, to Southeast Asia.^{xxxii}

Specific connections with radical organizations in Southeast Asia had already been established. Some terrorist organizations, like that of Jemaah Islamyiah, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Kumpulan Mujahidim Malaysia (KMM) and Laskar Jihad (LJ) have been linked with al-Qaeda.^{xxxiii}

The states in Southeast Asia have become recruitment pools and operation sites for both foreign and regional terrorist organizations. The Lebanese Hezbollah has operated out of Thailand for more than a

decade, using the country as a base to engage in support of terrorist activities. In the early 1990s the Malaysian branch of the Islamist terror network Jemaah Islamyiah spread to Singapore. Moreover, the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front still pose a significant threat to state security in the Philippines despite several efforts to diminish their power^{xxxiv} and in Indonesia Jemaah Islamyiah and Laskar Jihad are responsible for some of the most devastating attacks in the region. Although there is a substantial lack of transparency and disclosure regarding the operations, locations and magnitude of these organizations, it is safe to assert that in the light of the information available and the attacks that have been carried out that the threat facing Southeast Asia is real and could have severe effects on the stability of the entire region.

Structure of trans-national religious terrorism: the case of Jemaah Islamyiah

Briefly about Jemaah Islamyiah

In the late 1990s a new threat emerged in the Southeast Asia region. The idea of a purified, radical interpretation of Islam has long existed in failed post-colonial states in the Middle East yet in South East Asia signs and evidence of its manifestation has only recently been appreciated.^{xxxv} One of the groups that were formed around this interpretation of Darul Islam was Jemaah Islamyiah.^{xxxvi} The group can be said to have originated in Indonesia and their presence there remain the strongest out of the Southeast Asian states. One reason for the emergence of JI and other Islamic based terrorist organizations was the ban on Islamic activity that was enforced under Suharto. Islamic activists, violent as well as non-violent, found themselves in opposition to the regime and oppressed by the establishment. Subsequently, organizations were founded covertly. The founder and alleged spiritual leader of JI is said to be Sheikh Abu Bakar Baasyir, a nomadic cleric. He was imprisoned in Indonesia under the Suharto regime after having been found guilty of Islamic activism. In 1985 he fled to Malaysia and did not return to Indonesia until Suharto stepped down in 1998.^{xxxvii} After returning to Indonesia he gathered like-minded clerics and called for a jihad against the United States. Baasyir is assisted by his deputy Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali) who is believed to be the operational chief of the organization. Hambali is currently in U.S custody on charges of terrorism. It is assumed that Baasyir

and Hambali began constructing an extensive terror network in Southeast Asia as early as 1992. Yet the organization itself is believed to have been formally created in 1995.^{xxxviii} The self-proclaimed goal of the organization is to replace the post-colonial structure of Southeast Asia with an Islamic state founded on Shari'a law.^{xxxix}

In the wake of the Bali bombings in October 2002^{xl}, of which Jemaah Islamyiah are the alleged perpetrators, the organization was classified as a terrorist organization by the United Nations.^{xli} Recently many arrests have been made of JI members all over Southeast Asia, including that of Hambali in August 2003.^{1xlii} However, the strength of the organizations remains, and its resolve has not been quenched as shown by the bombings of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on the 5th of August the very same month as Hambali's arrest.^{xliii}

Jemaah Islamyiah has been linked to the al-Qaeda organization. Allegedly their cooperation harks back to Baasyir and Hambali's time in Malaysia, where al-Qaeda provided material and financial support for militant groups, like Jemaah Islamyiah.^{xliv} Although, Baasyir has consistently denied any connections to al-Qaeda or any terrorist group, Rohan Gunaratna has stated that Baasyir received training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan from 1987 and 1991, a statement which has been confirmed by U.S. intelligence officials.^{xlv}

