Date Posted: 08-Feb-2007

Criminal state of play - An examination of state-crime relations in post-Soviet Union Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, organised crime in Central Asia has developed links with state officials and institutions. Erica Marat investigates the reasons behind this in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Similarly to the rise of organised crime in post-Soviet Union Russia, contemporary criminal organisations in Central Asia have grown out of the successful exploitation of the redistribution of property rights and economic commodities.

Each Central Asian state, with the partial exception of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has resorted to achieving control over state bureaucracy by focusing on gaining control in rural areas where the state had limited access.

This has allowed organised crime to infiltrate the relatively lucrative and large agricultural sector and subsequently gain influence over the large flow of narcotics transiting the region from Afghanistan. As contemporary criminal groups became increasingly entrenched in the region, endemic corruption within public structures has also grown.

While current organised crime in the region has evolved within a context of political transformation and gaining control in rural areas, there are other factors that have shaped organised crime, such as relationships established with state officials that provides near impunity within ethnic groups and clan and familial structures. Regional organised crime is also facilitated by the fact that local cultures are accepting of male aggression. As such, many local criminal leaders are not condemned within their communities because they are regarded as protectors of social order and justice.

As a result, organised crime in Central Asia has flourished both within and without the state since the early 1990s. The most illustrative cases of the entrenchment and evolution of criminal groups in the region are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Although these countries are similar in many ways, they exhibit a diverging logic about to how organised crime and the state interact.

Kyrgyzstan's relatively open economic and political climate and Tajikistan's experience of civil war from 1992 to 1997 preconditioned different types of criminal groups. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two poorest countries in Central Asia and both are important transit countries for Afghan heroin. In fact, for many Central Asian criminal actors involved in the shadow economy, Afghan drugs have become a basic commodity to expand their own licit and illicit businesses.

While the Central Asian region is the second poorest in the world after West Africa, as one of Europe's neighbours it has largely been ignored by EU security policy. Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian region is still regarded as part of Russia or as belonging to the rest of Asia. Yet, a set of political, cultural and geographical traits distinguish the region from both Russia and Asia. Besides drug trafficking, the EU has become a major destination for Central Asian organised criminal groups and their leaders who seek to enrich themselves through illegal fiscal operations, smuggling looted natural resources, or illegally privatised commodities.

Kyrgyzstan

The introduction in 1992 of relatively open political and economic policies by former Kyrgyzstan president Askar Akayev provided opportunities for the unaccountable accumulation of capital among people who had connections to the leadership structure of state institutions or industry of the former Soviet Union.

This chaotic process of privatisation during the early years of independence enriched a small number of people many of whom profited from the black economy who then proceeded to develop political ambitions. As these people gained economic influence, the country's ability to resist their penetration of state institutions declined.

Some officials decided that their future security lay in co-operating with powerful leaders of the criminal organisations.

For example, regime incumbents during the Akayev presidency were known to use criminal leaders in order to connect with the periphery and threaten political rivals. In this environment, parliamentary candidates and local governors relied on the help of criminal leaders to help them compete in politics. Both criminal groups and state officials used the physical force of 'sportsmen' (these were usually former and active wrestlers, boxers and martial arts enthusiasts) to engage in racketeering, kidnapping or political intimidation on their behalf. As a result, during the 15 years of Akayev's leadership, a balance of informal relations between state officials and criminal leaders was formed with both sides seeking co-operation when their interests converged.

There are about 22 criminal groups operating in Kyrgyzstan. Most of these are concentrated around the capital city, Bishkek, and the Osh area in southern Kyrgyzstan. These gangs are either directly involved in licit and illicit businesses or provide protection for wealthy businessmen.

Rysbek Akmatbayev, a kingpin from Issyk-Kul oblast who was assassinated in May 2006, retained an overarching control over virtually all criminal gangs operating in the country from the mid 1990s until his death. After his death, several Kyrgyz mafia chiefs have competed to occupy his place resulting in numerous bloody showdowns across the country. According to Kyrgyz experts, top government officials considered promoting one single criminal leader to re-establish control over the entire criminal underworld. Such a leader would be supported by criminal leaders in Russia and be informally submitted to the top government officials.

The influence of the Russian criminal world is significant in Kyrgyzstan. Since the 1970s, there have been only a few 'thieves in law' (vory v zakone: a criminal society developed in the former Soviet Union) in Kyrgyzstan and they all had to be promoted by criminal leaders in Moscow. Only one 'thief in law' could operate in the country at a time and this person should be backed by the local politicians.