Trans-national terrorism

The phenomenon of trans-national terrorism emerged as a main focal point during the 1970s. The term was used to describe the engagement in violent struggle by sub-state groups on an international level. The word trans-national indicates activity that cross state boundaries but does not involve the state as an institution. It has commonly been used to denote economic and industrial activities, such as trans-national corporations (TNCs).^{xlvi} The combination of development of means of travel and the light, hard to detect, effective weapons and materials, facilitates the movement of human agents as well as their instruments of violence.^{xlvii} One defining characteristics of trans-national terrorist organizations is their presence in more than one country and that their attacks are directed against civilians in other states rather than their own, or targets

within their host state that are associated with another state. It also includes directing an attack against internationally positioned targets such as aircrafts.^{xlviii}

In the case of Jemaah Islamyiah the organizations has established a presence ranging form southern Thailand, through Malaysia, Mindanao, Singapore and Indonesia.^{xlix} It has been reported that Jemaah Islamyiah gained a foothold in Singapore as early as 1993, the same year as the first World Trade Center bombings. The indication that the organization had long been active in Singapore was confirmed with the arrest of 13 JI members in December 2001.ⁱ Plans were uncovered that laid out an impending attack on the Yishun subway station in northern Singapore, a station frequented by commuting American naval base personnel stationed at Changi.ⁱⁱ As referred to earlier, JI has also been judged the perpetrators of the Bali bombing in December 2002, which claimed the lives of over 200 people, leaving hundreds wounded.ⁱⁱⁱ Jemaah Islamyiah has also been connected to the terrorist attack in Manila that killed 22 people in December 2000.ⁱⁱⁱⁱ What is also a distinguishing characteristic of the terrorism that came strongly to the fore in the last decade of the 20th century, and that is connected with the trans-national element of the terrorist groups is their organizational structure. The organizational structure in the case of JI also gives an indication of the organization's wide-ranging presence.

The (Non) structural organization

Even though trans-national terrorism refers to terrorist organizations with a wide presence in different states, the structural organization of the terrorist groups is to a large extent 'non-present' in character. The traditional way of structuring terrorist organizations were very similar to that of traditional institutional organizations. Within organizations such as the IRA, the PLO and ETA a vertical structure was employed.^{iv} There was a visible hierarchical structure with a central command. It was clear even for the uninitiated who within the organization was the leader and gave orders of attack. This type of organizational structure has largely been abandoned within terrorist organizations in favor of a more 'loose' kind of structure. However, Jemaah Islamyiah do have a form of hierarchical structure yet it is unclear how much of the decisions that pass

through the central command. Indications show rather that the network structures and basic units of the organization have a wide-ranging autonomy. What is also clear is that no individual in the organization is indispensable.^{lv} This was proved through the continuous operations of the organization despite the removal of some of its highest leaders. According to information gathered by the International Crisis Group (ICG), and presented in their August 2003 report, the formal structure of JI is designed as shown below (fig.3).




Fig. 3 The formal structure of Jemaah Islamiyah^{vi}

The regional presence and direction of Jemaah Islamiyah is possible much due to the network form of structure the *Mantiqis* and the *Fiahs* provide.

Researchers within RAND, David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla were the first to introduce the term 'netwar' some years ago. The term was used to refer to 'an emerging mode of conflict at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines,

strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.^{lvii} The characteristics of the organizational structure of the terrorist groups, like that of Jemaah Islamyiah are that of dispersed groups who utilize a network-like manner to communicate, coordinate and conduct their campaigns.^{lviii}

This network structure of contemporary terrorist groups consolidates well with the increase in transnationalism within terrorist organizations. The terrorist organizations that bear on the experience of the Afghanistan war have had a great possibility to utilize the network created between those Mujahadeen who participated in that war. The usage of those established connections are readily visible in later formed transnational terrorist groups.^{lix} Many of these Mujahadeen originally came from Southeast Asia or have come there with the intent to render their services to various terrorist organizations in the region.^{lx}

The utilization of a horizontal network structure makes it harder to identify the chain of command within an organization. It also has a paradoxical character in that no one individual is indispensable yet the power in the organisation is widely distributed, making all members vital to the effectiveness of the organisation. Commonly, this is achieved through the existence of very autonomous or independent cells.

Cells are the basic units that make up the network. A cell is what Aquilla and Ronfeldt referred to as 'dispersed groups' and these cells are normally comprised of a limited number of individuals.^{lxi} Jemaah Islamyiah organizes themselves according to this structural blueprint. The organisation has established sleeper cells throughout the region, their mission being to attack American, British and Israeli targets. More specifically, JI expanded its presence and influence in Indonesia throughout 2001 and by the beginning of 2002 the organization had cells in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java and Jakarta.^{lxii} Although the JI was founded in the early to mid-1990s, the organization did not initiate a terror attack until 2000. The organization has spent a lot of time laying the groundwork for a long-term, sustainable environment for JI.^{lxiii} The majority of these cells are what is called "sleeper" cells and/or agents. This means that the individuals within the cell are waiting to be activated. Meanwhile they lead normal lives far from any connection with terrorist activity, this is what makes the individuals of a cell so hard to detect, and one might say they live under-cover.^{lxiv} The terrorist or terrorist in the making, have accepted the political message and underlying motivation and legitimacy of the organization and thus does not need to be contacted or encouraged on a regular basis to fight for the cause. Instead the cell member awaits instructions or will solely plan and execute an attack when opportunity arises.

Usage of a cell structure that is found in contemporary terrorism has a discouraging impact on the conventional methods utilized in counter-terrorism. The utilization of numerous autonomous cells make it extremely hard, if not impossible, for the authorities to foresee and thus prevent future terrorist attacks since there are few messages to intercept or communications to be tapped into. The cell structure also makes one traditional form of counter-terrorism tactics virtually impossible, namely infiltration. The cells are closed knit and the small amount of individuals in each cell makes penetration of the cell structure very difficult. In addition, organizations like JI also utilizes marriages to ensure loyalty and knowledge about members.

A further obstacle presented by the cell structure is the amount of information that can be gathered. Much of counter-terrorism entails intelligence gathering and the knowledge and information about terrorist organizations are to a large extent gained from interviewing arrested members or defectors of the organization. Due to the cell structure however, the level and amount of information held by any one individual is not extensive. From the organizational point of view, this is advantageous since the cell structure contributes to the control of information flow out of the organization. It also assures the survival of the organization in the event that one or several cells are eliminated, since those individuals seldom hold the information required to bring the entire organization down.

In sum, the increased presence of trans-national terrorist organizations is coupled with a lack of manifested structure and this loose structure makes counter-terrorism measures more difficult.

Regional problems in handling religious terrorism

The terrorist threat to regional and national stability has changed in shape and form and puts new challenges to the nations and regional organizations to handle the threats effectively. The traditional form of terrorism had an organization and a headquarter that states could target; this is however no longer the case. Terrorist organizations move around regionally and internationally, and as seen in fig. 3, they distribute their activities in different states making them difficult to target. Despite considerable success in dismantling the Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah networks they are far from eradicated and due to their ability to recruit, indoctrinate and

reconstitute themselves they are still organizations that pose a threat to nations and the region.

There have been attempts regionally to combat terrorism and the attempts that have been conducted have been modeled after the traditional forms of terrorism, i.e. terrorism with structure and form. There have been some attempts in dealing with the situation unilaterally and bilaterally; national security, coordination of national agencies, and the sharing of information between states have increased. These attempts, although somewhat productive, have occurred on low scale and are in dire need of further development. On the whole, attempts are few and far between and not up to meeting the challenges of trans-national terrorism, especially as nations have proven not to be able to cooperate. One exception has been the cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia to break up Jemaah Islamyiah.^{lxv} The success of this should not be exaggerated as the cells were small and could not offer enough information that could lead to the complete eradication of the problem. Although unilateral and bilateral efforts of conflict resolution are necessary and should be encouraged, in order to have a chance at eliminating the threat of trans-national terrorism to any significant degree, multinational cooperation and action is vital.