In the 1970-1980s, the position was occupied by Yuri Maslov, an ethnic Russian. He was succeeded by an ethnic Kyrgyz and then an ethnic Chechen. Rysbek Akmatbayev was promoted by a criminal kingpin from Naryn. The ethnicity of the 'thief in law' is important for the local criminal community and ethnic Kyrgyz criminals gain wider support among the population and the government. Rysbek Akmatbayev controlled the majority of Kyrgyz sportsmen from the mid-1990s and retained strong connections both with Akayev and the current President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's governments.

Unlike Russian 'thieves in law' or criminal leaders who aspired to control financial institutions and government structures from the early 1990s, Kyrgyz criminals mostly relied on physical intimidation. They acted through the direct threat or use of violence against their rivals.

There is a certain code of conduct among Kyrgyz criminals that represents a peculiar hybrid of 'thieves' world' rules formed during the Soviet period and tainted with some local cultural features. For instance, there are special messengers who transmit information between conflicting parties either in a verbal or written way. Furthermore, the cult of revenge is strong. If members of one gang are beaten, then the leader of that gang becomes responsible for revenge by personally challenging the rival group's leader. Age and gender differences also play an important role in hierarchies within criminal gangs.

Public concerns over state-criminal links came to a head during the parliamentary elections in February-March 2005, resulting in public campaigns and protests to cancel the election results. As these demonstrations turned more violent by 24 March 2005, President Akayev fled the country. His government subsequently collapsed and was replaced by an interim president, opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

After Bakiyev came into power, during what was referred to as the Tulip Revolution, the existing balance between the state and the criminal underworld was disturbed. As a result of some uncertainty that followed the change of political regimes, leaders from both domains sought to grasp political power. This imbalance between the state and criminal actors resulted in several exchanges.

Most significantly, violence became widespread in the country as the number of contract assassinations swiftly increased. The list of assassinated politicians who allegedly had connections to the criminal underworld and drug trafficking included: Bayaman Erkinbayev (shot dead in September 2005), Jyrgalbek Surabaldiyev (shot dead in June 2005), Tynychbek Akmatbayev (killed by rioting inmates in October 2005) and his brother Rysbek Akmatbayev (shot dead leaving a mosque in May 2006). All of these people were elected into parliament despite their alleged criminal backgrounds, but because their popularity in their local precincts gave them political leverage over the central government.

This assessment was most apparent with Erkinbayev and the Akmatbayev brothers, all of whom enjoyed total support among their fellow villagers and were able to influence other members of parliament and public employees. Their wealth and control of key economic sectors allowed these candidates to enjoy full authority in their precincts and undermine the central state's access to these areas. Erkinbayev owned the economically and politically important 'Khalmion' market in southern Kyrgyzstan close to the Uzbek border. He also owned a number of hotels and was allegedly involved in informally controlling the Khorog-Osh-Bishkek highway - regarded as a major drug trafficking route from Tajikistan to Russia. After his assassination, the control over this highway was reportedly seized by another former member of parliament.

Tynychbek and Rysbek Akmatbayev, on the other hand, were notorious for racketeering small and medium-sized businesses first in their native Issyk-Kul oblast and later expanding their activities to Chui and other oblasts. Despite the fact that both earned a reputation as criminals, they also enjoyed popularity in their communities. Part of their social appeal emerged as a result of their involvement in charity projects and rebuilding local infrastructure.

Rysbek Akmatbayev was known as a local 'Robin Hood' who supported the poor and deprived, including elderly people and orphans. Both men also supported local clergy and mosques, therefore building up an image of being religiously committed people. The Akmatbayev brothers were also respected by the local population for their encouragement of traditional social values a technique used by other parliamentary candidates seeking to gain public support in peripheral areas.

In their political campaigns, the Akmatbayev brothers and other political figures with alleged criminal backgrounds relied upon a private physical force comprised of sportsmen. Today, most parliamentarians are able to gather instant support of 100 to 400 of these sportsment to organise mass demonstrations to secure their own political positions. On 24 March 2005 and in the following months various politicians mobilised their teams of sportsmen to stage rallies at the central square in Bishkek.

Nearly two years after the regime change, Kyrgyz political actors appear less associated with criminal leaders. Greater transparency in the mass media and active civil society groups have helped to avert the continued criminalisation of state actors. However, this has not eliminated corruption within the state. Public positions allegedly continue to be sold on a free market where the highest bidder is most likely to benefit the most. In 2003, Kyrgyzstan was 2.1 in the Transparency International (an non-governmental organisation which aims to curb corruption) ranking of corruption, while in 2006 it was at 2.2. The organisation ranks countries from between 0 and 10, with 0 being the most corrupt.