Cooperation, however, is made difficult due to the suspicion between the states in the region and this has stalemated the cooperative process.^{lxvi} There is a need to increase the amount of dialogue and information sharing to improve bilateral initiatives and this must be institutionalized and coordinated between more than a few states. An example of the problem is that the opening of liaison offices in embassies are politically sensitive and have traditionally been a problem and no state has extradition treaties with all other ASEAN states. If treaties exist, they are generally limited to include one or two other states.

Regionally there has been some cooperation, but most of this originates from when the US virtually forced ASEAN to sign the May 2002 anti-terror treaty.^{lxvii} Furthermore, there is a reluctance to support the war against terrorism, as it is perceived as a war against Islam. For example, in 2002, 31 percent of Indonesians supported the war against terrorism but in 2003 only 23 percent were in favor of it. This despite the then recent terrorist attack in Bali.^{lxviii} Prior to 9/11, ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) had done little to curb trans-national terrorism, there was no legal commitment but simply a pledge to fight trans-national crime in general and enhance cooperation.^{lxix} Although ASEAN did establish the annual Senior Officials Meeting in Trans-national Crime as a part of the fight against terrorism.^{lxx} Unfortunately, these meetings have

served as little more than talk shops and are disregarded as an effective means to deal with terrorism and organized crime.^{lxxi} On November 5th, 2001, the ASEAN Heads of State signed the Declaration on Terrorism to enhance the cooperation in combating terrorism. ASEAN was now to 'deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing 'best practices'".^{lxxii} In May 2002 the states reached an agreement to standardize their criminal laws regarding trans-national crime.^{lxxiii} Results of this have not been overly exciting, especially since extradition and choice of laws are problems that have not been dealt with. It is clear that ASEAN, and ARFs, importance will diminish if nothing is done to improve its functionality with regard to terrorism. There are a few problems that can be singled out as the most important if ASEAN or ARF will be able to deal effectively with these questions.

Endemic in the region is the failure to arrest suspected terrorists as the information sharing has failed and the extradition procedures are less than functional. There have been some arrests done in a variety of states, but this is only a fraction of the people involved and often terrorists at a low level which do not threaten the operationally of the organizations as foot soldiers are expendable. Even when known leaders are captured they are replaced by people that are then unknown to the security officials making further arrests and investigations difficult. The uselessness of the passed laws stand as a monument of the lack of political will to engage in the struggle against terrorism, or at least against terrorism that is not defined by each individual state. There have however been some recent improvements, but it is far from proven that the region has taken the measures it will need to combat terrorist organizations in the region.

Lack of regional structures

As been noted in the previous section there is almost no regional structures that can take up the challenge against trans-national, religious terrorism in the region. The lack of formal structures has made this impossible, ASEAN has been successful in preventing inter-state conflicts through its informal structures, but a military threat from an invisible enemy calls for formal cooperation and organized efforts on a regional scale. This both to eradicate the base for new members and terrorist activities through education, social equality,

economic improvement etc. and to combat the existing terrorist cells. ASEAN has 'failed' to formalize its cooperation earlier and most of the conflict management and collaboration efforts have been on an *ad hoc* basis and based on conflict avoidance (musgrawarah).^{lxxiv} Needless to say this is not an option if social and military efforts are to be coordinated on a regional scale, both as it would be immensely expensive and probably fail due to internal conflicts and disputes over definitions. Moreover, ASEAN is in a weak position as it has recently accepted new members and it can be debated whether ASEAN has the political strength and willingness to initiate a politically controversial attempt such as formalized and active counter-terrorism. The formal structural weakness is threatening to prevent any effective measures. To the internal weakness of ASEAN should also be added the discrepancy between national views regarding the US involvement in the anti-terrorist activities. Vietnam and Myanmar has argued that the US involvement poses too much of a challenge to their national sovereignty, but more states are reluctant to let the US control the regional involvement.^{lxxv} This division can stalemate the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter terrorism in Malaysia when ASEAN members begin to move away from the formal structures. There is also a lack of leadership in ASEAN, Djakarta was the natural leader prior to the economic crisis due to its impressive resource base, large population and regional will to integrate the region. This has changed after the financial crisis and today ASEAN is a ship without captain.^{lxxvi} Before ASEAN can move forward to establish an effective organization to combat terrorism there needs to be a strengthening of the organization and leadership of ASEAN.

ARF is possibly in a worse situation than ASEAN as ARF will not only have to coordinate polices within a organization, but also coordinate efforts between two different cultures of interaction, i.e. the more direct and formal US culture and the more informal Southeast Asian culture.^{lxxvii} The ARF has also been largely inactive, except for of a few statements and workshops that largely have not been operational.^{lxxviii} There has been reluctance among many members to formalize ARF and the much-politicized question regarding terrorism has only accentuated this trend.^{lxxix} The mediocre results from ARF and the lack of support among states in the region for a US dominated war against terrorism accounts for the weak impact of ARF on the problem.

A more formalized structure with far reaching powers is a necessity in order for the regional organizations to function effectively in the fight against the forms of terrorism that has emerged during the past two

decades. This will not be possible under the control of the US, as the agendas between Washington and Southeast Asia differs widely and there is a reluctance to accept the US definitions on terrorism in the region. It should be noted that several groups that are considered extremist by the US have substantial support in the region, the support from the Indonesian Vice-President Hamsah Haz to Laskar Jihad serve as one example.^{lxxx} The Philippines on the other hand is the state that has the most to gain from the war against terrorism and also gave the strongest support in the form of logistics, airspace, access to Subic Bay, strengthening the law against terrorism and finally to step up the war on terror the Philippines.^{lxxxi} In short, the regional organisation has supported the war against terrorism in words, even if not in deeds due to the internal differences among its member states.

Non-Intervention

Combating international terrorism at the international, regional as well as the national level makes coordination of policies crucial, but also the abandonment of some sovereignty. The principle of non-intervention needs to be dealt with more as it creates immense problems for regional cooperation over terrorist conflicts. Non-intervention has been the golden principle in ASEAN, and to a certain extent in ARF and all Asian cooperation attempts.^{lxxxii} As the sovereignty principle has been so strong in Southeast Asia there is very little cooperation that threatens to breach the sovereignty principle and traditionally a large extent of the most serious conflicts have been internal. Modern conflicts, such as terrorism, have a trans-national reach, whether or not the Southeast Asian governments would like this or not and the measures against it has to be met on the regional and international level.

ASEAN is potentially not without tools to deal with terrorism, outside of the US guided attempts. The High Council in ASEAN was created to take 'cognizance' of existing disputes or situations that could potentially threaten regional 'peace and harmony'.^{lxxxiii} The High Council has not been implemented despite a few attempts at, for example, the Hanoi Summit in 1998 to make it more operational.^{lxxxiv} The greatest obstacle has been that there has been very little trust to override the sovereignty principle and cooperate on security

issues. Now at the gates of Mordor, ASEAN needs to realize that they can trust their neighbors to such an extent that they can accept minor changes in the sovereignty and that the main threat is not their neighbors but the lack of cooperation between them.

Discrepancies between internal policies

As mentioned, there is a discrepancy between the different states on how they view the US engagement, but this is not the only issue to be dealt with. The question of who is a terrorist still remains one of the main bulwarks against effective cooperation. It is telling that the Philippines, that is arguably hardest hit by terrorist actions, has no legal code regarding terrorism. Furthermore, who is a terrorist has not been dealt with effectively by the regional organizations. In the Joint Declaration between the US and ASEAN it is merely stated that terrorism should be fought in 'all its forms and manifestations'.^{lxxxv} The lack of definitions opens up for more controversy and further stalemate in the question, especially as one freedom fighter is another's terrorist. It is however due to the diversity of definitions that Southeast Asia has been forced to accept an *ad hoc* definition and a US interpretation.