Tajikistan

The development of state-criminal actors in Tajikistan shared with Kyrgyzstan this post-Soviet Union model of a lack of a governmental monopoly of power, but was also driven by the five-year civil war that ended in 1997. Afghan heroin played an important part of the war economy, enabling the purchase of weapons and personal enrichment in a collapsed state. The Tajik post-war government, formed under UN and Russian mediation, incorporated major field commanders who led battalions either on the pro-governmental or pro-opposition side.

Incumbent President Emomali Rakhmonov quickly felt pressure from former field commanders who refused to share their local influence with the central government. Those commanders were Rakhmonov's active supporters during the civil war, but were reluctant to comply with him after the end of the conflict, and there were several attempts to overthrow Rakhmonov by his former allies.

Starting from the late 1990s, Rakhmonov began to fiercely persecute his competitors by accusing them of corruption, possession of large quantities of weapons, and attempts to stage a coup d'état. Roughly a decade after the peace accord between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition was reached, Rakhmonov was able to suppress all the former war commanders including: Faizali Saidov, Gafor Mirzoyev (sentenced to life imprisonment in August 2006 after being convicted of charges of terrorism and plotting to overthrow the government), Makhmud Khudoiberdiyev, Ibodullo Boitmatov, Yakub Salimov (sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for state treason and banditry on April 2006) and Shamsiddin Shamsiddinov (sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment in January 2004 for organising a criminal gang, polygamy and illegal border crossings).

Rakhmonov's regime was also able to suppress all 'thieves in law' who were powerful during the former Soviet Union period and actively took part in the civil war. However, Mirzoyev and Salimov, the most notorious former war commanders, continued to have access to large weapons stocks (including helicopters and armoured trucks), be involved in the narcotics economy and control their own private armies in the 2000s.

Under the pressure of international financial institutions, these former field commanders were forced to legalise their capital. This was accomplished via investment in local and regional businesses such as hotels, casinos and restaurants. However, this class of enriched politicians did not break their links to the criminal world. Members of the Tajik parliament and government remain heavily involved in the shadow economy. In fact, as some Tajik non-governmental experts indicate, it is difficult to separate the country's major criminals and businessmen from politicians as both domains greatly overlap. Under Rakhmonov's leadership, virtually all public positions are distributed according to the financial capabilities of prospective candidates.

Corruption in Tajikistan is organised vertically with political elites being the final and biggest benefactor. It is therefore virtually impossible for members from other political parties, including the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), to win parliamentary seats or occupy top positions in the government. Following the November 2006 presidential elections, Rakhmonov fired Mirzo Zieyev from the position of minister of emergencies. Zieyev was the last high-ranked IRP representative in the government. As a result, now only candidates affiliated with the president are allowed to participate in the political and economic processes.

A number of known Tajik political figures have been arrested by Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Russian security forces, and there are many cases of former field commanders and opposition camps engaged in the drug trade. Some Tajik representatives of the security services have been found to be engaged in the drug economy and contraband.

Despite obvious corruption, nepotism, cronyism and despotism, Rakhmonov's regime is widely supported by the Tajik population. Having been re-elected in 2006, there is a subtle understanding that the current government is determined to hold on to power for at least the next two seven-year terms and will not give up its political power without a fight. The memory of the civil war still largely predetermines people's political behaviour. One local employee of an international organisation told Jane's: "The people will rather support a government that is corrupt, than a government that shoots."

With that, there is limited mobilisation to oust organised crime from within the country. Most non-state drug trafficking is carried out by ad hoc groups that rarely use convertible currencies for selling, transporting or buying drugs. Instead, drugs are exchanged for cattle, household goods or food. Those small transfers of Afghan drugs are then imported to Russia by labour migrants or are collected by bigger drug dealers and sold in larger quantities. Tajik labour migrants comprising almost 10 per cent of the seven million population are often forced into drug smuggling business by Russian or Central Asian organised criminal groups.

European implications

The ingrained nature of organised crime within Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is not necessarily a sign of instability within these states, but given the transnational character of much of the organised crime, the situation is a concern for extra-regional states, particularly in the EU. For example, Tajikistan is the primary transit country for Afghan opium to Europe. Furthermore, Europe is an important destination for looted natural resources and labour migrants from the region. Yet, although Central Asian organised crime benefits from access to the EU, the EU's security policy considers this region only marginally.

Indeed, the European Commission's current policy in the Central Asian region addresses organised crime solely by assisting national governments and not preventing the merger of the two.

However, Central Asian criminal groups share a close relationship with government structures or are represented in national government structures. These actors therefore either enjoy state support or possess legitimate status in their home countries. Despite this, the EU and other international organisations have been largely neglecting the problem of the state-crime nexus in weak countries, where both sides enter mutually beneficial relations and therefore expand transnationally without domestic constraints.

By January 2007, the US and various international organisations including the UN, NATO and the Asian Development Bank have been the major investors in building the region's security. The EU's presence has been rather indirect, acting through international organisations. In fact, because of its geographical proximity, the EU might find itself with greater leverage in influencing the current situation in the Central Asian region compared to other international powers.

The existing Partnership Co-operation Agreements between the EU and the Central Asian states are not as strongly reinforced compared to similar agreements with Russia and Ukraine. These agreements were signed in 1996 and remain more of an issue-based activity, rather than strategic collaboration. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, as greater international foreign policy attention was turned towards the Central Asian region, particularly Afghanistan, the European Commission allocated significant funding to increase regional governments' capacities to fight drug trafficking, border management, and to boost regional security cooperation.

However, little attention was paid to understanding the local tendencies of criminalisation and their co-operation with state actors. In effect, due to a lack of understanding of the local settings or long-term vision of the state-crime nexus, little effort has been invested in breaking the link between legal and illegal actors.

The risk for the EU is that the organisation's weak involvement in the region's economic development and in building the rule of law may potentially lead to a repetition of Europe's experience with the West African states, where the rise of state-supported criminal actors, such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) contributed to state failure, civil clashes and large emigration.

Breaking the relationship

The current understanding of local and transnational organised crime considers state and criminal actors as two loosely related phenomena. It is, however, essential especially in regional contexts such as Central Asia and West Africa to consider the interrelationship between the two. Understanding the dynamics of the state-crime nexus will lead to revisiting policy-makers understanding of state weakness and the rise of organised crime.

Because of the domestic legal or semi-legal status and connections with state structures of transnational organised crime groups in Central Asia, their expansion has led to the weakening of states. National governments are not capable of or lose interest in constructing viable political institutions, while societies suffer from high levels of violence and impoverishment. These trends result in state failures, emigration and civil clashes.

In Kyrgyzstan, the state and crime are two interactive domains, where both may compete or find common interests for co-operation. State actors resort to the aid of organised crime when competition over public office increases. Likewise, criminal leaders seek co-operation with the state to secure continuity of their business interests both licit and illicit.

In Tajikistan, the state and organised crime are more closely merged and virtually represent one phenomenon. State officials are deeply involved in organised crime, while there is little evidence of powerful criminal groups emerging outside the state domain. A combination of these models exists in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Importantly, other former Soviet Union countries also experience problems with the crime-state merger. For organisations such as the EU, it is likely a priority in policy making will be to diminish relations between state and criminal actors, instead of supporting either governments or societies alone in promoting good governance and security. This is achievable through investigating specific cases of connections between various state officials and criminal actors.

Previous research has shown that through investigating the logic of formation and interdependency of state structures with criminal groups, it is possible to come up with a set of recommendations for the international community on how to discourage co-operation between both worlds. For instance, identifying loopholes in electoral systems can potentially prevent candidates with criminal connections from winning elections. Likewise, developing entrepreneurial skills among the rural population can decrease society's dependence on local criminal leaders.

Breaking the state-crime link could potentially enhance the rule of law, free political leaders from a dependence on criminal actors, and discourage people with criminal backgrounds from entering politics. At the transnational level, such an approach could result in more effective economic and political co-operation between Europe and Central Asia. By fighting powerful domestic criminal activities, transnational mobilisation of organised criminals is also likely to reduce.

In this respect, the statement by the secretary general of the EU Council, Javier Solana, in December 2003 that "in order to understand global trends, we need to act locally" proves correct.

Kyrgyz protesters march in Kyrgyzstan in downtown Bishkek, on 9 January 2005. Protests against Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev began after the first round of voting in February. (Empics)

Ryspek Akmatbayev, an alleged organised crime boss, with his bodyguards in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 22 October 2005. Akmatbayev, who was assassinated in May 2006, served two prison terms for founding a criminal gang and possessing illegal weapons. (Empics)

The body of Adis Kulmanbetov lies near his car at Bishkek, Kyrgyz capital, on 1 March 2006. Kulmanbetov, a criminal gang member who was shot dead, was thought to be a loyalist of alleged criminl boss Ryspek Akmatbayev. (Empics)

One drug addict injects another addict with heroin in Osh, southern Kyrgyzstan, on 25 March 2005. Osh is a major transit point for drugs from Afghanistan and Tajikistan to Kazakhstan and Russia. (Empics)