Common legal structures are needed and despite a few attempts to coordinate the regional legal frameworks this has been less than successful.^{lxxxvi} Terrorist organizations have used the legal chaos to move between different states. When JI was outlawed in Indonesia it simply moved to Malaysia as it could function within its legal framework. This lack of judicial cohesion is actively used when moving people, money and weapons through the region and any state that remains outside a regional framework will potentially be used by JI as a base. This is closely related to the intelligence sharing and *regional* anti-terrorist groups that need to be established within Southeast Asia and strongly connected to a regional code of conduct. Currently there is a problem of information sharing between states as it could breach the national legislations. These need to be changed and not only at the bilateral level as between Malaysia and Singapore.

There is also a discrepancy between the ASEAN members on how to deal with the terrorists with regard to negotiations or military force. The problem is not so much what course of action that is decided upon but

more that the regional states have a consensus on how to deal with terrorists. Sanctions become another issue that the regional powers have not agreed upon how to deal with. Who should be sanctioned? And how can this be coordinated over the region?

Battle of structures, 3-0 to the terrorist team

The lack of structure of the terrorist organizations works in their favor, as it is difficult to target the organization and the leaders. States and organizations are often limited to attacking terrorist cells that rarely have information concerning the whole organization. It is the lack of structure among the terrorists that make all traditional forms of anti-terrorist activities less effective and unilateral action inadequate means in which to respond and resolve the threat. The absence of formal structure among the terrorists has proved to be strength to their defensive ability. However, a non-structured cooperation with regard to counter-terrorism measures does not promote efficiency or defensiveness in dealing with the threat of terrorism.

It seems obvious that the regional structures in Southeast Asia, and probably in most regions, are not up to the challenge of trans-national, religious terrorism. The cleavages between the different national polices and the reluctance to cooperate over the issue of trans-national, religious terrorism have given the terrorists the possibility to move between different states as the polices change. There is no regional structure, neither within ASEAN nor ARF and it seems unlikely that Southeast Asia will develop an effective regional mechanism for this in the short term. The lack of structure and network formations of terrorist organizations like that of Jemaah Islamyiah has instead to be meet with strong, formalized, structural cooperation on a regional scale. There is no other possibility in dealing with an enemy that, in essence, have neither structure nor organisation.

The new challenges posed by this form of terrorism have to be acknowledged and prepared for. The combating of terrorism is based on the experience of more traditional forms of terrorism with structures and organization. The danger is that the trans-national nature of the religious terrorists is not noticed and acted upon nationally, regionally and internationally. The attention from the states in the region has to a very high extent been on internal terrorism, yet many of the internal terrorist organizations have trans-national elements

such as weapons deliveries and financial support. If more in-depth cooperation is undertaken regarding the religious and trans-national terrorism it is likely that the laws and engagement over these issues will have positive implications on the combat of internal terrorists / extremists.

Despite its shortcomings regional cooperation is the best way to combat trans-national religious terrorism, not only by military force but by also increasing the economic development, social stability and political participation. In the short term there is a need to increase the cooperation between regional police and military forces to combat the terrorists, to eradicate their bases and prevent further destruction of resources and human lives. In the long term there is however a need to work for more structural changes (socio-political and economic) as this will be the only way to eradicate the terrorist threat over time. In the short-term the religious terrorists have to be challenged ruthlessly as the terrorist seems to have no regard for human life and everything is justified in the name of God. This ruthlessness do not necessarily have to be military force but more a decisiveness from the part of governments and regional organizations to take this threat seriously and work for the eradication of the problem.

i By Niklas Swanström who is the Executive director of the Program for Contemporary Silk Road Studies and Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and Emma Björnehed who is the Project Coordinator of the Project on Conflict Resolution of Conflicts Involving Terrorism in the Program for Contemporary Silkroad Studies (<http://www.silkroadstudies.org>)

ii RAND Corporation/Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

iii http://db.mipt.org/rand_tc.cfm

iv <http://untreaty.un.org/English/tersumen.htm#4>

v Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz 1998) pp.90-91

vi Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanatics and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press 1999) p.80

vii For a more detailed discussion on characteristics of religious terrorism and its implications for conflict resolution see Björnehed, Emma "Negating Negotiation" available at www.silkroadstudies.org

viii Peter Chalk, 'Low Intensity Conflict in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism' Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (Jan-Feb 1998) p.16

ix Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz 1998) pp.93-94

x Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press 2001) p.94

xi Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press 2001) p.95, for additional information see

Simon Reeves, *The New Jackals* (London: André Deutsch Ltd.) 1999

xii Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz 1998) p.87

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- xiii Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz 1998) p.95
- xiv The Qur'an 9:14 cited in Michael Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: Marcel Dekker IN 1979) p.110
- xv The Bible Numbers 25:4
- xvi Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz 1998) p.128 for additional information see Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press 2001) p.37
- xvii Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz 1998) p.96
- xviii Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz 1998) p.95
- xix The RAND Terrorism Chronology available at http://db.mipt.org/rep_inrg_rep.cfm
- xx The statistical data range from 1/1-1968 to 29/12-2002; the last days of December were not available for statistical reference. The year of 2003 has been excluded from the statistics since the article was completed before the end of that year. The peak in the year of 1977 represented by a hijacking of a plane leaving Penang, Malaysia and forced on route to Singapore. For unknown reasons the plane crashed on the Straits of Johore. The incident is responsible for 100 of the 103 fatalities for that year.
- xxi In 1968 three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El-al aircraft and commonly regarded as the beginning of international terrorism. Rather than choosing a year which has special significance for the region, 1968 was chosen due to its international significance in relation to terrorism emphasizing the global character of terrorism
- xxii The RAND Terrorism Chronology available at http://db.mipt.org/rep_inrg_rep.cfm
- xxiii James F. Hoge and Gideon Rose (eds.), *How Did This Happen?* (Oxford: Public Affairs Ltd 2001) p.76 see also Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux 1995) Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia Crucible of Terror* (Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 2003) and Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trend and Counter strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press 2002)
- xxiv World Bank Policy Research Report, *The East Asian Miracle, economic growth and public policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993) ch 1&2
- xxv Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux 1995) pp.87-88
- xxvi Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press 2001) pp.45-46
- xxvii "The Jemaah Islamyiah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism" White Paper (Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003) p.4
- xxviii Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia Crucible of Terror* (Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 2003) p.233
- xxix Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trend and Counter strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press 2002) p.16 for additional information see also ICG Asia report *Jemaah Islamyiah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but still dangerous* no.63 26(Aug 2003)
- xxx Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press 2002) p.129
- xxxi Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trend and Counter strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press 2002) p.10
- xxxii News coverage broadcast, CNN: *Trailing Al-Qaeda: the Southeast Asian Connection*, aired 7 December 2003
- xxxiii Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2003) p.89
- xxxiv Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trend and Counter strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press 2002) p.142-143
- xxxv David Martin Jones and Michael L. R Smith 'Islamists Defeat Asian Way' *The World Today* vol.58 no.6 (June 2002) p.12
- xxxvi "The Jemaah Islamyiah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism" White Paper (Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003) p.6
- xxxvii <http://www.terrorismsanswers.com/groups/jemaah.html>
- xxxviii Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2003) p.89 The ICG report from no. 63 26 Aug 2003 puts 1992 as the year of the formation of JI. Furthermore according to Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia Crucible of Terror* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 2003) p.129 JI was created 1993-94
- xxxix David Martin Jones and Michael L.R Smith, 'Islamists Defeat Asian Way' in *The World Today* vol.58 no.6 (June 2002) p.14
- xl Additional attacks that Jemaah Islamyiah has been accused of: An attempted assassination of the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia on 1 August 2000, which killed two people and seriously injured the Ambassador; a series of bomb attacks on churches in Jakarta, Sumatra, Lombok, Java and Batam Island on 24 December 2000. At least 14 people were killed in these attacks and as many as 100 injured
- xli <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/10/27/stories/2002102703521400.htm>
- xlii Shefali Rekhi, *The Straits Times*, "Smaller fractions, bigger threat", 4th February 2004, (Singapore Press Holdings Limited 2004) available at: <http://www.global.factiva.com/en/arch/>
- xliii ICG Asia report, *Jemaah Islamyiah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but still dangerous*, no.63, 26 (Aug, 2003) p.i
- xliv David Martin Jones and Michael L.R Smith, 'Islamists Defeat Asian Way' in *The World Today*, vol.58, no.6 (June, 2002) p.13
- xlv <http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20030815-125641-3509r.htm>
- xlvi Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System* (London: Tauris Academic Studies 1995) p.145
- lvii Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System* (London: Tauris Academic Studies 1995) p.146
- lviii http://db.mipt.org/rand_tc.cfm
- lix David Martin Jones and Michael L.R Smith, 'Islamists Defeat Asian Way', *The World Today*, vol.58, no.6, (June 2002) p.14
- l The Straits Times, "JI reloaded: Could it happen?" 13-12-03 (Singapore Press Holdings Limited 2003) available at: <http://www.global.factiva.com/en/arch/>
- li David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, 'From Konfrontasi to Disintegrasi: ASEAN and the Rise of Islamism in Southeast Asia' in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* vol.25, no.6, (2002) p.347
- lii <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2778923.stm>
- liii <http://www.cfrterrorism.org/g/groups/jemaah2.html\#Q9>
- liv Simon Reeves, *The New Jackals* (London: André Deutsch Ltd 1999) p.263

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- lv ICG Asia report, Jemaah Islamyiah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but still dangerous, no.63, 26 (Aug 2003)
- lvi Information for the construction of the figure is found in: ICG Asia report, Jemaah Islamyiah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but still dangerous, no.63, (Aug 2003) see also Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia Crucible of Terror*, (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 2003) ch. 4
- lvii Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press 2002) p.82
- lviii Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press 2002) p.82
- lix Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press 2001) p.46
- lx Peter Chalk, 'Low Intensity Conflict in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism', *Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism*, (Jan-Feb 1998) p.19
- lxi 'The Jemaah Islamyiah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism' White Paper (Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003) p.10
- lxii Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (London: Hurst and Company 2002) p.200
- lxiii Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia Crucible of Terror* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 2003) p.129
- lxiv 'The Jemaah Islamyiah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism' White Paper (Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003) p.2
- lxv Center for Defense Information, 'In the spotlight: Jemaah Islamyiah', 18 Dec 2002 available at <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ji.cfm>
- lxvi Niklas Swanström, *Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2002) pp. 151-154
- lxvii It should be noted that many people in Southeast Asia has been angered by the war in Iraq, and what have been seen as an attack on Muslims, especially seen in the light how North Korea has been dealt with silk gloves. See Niklas Swanström & Mikael Weissmann, 'The Chinese Impact on the Negotiations with North Korea' *Peace Review*, forthcoming.
- lxviii Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003) p. 201.
- lix ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997); Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime (1998); Joint Communiqué of the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (1999) 23 June 1999, Yangon, Myanmar
- lxx Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002, ASEAN.
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- lxxii ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, 2001
- lxxiii Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002, ASEAN.
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- lxxv Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003) p. 250.
- lxxvi Acharya Amitav, 'Collective Security and conflict management in Southeast Asia', in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000) pp.198-219.
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- lxxviii ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing, 30 July 2002; ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Prevention of Terrorism, Bangkok 17-19 April 2002.
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- lxxxi Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003) p. 202.
- lxxxii Bangkok Declaration, August 8 1967, paragraph 2 (c).
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- lxxxiv The Hanoi Plan of Action, December, 1999.
- lxxxv ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 August 2002.
- lxxxvi Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, 3 November 2002; Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN EU Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 27 January 2003 available at <http://www.nsl.asean.or.id/14396.htm> see ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terrorism